ML12271A129

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2011 Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Initial License Examination Proposed Written Examination
ML12271A129
Person / Time
Site: Quad Cities  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/05/2012
From: Moore C
Operations Branch III
To:
Exelon Generation Co
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ML11167A121 List:
References
Download: ML12271A129 (51)


Text

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 1 of 51 29 March 2011 76 ID: QDC.ILT.16388 Points: 1.00 Unit 1 was in Mode 2 performing a startup when IRM Channel 12 spiked HIGH and immediately returned to its normal value.

The following indications are present on the 901

-5 panel: A-5, IRM HIGH is slow

-flashing C-10, CHANNEL A IRM HIGH HIGH OR INOP is slow

-flashing RPS Channel A scram solenoid GROUP 1 and 4 lights are OUT RPS Channel A scram solenoid GROUP 2 and 3 lights are LIT ALL RPS Channel B scram solenoid group lights are LIT Which of the following actions are required to be directed FIRST?

A. BYPASS the affected IRM per QCOP 0700

-02, IRM Operation.

B. Insert a FULL scram per QCGP 2

-3, Reactor Scram.

C. Insert a HALF scram on RPS A per QCOA 0500

-01, Partial Scram Actuation.

D. RESET the half scram on RPS A per QCOP 0500

-03, Resetting Scrams.

Answer: C Answer Explanation:

Using the available indications, the candidate must determine that a partial half scram has occurred (all 4 group lights should be out on RPS Channel A). During a partial scram actuation, Operator response must be focused on plant safety requirements and not on investigating the RPS system. The proper response is to force all lights in the affected RPS Channel to de

-energize, which ensures that all control rods move together if a half scram occurs in the other channel.

Distractor 1:

Plausible because this would be the required action if RPS had responded to this event as designed.

Distractor 2: Plausible because a full scram is required for a partial "full" scram.

Distractor 3:

Plausible if candidate assumes that the scram should be reset to ensure that a half scram on the other channel does not result in only 2 groups of control rods inserting into the core.

Reference:

QCOA 0500-01 Rev 8 Reference provided during examination:

None Cognitive level:

High Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 1 Group: 1 Question Source:

New Question History:

N/A 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

43(b)(5)

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 2 of 51 29 March 2011 SRO Justification:

Candidate must assess plant conditions and then set priorities by selecting a procedure to implement FIRST based on guidance contained within the AOPs. Comments: None.

Associated objective(s):

295006.AA2.05 (CFR 41.10, 43.5, 45.13)

Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to SCRAM : Whether a reactor SCRAM has occurred (RO=4.6 / SRO=4.6)

SR-0500-K26 (Freq: LIC=B)

EVALUATE given key Reactor Protection System parameter indications and/or responses depicting a system specific abnormality/failure and DETERMINE a course of action to correct or mitigate the following abnormal condition(s):

a. Partial half scram
b. Failure to reset
c. Failure to scram
d. Half

-scram e. Loss of one RPS bus

f. Loss of both RPS bus

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 3 of 51 29 March 2011 77 ID: QDC.ILT.16389 Points: 1.00 A normal plant Shutdown/Cooldown is in progress on Unit 1 with the following conditions:

RPV pressure is 5 psig and slowly lowering No surveillances are in progress 1C RHR pump is out

-of-service 1B RHR and 1A RHRSW pumps are operating in the Shutdown Cooling Mode If the 1B RHR pump TRIPS due to equipment failure, which of the following is the correct action, if any, to be taken in regards to LCO 3.4.7, RHR SDC System

- Hot Shutdown?

A. NO action required. LCO 3.4.7 is NOT applicable with the current plant conditions.

B. NO action required. LCO 3.4.7 is met with the remaining OPERABLE equipment.

C. Declare ONE (1) required RHR SDC subsystem inoperable.

D. Declare TWO (2) required RHR SDC subsystems inoperable.

Answer: B Answer Explanation:

To meet the LCO, both RHR pumps (and two RHR service water pumps) in one loop or one RHR pump (and one RHR service water pump) in each of the two loops must be OPERABLE. In this case, the 1A and 1D RHR pumps (and associated RHRSW pumps) remain operable, therefore, TWO subsystems are operable per LCO 3.4.7 basis

. Distractor 1:

Plausible if candidate assumes that the applicability for LCO 3.4.7 is Mode 4 (applicability for LCO 3.4.8).

Distractor 2: Plausible if candidate assumes that two RHR pumps constitutes one subsystem.

Distractor 3:

Plausible if candidate assumes that two RHR pumps must be operable in each subsystems for operability (similar to RHR

-LPCI mode of operation).

Reference:

LCO 3.4.7 Amendment No. 223/218, LCO 3.4.7 Bases Revision 0 Reference provided during examination:

None Cognitive level:

High Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 1 Group: 1 Question Source:

Modified from Quad Cities ILT Bank (QDC.ILT.737508)

Question History:

N/A 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

43(b)(2) SRO Justification:

The operability determination cannot be made without knowledge of the basis of Tech Spec LCO 3.4.7.

Comments: None.

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 4 of 51 29 March 2011

Associated objective(s):

295021.2.2.37 Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment. (RO=3.6 / SRO=4.6)

S-1000-K33 (Freq: LIC=B)

Discuss the bases for RHR/RHRSW System LCO's.

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 5 of 51 29 March 2011 78 ID: QDC.ILT.16390 Points: 1.00 Unit 1 is in a refuel outage with fuel moves in progress when an IRRADIATED fuel bundle is accidentally raised ABOVE the normal up position limit.

Numerous alarms are in, including:

901-3 G-16, FUEL POOL CHANNEL A HI RADIATION 901-5 D-8, CONTROL ROOM VENT ISOLATED 912-5 A-1, RX BLD 1 VENT/EXH FAN TRIP 912-5 A-6, STAND BY GAS TREATMENT SYS A TROUBLE Which ONE of the following actions must the SRO prioritize to complete FIRST based on the above annunciators?

A. Evacuate the refuel platform and control refuel floor access per QCFHP 110

-7, Irradiated Fuel Above Normal Up Position.

B. Start a Control Room AFU Booster Fan per QCOP 5750

-09, Control Room Ventilation System.

C. Restore Reactor Building Ventilation to a normal lineup per QCOP 5750

-02, Reactor Building Ventilation System.

D. Verify a Standby Gas Treatment system train is in operation per QCOA 7500

-01, Standby Gas Treatment System Auto Start.

Answer: A Answer Explanation:

It is an immediate operator action to evacuate the refuel platform and control access to the refuel floor when an ARM alarms due to irradiated fuel above the normal up position limit. All other distractors contain subsequent actions or actions that are not required.

Therefore, the immediate operator action is the priority.

Distractor 1:

Plausible because the AFU is sometimes required to be started in casualty situations following control room ventilation isolation. However, the AFU fan is not required to be started unless a LOCA occurs.

Distractor 2: Plausible because the abnormal procedure for Reactor Building ventilation isolation directs restoration following isolation. However, the isolation is expected for fuel pool high radiation and SBGT will maintain secondary containment d/p.

Distractor 3:

Plausible because the abnormal procedure has the operator verify SBGT system train operation, however, it is not an immediate operator action.

Reference:

QCFHP 0110

-7 Rev 0 Reference provided during examination:

None. Cognitive level: High Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 1 Group: 1 Question Source:

New EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 6 of 51 29 March 2011 Question History:

N/A 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

43(b)(7) SRO Justification:

The immediate operator action tested is contained in a fuel handling abnormal procedure (QCFHP), NOT an operations abnormal procedure (QCOA). Therefore, the candidate must have knowledge of fuel handling procedures to successfully answer this question.

Comments: None Associated objective(s):

SRLF-805-K16 (Freq: LIC=B NF=B)

Given a Refueling Operations related casualty, STATE the immediate operator actions of the applicable abnormal procedure.

295023.2.4.45 Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm. (RO=4.1 / SRO=4.3)

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 7 of 51 29 March 2011 79 ID: QDC.ILT.16418 Points: 1.00 (Use your provided reference to answer this question.)

Unit 2 is operating at rated power when the Unit 2 125 VDC Station Battery is determined to be INOPERABLE.

Complete the following statement per Technical Specifications:

If the Unit 2 125 VDC electrical loads are transferred to the Unit 2 125 VDC Alternate Battery, Unit 2 operation at rated power... A. CAN continue indefinitely.

B. can NOT continue indefinitely because the location of the alternate battery makes it susceptible to single failure.

C. can NOT continue indefinitely because the alternate battery does NOT have the capacity to carry additional loads during a DBA for a period of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

D. can NOT continue indefinitely because the alternate battery charger does NOT have the capacity to carry normal loads and maintain the alternate battery on a float charge.

Answer: B Answer Explanation:

When the station 125 VDC battery is inoperable (whether due to loss of voltage or testing/maintenance), placement of the operable alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem in

-service helps ensure that the design basis can be met. However, the design configuration of the alternate battery (location) is susceptible to failure and hence, is not as reliable as the normal battery. Therefore, only a limited time of operation is allowed in this condition.

Distractor 1:

Plausible because the alternate battery has the capacity to carry required design basis loading.

Distractor 2: Plausible because part of the design basis of the DC sources is to carry the loading required for a DBA on one unit, and safe shutdown of the other unit for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Incorrect because the alternate battery capacity is adequate.

Distractor 3:

Plausible because the alternate battery charger is smaller than the two normal chargers.

Reference:

TS B 3.8.4 Rev 40, TS LCO 3.8.4 Amendment No. 245/240 Reference provided during examination:

TS LCO 3.8.4 with statement, applicability and surveillance requirements removed.

Cognitive level:

Memory Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 1 Group: 1 Question Source:

Quad Cities ILT Exam Bank (QDC.ILT.05504)

Question History:

N/A EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 8 of 51 29 March 2011 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

43(b)(2) SRO Justification:

Candidate must have knowledge of Technical Specifications and their bases.

Comments: None Associated objective(s):

S-6900-K33 (Freq: LIC=I)

DISCUSS the bases for Station DC Electrical Systems related Tech Spec LCO's.

295004.2.1.07 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. (RO

= 4.4 / SRO = 4.7)

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 9 of 51 29 March 2011 80 ID: QDC.ILT.16393 Points: 1.00 Unit 2 was at rated power when an accident occurred resulting in the following plant conditions:

Torus water level is 12.0 feet and steady Torus water temperature is 190F and stead y Reactor pressure is 400 psig and steady Complete the following statements:

Given the above plant conditions, the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL) __(1)__ exceeded.

Per the EOP basis, maintaining plant conditions within the HCTL will __(2)__.

A. (1) IS (2) prevent ECCS pump damage from inadequate net positive suction head B. (1) IS NOT (2) prevent ECCS pump damage from inadequate net positive suction head C. (1) IS (2) ensure Torus pressure remains below the Primary Containment Pressure Limit (PCPL) during a RPV blowdown D. (1) IS NOT (2) ensure Torus pressure remains below the Primary Containment Pressure Limit (PCPL) during a RPV blowdown Answer: C EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 10 of 51 29 March 2011 Answer Explanation:

The HCTL is the highest torus temperature from which a RPV blowdown will not raise (a) torus temperature above the torus design temperature and (b) torus pressure above the PCPL, while the rate of energy transfer from the RPV to the primary containment is greater than the capacity of the containment vent.

Distractor 1: Plausible because pump damage is a concern when suppression pool temperature is high (displayed as a caution in the EOP torus temperature leg). However, a separate graph is used to determine margin to pump damage from inadequate NPSH.

Distractor 2:

Combination of distractor 1 and 2.

Distractor 3:

Plausible if candidate determines that operation must be above the line, similar to the BFPL curves for the RPV.

Reference:

L-QGADET Rev 8 Reference provided during examination:

None Cognitive level:

High Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 1 Group: 1 Question Source:

Modified from Quad Cities LORT question (QDC.LORTB.0312)

Question History:

N/A 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

Unique to the SRO position SRO Justification:

Candidate must perform actions that are unique to the SRO position (reference facility objective).

Comments: None Associated objective(s):

295026.2.4.18 Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs. (RO=3.3 / SRO=4.0)

S-0001-K12a (Freq: LIC=B)

EVALUATE given system/plant parameters and the following QGA curves/tables, DETERMINE if any QGA related limits have been exceeded:

a. QGA Detail A, RPV Water Level Instruments
1. Figure B, RPV Saturation Curve
2. Table C, RPV Level Instrument Criteria
b. QGA Figure D, Primary Containment Pressure Limit
c. QGA Table J, Minimum Steam Cooling Pressure
d. QGA Figure K, Drywell Spray Initiation Limit
e. QGA Figure L, Pressure Suppression Pressure
f. QGA Figure M, Heat Capacity Limit
g. QGA Table S, Reactor Building Area Temperatures
h. QGA Table T, Reactor Building Area Radiation Levels
i. QGA Table U, Reactor Building Area Water Levels

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 11 of 51 29 March 2011 81 ID: QDC.ILT.16394 Points: 1.00 (Use your provided references to answer this question.)

A LOCA with a loss of offsite power (LOOP) has occurred on Unit 2. Current plant parameters are: RPV pressure 50 psig RPV water level

-250 inches and lowering Drywell pressure 21 psig Torus pressure 19 psig Drywell H2 concentration 3% Drywell O2 concentration 1% Torus H2 concentration 2% Torus O2 concentration 1% All available systems are injecting into the RPV.

Which of the actions listed below has the GREATEST priority? A. Exit all QGAs AND enter all SAMGs provided the TSC is prepared to provide SAMG decision

-making. B. Enter QGA 200

-5, Hydrogen Control, and vent and purge the Drywell if the offsite release rate is expected to stay below the LCO limit.

C. Enter QCOP 1000

-30, Post-Accident RHR Operation, and initiate Drywell Sprays. D. Enter QCOP 1600

-13, Post Accident Venting of the Primary Containment, and vent the Torus even if release rate limits are exceeded.

Answer: A Answer Explanation:

The SAMGs are entered when "adequate core cooling" cannot be established. QGA 100 and QGA 101 specifically direct entry into the SAMGs and exit from ALL QGAs when core cooling is lost and the TSC is prepared to provide SAMG decision

-making.

Any direction of QCOPs or QCOAs from the QGAs are also overridden by SAMG direction.

Distractor 1:

QGA directed action from QGA 200 on detection of Hydrogen in the containment. Is not a priority over SAMG actions.

Distractor 2: Per QGA 200 , flow cannot be diverted from the core if adequate core cooling is not established.

Distractor 3:

PCPL has not been violated, so the Torus cannot be vented irrespective of the release rate.

Reference:

QGA 100 Rev. 9 Reference provided during examination:

QGA 100, 200 and 200

-5 (delete entry conditions, Torus temperature leg information, Low Torus level actions for 11 ft and Caution statement in Detail A)

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 12 of 51 29 March 2011 Cognitive level:

High Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 1 Group: 1 Question Source:

Quad Cities Bank (QDC.ILT.15565)

Question History:

2009 ILT NRC Exam

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

43(b)(5) SRO Justification:

Requires candidate to assess plant conditions and, using the EOP flowcharts, select and supporting procedure and action to mitigate with. Also is supported by a SRO only facility objective.

Comments: None Associated objective(s):

S-0001-K18 (Freq: LIC=B)

Given QGA 100, RPV Control, and various conditions, EVALUATE the conditions and DESCRIBE how to proceed through the flowchart including transitions within QGA 100, to other QGA procedures, station operating procedures, or SAMGs.

295031.EA2.04 (CFR 41.10, 43.5, 45.13)

Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to REACTOR LOW WATER LEVEL: Adequate core cooling. (RO=4.6 / SRO=4.8)

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 13 of 51 29 March 2011 82 ID: QDC.ILT.16395 Points: 1.00 Unit 2 is at 100% power when a transient occurs, resulting in a HIGH reactor pressure condition.

Which of the following conditions, if any, will require the Shift Manager to declare an ALERT due to meeting the threshold values of MA3? If neither condition requires a declaration, why?

Condition 1: RPV pressure reaches 1103 psig and reactor shutdown is achieved by automatic scram solenoid pilot valve operation.

Condition 2: RPV pressure reaches 1257 psig and reactor shutdown is achieved by automatic ARI initiation.

(Note: Consider each condition separately.)

A. Condition 2 only B. Condition 1 and 2 C. NEITHER because MA3 is NOT applicable for the initial operating condition.

D. NEITHER because the reactor was automatically shutdown in both conditions.

Answer: A Answer Explanation:

The candidate must determine:

1) if reactor pressure is above the RPS scram setpoint.
2) if ARI and scram solenoid pilot valves are normal or alternate means of rod insertion.
3) if MA3 is applicable if the reactor is shutdown and in Mode 3.

The UFSAR analytical value for RPS scram on high RPV pressure is 1060 psig (actual is 1024 psig). Therefore, anything less than 1024 psig does not meet threshold value one (1).

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 14 of 51 29 March 2011

The second condition of this EAL indicates a failure of the automatic RPS scram function to rapidly insert a sufficient number of control rods to achieve reactor shutdown. The Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) system provides an automatic and alternate method of completing the scram function. This backup, however, inserts control rods at a much slower rate than the automatic RPS scram function. For the purpose of emergency classification at the Alert level, reactor shutdown achieved by ARI initiation does not constitute a successful RPS automatic scram.

Since the ATWS condition (for Condition 2) was initially present with the plant in Mode 1, MA3 is applicable (even if ARI places the plant in Mode 3).

Distractor 1:

Plausible if candidate does not recognize that reactor shutdown from automatic scram solenoid pilot valve operation is the normal method of control rod insertion.

Distractor 2:

Plausible if candidate incorrectly applies the applicability of MA3 to the initial condition of the plant.

Distractor 3:

Plausible if candidate assumes that declaring an alert is not required because the reactor was automatically shutdown in both conditions.

Reference:

EP-AA-1006 Rev 29 Reference provided during examination:

None Cognitive level:

High Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 1 Group: 1 Question Source:

Modified from Quad ILT Bank (QDC.ILT.760618)

Question History:

N/A 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41(b)(10) SRO Justification

Unique to SRO position (reference facility objective)

Comments: None Associated objective(s):

295037.EA2.06 (CFR 41.10, 43.5, 45.13)

Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to SCRAM CONDITION PRESENT AND REACTOR POWER ABOVE APRM DOWNSCALE OR UNKNOWN: Reactor pressure (RO=4.0 / SRO=4.1)

S-0303-K70 (Freq: LIC=B ILT=NA) Given an ATWS/ARI System operating mode and various plant conditions and a copy of EP

-AA-111 and EP

-AA-1006, CLASSIFY the event/abnormal condition including correct EALs and PARs in accordance with EP

-AA-111 and EP

-AA-1006.

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 15 of 51 29 March 2011 83 ID: QDC.ILT.16397 Points: 1.00 (Use your provided references to answer this question.)

Unit 2 is in Day 2 of a refuel outage with the following plant conditions:

2A CRD pump is RUNNING CRD charging water header is ISOLATED All 177 HCUs are in the process of being hydraulically ISOLATED Fuel is NOT being moved within the reactor vessel With the HCU isolations in progress, control rods D

-7, E-6 and F-6 drift out to positions 12, 18 and 22 respectively and STOP.

One (1) minute later, the following indications are present on the 902

-5 panel: If operator action is then taken and ALL control rods are inserted to position 00, what is the HIGHEST Reactivity Management significance level that must be assigned to this event?

A. Significance Level 1 B. Significance Level 2 C. Significance Level 3 D. Significance Level 4

Answer: A Answer Explanation:

This question is modeled after SEN 264 and a significant event at Dresden station in 2008 (OE28297).

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 16 of 51 29 March 2011

Control rods D

-7, E-6 and F-6 are near SRM 24. Per QCFHP 0110

-02, true criticality is indicated by a sustained increase in count rate, over 15 to 20 seconds, of the SRM closest to the control rod being moved.

Therefore, an inadvertent criticality has occurred during refueling operations. That is a Level 1 significant event.

Distractor 1:

Plausible if candidate does not determine that the reactor is critical because indications of criticality are only associated with SRM 24. A classification to Level 2 would be based on entry into Tech Spec actions for loss of Shutdown Margin.

Distractor 2: Plausible if candidate does not fully evaluate all levels of significance and determines a Level 3 based on mispositioned control rod due to degraded equipment.

Distractor 3:

Plausible if candidate does not fully evaluate all levels of significance and determines a Level 4 based on an observable change in reactor power of < 0.5% RTP caused by personnel error.

Reference:

OP-AA-300-1540 Rev 6, QCFHP 0110

-02 Rev 4 Reference provided during examination:

OP-AA-300-1540 Attachment 1 Rev 6 Cognitive level:

High Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 1 Group: 2 Question Source:

Modified from Quad Cities ILT Exam Bank (QDC.ILT.15502)

Question History:

Original version used on Quad 2009 ILT NRC Exam

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

43(b)(6) SRO Justification:

Comments: None Associated objective(s):

SRLF-PGRM-K4 (Freq: LIC=A NF=A)

Given various reactor conditions and evolutions in progress, IDENTIFY the activities that impact core reactivity and/or have reactivity management implications.

295014.AA2.02 (CFR 41.10, 43.5, 45.13)

Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to INADVERTENT REACTIVITY ADDITION: Reactor period (RO=3.9 / SRO=3.9)

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 17 of 51 29 March 2011 84 ID: QDC.ILT.16398 Points: 1.00 (Use your provided references to answer this question.)

Unit 2 was operating at rated power when an accident occurred involving a LEAK from the north scram discharge volume (SDV). Current plant conditions are as follows:

Reactor has been SCRAMMED for 45 minutes ALL attempts to reset the scram have FAILED Drywell Radiation Monitor 'A' indicates 550 R/hr and rising Drywell Radiation Monitor 'B' indicates 600 R/hr and rising North CRD Module Area ARM indicates 3336 mr/hr and rising South CRD Module Area ARM indicates 2810 mr/hr and rising Which of the following is the HIGHEST emergency action level of classification for the above plant conditions?

A. Unusual Event B. Alert C. Site Area Emergency D. General Emergency Answer: C Answer Explanation:

Site Area Emergency (FS1) must be declared based on meeting the threshold values of RC4 (for potential loss) and CT6.

Based on plant conditions, candidate must determine that the North CRD Module Area is

on the first floor of the reactor building (595' elevation), and therefore a radiation level of QGA 300 has exceeded both normal and maximum safe levels.

Candidate must also determine that a leak from the SDV with a failure to reset the scram constitutes a n unisolable primary system leak.

Distractor 1:

Plausible if candidate determines EAL classification by reading the Fission Product Barrier Matrix chart from right

-to-left. Candidate would arrive at an Unusual Event based on CT5 or CT6 and then make the declaration. Operators are specifically trained to classify by reading right

-to-left to prevent under classification of events.

Distractor 2: Plausible if candidate only references the Abnormal Radiation Levels / Radiological Effluent matrix and classifies the event due to meeting the threshold values of RA3. Also plausible if candidate determines that threshold value of RC4 (for potential loss) is met but does not recognize that CT6 is also met with the same plant conditions.

Distractor 3:

Plausible if candidate misinterprets Table F1, assumes a loss of the fuel clad barrier and declares a General Emergency based on FG1.

Reference:

EP-AA-1006 Rev 29, QGA 300 Rev 11, QCOP 1800

-01 Rev 12 Reference provided during examination:

EP-AA-1006 Rev 29 pages QC 3

-11 thru 3-12, QGA 300 Rev 1 (with entry conditions, QGA 400 and Detail A deleted)

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 18 of 51 29 March 2011 Cognitive level:

High Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 1 Group: 2 Question Source:

New Question History:

N/A 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

Unique to SRO position SRO Justification:

Determination of emergency classification is a function of the SRO position (see facility objective).

Comments: None Associated objective(s):

S-0001-K70d (Freq: LIC=B ILT=NA) Given a various plant conditions related to QGA 300, RPV Control, and a copy of EP-AA-111 and EP

-AA-1006, CLASSIFY the event/abnormal condition including correct EALs and PARs in accordance with EP

-AA-111 and EP

-AA-1006. 295033.2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications. (RO=2.9 / SRO=4.6)

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 19 of 51 29 March 2011 85 ID: QDC.ILT.16507 Points: 1.00 (Use your provided reference to answer this question.)

The following conditions exist on Unit 2:

Reactor Mode Switch is in REFUEL.

Mode 5 was entered 8 DAYS ago.

Fuel moves are in progress within the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)

Control Rod Drive (CRD) removal from under the vessel is in progress. This activity has been screened as an Operation with the Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel (OPDRV).

A Reactor Building Ventilation exhaust fan TRIPS, resulting in the indication BELOW.

What action, if any, is required per TS LCO 3.6.4.1, Secondary Containment and why?

A. NO action is required because the secondary containment is OPERABLE.

B. NO action is required because current plant conditions do NOT require the secondary containment to be operable.

C. IMMEDIATELY initiate action to suspend CRD removal because the secondary containment is INOPERABLE.

D. IMMEDIATELY suspend core alterations because the secondary containment is INOPERABLE.

Answer: C EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 20 of 51 29 March 2011 Answer Explanation:

Per SR 3.6.4.1.1 requires secondary containment d/p to be

> 0.01 inch of vacuum water gauge. The given indication does not meet SR 3.6.4.1.1, therefore the secondary containment is INOPERABLE.

With OPDRVs in progress, immediate action must be taken to suspend OPDRVs.

Distractor 1:

Plausible if candidate interprets the

> 0.10 inch vacuum water gauge to mean "greater than" in the positive direction.

Distractor 2:

Plausible if candidate assumes that the secondary containment is not required to be operable given the current plant conditions.

Distractor 3:

Plausible if candidate assumes that recently (< 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) irradiated fuel is being moved within the secondary containment.

Reference:

TS LCO 3.6.4.1 Amendment No. 245/240 Reference provided during examination:

TS 3.6.4.1 and TS 3.6.4.1 Surveillance Requirements with the following statements deleted:

TS 3.6.4.1 LCO and Applicability statements, Condition C, Required Action C.2, and Condition C Completion Times.

Cognitive level:

High Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 1 Group: 2 Question Source:

New Question History:

N/A 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.43 (2) SRO Justification:

The candidate must determine operability of a system and the required actions in accordance with the rules of application requirements of TS Section 1.

Comments: None. Associated objective(s):

295035.EA2.01 (CFR 41.8 to 41.10)

Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to SECONDARY CONTAINMENT HIGH DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE: Secondary containment pressure: Plant-Specific (RO=3.8 / SRO=3.9)

SR-1601-K32 (Freq: LIC=B)

Given Containment Systems operability status OR key parameter indications, various plant conditions and a copy of Tech Specs, DETERMINE Tech Spec compliance and required actions, if any.

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 21 of 51 29 March 2011 86 ID: QDC.ILT.16414 Points: 1.00 The Unit 2 HPCI system is running in its test lineup for a periodic surveillance circulating water to the CCSTs.

Complete the following two statements:

If the HPCI turbine TRIPS on high turbine exhaust pressure, MO 2-2301-14 (MIN FLOW BYP VLV) will __(1)__.

If a HIGH torus water level condition is present after the completion of the surveillance, the PREFERRED (normal) method of lowering torus water level is using __(2)__.

A. (1) OPEN, draining CCST water to the Torus (2) QCOP 1000

-12, Torus Water Transfer to Main Condenser B. (1) OPEN, draining CCST water to the Torus (2) QCOP 1000

-18, Torus Water Transfer to Floor Drain Collector Tank C. (1) remain CLOSED, maintaining CCST level steady (2) QCOP 1000

-18, Torus Water Transfer to Floor Drain Collector Tank D. (1) remain CLOSED, maintaining CCST level steady (2) QCOP 1000

-12, Torus Water Transfer to Main Condenser Answer: B Answer Explanation:

When the MO 1

-2301-3 (HPCI Turbine Steam Supply) is open, the MO 1-2301-14 (Min Flow) operates as a minimum flow valve. A turbine trip does not close the HPCI 3 valve, therefore the HPCI 14 valve will be open following a turbine trip.

If Torus level is high, transfer of Torus water to the Floor Drain Collector Tank is preferred due to high Torus water conductivity.

Distractor 1:

Plausible because torus water can be transferred to the main condenser.

Distractor 2: Plausible if candidate assumes that the minimum flow valve closes on a HPCI trip (e.g. similar to the Core Spray min flow valve closing on a Core Spray pump trip). Distractor 3:

Combination of distractor 1 and 2.

Reference:

QCOP 1600-12 Rev 14, LN

-2300 Rev 17 Reference provided during examination:

None Cognitive level:

High Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 2 Group: 1 Question Source: New Question History:

N/A 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

43(b)(5)

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 22 of 51 29 March 2011 SRO Justification:

Candidate must select appropriate procedure to lower Torus water level based on concerns with high conductivity and subsequent plant operation.

Comments: None Associated objective(s):

206000.A2.01 (CFR 41.5 / 45.6)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Turbine trips: BWR

-2,3,4 (RO=4.0 / SRO=4.0)

SR-2300-K20 (Freq: LIC=B)

Given a HPCI System operating mode and various plant conditions, EVALUATE the following HPCI System indications/responses and DETERMINE if the indication/ response is expected and normal.

a. MOV and AOV valve positions
b. Turbine inlet and exhaust steam pressures
c. Turbine speed
d. HPCI booster pump suction
e. HPCI main pump discharge pressure
f. HPCI flow rate
g. Turbine oil tank level
h. Turbine lubrication and control oil pressures, temperatures
i. Turning gear engaged/running indications
j. Zero speed indicator light
k. Gland seal condensate (hotwell) pump and leakoff (exhaust) blower run indications
l. Gland seal cooling water pump run indications
m. Auxiliary oil pump and emergency bearing oil pump run indications
n. Gland seal condenser hotwell level
o. Isolation trip channel power supply indications
p. HPCI area temperature and radiation levels
q. Local MGU power indications
r. MSC and MGU position indication

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 23 of 51 29 March 2011 87 ID: QDC.ILT.16415 Points: 1.00 Unit 1 was at 75% power when there was a complete LOSS of off

-site power.

All rods are fully inserted in the core.

Reactor Mode switch is in SHUTDOWN.

The HIGHEST reactor pressure reached during the transient was 1065 psig.

Reactor pressure is currently 1050 psig and rising at 2 psig per minute.

QGA 100, RPV Control has been entered but NO further operator action has been taken.

Complete the following statements regarding the execution of the QGA 100 pressure leg:

The correct ANSWER to the decision diamond question "Any ADS Valve Cycling?" is __(1)__.

Given the current plant conditions, the Unit Supervisor must direct the Operator to maintain reactor pressure 800

- 1000 psig using __(2)__.

A. (1) NO (2) main turbine bypass valves per QCGP 2

-3, Reactor Scram B. (1) NO (2) ADS valves per QCOP 0203

-01, Reactor Pressure Control Using Manual Relief Valve Actuation C. (1) YES (2) ADS valves per QCOP 0203

-01, Reactor Pressure Control Using Manual Relief Valve Actuation D. (1) YES (2) main turbine bypass valves per QCGP 2

-3, Reactor Scram

Answer: B EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 24 of 51 29 March 2011 Answer Explanation:

Reactor pressure of 1065 psig is high, but below the lift setpoint of the low

-set relief valves (1115 psig). Therefore, no ADS valves are expected to by cycling.

With a loss of off

-site power, main turbine bypass valves are NOT available (MSIVs are shut and power is lost to the EHC pumps). Therefore, alternate pressure control systems must be used. In this case, the ADS valves will serve as pressure control.

Distractor 1:

Plausible if candidate does not recognize that the preferred pressure control system (main turbine bypass valves) is not available.

Distractor 2: Plausible if candidate assumes the high reactor pressure condition will actuate the low

-set relief valves.

Distractor 3:

Combination of distractor 1 and 2.

Reference:

QGA 100 Rev 9, LIC

-0203 Rev 16, QOM 1

-6700-T03 Rev 4, QOM 1

-6700-T01 Rev 6 Reference provided during examination:

None Cognitive level:

High Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 2 Group: 1 Question Source:

New Question History:

N/A 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

Unique to the SRO position SRO Justification:

Candidate must assess plant conditions and select appropriate action within the EOPs (see facility objective).

Comments: None Associated objective(s):

239002.A2.06 (CFR 41.5 / 45.6)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the RELIEF/SAFETY VALVES ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Reactor high pressure (RO=4.1 / SRO=4.3)

S-0001-K18 (Freq: LIC=B)

Given QGA 100, RPV Control, and various conditions, EVALUATE the conditions and DESCRIBE how to proceed through the flowchart including transitions within QGA 100, to other QGA procedures, station operating procedures, or SAMGs.

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 25 of 51 29 March 2011 88 ID: QDC.ILT.16400 Points: 1.00 Unit 1 was at rated power when a transient occurred resulting in entry into QGA 100, RPV CONTROL. Digital Feedwater Level Control (DFWLC) is attempting to control RPV water level.

Which of the following conditions will require the Unit Supervisor to declare RPV water level UNKNOWN and enter QGA 500

-4, RPV FLOODING?

Condition 1:

RPV pressure is 100 psig, drywell temperature is 250F and ALL Detail C instruments are DOWNSCALE.

Condition 2:

RPV pressure is 50 psig, drywell temperature is 325F and both Medium Range instruments are reading +30 inches and STEADY.

Condition 3:

RPV pressure is 40 psig, drywell temperature is 340F and ALL Detail C instruments are UPSCALE.

(Note: Consider each condition separately.)

A. Condition 3 only B. Conditions 1 and 3 only C. Conditions 2 and 3 only D. Conditions 1, 2 and 3 Answer: A EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 26 of 51 29 March 2011 Answer Explanation:

The operational implication of Detail A, RPV Water Level Instruments, within the EOPs is being tested. The candidate must analyze each condition and determine which one(s) have the operational implication of "RPV water level unknown." Determining RPV level can be accomplished by three methods:

1) Directly reading the instruments.
2) Utilizing level correction for the instrument per Attachment A of QCAP 0200

-10 to obtain a reading

. 3) The RPV level can be considered KNOWN when level is below the usable range per Figure C if there are no other changes to the status of the instruments, such as saturation and reference leg flashing or loss of power. Simply by dropping below the usable range per Figure C the instruments are not usable for a definitive direct reading. However, there is a reasonable assurance the instruments will respond properly when level is restored if nothing has caused the instruments to be considered unreliable.

The only condition that does not meet this guidance is Condition 3 because plant conditions are within the saturation portion of Detail B and all instruments are upscale (which is what happens when reference leg flashing occurs). A caution in Detail A states: RPV water level instruments may be unreliable due to boiling in the instrument runs when drywell or reactor building temperature is above Fig B, RPV Saturation Temperature.

Distractor 1:

Plausible if candidate assumes that RPV level must be consider ed unknown when all instruments are downscale and outside of their QGA usable range.

Distractor 2: Plausible if candidate assumes that the caution in Detail A states that all instruments must (vice may) be considered unreliable when saturation conditions are present for the instrument reference legs.

Distractor 3:

Combination of distractor 2 and 3.

Reference:

QGA 100 Rev 9, QCAP 0200

-10 Rev 41 Reference provided during examination:

None Cognitive level:

High Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 2 Group: 1 Question Source: New Question History:

N/A 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

Unique to the SRO position.

SRO Justification:

Candidate must have knowledge of Detail A use and when to transition to QGA 500

-4 (see facility objective).

Comments: None EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 27 of 51 29 March 2011 Associated objective(s

): 259002.2.4.20 Knowledge of operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes. (RO=3.8 / SRO=4.3)

S-0001-K12a (Freq: LIC=B)

EVALUATE given system/plant parameters and the following QGA curves/tables, DETERMINE if any QGA related limits have been exceeded:

a. QGA Detail A, RPV Water Level Instruments
1. Figure B, RPV Saturation Curve
2. Table C, RPV Level Instrument Criteria
b. QGA Figure D, Primary Containment Pressure Limit
c. QGA Table J, Minimum Steam Cooling Pressure
d. QGA Figure K, Drywell Spray Initiation Limit
e. QGA Figure L, Pressure Suppression Pressure
f. QGA Figure M, Heat Capacity Limit
g. QGA Table S, Reactor Building Area Temperatures
h. QGA Table T, Reactor Building Area Radiation Levels
i. QGA Table U, Reactor Building Area Water Levels

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 28 of 51 29 March 2011 89 ID: QDC.ILT.16413 Points: 1.00 A startup is in progress on Unit 1 with the following plant conditions:

Reactor Mode switch in STARTUP IRMs are on Range 8 Reactor pressure is 95 psig Which of the following annunciators, if received with the current plant conditions, must be addressed FIRST if the Unit Supervisor places a priority on ensuring the OPERABILITY of Technical Specification required equipment?

(Note: Consider each annunciator separately.)

A. 901-5 A-7, RBM HIGH OR INOP B. 901-3 G-14, AUTO BLOWDOWN INHIBIT C. 901-5 D-8, CONTROL ROOM VENT ISOLATED D. 901-3 C-3, CORE SPRAY PUMP AREA CLR FAN TRIP Answer: D Answer Explanation:

901-3 C-3 annunciator indicates that a breaker for the room cooler in the 'A' or 'B' Core Spray pump room is tripped. If the cooler cannot be restored, the Core Spray and/or RCIC subsystem will be required to be declared inoperable.

Distractor 1:

Plausible if candidate assumes that the RBM is required per Technical Specifications during a startup. Incorrect because reactor power is < 30% RTP.

Distractor 2: Plausible because this alarm indicates that the ADS function of the relief valves will not work. However, the ADS function is not required due to steam dome pressure <150 psig. The relief, safety and manual functions of the valves remain operable with this alarm in.

Distractor 3:

Plausible if candidate assumes that the 'B' train of control room ventilation is impacted by an isolation. A control room isolation will prevent the 'A' (non

-safety related) train from running in the normal mode, but will not prevent the 'B' train from satisfying its safety function. Also plausible because reactor building ventilation isolation results in the SRO declaring a Tech Spec required equipment inoperable (rad monitors).

Reference:

QCAN 901(2)

-3 F- Rev 4 Reference provided during examination:

None Cognitive level:

High Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 2 Group: 1 Question Source:

New Question History:

N/A 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

Unique to the SRO position

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 29 of 51 29 March 2011 SRO Justification:

Candidate must be able to determine operability of Tech Spec required equipment (see facility objective).

Comments: None Associated objective(s):

209001.2.4.45 Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm. (RO=4.1 / SRO=4.3)

S-OPDT-K06 (Freq: LIC=A) Given a degraded or nonconforming condition that may impact the operability of a specific SSC described in Tech Specs, using P&ID/C&IDs, E

-prints and Tech Specs, if necessary, PERFORM an immediate Operability Determination and DETERMINE if the SSC meets Tech Spec operability requirements in accordance with the Operability Determination procedures, OP

-AA-108-115 and OP

-AA-108-115-1002.

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 30 of 51 29 March 2011 90 ID: QDC.ILT.16401 Points: 1.00 Unit 1 is shutdown and in Mode 3, Unit 2 is at rated power.

Emergent maintenance requires MCC 18

-2 to be DE

-ENERGIZED.

If MCC 18-2 is removed from service, determine the OPERABILITY of affected AC distribution subsystems in accordance with LCO 3.8.7, Distribution Systems

- Operating, for BOTH Units.

A. ALL required AC subsystems are OPERABLE for both Unit 1 and Unit 2.

B. One (1) required AC subsystem is INOPERABLE for both Unit 1 and Unit 2.

C. One (1) required AC subsystem is INOPERABLE for Unit 1. All required AC subsystems are OPERABLE for Unit 2.

D. ALL required AC subsystems are OPERABLE for Unit 1. One (1) required AC subsystem is INOPERABLE for Unit 2.

Answer: B Answer Explanation:

The Essential Service (ESS) Bus is required as an AC safety bus subsystem.

De-energizing MCC 18

-2 will not de

-energize the ESS bus (UPS is still powering bus). However, TS B 3.8.7 states that the 120 VAC ESS Bus must be capable of being energized from Bus 18

-2 (28-2).

Operability requirements of the opposite unit's Division 1 AC electrical power distribution subsystem requires operability of the Unit 1 ESS Bus.

Distractor 1:

Plausible if candidate does not know that the ESS bus must be capable of being energized from MCC 18

-2 to be considered operable in Modes 1, 2 and 3.

Distractor 2: Plausible if candidate does not know that the opposite unit ESS bus must be operable to meet the requirements of TS LCO 3.8.7.

Distractor 3:

Plausible if candidate assumes that LCO 3.8.7 is only applicable in Modes 1 and 2 (i.e. when operating).

Reference:

TS LCO 3.8.7 Amendment No. 245/240, TS B 3.8.7 Rev 40 Reference provided during examination:

None Cognitive level:

High Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 2 Group: 1 Question Source:

Modified from Quad Cities Bank (QDC.LN.604715)

Question History:

N/A 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

43(b)(2) SRO Justification:

Candidate must have knowledge of Technical Specification bases and determine operability based on plant equipment availability.

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 31 of 51 29 March 2011 Comments: None Associated objective(s):

262002.2.2.36 Ability to analyze the affect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations. (RO=3.1 / SRO=4.2)

S-6500-K33 (Freq: LIC=I) DISCUSS the bases for 4KV / 480 VAC Distribution Systems related Tech Spec LCO's.

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 32 of 51 29 March 2011 91 ID: QDC.ILT.16402 Points: 1.00 Unit 1 is in Mode 2 performing a startup with reactor power at 3%.

Control rod G

-6 has just been declared INOPERABLE and must be fully inserted into the core. RWM Mode switch is in NORMAL.

Using the information on the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) display below, complete the following statements:

If control rod G

-6 is selected on the rod select matrix, an INSERT BLOCK will be applied __(1)__.

If the Unit Supervisor directs the Reactor Operator to BYPASS the RWM, LCO 3.3.2.1 (Control Rod Block Instrumentation) must be entered because the RWM ensures that the initial conditions of the __(2)__ analysis are NOT violated.

A. (1) immediately (2) single control rod withdrawal error (RWE)

B. (1) immediately (2) control rod drop accident (CRDA)

C. (1) ONLY after the rod is inserted to position 46 (2) control rod drop accident (CRDA)

D. (1) ONLY after the rod is inserted to position 46 (2) single control rod withdrawal error (RWE)

Answer: B Answer Explanation:

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 33 of 51 29 March 2011 Candidate must recognize that control rod G

-6 is out-of-sequence (not green in color). Candidate must also recognize that control rod G

-6 is in its expected position (white in color).

Any out-of-sequence rod selected will cause an insert and withdraw block to be applied for the selected rod with one exception: insertion/withdrawal of an out

-of-sequence rod is allowed in order to correct a withdraw/insert error.

The RWM is required by Technical Specifications when

< 10% RTP to satisfy the initial conditions of the Control Rod Drop Accident (CRDA).

Distractor 1:

Plausible if candidate assumes that the RWM satisfies the initial conditions of the single rod withdraw error event. This is the basis of the Rod Block Monitor and is a frequent misconception.

Distractor 2: Plausible if candidate does not apply the concept of "selection error" for the RWM and assumes that the sequence must be violated before the RWM enforces a rod block. Distractor 3:

Combination of distractor 1 and 2.

Reference:

QCOP 0207-01 Rev 18, TS B 3.3.2.1 Rev 28 Reference provided during examination:

None Cognitive level:

High Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 2 Group: 2 Question Source:

New Question History:

N/A 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

43(b)(2) SRO Justification:

Question requires candidate to have knowledge of TS LCO 3.3.2.1 bases for the RWM.

Comments: None Associated objective(s):

201006.2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions. (RO=4.2 / SRO=4.4)

S-0207-K33 (Freq: LIC=I)

DISCUSS the bases for Rod Worth Minimizer Tech Spec LCOs.

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 34 of 51 29 March 2011 92 ID: QDC.ILT.16410 Points: 1.00 Unit 2 is operating at 65% power with all OPRMs inoperable

. A TRIP of the 2A Reactor Recirc pump occurs.

Complete the following two statements:

Following the pump trip, INDICATED reactor water level on LI 2

-0640-29A/B "Narrow Range" instruments will INITIALLY __(1)__.

If plant operation stabilizes within Instability Region I, the Unit Supervisor is required to enter __(2)__ to exit the instability region.

A. (1) lower (2) QCGP 2

-3, Reactor Scram, and initiate a reactor scram B. (1) lower (2) QCOA 0400

-02, Core Instabilities, and insert control rods C. (1) rise (2) QCOA 0400

-02, Core Instabilities, and insert control rods D. (1) rise (2) QCGP 2

-3, Reactor Scram, and initiate a reactor scram Answer: D EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 35 of 51 29 March 2011 Answer Explanation:

Immediately following a reactor recirc pump trip, core flow lowers and void fraction within the core increases. This results in a higher core d/p, therefore reactor water level increases until DFWLC responds.

With the OPRM system inoperable, plant operation is not allowed within Instability Region I. Distractor 1:

Plausible if candidate assumes that water level lowers because initially core flow is lower with steam flow constant.

Distractor 2: Combination of distractor 1 and 3.

Distractor 3:

Plausible because if the OPRMs were operable, plant operation can continue if control rods are inserted to exit Instability Region I.

Reference:

QCOA 0400-02 Rev 20 Reference provided during examination:

None Cognitive level:

High Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 2 Group: 2 Question Source:

Modified from Hatch ILT Exam Bank Question History:

Hatch 2009 ILT NRC Exam 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

43(b)(5) SRO Justification:

Candidate must assess plant conditions and select appropriate procedure during abnormal operation.

Comments: None Associated objective(s):

SR-0201-K22 (Freq: LIC=B)

Given a Reactor Vessel and Internals operating mode and various plant conditions, PREDICT how key system/ plant parameters will respond to the following failures:

a. DBA LOCA
b. Abnormally high water level
c. Abnormally low water level
d. Failed jet pump
e. Failed recirculation pump
f. Shroud access hole cover failure 216000.A2.14 (CFR 41.5 / 45.6)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the NUCLEAR BOILER INSTRUMENTATION ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Recirculation flow: Design

-Specific (RO=2.9 / SRO=2.9)

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 36 of 51 29 March 2011 93 ID: QDC.ILT.16411 Points: 1.00 Unit 1 has a steam leak in the Drywell. Drywell sprays were initiated and secured when required.

Containment parameters are presently:

Drywell temperature 120°F Drywell pressure 1.80 psig and rising Torus temperature 91°F Torus pressure 1.80 psig and rising The NSO reports the following annunciators are in alarm:

Annunciator 901

-3 C-13, "TORUS VACUUM BRK VALVES OPEN DIV I".

Annunciator 901

-3 G-11, "TORUS VACUUM BRK VALVES OPEN DIV II".

What is the impact, if any, to the primary containment and wh y?

The primary containment...

A. CAN perform its intended safety function. There is NO impact on primary containment operability.

B. may NOT perform its intended safety function because initial conditions are NOT met for ensuring the maximum drywell pressure during a LOCA will remain below the design value.

C. may NOT perform its intended safety function because initial conditions are NOT met for ensuring the negative differential pressure across the drywell wall will remain below the design value.

D. may NOT perform its intended safety function because initial conditions are NOT met for ensuring that an event producing hydrogen and oxygen does NOT result in a combustible mixture inside the primary containment.

Answer: B Answer Explanation:

Technical Specification bases states that all drywell

-to-torus vacuum breakers must be closed to satisfy the pressure

-suppression function of the containment.

With annunciators 901

-3 C-13(G-11) in alarm, one of the 12 Drywell

-Torus vacuum breakers is open and compromising the pressure

-suppression function of containment.

Candidate must verify that the alarms for the vacuum breakers are consistent with plant conditions (d/p is zero between the drywell and torus when it should be no less than 0.5 psid). Distractor 1: Plausible to consider primary containment operable because not all 12 vacuum breakers have to open as intended. Also plausible if candidate assumes that there is a second vacuum breaker in the line (similar to torus

-to-reactor building vacuum breakers). Distractor 2: Plausible because the assumptions for closed vacuum breakers control the amount of negative d/p across the containment walls.

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 37 of 51 29 March 2011 Distractor 3:

Plausible if candidate confuses the alarm indication for the torus

-to-reactor building vacuum breakers (i.e. D

-14, Torus Vacuum Relief LVL 20B Not Closed)

Reference:

TS B 3.6.1.8 Rev 40, QCAN 901(2)

-3 C-13 Rev 9, QCAN 901(2)

-3 Rev 7 Reference provided during examination:

None Cognitive level:

High Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 2 Group: 2 Question Source: Modified from Quad Cities ILT Exam Bank (QDC.ILT.15447)

Question History:

N/A 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

43(b)(2) SRO Justification:

Candidate must have knowledge of Technical Specification bases and primary containment operability requirements.

Comments: None Associated objective(s):

S-1601-K33 (Freq: LIC=I)

DISCUSS the bases for Containment Systems Tech Spec LCO's.

223001.2.4.46 Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions.

(RO=4.2 / SRO=4.2)

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 38 of 51 29 March 2011 94 ID: QDC.ILT.16412 Points: 1.00 Given: Unit 1 is in a refueling outage with fuel offloading scheduled to begin this shift.

SRM 21 is INOPERABLE and bypassed with its joystick.

You are facing the 901

-5 panel full

-core display.

Which of the following is true concerning the administrative requirements for fuel moves?

A. Fuel can be offloaded from the LOWER RIGHT quadrant ONLY.

B. Fuel can be offloaded from all quadrants EXCEPT the UPPER LEFT.

C. Fuel can be offloaded from ALL quadrants.

D. Fuel can NOT be offloaded from ANY quadrant.

Answer: B EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 39 of 51 29 March 2011 Answer Explanation:

QCFHP 0100

-01, Step E.5.d, states that while you must have 2 operable SRMs, they must be in the quadrant you are performing the core alterations in and in a quadrant adjacent to where core alterations are being performed.

Distractor 1:

Plausible if candidate assumes that two SRMs are required in an adjacent quadrant. Distractor 2: Plausible if the candidate assumes that an SRM in an adjacent quadrant meets the requirements.

Distractor 3:

Plausible if candidate assumes that SRMs are required in all fuel regions during an offload.

Reference:

QCFHP 0100

-01 Rev 31 Reference provided during examination:

None Cognitive level:

High Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 3 Group: N/A Question Source:

Quad Cities ILT Exam Bank (QDC.ILT.15608)

Question History:

N/A 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

43(b)(6) SRO Justification:

Candidate must have knowledge of administrative requirements associated with moving fuel.

Comments: None Associated objective(s):

SRL-805-K19 (Freq: LIC=I NF=I)

Given Refueling related equipment operability or key parameter indications and various plant conditions, DETERMINE, from memory, if the Conduct of Refueling Tech Spec LCOs have been met.

2.1.40 Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements. (RO=2.8/ SRO=3.9)

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 40 of 51 29 March 2011 95 ID: QDC.ILT.16488 Points: 1.00 Refer to the ACTIONS Table provided in Example 1.3

-2 to answer the following question. Assume that the system is a two (2) pump system.

Pump A is declared inoperable at 0800 on November 7. Pump B is declared inoperable at 1330 on November 7.

Which one of the following is required to maintain compliance with Technical Specifications?

A. Immediately exit Condition A and immediately enter LCO 3.0.3.

B. Immediately enter LCO 3.0.3 and continue to track Condition A completion time from 0800 on November 7.

C. Re-enter Condition A at 1330 on November 7 for Pump B and track its time separately. LCO 3.0.3 entry is NOT required.

D. Restore both pumps to OPERABLE status by 0800 on November 14. LCO 3.0.3 entry is NOT required.

Answer: B Answer Explanation:

Operation with more than 1 pump inoperable is not defined in the LCO. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered while continuing to track Condition A time.

Distractor 1:

Plausible if candidate assumes that once LCO 3.0.3 is entered, completion time of Condition A stops.

Distractor 2: Plausible if candidate assumes that seperate entry condition is allowed. Incorrect because separate entry condition is not stated as being allowe

d. Distractor 3:

Plausible if candidate assumes that required actions of Condition A is adequate for any number of inoperable pumps.

Reference:

TS Completion Times Section 1.3 Amendment 199/195 Reference provided during examination:

TS Section 1.3 Example 1.3-2 Cognitive level:

High Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 3 Group: N/A Question Source:

Quad Cities Bank (QDC.L.102648)

Question History:

N/A 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

43(b)(2) SRO Justification:

Candidate must apply Required Actions in accordance with rules of application requirements of Section 1.

Comments: None

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 41 of 51 29 March 2011 Associated objective(s):

Given the Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) and the associated Bases, the trainee shall: GIVEN PLANT CONDITIONS, APPLY THE RULES OF ITS SECTION 1.3 TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

2.2.40 Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system. (RO=3.4 / SRO

-4.7)

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 42 of 51 29 March 2011 96 ID: QDC.ILT.16416 Points: 1.00 Unit 2 was at 100% power when an accident occurred.

QGA 200, Primary Containment Control, is being executed.

Current plant conditions require VENTING the primary containment to stay below the Primary Containment Pressure Limit (PCPL).

QGAs allow exceeding release rate limits Drywell pressure is 52 psig and rising Torus pressure is 50 psig and rising Torus water level is 16 feet

Which of the following is the PREFERRED method of venting the drywell given the current plant conditions?

A. Vent the TORUS via the hardened vent ONLY long enough to maintain containment pressure below the PCPL limit.

B. Vent the TORUS via the hardened vent and MAINTAIN a continuous vent path until containment pressure is restored to its normal range.

C. Vent the DRYWELL via the hardened vent ONLY long enough to maintain containment pressure below the PCPL limit.

D. Vent the DRYWELL via the hardened vent and MAINTAIN a continuous vent path until containment pressure is restored to its normal range.

Answer: A Answer Explanation:

The preferred method of venting the primary containment is via the torus. A decontamination factor of up to four is provided when vented gases are required to bubble through water first. As long as torus water level is less than 30 ft, the torus can be vented.

A precaution in QCOP 1600

-03, Post-Accident Venting of the Primary Containment, states that there should be an attempt to limit the total amount of the radioactive release by controlling and maintaining Containment pressure below its applicable limit, rather than maintaining a continuous vent path. This precaution does NOT show up in the procedure flow chart or hard card that the RO would use to vent the containment. It is the Unit Supervisors responsibility to set the pressure band for venting using the hardened vent.

Distractor 1:

Plausible if candidate assumes that once the limit is reached, you must maintain a continuous vent condition.

Distractor 2: Plausible because drywell pressure will be higher than torus pressure and venting the drywell will give a more immediate pressure reduction than by venting through the torus. Also plausible if candidate assumes that the high torus water level condition prevents venting the torus.

Distractor 3:

Combination of distractor 1 and 2.

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 43 of 51 29 March 2011

Reference:

QCOA 1600-13 Rev 22 Reference provided during examination:

None Cognitive level:

High Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 3 Group: N/A Question Source:

Monticello ILT Exam Bank Question History:

Monticello 2007 ILT NRC Exam

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

43(b)(4) SRO Justification:

Candidate must have knowledge of the radiation hazards that apply during hardened vent operation (emergency situation). Also supported by a SRO

-only facility knowledge objective.

Comments: None Associated objective(s):

S-0001-K24 (Freq: LIC=B)

Given QGA 200, 'Primary Containment Control' and QGA 200

-5, 'Hydrogen Control', and various conditions, EVALUATE the conditions and DESCRIBE how to proceed through the flowcharts including transitions within QGA 200 or 200

-5, to other QGA procedures or to normal operating procedures.

2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases. (RO=3.8 / SRO=4.3)

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 44 of 51 29 March 2011 97 ID: QDC.ILT.16406 Points: 1.00 Given the following:

At 12:00 the threshold value for an UNUSUAL EVENT was exceeded, with indication available in the control room.

At 12:08 the Shift Emergency Director classified an UNUSUAL EVENT based on the associated control room indication.

Based on the above conditions, which of the following identifies the LATEST time at which the State/Local notifications of the UNUSUAL EVENT classification can be initiated and still meet notification requirements per EP

-AA-114 "Notifications"?

A. 12:15 B. 12:23 C. 13:00 D. 13:08 Answer: B Answer Explanation:

Candidate must know that the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) is a telecommunication network and form used to transmit information to appropriate state and local agencies. This notification must be initiated within 15 minutes of the declaration of an emergency.

Distractor 1:

Plausible because the event must be classified within 15 of the threshold value being exceeded.

Distractor 2:

Combination of distractor 1 and 2.

Distractor 3:

Plausible if candidate confuses when the NRC must be notified (ENS) and when state and local agencies must be notified.

Reference:

EP-AA-114 Rev 8 Reference provided during examination:

None Cognitive level: High Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 3 Group: N/A Question Source:

Modified from LaSalle Exam Bank Question History:

LaSalle 2008 ILT NRC Exam

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

Unique to the SRO position SRO Justification:

Candidate must have knowledge of the performance requirements of the Shift Emergency Director (SED).

Comments: None EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 45 of 51 29 March 2011 Associated objective(s):

2.4.29 Knowledge of the emergency plan. (RO=3.1 / SRO=4.4)

EP Training (G

-5) Objective 7 Given event specific information, determine when the state and local agencies must be notified.

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 46 of 51 29 March 2011 98 ID: QDC.ILT.16409 Points: 1.00 Complete the following two statements regarding interpretation and execution of Quad Cities Emergency Operating Procedures (QGAs):

Per the QGA Marking Standards, an ARROW pointing at a step in a QGA leg indicates that the crew __(1)__.

Per OP-QC-103-102-1002, Quad Cities Strategies for Successful Transient Mitigation, when executing a leg of the QGAs, all steps should be __(2)__.

A. (1) has COMPLETED the referenced step (2) FOLLOWED in order, even if an emergency depressurization parameter is EXCEEDED further down in the leg B. (1) has COMPLETED the referenced step (2) OMITTED up to the blowdown step if an emergency depressurization parameter is EXCEEDED further down in the l eg C. (1) is MAINTAINING or WAITING for a specific plant condition (2) FOLLOWED in order, even if an emergency depressurization parameter is EXCEEDED further down in the leg D. (1) is MAINTAINING or WAITING for a specific plant condition (2) OMITTED up to the blowdown step if an emergency depressurization parameter is EXCEEDED further down in the leg Answer: C Answer Explanation:

When actions have progressed to a point where the crew is maintaining or waiting for a specific plant condition, an arrow should be used to mark their place.

When executing a leg of the QGAs, then all steps should be followed in order to allow the use of all of the mitigating systems to be used and their effectiveness assessed, even if a blowdown parameter is exceeded further down in the leg.

Distractor 1:

Plausible because there is a marking standard to indicate a step is complete (line through step).

Distractor 2: Combination of distractor 1 and 2.

Distractor 3:

Plausible if candidate assumes that a blowdown must be executed even if the blowdown parameter is exceeded upon entry into the EOP.

Reference:

QCAP 0200-10 Rev 41, OP

-QC-103-102-1002 Rev 4 Reference provided during examination:

None Cognitive level:

Memory Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 3 Group: N/A Question Sourc e: New Question History:

N/A EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 47 of 51 29 March 2011 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

Unique to the SRO position SRO Justification:

Execution standards of the EOPs are a function of the SRO (see facility objective).

Comments: None Associated objective(s):

S-0001-K03 (Freq: LIC=I)

DESCRIBE the QGA flowchart procedure structure 2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps. (RO=4.6 / SRO=4.6)

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 48 of 51 29 March 2011 99 ID: QDC.ILT.16408 Points: 1.00 Operations needs to place one valve for the Turbine Lube Oil system in a DIFFERENT position

than its normal valve lineup to isolate a small leak.

The leak is NOT threatening to the continued operation of the Unit.

This task will NOT have an affect on UFSAR described design functions and NO emergency or equipment damage will result.

NO approved procedure exists for the evolution.

In ADDITION to an Equipment Status Tag (EST), which of the following (if any) is required to support the immediate re

-positioning of the valve?

A. No documentation is required.

B. Degraded Equipment Log (DEL)

C. Adverse Condition Monitoring Plan (ACMP)

D. Abnormal Component Positioning Sheet (ACPS)

Answer: D Answer Explanation:

For situations, excluding routine operation, where a component, system or structure is required to be placed in a position differing from its normal line

-up, the alignment must be done utilizing an Abnormal Component Positioning Sheet (ACPS). The ACPS will document proper evaluation, performance and restoration of the alignment, ensuring plant configuration control is maintained.

Such situations will occur when it is desired to reposition a component and NO approved documentation exists.

Distractor 1:

Plausible because some activities do NOT fall under the controls of OP

-AA-108-101 and therefore do not require a procedure. These activities (e.g. swapping MSIV Room Cooler strainers) are listed in OP

-QC-108-1001, Activities That Do Not Require Procedural Guidance. This activity is not one listed in OP

-QC-108-1001. Distractor 2: Plausible because Degraded Equipment Logs are used to track degraded and inoperable Systems, Structures and Components (SSCs). Incorrect because this activity does not fall within the requirements of OP

-AA-108-104, Technical Specification Compliance, for degraded equipment (i.e. not tied to Tech Specs, ATR, TRM, ISFSI or ODCM requirements).

Distractor 3:

Plausible because ACMPs address plant conditions and parameters that are abnormal. Incorrect because they address significant plant conditions that have not yet reached plant operating procedure action levels. ACMPs are not used to control the abnormal positioning of components for configuration control.

Reference:

OP-AA-108-101 Rev 8 Reference provided during examination:

None Cognitive level:

Memory Level (RO/SRO):

SRO EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 49 of 51 29 March 2011 Tier: 3 Group: N/A Question Sourc e: Quad Cities ILT Bank (QDC.LWQ.147386)

Question History:

N/A 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

43(b)(3) SRO Justification:

Candidate must have knowledge of the processes for changing the plant configuration and the method of documentation.

Comments: None Associated objective(s):

2.2.14 Knowledge of the process for controlling equipment configuration or status. (RO=3.9 / SRO=4.3)

SRNLF-CM-K4 (Freq: LIC=I NF=I)

Given OP-AA-108-101, Operations Configuration Control, DESCRIBE the process and form used to place a component, system, or structure into a position differing from its normal alignment.

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 50 of 51 29 March 2011 100 ID: QDC.ILT.16407 Points: 1.00 Which of the following, without prior NRC approval, is a violation of the Conditions and Limitations in the Facility License?

A. Operation in Mode 1 with a Reactor Coolant System unidentified leakage rate of 3 gpm. B. Control Room staff of one Senior Reactor Operator and two Reactor Operators with Unit 1 in Mode 4 and Unit 2 in Mode 5.

C. Steady state thermal power below the license thermal power limit, with momentary indications above the limit as a result of normal process fluctuations.

D. A change is made to an Appendix R procedure that results in 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> to achieve Cold Shutdown.

Answer: D Answer Explanation:

The 10 CFR 50 Appendix R requirement is to achieve cold shutdown in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The Facility license allows changes to the fire protection program without NRC approval if those "changes WOULD NOT adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire." Distractor 1:

The Technical Specification limit for unidentified RCS leakage is < 5 gpm. (Reference TS LCO 3.4.4 (b) ). Operation is within the TS LCO and NOT a violation of the Facility Operating License.

Distractor 2: Lineup is within guidelines of Tech Spec 5.2.2 and 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)( i ).

Distractor 3:

Power fluctuations as a result of normal oscillations due to stabilizing after control rod movement or flow adjustments are NOT considered "intentional operation above the Facility License limit of 2957 MWth".

Reference:

10 CFR50 Appendix R, DPR 29 Reference provided during examination:

None Cognitive level:

Memory Level (RO/SRO):

SRO Tier: 3 Group: N/A Question Source:

Quad Cities ILT Bank (QDC.ILT.15556)

Question History: Quad Cities 2009 ILT NRC Exam 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

43(b)(1) SRO Justification:

Candidate must have knowledge of the administration of the fire protection program requirements.

Comments: None EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY Quad Cities 2011 ILT NRC Exam (SRO Portion)

Page: 51 of 51 29 March 2011 Associated objective(s):

2.4.25 Knowledge of fire protection procedures. (RO=3.3 / SRO=3.7)

S-ARP-K027 (Freq: LIC=B)

ANALYZE a given condition that may impact the operability of Safe Shutdown Systems or System Combinations (ie component/controller failure, Clearance) using P&ID/C&IDs, E-prints, QCARPs and QCAP 1500

-02, if necessary, and DETERMINE if the Safe Shutdown Systems or System Combinations are operable.