ML17284A673

LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr

ML17284A673
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	07/01/1998
From:	Arbuckle J, Bemis P WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
GO2-98-114, LER-98-009, LER-98-9, NUDOCS 9807090058
Download: ML17284A673 (10)

Text

4A L ZsU'VXC.L J.REGULATOR&

INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RXDS)ACCESSION NBR:9807090058 DOC.DATE: 98/07/01 NOTARIZED:

NO FACZL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ARBUCKLE,J.D.

Washington Public Power Supply System BEMIS,P.R.

Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET 05000397

SUBJECT:

LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear steam supply shutoff sys group 3&4 isolations during testing was noted.Caused by procedural deficiency.

Counseled individuals involved in preparation.W/980701 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Inciden Rpt, etc.NOTES: RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD4-2 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB

'NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HOHB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN4 FILE 01 , EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC POORE,W.NRC PDR 1'1 1 1.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1'1 1 AEOD/SPD/RAB E DE ELB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DET/EIB 1 1.LITCO BRYCE, J H 1 1 NOAC QUEENER,DS 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TZT COPIES" RECIPIENT LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME 1" 1 POSLUSNY,C COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1'1 1 1 1 1 1.1 1 1 1 I NOTE TO ALL"RZDS" RECiPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE.TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED-FROM DISTRIBUTION LIST OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTRO.DESK (DCD)ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED'-

LTTR 24 ENCL 24 0

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM PO.Box 968~Richiand, Washington 99352-0968 July 1, 1998 GO2-98-114 Docket No.50-397 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

Subject:

WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.98-009-00 Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.98-009-00 for WNP-2.This report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action to preclude recurrence.

Should you have any questions or desire additional information pertauung to this report, please call me or P.J.Inserra at (509)377-4147.R tfully,'Vi President uclear Operations Mail Drop 3 Attachment CC: EW Merschoff-NRC RIV KE Perkins, Jr.-NRC RIV, WCFO C Poslusny, Jr-NRC NRR PD Robinson-Winston&Strawn NRC Senior Resident Inspector-927N (2)DL Williams-BPA/399 INPO Records Center 9'807090058

'P8070i PDR ADQCK 05000397 8 PDR v i)>v f3

ENSEE EVENT REPORT LER FACILITY NAME (1)Washin on Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2)50-397 PAGE (3)1OF4 TITLE (4)Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System Group 3 and 4 Isolations During Testing EVENT DATE (5)DAY YEAR MONTH LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV.NUMBER REPORT DATE (7)OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (6)DOCKET NUMBER DAY YEAR FADUTY NAME 06 06 98 009 00 07 01 98 FACfUTY NAME OPERATING NODE THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (check one or more)(11)POWER LEVEL 20.402(b)20.405 a 1 20.405(a)(1) 00 20.405 a 1<0 20.405 a 1 N 20.405 a 1 v 20.405(c)50.36 c 1 5036(c)(2) 50.73 a 50.73 a a 50.73 a 2 ra 50.73(a)(2)(iv)50.73 a v 50 73(a)(2)(vi))

50.73 a viil A 50.73 a vii>50.73 a x 73.71(b)73.71 c OTHER NAME J.D.Arbnckle, Licensing Technical Specialist I ICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)(509)377-4601 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE COMPONENT MNA/FACTVRK R REPORTABLE TO EPIX CAUSE COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES gf yes, completed EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).ABSTRACF: NO EXPECTED MONTH DAY On June 6, 1998 at 1359 hours0.0157 days <br />0.378 hours <br />0.00225 weeks <br />5.170995e-4 months <br />, with the plant in a shutdown condition for the annual maintenance and refueling outage, unexpected engineered safety feature isolations and initiations occurred during logic system functional testing of Traversing Incore Probe (TIP)System purge isolation valve TIP-V-15.During the test, an electrical jumper was removed as directed by the procedure.

However, by design, removal of the jumper resulted in isolations and initiations associated with Nuclear Steam Supply.Shutoff System Group 3 (reactor building and containment) and Group 4 (miscellaneous balance of plant)Division 2 trip systems and logic channels.The procedure incorrectly directed removal of the electrical jumper before resetting of the half-isolation signals during the test.As an immediate corrective action, Control Room Operators responded in an appropriate and timely manner by taking action to restore all systems to pre-event lineup status.The cause of this event is a procedural deficiency.

The procedure should have directed removal of the electrical jumper after resetting the half-isolation signals, rather than before.Further corrective actions consist of counseling the individuals involved in the preparation and review of the procedure on the importance of attention to detail and self-checking during procedure development, and revising the logic system functional test prior to the next performance of the procedure.

There were no safety consequences associated with this event.No plant'condition requiring the engineered safety features existed and all isolations

'and initiations occurred as designed.Therefore, this event had no impact on the health and safe of either the ublic or lant ersonnel.

<<ly LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System Group 3 and 4 Isolations During Testing pAcrLzTr NAME fi.)Washington Nuclear Plant Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER i2)50-397 98 LER NUMBER i6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 009 REVISION NlYB E R 00 PAGE i3)2 QF 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRG Form 366A)(17)Event Descri tion On June 6, 1998 at 1359 hours0.0157 days <br />0.378 hours <br />0.00225 weeks <br />5.170995e-4 months <br />, with the plant in a shutdown condition for the annual maintenance and refueling outage, unexpected engineered safety feature isolations and initiations occurred during logic system functional testing of Traversing Incore Probe (TIP)[IG]System purge isolation valve TIP-V-15 PSV].During the test, an electrical jumper was removed as directed by the procedure.

Removal of the jumper resulted in isolations and initiations associated with Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System[BD]Group 3 (reactor building and containment) and Group 4 (miscellaneous balance of plant)Division 2 trip systeins and logic channels.The following isolations and initiations occurred:~Isolation of Reactor Building and Primary Containment Supply and Exhaust Ventilation

[VB]Initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment System[BH]~Isolation of Suppression Pool[BT]letdown (by means of the Fuel Pool Cooling System[DA])Isolation of the Equipment and Floor Drain Systems[BD]Initiation of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System[VH]~Isolation of the Reactor Closed Cooling Water System[CC]~Shedding of Division 2, non-vital Buses MC-8C and MC-8E[EC]The logic system functional test procedure incorrectly directed removal of the electrical jumper before resetting of the half-isolation signals.By design, removal of the jumper before resetting the half-isolation signals caused the engineered safety feature isolations and initiations.

The procedure should have directed removal of the electrical jumper after resetting the half-isolation signals during the test.Immediate Corrective Action Plant Control Room Operators secured Reactor Recirculation (RRC)[AD]System pump RRC-'P-1A[P]due to loss of the reactor closed cooling water system.At 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br />, operators entered Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)5.3.1,"Secondary Containment Control," when Secondary Containment

[NG]differential pressure was observed to be slightly greater than zero due to isolation of reactor building ventilation.

At 1403 hours0.0162 days <br />0.39 hours <br />0.00232 weeks <br />5.338415e-4 months <br />, secondary containment differential pressure was restored to within normal limits and operators exited EOP 5.3.1.The operators also verified that the isolations and initiations were consistent with a Division 2 FAZ isolation and continued to respond in an appropriate and timely manner by taking action to restore all systems to pre-event lineup status.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System Group 3 and 4 Isolations During Testing FACILITY NAME (I)Washington Nuclear Plant Unit 2 OOCKET NUMBER (2)50-397 98 LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NAKER 009 gEVISION WEBER 00 PAGE (3)3 QF 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)Further Evaluation 1.This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature.2.During event recovery efforts, reactor core circulation and decay heat removal were maintained by means of operating the Residual Heat Removal System tBO], Loop B, in the shutdown cooling mode.3..On June 6, 1998 at 1641 hours0.019 days <br />0.456 hours <br />0.00271 weeks <br />6.244005e-4 months <br />, event recovery efforts were completed in accordance with Abnormal Condition Procedure 4.12.4.6,"FAZ." Root Cause The cause of this event was attributed to a procedural deficiency that occurred during the conversion process pertaining to implementation of the Improved Technical Specifications.

The Supply System converted to the Improved Technical Specifications in March 1997.Prior to the conversion, Plant Procedure (PPM)7.4.3.2.2.1,"Containment Isolation-LSFT," was used to perform containment isolation logic system functional testing in accordance with the surveillance requirements of the Technical Specifications.

The frequency for'performing this procedure was once every 18 months.This procedure contained the correct sequence of steps to ensure that an unplanned engineered safety feature actuation would not occur.As part of.the procedure, fuses were removed to simulate partial logic actuation and an electrical jumper was installed.

Following I'e-installation of the fuses and resetting of the half-isolation signals, the jumper was then removed.,As part of the Improved Technical Specification implementation process, PPM 7.4.3.2.2.1 was converted to PPM TSP-CONT/ISOL-,B501,"Containment Isolation-LSFT." Other than formatting changes to reflect the Improved Technical Specifications and editorial enhancements, no other changes to the procedure were planned.However, during the revision process, the steps were inadvertently re-sequenced such that the procedure now directed removal of the electrical jumper before resetting of the half-isolation signals.By design, removal of the jumper before resetting the half-isolations caused the engineered safety feature isolations and initiations.

In this particular case, the procedure was not reviewed to the level of detail necessary to ensure that there would be no unplanned engineered safety system actuations when the procedure.was converted to reflect the Improved Technical Specifications.

This was the first time that this section of the procedure had been performed since the conversion to the Improved Technical Specifications.

The frequency for performing this procedure was also changed to once every 24 months as part of the conversion.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System Group 3 and 4 Isolations During Testing FACILITY NAME (I)DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVIS ICN NUNaEA PAGE (3)Washington Nuclear Plant Unit 2 50-397'8 009 00 4 OF 4 TEXT (If more space is reqaired, use addi()onal copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)Further Corrective Action f 1.Individuals involved in the preparation and review of the procedure were counseled on the importance of attention to detail and self-checking during procedure development.

2.Prior to the next performance of the procedure, TSP-CONT/ISOL-B501 will be revised to correct the instructions for the logic system functional test.Ass ment of Safe Conse uences There were no safety consequences associated with this'vent.

No plant condition requiring the engineered safety features existed'nd all isolations and initiations occurred as designed.Therefore, this event had no impact on the health and safety of either the public or plant personnel.

imilar Even Although there have been safety system actuations in the past associated with less than adequate procedures, this is the first event where engineered safety system actuations were the result of a procedural deficiency that occurred as part of the conversion process associated with implementation of the Improved Technical Specifications.