ML18219C357

LER 1976-018-00 & LER 1976-019-00 for Donald C. Cook, Unit 1 One Accelerometer Out of Three Found Movable Mass Hard-Up Against Stops & Reactor Coolant System Pressure Increasing

ML18219C357
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	05/14/1976
From:	Jurgensen R American Electric Power Service Corp, Indiana Michigan Power Co, (Formerly Indiana & Michigan Power Co)
To:	James Keppler NRC/IE, NRC/RGN-III
References
LER 1976-018-00, LER 1976-019-00
Download: ML18219C357 (6)

Text

NRC FORM 195 I2.78)U.S.NUCLEAA AEGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKET NUMIIER 50-315 FILE NUMBER XNCIDENT REPORT Tp:..G.Keppler,.~'RQM:Indiana

&Michigan Power, Co.Bridgman, Michigan R.W.Jurgensen DATE OF DOCUMENT 5-14-76 DATE RECEIVED 5-20-76 QLETTER 0ORIGINAL@COPY CINOTOAIZED CYUNCLASSIFI ED PROP INPUT FOAM NUMSER OF COPIES RECEIVED 40'ESCRIPTION Ltr.trass the following........

PLANT NAM.: Co>>>1~p~W>6+4@>P4e ENCLOSURE Licensee Event Report (ROO.)n)76-18)pn 4-19-7 Concerning one A'cceleromhher out of'three foun movable mass.hztC-up against stops....Licensee Event'Report (R.O.8 76-19)on 4-14-7 (oncern)igg Reactor Coolant System Pressure Increasing to 1040 PSIG (40 Carbon Cys.Received).Z)O@OT aEMOVF, ACKNOWLED<<D

'OT/: IF.PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J.COLLXNS~Oetl4f~~t SAFETY BRANCH CHIEF.: W 3 CYS FOR ACTXON LXC.ASST: W/CYS ACRS CYS Kniel Sergice ENT TO LA FOR ACTION/INFORMATION ENVXRO AB XL NRC PDR 6 E 2 INTERNAL D IST Rl BUTION SCHROEDER/XPPOLITO NOVAK CHECK IIES SCHWEN ER TEDESCO tQ CCA SHAO OLLlIER BUNCH KRE F.OLL NS LPDR TXC NSIC EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION CONTROL NUMBER 5105 NRC FORM 195 I2.7II)

B~~m'l P oo ceno usmc tray 14, 1976 6 0 1876 Mal Section Doc4t c4<k Nr.J.G.Keppler, Regional Director Office of Inspection and Enforcenient United States Nuclear Regulatory Commiss Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 1 0 cr,","...IMIAllIA 8c bfICHIGAfi!

POWER CONPAIJIE'ONAIiD C.COOING YUCLF AR I LA%a'T P.O.IIox 458, Drid>',man, michigan 49106~p/'f')~M(A{g@g)A(41~egg Operating License DPR-58 Docket No.50-315

Dear ter.Keppler:

Pursuant to the requirements of Appendix A Technical Specifications and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide l.16, Revision 4, Section 2.b, the following reports are submitted:

RO 50-315/76-18 RO 50-315/76-19 Since ely, R.W.g sen Plant tlanager/bab CC: R.S.Hunter J.E.Dolan G.E.Lien R.Kilburn R.J.Vollen BPI R.C.Callen tlPSC K.R.Baker RO: III P.lt.Steketee, Esq.R.Walsh, Esq, G.Charnoff, Esq.G.Olson J.H.Hennigan PNSRC RES.Keith Dir., IE (30 copies)Dir., HIPC (3 copies)

IUCENSEE EVEtIT I~EPOAT~CONTROL~/LOCK:

LLCCNSEC txAME LICENSE NULIOLA 0 0-0 0 0 0 0 1~I 15 (PLEASE PAINT ALI.AEOUIAED INFOAIVIATION)

I ICftISE f.vf NI I YPE I Yl'E o o Loa~f 25 20 30.31;I2 Af PO AT CATEOOAY Z YPE~0'I CQf41~L/0 57 50 59 AfPAAI SUUACE FIOAT(I tIUMI IF A~L 0 5 0-0 3 00 01 LVI t4I OATE IIIPOIIT IIAfC 1 5[0 Il 1 9 7'6 0 5 4 7 6 00 09 75 UO FVENT DESCRIPTION

[oO~]Nhil'e in trode 5 Performance of Calibration Test on Seismic Peak Recording Accelerometer.

7 09UO I located in the s ent fuel pit area and reactor pit area found one AcceleroiIIeter out of 7 09 UO Jog three on each instrument with the movable IIIass hard-up against the stops.The units 7 0 9 Qg were re laced with functional units from more accessible areas (RO-50-315/7C-19) 7 0 9~06 7 0 9 SYSTEM CAUSE COOE COOS~a~~XX G X 7 0 9 10 11 12 CAUSE DESCRIPTION

[os COI IPONENT COOC FAME COMPIINEN'f SUPPUCA X X X X X~L 17 43 COMPONFNT IJIANLIFACI U~A T 1 0 0 VIOLATION nt deterioration.

The surveillance schedule has been changed 00 00 7 0 9 toOj9 t r uire annual calibration of these instruments vice 18 Honthly.Qoj 00 00 OTHEA STATUS ADDITIONAL FACTORS Q~g I HA'/II I}7 09 FACILITY S'f A'T US POWEA.0~QO 0 IIA 7 0 9 10 12 13 FOAM OF ACTIVITY COATENT AELCASEO OF AELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY Kg Z Z NA 7 0 9 10 11 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMOEA TYPF.OESCAIPTION

~>>~no o z IIII/09 11 12 13 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMOEA OESCAIPTION

~>4~00 0 II A 7 09 11 12 PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES Q~g I 7 09 LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE OESCAlPTION Q~g Z HA 7 09 10 PUOLICITY NA 7 0 9 MCTHOO OF OlSCOVEAY OISCOVEAY OESCAlPTION 8 Surveillance Testing 40 LOCATION OF AELEASE NA 44 45 00 00 00 7 09 NAF,IE G.Swan PHON-.616-465-5901 (368)CI'0 011 oGT

~LICENSEE EVEIVT AEPonr CONTROL OL5CK: LICENSEE NAME Jog tl I D C C 1 7 09 14 LLCllvSE NUMI'I'n O O 0 0 0 00 15 0 0 05 I.ICI NSE I YPE EVENT TYPE 4 1 1 1 1 LOO3)30 31 30>6 r PLEASE PAINT ALL AKOUIAEO INFOAlVIATION)

AEponT nfponl cATroonv-Tvvf souncE OOCIiLT l'UMliln l'VI IIT UA'll.Iocijcowc~L~L 0 5 0 0 3 I 5 0 O I II 7 7 0 57 50 59 60 61 60 69 nil>onl DAIr 6 0 5]4 7 6 74 75 Uo EVENT OESCRIPTION Jog ftHILE IN tfODE 5, WITH REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEtl RESPONSE TIt1E TESTING IN PROGRESS, AN 7 0 9 00 m It)ADVERTENT LET-DOWff ISOLATION WAS INITIATED WlfICH CAUSED REACTOR COOLAtfT SYSTEtf PRESSURl 7 09 II 0~gq TO INCREASE TO 1040 PSIG WHILE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEtl PRESSURE llAS 1100F EXCEEDING LItfIT.7 8 9[oOJ SET FORTH It<TECffNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PARAGRAPH 3.4.9.1.7 0 9 tm 7 0 9 SYSTEM CAUSE CODE CODE (SEE SUP PLEf 1ENT)COMPONENT CODE PAME COMPONENT sUPPUEA COMPONENT MA>vr*cTunln RO-50-315/76-18 VIOLATIOV 00 IOOYI~cA 0 z z z z z z~z z z z z~Y 7 0 9 10 11 12 17 43 44 47 40 CAUSE OESCRIPTION Jog PRERE(jUISITES FOR RESPONSE TIME TESTING INCLUDED PLACING BOTH PROTECTION SYSTEt1 TRAINS 7 0 9 Q~g It<TEST SIIIULTANEOUSLY AND REtfOVING TRAIN B OUTPUT FUSES.REMOVAL OF THESE FUSES 7 0 9~10 DEEr<ERGIZED RELAYS GIVING LETDOWN ISOLATION AND RHR ISOLATION.(SEE SUPPLEtdENT) 00 7 09 fACILITY STATUS 5I POWEA OTHEA STATUS G~00 0 NA 7 0 9 10 12 13 fOAM OF ACTIVITY COATENT AELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY Q~g z~z tTA 7 0 9 10 11 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMOEA TYPE OESCAIPI'ION

~s~oo o~z w 7 09 11 12 13 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMSEA OESCAIPTION Pg~QO 0 IN 7 09 11 12 PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES Q~s]NA 7 89 LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE OESCAIPTION

~16~NA 7 09 10 PUBLICITY tQ 7 09 AOOITIONAL FACTORS Q~g NA Q3gJ 7 89 NAME.G SWAtf METHOD OF OISCOvEnv 44 45 46 44 45 OISCOVEAY OESCAIP'AON OPERATIONAL EVENT LOCATION OF AELEASE 80 00 00 00 OU i'tiovr::(~1~)

I65-%01+68)(.I'II ii I~o 6 7

'LICENSEE EVENT REPORT RO-50-315/76-18 SUPPLEt1EHT SUPPLEtlENT TO EVENT DESCRIPTION A fracture mechanics analysis of this overpressurization transient was performed by Westinghouse Electric Corporation.

This analysis shows that the transient did not affect the structural integrity of the reactor vessel.ASSUNPTIOHS OF THE ANALYSIS-Since irradiation effects the fracture toughness of the beltline region of the reactor vessel, and the pressure temperature curves are determined for this region, only the core beltline region was considered in this analysis.Ho there>al stress contribution was used in the analysis.The fracture mechanics analysis was based on the methods as defined in Appendix G to Section III of the ASME Code.CONCLUSIONS OF THE ANALYSIS-As indicated by performed analysis, the stress intensity factor for a 1/4 thickness flaw in the beltline region is less than the fracture toughness by a factor of approximately 1.3.The 1/4 thickness flaw would not have become critical.Furthermore, the assumption of a 1/4 thickness flaw is extremely conservative as compared with any flaw that may be present in the pressure vessel.In addition, a fatigue evaluation was made which indicated that the contribution of the overpressuri zation transient to the total fatigue usage factor is negligible.

It should be noted that the total cumulative fatigue usage factor due to all the transients specified to occur during the 40 year life of the plant is less than 0.0024.The results of the fracture mechanics analysis and the fatigue evaluation indicate that the integrity of the reactor vessel was not affected and that the reactor coolant system is acceptable for continued operation.

AEP Service Corporation engineers and the Plant Nuclear Safety Review Committee have evaluated the Westinghouse analysis and.oncur with the conclusions reached by this analysis.SUPPLEMENT TO CAUSE DESCRIPTION A Temporary Change Sheet was written to the procedure to disable the isolations by lifting the lead on TB 148-12 in the Train B Auxiliary Relay Cabinet to prevent this problem from recurring.