ML17348A477
| ML17348A477 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 12/14/2017 |
| From: | McFeaters C V Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LR-N17-0188 IR 2017003 | |
| Download: ML17348A477 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000272/2017003
Text
PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks
Blidge, NJ 08038-0236
DEC 1 4 2017 LR-N17-0188
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission,
ATTN: Document
Control Desk, Washington,
DC 20555-0001
Salem Generating
Station,
Unit 1 Renewed Facility
Operating
License No. DPR-70 NRC Docket No. 50-272 Subject:
Response
to Integrated
Inspection
Report 05000272/2017003
and 05000311/2017003
Reference:
(1) Salem Nuclear Generating
Station,
Units 1 and 2-Integrated
Inspection
Report 05000272/2017003
and 05000311/2017003
PSEG is submitting
this letter to contest the Green non-cited
violation
(NCV) of Salem Generating
Station (Salem) Unit 1 technical
specification
(TS) limiting
condition
for operation
(LCO) 3.6.1.1 as described
in NRC Inspection
Report 05000272/2017003
and 05000311/2017003
(Reference
1 ). The NRC stated that a violation
existed because PSEG did not ensure that the air particulate
detector
(APD) backup containment
isolation
valves (CIV), associated
with penetrations
required
to be closed during accident
conditions,
were unisolated
intermittently
under appropriate
administrative
controls.
Specifically,
manual CIVs associated
with the APD sampling
system were opened and left continuously
open for 27 days, under tagging instructions
that would have resulted
in an actual open penetration
outside of containment
during certain design basis accidents
and PSEG had not evaluated
the adequacy
of the tagging instruction
to ensure radiological
dose consequences
would remain in conformance
with the licensing
basis. PSEG Nuclear respectfully
requests
that this non-cited
violation
be withdrawn.
As described
in the attachment,
administrative
controls
put in place to govern the open
USNRC Document
Control Desk LR-N17-0188
Page 2 remote manual CIVs were adequate.
Operating
in a manner that keeps important
monitoring
equipment
like the APD in service promotes
public health and safety. The unintended
consequence
of this violation
could adversely
impact safety by encouraging
licensees
to disable such equipment.
During the pendency
of the NRC review of our appeal on the NCV, PSEG Nuclear will toll the timing related to submission
of a licensee
event report (LER) as may be required
under 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B).
There are no regulatory
commitments
in this correspondence.
Should there be any questions
regarding
this matter, please contact Jean Fleming,
Director,
Site Regulatory
Compliance,
at 856-339-1653.
Charles V. McFeaters
Site Vice President
Salem Generating
Station Attachment
*---*------*---
........
. cc: Mr. David C. Lew, Regional
Administrator-
Region I, NRC Ms. Carleen J. Parker, Project Manager-US NRC Mr. Patrick W. Finney, NRC Senior Resident
Inspector-
Salem (X24) Ms. Anne T. Boland, Director,
Office of Enforcement,
US NRC Mr. Patrick Mulligan,
Chief NJ Bureau of Nuclear Engineering
/Manager
IV Mr. Thomas J. Cachaza,
Salem Commitment
Tracking
Coordinator
(H02) Mr. Lee A. Marabella-
Corporate
Commitment
Tracking
Coordinator
(N21)
LR-N17-0188
Attachment
1 Attachment
1 Administrative
Controls
Related to Salem Unit 1 Containment
Isolation
Valves Page 1 of 13
LR-N17-0188
Attachment
1 This attachment
provides
background
information
and addresses
the individual
NRC concerns
that are discussed
in the contested
NCV. That discussion
is followed
by identification
and discussion
of two additional
concerns.
Those concerns
have the potential
for unintended
consequences
and backfit issues associated
with the NCV. Background
The containment
APD monitors
for the presence
of radionuclides
in the containment
atmosphere.
The actual radiation
monitor is located outside of containment
and is supplied
with containment
air through one inch diameter
sample lines. The sample lines are equipped
with normally
open air operated
CIVs identified
as 1VC7, 8, 11 and 12 that automatically
close in response
to accident
conditions.
A parallel
flow path is provided
that is equipped
with normally
closed air operated
valves (AOV) identified
as 1 VC9, 10, 13 and 14. These are the 'manual CIVs' the NRC refers to. These manual CIVs can be closed remotely
from the control room by operation
of a switch. The flow paths are illustrated
below. The containment
ventilation
sampling
skid identified
below as S1 RM-1 RME25 contains
both the APD and a gaseous radioactivity
(radiogas)
monitoring
system. Isolating
air flow to the skid disables
both monitoring
systems.
1VC'llB I I CCtHAINMENT
VENI SAMPLING
S!RM*!RME25 wcq11 wcq XA*\5 A.O. 1'*22C J CONTAINMENT
RADIATION
MONITORING
SYSTEM SAMPLE INLET 8t OUTLET ISOLATION
VAS. REFERENCE
DRAWING 23BB05-8-9638
(PIPING)
Page 2 of 13 ----0 -----fffij
!RP! OUTLET CLO 0,1 ----0
f*C 6358 l*A
LR-N17-0188
Attachment
1 Salem Unit 1 TS prescribes
the following
definitions
and LCOs: * TS 1.7 states CONTAINMENT
INTEGRITY
shall exist when all penetrations
required
to be closed during accident
conditions
are either capable of being closed by an operable
containment
automatic
isolation
valve system, or closed by manual valves, blind flanges,
or deactivated
automatic
valves secured in their closed positions,
except for valves that are open under administrative
control as permitted
by TS 3.6.3.1.
- LCO 3.6.1.1 requires
that CONTAINMENT
INTEGRITY
be maintained
when operating
in modes 1, 2, 3 and 4. Surveillance
requirement
(SR) 4.6.1.1.a1
is associated
with this LCO and requires
that CIVs required
to be closed during accident
conditions
are closed except for CIVs that are open under administrative
controls.
- LCO 3.6.3.1 requires
when operating
in modes 1, 2, 3 and 4. NOTE 1 to this LCO allows intermittently
opening CIVs under administrative
controls.
The basis section of TS for this LCO explains
that opening of locked or sealed closed CIVs on an intermittent
basis under administrative
controls
includes
three considerations:
1) Stationing
a dedicated
individual,
who is in constant
communication
with the control room, at the valve controls;
2) Instructing
the dedicated
individual
to close the valves in an accident
situation;
and 3) Assuring
that environmental
conditions
will not preclude
access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity
outside of containment.
- LCO 3.4.6.1 requires
that three reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage detection
methods be OPERABLE.
The required
methods include containment
atmosphere
particulate
radioactivity,
the containment
sump level, and either the containment
fan cooler condensate
flow rate or the containment
atmosphere
gaseous radioactivity
monitoring
system. The associated
action statement
requires
grab sampling
of the containment
atmosphere
if the APD or gaseous radioactivity
monitoring
system is not operable.
Section 5.2. 7.1 of the Salem updated final safety analysis
report (UFSAR) explains
that reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage is detected
by radiation
sensitive
instruments
(APD and radiogas
monitor),
humidity
detection,
increased
RCS makeup to maintain
constant
pressurizer
level and increased
containment
sump level. The UFSAR Page 3 of 13
LR-N17-0188
Attachment
1 description
explains
that the APD is the most sensitive
instrument
of those available
to detect RCS leakage into containment.
Finally,
1 VC9, 10, 13 and 14 are tested each calendar
quarter by measuring
the time it takes to close. Local leak rate testing of the associated
is completed
every refueling
outage. The remote valve position
indications
are tested every two years. As described
in the contested
NCV, CIVs 1VC7, 8, 11 and 12 (the "automatic
CIVs") were closed to support work on an unrelated
radiation
monitor.
CIVs 1VC9, 10, 13 and 14 (the "remote-manual
CIVs") were opened to allow the containment
APD to continue
operating.
This configuration
was entered pursuant
to a clearance
and tagging document
that mandated
placement
of information
tags to alert control room operators
that the automatic
CIVs were disabled
and that the remote-manual
CIVs needed to be closed in the event of an accident.
This was a planned maintenance
activity
that began on December
8, 2016 and was successfully
completed
on January 4, 2017. The NRC states that: * Tagging instructions
may have caused a penetration
to remain open for some accident
scenarios;
- PSEG failed to adequately
assess the tagging instructions
to ensure radiological
dose consequences
would remain below licensing
basis limits; * PSEG did not assess the timing of the control room action to close the manual CIVs; * A technical
evaluation
prepared
in response
to inspection
questions
was inadequate;
- Placement
of a note in LCO 3.6.3.1 mandates
entry into the associated
action statement
before the guidelines
of the note can be invoked;
- Emergency
operating
procedure
(EOP) guidance
to check CIVs closed was insufficient;
and * Operation
during the maintenance
activity
with remote-manual
CIVs open was continuous
and not intermittent.
PSEG Nuclear contends
that this NCV is erroneously
classified
as a violation.
The following
discussion
addresses
each of these aspects of the NCV. This is followed
by a discussion
of two additional
considerations.
The additional
considerations
are unintended safety consequences
of prosecuting
this NCV and backfit concerns.
Page 4 of 13
LR-N17-0188
Attachment
1 Adequacy
of the Tagging Instructions
The NRC states that the tagging instructions
may have caused an open penetration
for some accident
scenarios
and that PSEG failed to adequately
assess the tagging instructions
to ensure radiological
dose consequences
would remain below licensing
basis limits. PSEG Nuclear asserts that a radiological
dose consequence
analysis
is not required
by administrative
controls
associated
with opening a CIV or by the clearance
and tagging process.
The tagging instructions
associated
with this work indicated
that the open/close
indication
for 1 VC8 and 1 VC12 will extinguish
when the power supply breaker is opened and tags are hung. These extinguished
lights continuously
indicate
to operators
that the configuration
is not normal. The tagging instructions
state the remote-manual
valves must be manually
closed from the control room if a Phase 'A' containment
isolation
signal were to occur. These instructions
were carried from shift to shift through the turnover
process.
The tagging included
three instructional
tags posted in the control room that would alert control room operators
of the configuration.
One tag was at the switch for inboard valves 1 VC9 and 1 VC13. Another tag was at the switch for outboard
valves 1 VC1 0 and 1 VC14. The third tag was on a control room operating
panel to alert control room operators
that the backup APD valves were open. These instructions
were sufficient
to alert operators
of the need to isolate the APD containment
air flow path if necessary.
The NRC stated that PSEG did not evaluate the
adequacy
of the tagging instruction
to ensure radiological
dose consequences
would remain in conformance
with the station licensing
basis. There is no requirement
to perform such an evaluation
in the clearance
and tagging process or, as described
below, in the administrative
controls
associated
with opening CIVs. The tagging instructions
were written to comply with the TS bases of LCO 3.6.3.1.
The TS basis provides
requirements
for administrative
controls
that include a dedicated
operator
in constant
communication
with the control room, with instructions
to close the valves and in an environment
that does not preclude
successful
operation.
Here, the dedicated
operator
is a control room operator;
who was required
to be in the control room by technical
specifications
and was provided
with instructions
to manually
close the remote-manual
CIVs if a Phase 'A' containment
isolation
signal occurs. The technical
specifications
administrative
controls
section 6.2.2.b requires
that at least one licensed
Reactor Operator
shall be in the control room when fuel is in the reactor.
By virtue of the Salem licensing
basis, the operator's
presence
in the control room met the administrative
requirements
for constant
communication
and for a safe environment.
Page 5 of 13
LR-N17-0188
Attachment
1 The Enforcement
section of the NCV indicates
that PSEG did not evaluate
the adequacy
of the tagging instruction
to ensure radiological
dose consequences
would remain in conformance
with the licensing
basis. The NRC Enforcement
Manual, section 2.2.5, requires
that a NCV provide sufficient
detail to substantiate
the existence
of a violation
associated
with a green significance
determination
process (SOP) outcome.
NRC Inspection
Manual 0612, Power Reactor Inspection
Reports,
section 06.03, requires
identification
of the requirement
or standard
that was not met and a description
of how the licensee
failed to satisfy the requirement
or standard.
However,
the NCV Description
and Analysis
sections
were not specific
with regard to tagging instruction
deficiencies.
PSEG Nuclear asserts that the instructions
were adequate
based on the above discussion.
Adequacy
of the Technical
Evaluation
The NRC states that PSEG did not assess the timing of the manual action to close the remote-manual
CIVs and that a technical
evaluation
prepared
in response
to inspection
related questions
was inadequate.
PSEG Nuclear asserts that a technical
evaluation
of dose consequences
or timing of the manual action to close the remote-manual
CIVs is not required.
The NRC asserts that a technical
evaluation
did not ensure radiological
dose consequences
would remain within the station licensing
basis. A technical
evaluation
of dose consequences
is not a requirement
for administrative
controls
of CIVs or clearance
and tagging.
Moreover,
the maintenance
activity
is not within the scope of 1 OCFR50.59
because the activities
are considered
maintenance.
NEI 96-07, "Guidelines
for 10CFR50.59
Implementation",
supports
this understanding
and was endorsed
by the NRC by Regulatory
Guide 1.187, "Guidance
for Implementation
of 1 OCFR50.59,
Changes,
Tests, and Experiments".
The technical
evaluation
was prepared
to support NRC inspection
efforts and is not a requirement
to open a CIV under administrative
controls.
The NRC disagreed
with a fundamental
assumption
of the unrequired
evaluation,
that CIVs would be isolated
before the onset of fuel damage. In their assessment,
the NRC relied on the alternate
source term (AST) amendment
to the plant licensing
basis and rejected
application
of leak before break (LBB) assumptions
that are consistent
with the Salem licensing
basis for large primary loop ruptures.
1 The NRC states the unrequired
technical
evaluation
was inadequate
because it assumed the remote-manual
CIVs U. 5. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
letter dated May 25, 1994; granting
approval
to eliminate
primary loop pipe rupture from the design basis for Salem, Units 1 and 2. Page 6 of 13
LR-N17-0188
Attachment
1 would be isolated
within ten minutes instead of thirty seconds of accident
initiation.
The ten minute assumption
is consistent
with the Salem licensing
basis that includes
LBB of large primary loop ruptures.
2 Interpreting
the licensing
basis in this fashion effectively
invalidates
all TS and UFSAR provisions
that allow opening of CIVs under administrative
controls
because a thirty second closure is an unrealistic
expectation
that would render administrative
control unachievable.
Consequently,
this interpretation
raises backfit issues that require resolution
per 1 OCFR50.1
09. To summarize,
the technical
evaluation
is not a requirement
for administrative
control of CIVs or the PSEG Nuclear clearance
and tagging process.
The tagging instructions
were written in conformance
with the TS prescribed
administrative
controls
for CIVs and did not require a dose consequence
analysis.
Finally,
maintenance
activities
are governed
by 1 OCFR50.65(a)(4)
and plant TS. As such, maintenance
activities
are exempt from 1 OCFR50.59.
Sufficiency
of Emergency
Operating
Procedure
(EOP) Guidance
The NRC stated the technical
evaluation
was inadequate
because it assumed the expected
time for operators
to reach a step in the EOPs that mandates
verification
of Phase 'A' isolation
would be ten minutes instead of thirty seconds.
The NRC stated that a number of steps preceding
step 10 of 1-EOP-TRIP-1,
"Reactor
Trip or Safety Injection"
would divert operators
to other EOPs. Step 10 directs operators
to verify that 1VC7, 8, 11 and 12 (the automatic
CIVs) are closed. However,
the EOP flow path directs operators
to close the remote-manual
CIVs for each diversion
out of TRIP-1 as detailed
below: * Step 2 of 1-EOP-TRIP-1
directs operators
to confirm that the reactor is tripped.
If the reactor
is not tripped,
they are directed
to functional
recovery
procedure,
1-EOP-FRSM-1,
"Response
to Nuclear Power Generation",
to take higher priority
actions related to anticipated
without scram (A TWS). Step 7 of FRSM-1 directs operators
to 1-EOP-APPX-3,
"SI Verification".
Step 3 of APPX-3 directs operators
to close phase 'A' CIVs. * Step 4 of 1-EOP-TRIP-1
directs operators
to 1-EOP-LOPA-1
"Loss of all AC Power", if all 4kV vital electric
buses are not energized.
Step 22 of LOPA-1 directs operators
to close the automatic
CIVs. At this point, the tagging instructions
would alert operators
that the remote-manual
CIVs should be closed. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
letter dated May 25, 1994; granting
approval
to eliminate
primary loop pipe rupture from the design basis for Salem, Units 1 and 2. Page 7 of 13
LR-N17-0188
Attachment
1 * Step 5 of 1-EOP-TRIP-1
directs operators
to 1-EOP-TRIP-2,
"Reactor
Trip Response"
only if a safety injection
(SI) is not required;
in which case a Phase 'A' actuation
is neither required
nor desired.
A continuous
action step in TRIP-2 returns operators
to 1-EOP-TRIP-1
if a Sl has been initiated.
Therefore,
operators
would return to a procedure
that directs verification
of Phase 'A' actuations.
Each diversion
prior to 1-EOP-TRIP-1, step 10 addresses
higher priority
accident
symptoms
and directs verification
of Phase 'A' actuations
at the most appropriate
time. Timing of the Manual Actions The NRC stated that the timing of CIV manual actions was not evaluated
prior to implementation
of the tagging instructions.
The requirements
to implement
CIV administrative
controls
do not require an evaluation
of the timeliness
of those manual actions.
Further,
the tagging instructions
directed
operators
to close the remote-manual
CIVs in a timely manner as directed
by the EOPs. LCO 3.6.3.1 and Associated
Notes LCO 3.6.3.1 has three notes. Note 1 allows penetration
flow paths to be unisolated
intermittently
under administrative
controls.
Note 2 excludes
containment
purge valves from the CIV classification
if isolated
by blind flange. Note 3 allows the containment
pressure-vacuum
relief isolation
valves to be opened intermittently,
under administrative
control,
to satisfy requirements
of LCO 3.6.1.4,
Containment
Systems,
Internal
Pressure.
The NRC stated that the action statement
associated
with LCO 3.6.3.1 must be entered to take advantage
of NOTE 1 because the notes appear below the line that separates
the LCO and associated
applicability
from the required
actions to be taken if the LCO is not met while operating
in an applicable
MODE. Construction
of the Salem LCO is consistent
with NUREG-1431,
"Standard
Technical
Specifications,
Plants".
This interpretation
set forth in the NCV is contrary
to Salem's longstanding
practice
of invoking
NOTE 3 to the same LCO when opening containment
pressure-vacuum
relief valves 1 VC5 and 1 VC6 to reduce containment
pressure.
This activity
has been Page 8 of 13
LR-N17-0188
Attachment
1 conducted
thousands
of time over the life of the plant without entering
the action statement
of LCO 3.6.3.1.
LCO 3.6.3.1 requires
According
to the Salem Technical
Requirements
Manual (TRM), the remote-manual
backup valves are CIVs and, as such, are required
to be operable.
However,
at no time during this maintenance
activity
were the valves inoperable.
They were open and capable of being closed by a dedicated
reactor operator
in the control room, who was given adequate
instructions
and an environmentally
secure location.
The Meaning of Intermittent
The NRC categorized
this maintenance
activity
as continuous
without distinguishing
'continuous'
from 'intermittent'.
PSEG Nuclear research
did not identify
a regulatory
definition
of 'intermittent'.
However,
this maintenance
activity
was shorter than ninety days at which point review under 1 OCFR50.59
would have been considered.
Finally,
LCO 3.6.1.1 requires
that containment
integrity
be maintained.
Surveillance
requirement
(SR) 4.6.1.1.a1
is associated
with this LCO and requires
that CIVs required
to be closed during accident
conditions
are closed except for CIVs that are open under administrative
controls.
The allowance
for use of administrative
controls
applies to OPERABLE
CIVs. The restriction
of intermittently
opening CIVs only applies to inoperable
CIVs. Therefore,
the SR is not required
to be met when the valves are open under administrative
controls
and the LCO is fully complied
with. Additional
Considerations
The discussion
above addresses
each point of NCV. The following
discussion
identifies
two additional
considerations;
specifically,
the potential
for unintended
safety consequences
and backfit concerns.
Risk-informed
Decision-making
The NRC Principles
of Good Regulation
include Efficiency,
Clarity and Reliability.
Efficiency
calls for regulatory
activities
that are consistent
with the degree of risk reduction
they achieve.
When multiple
effective
alternatives
are available,
the option Page 9 of 13
LR-N17-0188
Attachment
1 that uses the minimum use of resources
should be adopted.
Clarity calls for a clear nexus between regulations
and agency goals. Agency positions
should be readily understood
and easily applied.
Reliability
calls for the use of best available
knowledge
from research
and operational
experience.
The containment
APD is considered
the most sensitive
monitoring
method because it can more rapidly detect small RCS leaks that are likely to precede a large break of the RCS barrier.
PSEG's decision
to operate with the APD in service by opening the remote-manual
CIVs under administrative
control is wholly consistent
with safe operating
practices
and is aligned with the principles
of efficiency
and clarity.
Regulatory
activities
should be consistent
with the degree of risk reduction
they achieve.
The containment
at issue here are two one-inch
diameter
flow paths. Most full power internal
events (FPIE) probabilistic
risk assessments
(PRA) for commercial nuclear power
plants screen penetrations
of two inches or less from the level 2, large early release analysis.
PSEG could have isolated
the APD for up to 30 days and relied only on a daily grab sample of the containment
atmosphere.
This would have defeated
the safer alternative
of continuing
to operate the APD in the modified
lineup and could drive licensees
to take actions that do not reduce risk and can be shown to actually
increase
it. PSEG's actions were based on the best available
knowledge
regarding
leak behavior
and were aligned with the principle
of reliability.
Backfit Analysis
The NRC states that tagging instructions
may have caused an open penetration
for some accident
scenarios.
However,
PSEG has shown that the tagging instructions
met TS requirements
and complemented
the existing
EOPs to ensure sufficient
guidance
was available
to dedicated
operators
who had the means to perform the safety function.
The NRC states that PSEG failed to adequately
assess the tagging instructions
to ensure radiological
dose consequences
would remain below licensing
basis limits. However,
PSEG has shown that an assessment
of radiological
dose consequences
is not required.
The NRC states that PSEG did not assess the timing of the control room action to close the remote-manual
CIVs. However,
PSEG has shown that an assessment
of timing is not required.
The NRC states that a technical
evaluation
prepared
in response
to inspection
questions
was inadequate.
PSEG has shown that the technical
evaluation
uses the best available
knowledge
of RCS leak behavior
and was consistent
with the station licensing
basis that includes
LBB for large RCS piping. The NRC states that placement
of a note in LCO 3.6.3.1 mandates
entry into the Page 10 of 13
LR-N17-0188
Attachment
1 associated
action statement
before the guidelines
of the note can be invoked.
However,
PSEG has shown that this interpretation
is inconsistent
with many years of operation.
The NRC states that Salem Unit 1 EOP guidance
to check CIVs closed was insufficient.
However,
PSEG has shown that the EOP guidance
prioritizes
activities
based on accident
symptoms
and, in all cases, returns to a requirement
to ensure Phase 'A' containment
actuation
if required.
Finally,
the NRC states that operation
during maintenance
with remote-manual
CIVs open was continuous
and not intermittent.
However,
PSEG has shown that intermittent
is not precisely
defined by Salem TS or other related regulatory
guidance.
Given the NCV as written,
PSEG Nuclear is required
to take corrective
actions that include evaluating
dose consequences
when opening CIVs under administrative
controls
and defining
intermittent.
Moreover,
applying
a thirty second time limit to manually
close a CIV that is opened under administrative
controls
effectively
nullifies
the TS and UFSAR provisions
that allow opening a CIV under administrative
controls.
Finally,
PSEG Nuclear will be required
to file a licensee
event report per 1 OCFR50. 73 within sixty days of the event. However,
the event date is not defined because intermittent
is not defined.
Consequently,
PSEG Nuclear concludes
the NCV is a backfit subject to 1 OCFR50.1
09, as discussed
below. 1 OCFR50.1
09(a)(1)
defines BACKFITTING
to include modification
of or addition
to the procedures
required
to operate a facility.
This includes
imposition
of a new or different
interpretation
or regulatory
staff position
after the operating
license is issued. A demonstration
of substantial
increase
in public health and safety justifying
the additional
cost for implementation
is required
of the NRC unless the backfit meets one of three exceptions
set forth in 1 OCFR50.190(a)(4)(i)
through (iii). The regulatory
action represented
by this NCV does not fit any of the three exceptions.
1 OCFR50.190(a)(4)(i)
allows a backfit to be imposed without evaluation
and justification
if necessary
to restore compliance
with NRC requirements
(the "compliance
exception").
According
to section 3.1 of NUREG-1409,
"Backfitting
Guidelines",
the compliance
exception
is intended
to address situations
where the licensee
failed to meet known and established
standards
because of omission
or mistake of fact. The NCV at issue does not identify
a known and established
standard
that Salem Unit 1 is not complying
with. As described
above, the administrative
controls
were adequate,
consisting
of tagging instructions
that complemented
existing
EOPs for use by control room operators;
the technical
evaluation
was not required
before entering
the configuration
and was consistent
with the best available
knowledge;
the technical
specification
interpretation
was consistent
with longstanding
past practice; and
the distinction
between 'continuous'
and 'intermittent'
is not defined.
Nor does the NCV at issue identify
an omission
or Page 11 of 13
LR-N17-0188
Attachment
1 mistake of fact that NRC staff relied upon when the licensing
basis and LCOs were approved.
New or revised interpretations
do not fall within scope of this exception.
1 OCFR50.190(a)(4)(ii)
allows a backfit to be imposed without evaluation
and justification
if necessary
to ensure the facility
provides
adequate
protection
to the health and safety of the public and is in accord with the common defense and security
("provide
assurance
of adequate
protection").
Nevertheless,
per NUREG-1409,
a written evaluation
is needed to provide the objectives
of and reasons for a backfit modification
under the compliance
exception
or to provide assurance
of adequate
protection.
The written evaluation
must also disclose
the basis for invoking
either exception.
As discussed
above, the unrequired
technical
evaluation
used the best available
information
concerning
plant behavior
in a manner consistent
with the plant licensing
basis to provide assurance
of adequate
protection.
The NCV does not explain the objectives
or reasons for invoking
an exception
to the requirements
of 1 OCFR50.1
09. 1 OCFR50.190(a)(
4 )(iii) allows a backfit to be imposed without evaluation
and justification
if the regulatory
action defines or redefines
what level of protection
to the public health and safety or common defense
and security
is adequate
("new level of protection").
According
to NUREG-1409,
specific
criteria
determining
when adequate
protection
should be redefined
is not available.
However,
PSEG has shown that its actions enhanced
safety and that the alternative
of operating
with the APD unavailable
has potential
unintended
consequences
that arguably
make the plant less safe. Given that none of these exceptions
are applicable
to the issue, the regulation
requires
an evaluation
and justification
of the backfit per guidance
of 1 OCFR50.190(c)(1)
through (9). These considerations
include a general description
and estimated
costs of the activities
necessary
to complete
the backfit;
potential
impact on risk, safety and radiological
consequences;
and whether the backfit is interim or final. Conclusion
Issuing a violation
of Salem Unit 1 LCO 3.6.1.1 is not justified.
Salem Unit 1 remained
in full compliance
with its technical
specifications
and regulations.
PSEG Nuclear respectfully
requests
that this non-cited
violation
be withdrawn.
As described
in the attachment,
administrative
controls
put in place to govern the open remote manual CIVs were adequate.
PSEG Nuclear adequately
supported
inspection
efforts to assess potential
radiological
consequences
with a technical
evaluation
that applied the best available
knowledge
of plant behavior
that was also consistent
with the plant licensing
basis. Page 12 of 13
LR-N17-0188
Attachment
1 Operating
in a manner that keeps important
monitoring
equipment
like the APD in service promotes
public health and safety. The unintended
consequence
of this violation
could adversely
impact safety by encouraging
licensees
to disable such equipment.
Page 13 of 13