Information Notice 1984-09, Lessons Learned from NRC Inspections of Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Systems (10 CFR 50, Appendix R): Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:12 IN 84-09, Rev. 1 UNITED STATES
{{#Wiki_filter:12 IN 84-09, Rev.


1
===UNITED STATES===
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
===OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT===
WASHINGTON,
D.C.


WASHINGTON, D.C.    20555 March 7, 1984 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO.  84-09, REVISION 1:    LESSONS LEARNED FROM NRC
20555


===March 7, 1984===
IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO.
84-09, REVISION
1:
===LESSONS LEARNED FROM NRC===
INSPECTIONS OF FIRE PROTECTION
INSPECTIONS OF FIRE PROTECTION


SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS (10 CFR 50,
SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS (10 CFR 50,
                                                        APPENDIX R)
APPENDIX R)


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:
:
      All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL)       or
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL)  
or


construction permit (CP).
construction permit (CP).
Line 35: Line 49:
==Purpose==
==Purpose==
:
:
      This Information Notice is a revision to IE Information Notice No. 84-09 issued
This Information Notice is a revision to IE Information Notice No. 84-09 issued


on February 13, 1984.   Attachment 1 to this revision is a replacement page
on February 13, 1984.


===Attachment 1 to this revision is a replacement page===
which will accomplish a needed correction to subparagraph 4 of Section III of
which will accomplish a needed correction to subparagraph 4 of Section III of


IE Information Notice 84-09. The revision on page 2 is indicated in comparative
IE Information Notice 84-09.
 
===The revision on page 2 is indicated in comparative===
text and in the margin to highlight the change.


text and in the margin to highlight the change.      Licensees should add the
===Licensees should add the===
replacement page 2.


replacement page 2.  No specific action or response is required as a result of
No specific action or response is required as a result of


this replacement.
this replacement.
Line 55: Line 74:
*Edward L Jordan, Director
*Edward L Jordan, Director


Divis o of Emergency Preparedness and
===Divis o of Emergency Preparedness and===
 
Eangdeeringg Response
Eangdeeringg Response


Office of Inspection and Enforcement
===Office of Inspection and Enforcement===
 
Technical Contacts:  
Technical Contacts:   L. E. Whitney, IE
L. E. Whitney, IE


(301) 492-9668 T. Wambach, NRR
(301) 492-9668 T. Wambach, NRR


(301) 492-7072 Attachments:
(301) 492-7072 Attachments:
      1. Supplemental Guidance on 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Fire
1. Supplemental Guidance on 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Fire


Protection Safe Shutdown Requi.,ements, Replacement page 2
Protection Safe Shutdown Requi.,ements,  
      2.  List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices


===Replacement page 2===
2.
===List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices===
8402090024 640307 PDR I&E
8402090024 640307 PDR I&E


NOTICEB4-09       PDR
NOTICEB4-09 PDR


Attachment 1 IN 84-09, Rev. 1 March     1984 I11.Protection of Equipment Necessary To Achieve Hot Shutdown
===Attachment 1===
IN 84-09, Rev.
 
1 March
 
1984 I11. Protection of Equipment Necessary To Achieve Hot Shutdown


At one facility, redundant pressurizer heater control and power cables were
At one facility, redundant pressurizer heater control and power cables were
Line 85: Line 111:
each other and separated by a partial steel missile shield coated on one side
each other and separated by a partial steel missile shield coated on one side


with fire-retardant material.   The separation criteria of Appendix R, Section
with fire-retardant material.


===The separation criteria of Appendix R, Section===
III.G.2, were not met in that the coated shield did not meet the definition of
III.G.2, were not met in that the coated shield did not meet the definition of


a fire barrier of BTP APCSB 9.5-1.   No alternative means of feedwater supply
a fire barrier of BTP APCSB 9.5-1.


was designated.
===No alternative means of feedwater supply===
was designated.


At a second facility, redundant pressurizer heater load centers were located
At a second facility, redundant pressurizer heater load centers were located


within the same cabinet.   At a third facility, redundant steamline isolation
within the same cabinet.


===At a third facility, redundant steamline isolation===
valve control cables for HPCI and RCIC pumps were located in close proximity
valve control cables for HPCI and RCIC pumps were located in close proximity


Line 115: Line 144:
outside of primary containment to assure that one redundant train of equipment, cabling and associated circuits necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown
outside of primary containment to assure that one redundant train of equipment, cabling and associated circuits necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown


remains free of fire damage.   The alternatives are:
remains free of fire damage.
1.   Separation of redundant trains of equipment,   cabling, and associated
 
The alternatives are:
1.
 
Separation of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated


circuits by a three-hour fire barrier.
circuits by a three-hour fire barrier.


2.   Enclosure of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated
2.
 
Enclosure of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated


circuits by a one-hour fire barrier with fire detection and automratic fire
circuits by a one-hour fire barrier with fire detection and automratic fire
Line 126: Line 161:
suppression systems installed in the area.
suppression systems installed in the area.


3.   Separation of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated
3.
 
Separation of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated


circuits by a horizontal distance of 20 feet with no intervening combustibles
circuits by a horizontal distance of 20 feet with no intervening combustibles
Line 134: Line 171:
in the area.
in the area.


4.   Installation of alternative or dedicated shutdown capability independent
4.
 
Installation of alternative or dedicated shutdown capability independent


of the equipment, cabling, and associated circuits under consideration, and installation of fire detection and fixed fire suppression systems in
of the equipment, cabling, and associated circuits under consideration, and installation of fire detection and fixed fire suppression systems in


the area contining-this-aernative-or-dedic ted-shutdown-cepabity7 under consideration.                                                         R1 It should be noted *that Sections III.G.2.d, e and f of Appendix R, provide
the area contining-this-aernative-or-dedic ted-shutdown-cepabity7 under consideration.
 
R1 It should be noted *that Sections III.G.2.d, e and f of Appendix R, provide


additional options for the separation of redundant trains of equipment and
additional options for the separation of redundant trains of equipment and
Line 144: Line 185:
cableswithin non-inerted containments.
cableswithin non-inerted containments.


Attachment 2 IN 84-09, Rev. I
===Attachment 2===
IN 84-09, Rev.
 
I
 
===March 7, 1984===
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
 
===IE INFORMATION NOTICES===
Information
 
Date of
 
Notice No.
 
Subject
 
Issue
 
Issued to


March 7, 1984 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
84-18
84-17
84-16
84-15
84-14
84-13


IE INFORMATION NOTICES
===Stress Corrosion Cracking in===
Pressurized Water Reactcr


Information                                  Date of
Sysetms


Notice No.    Subject                        Issue    Issued to
===Problems with Liquid Nitrogen===
Cooling Components Below the


84-18          Stress Corrosion Cracking in  3/7/84  All power reactor
===Nil Ductility Temperature===
Failure of Automatic


Pressurized Water Reactcr              facilities holding
===Sprinkler System Valves to===
Operate


Sysetms                                an OL or CP
===Reporting of Radiological===
Releases


84-17          Problems with Liquid Nitrogen 3/5/84    All power reactor
Highlights of Recent Trans- port Regulatory Revisions by


Cooling Components Below the            facilities holding
DOT and NRC


Nil Ductility Temperature              an OL or CP
===Potential Deficiency in===
Motor-Operated Valve Control


84-16          Failure of Automatic          3/2/84  All power reactor
===Circuits and Annunciation===
Failure of Soft Seat Valve


Sprinkler System Valves to              facilities holding
Seals


Operate                                an OL or CP
Training Program Deficienc- ies


84-15          Reporting of Radiological      3/2/84  All power reactor
Motor-Operated Valve Torque


Releases                                facilities holding
===Switches Set Below the===
manufacturer's Recommended


an OL or CP
Value
 
===Lessons Learned from NRC===
Inspections of Fire Pro- tection Safe Shutdown


84-14          Highlights of Recent Trans-    3/2/84   All NRC licensees
Systems (10
CFR 50,
Appendix R)
3/7/84
3/5/84
3/2/84
3/2/84
3/2/84
2/28/84
2/27/84
2/24/84
2/21/84
02/13/84


port Regulatory Revisions by
===All power reactor===
facilities holding


DOT and NRC
an OL or CP


84-13          Potential Deficiency in        2/28/84  All power reactor
===All power reactor===
facilities holding


Motor-Operated Valve Control            facilities holding
an OL or CP


Circuits and Annunciation              an OL or CP
===All power reactor===
facilities holding


84-12          Failure of Soft Seat Valve    2/27/84  All power reactor
an OL or CP


Seals                                  facilities holding
===All power reactor===
facilities holding


an OL or CP
an OL or CP


84-11          Training Program Deficienc-    2/24/84  All power reactor
===All NRC licensees===
All power reactor


ies                                    facilities holding
facilities holding


an OL or CP
an OL or CP


84-10          Motor-Operated Valve Torque    2/21/84  All power reactor
===All power reactor===
facilities holding


Switches Set Below the                  facilities holding
an OL or CP


manufacturer's Recommended              an OL or CP
===All power reactor===
facilities holding


Value
an OL or CP
 
===All power reactor===
facilities holding


84-09          Lessons Learned from NRC      02/13/84 All power reactor
an OL or CP


Inspections of Fire Pro-                facilities holding
===All power reactor===
facilities holding


tection Safe Shutdown                  an OL or CP
an OL or CP


Systems (10 CFR 50,
84-12
              Appendix R)
84-11
OL = Operating License
84-10
84-09 OL = Operating License


CP = Construction Permit}}
CP = Construction Permit}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 05:09, 15 January 2025

Lessons Learned from NRC Inspections of Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Systems (10 CFR 50, Appendix R)
ML070180075
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, 05000496, 05000497, 05000262, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill, Crane
Issue date: 03/07/1984
From: Jordan E
NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-84-009, Rev.1, NUDOCS 8402090024
Download: ML070180075 (3)
v • d • e


12 IN 84-09, Rev.

1

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON,

D.C.

20555

March 7, 1984

IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO.

84-09, REVISION

1:

LESSONS LEARNED FROM NRC

INSPECTIONS OF FIRE PROTECTION

SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS (10 CFR 50,

APPENDIX R)

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL)

or

construction permit (CP).

Purpose

This Information Notice is a revision to IE Information Notice No. 84-09 issued

on February 13, 1984.

Attachment 1 to this revision is a replacement page

which will accomplish a needed correction to subparagraph 4 of Section III of

IE Information Notice 84-09.

The revision on page 2 is indicated in comparative

text and in the margin to highlight the change.

Licensees should add the

replacement page 2.

No specific action or response is required as a result of

this replacement.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional

Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or this office.

  • Edward L Jordan, Director

Divis o of Emergency Preparedness and

Eangdeeringg Response

Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Technical Contacts:

L. E. Whitney, IE

(301) 492-9668 T. Wambach, NRR

(301) 492-7072 Attachments:

1. Supplemental Guidance on 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Fire

Protection Safe Shutdown Requi.,ements,

Replacement page 2

2.

List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

8402090024 640307 PDR I&E

NOTICEB4-09 PDR

Attachment 1

IN 84-09, Rev.

1 March

1984 I11. Protection of Equipment Necessary To Achieve Hot Shutdown

At one facility, redundant pressurizer heater control and power cables were

Separated by a partial horizontal pyrocrete barrier suspended from the overhead.

At the same facility, two auxiliary feedwater pumps were located adjacent to

each other and separated by a partial steel missile shield coated on one side

with fire-retardant material.

The separation criteria of Appendix R, Section

III.G.2, were not met in that the coated shield did not meet the definition of

a fire barrier of BTP APCSB 9.5-1.

No alternative means of feedwater supply

was designated.

At a second facility, redundant pressurizer heater load centers were located

within the same cabinet.

At a third facility, redundant steamline isolation

valve control cables for HPCI and RCIC pumps were located in close proximity

without a fire rated barrier.

Appendix R,Section III.G.1, requires that fire protection features shall be

provided for structures, systems, and components important to safe shutdown.

These features shall be capable of limiting fire damage so that one train of

systems necessary to achieve and maintain a hot shutdown condition from either

the control room or emergency control station(s) is free of fire damage.

Sections III.G.2 and III.G.3 specify four alternatives that may be implemented

outside of primary containment to assure that one redundant train of equipment, cabling and associated circuits necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown

remains free of fire damage.

The alternatives are:

1.

Separation of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated

circuits by a three-hour fire barrier.

2.

Enclosure of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated

circuits by a one-hour fire barrier with fire detection and automratic fire

suppression systems installed in the area.

3.

Separation of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated

circuits by a horizontal distance of 20 feet with no intervening combustibles

and with fire detection and automatic fire suppression systems installed

in the area.

4.

Installation of alternative or dedicated shutdown capability independent

of the equipment, cabling, and associated circuits under consideration, and installation of fire detection and fixed fire suppression systems in

the area contining-this-aernative-or-dedic ted-shutdown-cepabity7 under consideration.

R1 It should be noted *that Sections III.G.2.d, e and f of Appendix R, provide

additional options for the separation of redundant trains of equipment and

cableswithin non-inerted containments.

Attachment 2

IN 84-09, Rev.

I

March 7, 1984

LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information

Date of

Notice No.

Subject

Issue

Issued to

84-18

84-17

84-16

84-15

84-14

84-13

Stress Corrosion Cracking in

Pressurized Water Reactcr

Sysetms

Problems with Liquid Nitrogen

Cooling Components Below the

Nil Ductility Temperature

Failure of Automatic

Sprinkler System Valves to

Operate

Reporting of Radiological

Releases

Highlights of Recent Trans- port Regulatory Revisions by

DOT and NRC

Potential Deficiency in

Motor-Operated Valve Control

Circuits and Annunciation

Failure of Soft Seat Valve

Seals

Training Program Deficienc- ies

Motor-Operated Valve Torque

Switches Set Below the

manufacturer's Recommended

Value

Lessons Learned from NRC

Inspections of Fire Pro- tection Safe Shutdown

Systems (10

CFR 50,

Appendix R)

3/7/84

3/5/84

3/2/84

3/2/84

3/2/84

2/28/84

2/27/84

2/24/84

2/21/84

02/13/84

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All NRC licensees

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

84-12

84-11

84-10

84-09 OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit


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