Information Notice 1984-09, Lessons Learned from NRC Inspections of Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Systems (10 CFR 50, Appendix R)

Lessons Learned from NRC Inspections of Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Systems (10 CFR 50, Appendix R)

ML070180075
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, 05000496, 05000497, 05000262, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill
Issue date:	03/07/1984
From:	Jordan E NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-84-009, Rev.1, NUDOCS 8402090024
Download: ML070180075 (3)

12 IN 84-09, Rev. 1 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 March 7, 1984 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 84-09, REVISION 1: LESSONS LEARNED FROM NRC

INSPECTIONS OF FIRE PROTECTION

SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS (10 CFR 50,

APPENDIX R)

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or

construction permit (CP).

Purpose

This Information Notice is a revision to IE Information Notice No. 84-09 issued

on February 13, 1984. Attachment 1 to this revision is a replacement page

which will accomplish a needed correction to subparagraph 4 of Section III of

IE Information Notice 84-09. The revision on page 2 is indicated in comparative

text and in the margin to highlight the change. Licensees should add the

replacement page 2. No specific action or response is required as a result of

this replacement.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional

Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or this office.

• Edward L Jordan, Director

Divis o of Emergency Preparedness and

Eangdeeringg Response

Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Technical Contacts: L. E. Whitney, IE

(301) 492-9668 T. Wambach, NRR

(301) 492-7072 Attachments:

1. Supplemental Guidance on 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Fire

Protection Safe Shutdown Requi.,ements, Replacement page 2

2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

8402090024 640307 PDR I&E

NOTICEB4-09 PDR

Attachment 1 IN 84-09, Rev. 1 March 1984 I11.Protection of Equipment Necessary To Achieve Hot Shutdown

At one facility, redundant pressurizer heater control and power cables were

Separated by a partial horizontal pyrocrete barrier suspended from the overhead.

At the same facility, two auxiliary feedwater pumps were located adjacent to

each other and separated by a partial steel missile shield coated on one side

with fire-retardant material. The separation criteria of Appendix R, Section

III.G.2, were not met in that the coated shield did not meet the definition of

a fire barrier of BTP APCSB 9.5-1. No alternative means of feedwater supply

was designated.

At a second facility, redundant pressurizer heater load centers were located

within the same cabinet. At a third facility, redundant steamline isolation

valve control cables for HPCI and RCIC pumps were located in close proximity

without a fire rated barrier.

Appendix R,Section III.G.1, requires that fire protection features shall be

provided for structures, systems, and components important to safe shutdown.

These features shall be capable of limiting fire damage so that one train of

systems necessary to achieve and maintain a hot shutdown condition from either

the control room or emergency control station(s) is free of fire damage.

Sections III.G.2 and III.G.3 specify four alternatives that may be implemented

outside of primary containment to assure that one redundant train of equipment, cabling and associated circuits necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown

remains free of fire damage. The alternatives are:

1. Separation of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated

circuits by a three-hour fire barrier.

2. Enclosure of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated

circuits by a one-hour fire barrier with fire detection and automratic fire

suppression systems installed in the area.

3. Separation of redundant trains of equipment, cabling, and associated

circuits by a horizontal distance of 20 feet with no intervening combustibles

and with fire detection and automatic fire suppression systems installed

in the area.

4. Installation of alternative or dedicated shutdown capability independent

of the equipment, cabling, and associated circuits under consideration, and installation of fire detection and fixed fire suppression systems in

the area contining-this-aernative-or-dedic ted-shutdown-cepabity7 under consideration. R1 It should be noted *that Sections III.G.2.d, e and f of Appendix R, provide

additional options for the separation of redundant trains of equipment and

cableswithin non-inerted containments.

Attachment 2 IN 84-09, Rev. I

March 7, 1984 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to

84-18 Stress Corrosion Cracking in 3/7/84 All power reactor

Pressurized Water Reactcr facilities holding

Sysetms an OL or CP

84-17 Problems with Liquid Nitrogen 3/5/84 All power reactor

Cooling Components Below the facilities holding

Nil Ductility Temperature an OL or CP

84-16 Failure of Automatic 3/2/84 All power reactor

Sprinkler System Valves to facilities holding

Operate an OL or CP

84-15 Reporting of Radiological 3/2/84 All power reactor

Releases facilities holding

an OL or CP

84-14 Highlights of Recent Trans- 3/2/84 All NRC licensees

port Regulatory Revisions by

DOT and NRC

84-13 Potential Deficiency in 2/28/84 All power reactor

Motor-Operated Valve Control facilities holding

Circuits and Annunciation an OL or CP

84-12 Failure of Soft Seat Valve 2/27/84 All power reactor

Seals facilities holding

an OL or CP

84-11 Training Program Deficienc- 2/24/84 All power reactor

ies facilities holding

an OL or CP

84-10 Motor-Operated Valve Torque 2/21/84 All power reactor

Switches Set Below the facilities holding

manufacturer's Recommended an OL or CP

Value

84-09 Lessons Learned from NRC 02/13/84 All power reactor

Inspections of Fire Pro- facilities holding

tection Safe Shutdown an OL or CP

Systems (10 CFR 50,

Appendix R)

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit