Information Notice 2009-09, Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
{{#Wiki_filter:ML091050027 UNITED STATES


NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Line 20: Line 20:
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION


WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 June 19, 2009 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2009-09:               IMPROPER FLOW CONTROLLER SETTINGS
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001  
 
June 19, 2009  
 
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2009-09:  
IMPROPER FLOW CONTROLLER SETTINGS


RENDERS INJECTION SYSTEMS INOPERABLE
RENDERS INJECTION SYSTEMS INOPERABLE
Line 36: Line 41:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to alert
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to alert


addressees that improper flow controller settings in the high-pressure core spray (HPCS)
addressees that improper flow controller settings in the high-pressure core spray (HPCS)  
system, high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system, and/or reactor core isolation cooling
system, high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system, and/or reactor core isolation cooling


(RCIC) system injection systems at several boiling-water reactors resulted in system flow
(RCIC) system injection systems at several boiling-water reactors resulted in system flow


oscillations that rendered the systems inoperable. Testing failed to identify the inoperable
oscillations that rendered the systems inoperable. Testing failed to identify the inoperable


systems because the system alignment during the surveillance differed from the system
systems because the system alignment during the surveillance differed from the system


alignment when the systems are called upon to perform their safety functions. The NRC
alignment when the systems are called upon to perform their safety functions. The NRC


expects that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and will
expects that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and will


consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. Suggestions contained in this IN
consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. Suggestions contained in this IN


are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.


==DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES==
==DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES==
Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1


===Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1===
As discussed in NRC IN 2008-13, Main Feedwater System Issues and Related 2007 Reactor
As discussed in NRC IN 2008-13, Main Feedwater System Issues and Related 2007 Reactor


Line 66: Line 71:
after 11 seconds on low RCIC pump suction pressure because the RCIC flow controller was
after 11 seconds on low RCIC pump suction pressure because the RCIC flow controller was


tuned incorrectly in 2006. At the time of the RCIC pump trip, RCIC was aligned to take suction
tuned incorrectly in 2006. At the time of the RCIC pump trip, RCIC was aligned to take suction


from the suppression pool instead of the normal path from the condensate storage tank (CST)
from the suppression pool instead of the normal path from the condensate storage tank (CST)  
because of an inoperable CST level indicator. While using HPCS to maintain the water level in
because of an inoperable CST level indicator. While using HPCS to maintain the water level in


the reactor vessel, the operating crew attempted to recover RCIC by first realigning the RCIC
the reactor vessel, the operating crew attempted to recover RCIC by first realigning the RCIC


pump suction from the suppression pool to the CST. With the RCIC flow controller in automatic, operators started and ran the RCIC pump and then attempted to feed water into the reactor. At
pump suction from the suppression pool to the CST. With the RCIC flow controller in automatic, operators started and ran the RCIC pump and then attempted to feed water into the reactor. At


that point, the operator noted large injection flow oscillations and RCIC again tripped on low
that point, the operator noted large injection flow oscillations and RCIC again tripped on low


suction pressure. Operators successfully recovered RCIC by starting the RCIC pump with the
suction pressure. Operators successfully recovered RCIC by starting the RCIC pump with the


flow controller in manual, and supplied water to the reactor vessel without large flow oscillations
flow controller in manual, and supplied water to the reactor vessel without large flow oscillations or RCIC tripping.  It was later determined that the RCIC flow controller gain, reset and rate


or RCIC tripping. It was later determined that the RCIC flow controller gain, reset and rate
settings had been altered from the settings used to successfully inject to the reactor vessel


settings had been altered from the settings used to successfully inject to the reactor vessel
during plant startup testing.  These changes resulted in an overly responsive flow control loop.


during plant startup testing. These changes resulted in an overly responsive flow control loop.
Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2


===Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2===
On April 24, 2007, the Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2, was at 100-percent power when the
On April 24, 2007, the Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2, was at 100-percent power when the


redundant reactivity control system inadvertently initiated a reduction in total feedwater flow to
redundant reactivity control system inadvertently initiated a reduction in total feedwater flow to


the reactor vessel. Subsequently, the rapid decrease of the water level in the reactor vessel
the reactor vessel. Subsequently, the rapid decrease of the water level in the reactor vessel


caused an automatic scram. As the water level of the reactor vessel continued to decrease
caused an automatic scram. As the water level of the reactor vessel continued to decrease


during the event, the HPCI and RCIC systems automatically started at -38 inches, as designed.
during the event, the HPCI and RCIC systems automatically started at -38 inches, as designed.
Line 102: Line 106:
from no-flow to full-flow (5,600 gallons per minute for the HPCI system and 600 gallons per
from no-flow to full-flow (5,600 gallons per minute for the HPCI system and 600 gallons per


minute for the RCIC system) for 3.4 seconds and 1.2 seconds, respectively. Additionally, the
minute for the RCIC system) for 3.4 seconds and 1.2 seconds, respectively. Additionally, the


common suction source for both systems unexpectedly swapped from the CST to the
common suction source for both systems unexpectedly swapped from the CST to the


suppression pool due to pressure oscillations in the common suction piping. Approximately
suppression pool due to pressure oscillations in the common suction piping. Approximately


2 minutes following the scram, the operators placed both HPCI and RCIC flow controllers into
2 minutes following the scram, the operators placed both HPCI and RCIC flow controllers into


manual control and continued to restore reactor water level. Both systems responded to
manual control and continued to restore reactor water level. Both systems responded to


manual control as expected, and the flow oscillations ceased. The licensee subsequently
manual control as expected, and the flow oscillations ceased. The licensee subsequently


determined it had incorrectly adjusted the flow controller gain and reset settings to the values
determined it had incorrectly adjusted the flow controller gain and reset settings to the values


outside the expected range by a factor of 10. Additional information is available in Limerick
outside the expected range by a factor of 10. Additional information is available in Limerick


Licensee Event Report 50-353/2007-003, dated June 22, 2007 (which can be found on the
Licensee Event Report 50-353/2007-003, dated June 22, 2007 (which can be found on the
Line 128: Line 132:
In each of the above examples, one of the causes of the flow oscillations was improper flow
In each of the above examples, one of the causes of the flow oscillations was improper flow


controller tuning of the HPCS, HPCI, and RCIC systems. Licensee test programs and
controller tuning of the HPCS, HPCI, and RCIC systems. Licensee test programs and


surveillance procedures did not identify this deficiency. Surveillance testing of HPCS, HPCI,
surveillance procedures did not identify this deficiency. Surveillance testing of HPCS, HPCI,  
and RCIC pumps is performed while at power with the systems drawing water from the CST and
and RCIC pumps is performed while at power with the systems drawing water from the CST and


discharging through a full-flow test return line back to the CST, also known as a CST-to-CST
discharging through a full-flow test return line back to the CST, also known as a CST-to-CST


alignment. However, when these systems are called upon to perform their safety function, these systems draw water from the CST and inject into the reactor vessel. Industry operating
alignment. However, when these systems are called upon to perform their safety function, these systems draw water from the CST and inject into the reactor vessel. Industry operating


experience has demonstrated that HPCS, HPCI and RCIC system response is slower when
experience has demonstrated that HPCS, HPCI and RCIC system response is slower when


operating in a CST-to-CST alignment compared to actual injection operation. Therefore, these
operating in a CST-to-CST alignment compared to actual injection operation. Therefore, these


systems need to be tuned and maintained appropriately to account for the difference in
systems need to be tuned and maintained appropriately to account for the difference in


response during actual vessel injection. General Electric/Hitachi Report 0000-0079-1103, Revision 1, delineates that RCIC operability of the flow control loop can be assured by
response during actual vessel injection. General Electric/Hitachi Report 0000-0079-1103, Revision 1, delineates that RCIC operability of the flow control loop can be assured by


maintaining RCIC flow controller tuning settings used during successful reactor pressure vessel
maintaining RCIC flow controller tuning settings used during successful reactor pressure vessel
Line 152: Line 156:
The HPCS, HPCI, and RCIC systems are required to be operable as specified in plant technical
The HPCS, HPCI, and RCIC systems are required to be operable as specified in plant technical


specifications. As illustrated above, failure to establish adequate procedures to properly tune
specifications. As illustrated above, failure to establish adequate procedures to properly tune


system flow controllers as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)
system flow controllers as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)  
Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings can result in these systems being rendered inoperable. In addition, surveillance testing did not reveal that systems
Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings can result in these systems being rendered inoperable. In addition, surveillance testing did not reveal that systems


were inoperable and could not perform their safety function to inject water to the reactor vessel, which is contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control.
were inoperable and could not perform their safety function to inject water to the reactor vessel, which is contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control.


==CONTACT==
==CONTACT==
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this


matter to the technical contact listed below or to the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
matter to the technical contact listed below or to the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
Line 166: Line 170:
Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Regulation (NRR) project manager.


/RA by TQuay for/
/RA by TQuay for/  
                                              Timothy J. McGinty, Director
 
Timothy J. McGinty, Director


Division of Policy and Rulemaking
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
Line 174: Line 179:


===Technical Contact:===
===Technical Contact:===
Pong Chung, NRR


===Pong Chung, NRR===
301-415-2473 E-mail: Pong.Chung@nrc.gov
                      301-415-2473 E-mail: Pong.Chung@nrc.gov


Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections. systems being rendered inoperable. In addition, surveillance testing did not reveal that systems
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections. systems being rendered inoperable. In addition, surveillance testing did not reveal that systems


were inoperable and could not perform their safety function to inject to the reactor vessel, which
were inoperable and could not perform their safety function to inject to the reactor vessel, which
Line 185: Line 190:


==CONTACT==
==CONTACT==
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this


matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
Line 191: Line 196:
Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Regulation (NRR) project manager.


/RA by TQuay for/
/RA by TQuay for/  
                                                Timothy J. McGinty, Director
 
Timothy J. McGinty, Director


Division of Policy and Rulemaking
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
Line 199: Line 205:


===Technical Contact:===
===Technical Contact:===
Pong Chung, NRR
301-415-2473 E-mail:  Pong.Chung@nrc.gov
Note:  NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
ADAMS Accession Number: ML091050027 
TAC No.: ME0622 OFFICE
EICB:DE
TECH EDITOR
BC:EICB:DE
D:DE
PGCB:DPR
PGCB:DPR
NAME
PChung
KAzariah-Kribbs
WKemper
PHiland
DBeaulieu
CHawes
DATE
5/12/09
4/15/09 email
5/26/09
5/28/09
6/3/09
6/3/09 OFFICE
BC:PGCB:DPR


===Pong Chung, NRR===
D:DPR
                      301-415-2473 E-mail: Pong.Chung@nrc.gov


Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
NAME


ADAMS Accession Number: ML091050027                              TAC No.: ME0622 OFFICE  EICB:DE        TECH EDITOR      BC:EICB:DE D:DE        PGCB:DPR  PGCB:DPR
MMurphy


NAME    PChung        KAzariah-Kribbs  WKemper      PHiland DBeaulieu  CHawes
TMcGinty


DATE     5/12/09        4/15/09 email    5/26/09      5/28/09  6/3/09    6/3/09 OFFICE  BC:PGCB:DPR    D:DPR
DATE


NAME    MMurphy        TMcGinty
6/16/09
6/19/09


DATE    6/16/09        6/19/09 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY}}
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 12:24, 14 January 2025

Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify
ML091050027
Person / Time
Site: Perry  
Issue date: 06/19/2009
From: Mcginty T
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
To:
Pong Chung, NRR/DE/EICB 415-2473
References
IN-09-009
Download: ML091050027 (4)


ML091050027 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001

June 19, 2009

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2009-09:

IMPROPER FLOW CONTROLLER SETTINGS

RENDERS INJECTION SYSTEMS INOPERABLE

AND SURVEILLANCE DID NOT IDENTIFY

ADDRESSEES

All holders of operating licenses for boiling-water nuclear power reactors, except those who

have permanently ceased operations and who have certified that fuel has been permanently

removed from the reactor vessel.

PURPOSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to alert

addressees that improper flow controller settings in the high-pressure core spray (HPCS)

system, high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system, and/or reactor core isolation cooling

(RCIC) system injection systems at several boiling-water reactors resulted in system flow

oscillations that rendered the systems inoperable. Testing failed to identify the inoperable

systems because the system alignment during the surveillance differed from the system

alignment when the systems are called upon to perform their safety functions. The NRC

expects that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and will

consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. Suggestions contained in this IN

are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1

As discussed in NRC IN 2008-13, Main Feedwater System Issues and Related 2007 Reactor

Trip Data, on November 28, 2007, an unplanned automatic reactor trip occurred at Perry

Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, that stemmed from a failure of the digital feedwater control system.

As the reactor vessel water level decreased, the RCIC pump automatically started but tripped

after 11 seconds on low RCIC pump suction pressure because the RCIC flow controller was

tuned incorrectly in 2006. At the time of the RCIC pump trip, RCIC was aligned to take suction

from the suppression pool instead of the normal path from the condensate storage tank (CST)

because of an inoperable CST level indicator. While using HPCS to maintain the water level in

the reactor vessel, the operating crew attempted to recover RCIC by first realigning the RCIC

pump suction from the suppression pool to the CST. With the RCIC flow controller in automatic, operators started and ran the RCIC pump and then attempted to feed water into the reactor. At

that point, the operator noted large injection flow oscillations and RCIC again tripped on low

suction pressure. Operators successfully recovered RCIC by starting the RCIC pump with the

flow controller in manual, and supplied water to the reactor vessel without large flow oscillations or RCIC tripping. It was later determined that the RCIC flow controller gain, reset and rate

settings had been altered from the settings used to successfully inject to the reactor vessel

during plant startup testing. These changes resulted in an overly responsive flow control loop.

Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2

On April 24, 2007, the Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2, was at 100-percent power when the

redundant reactivity control system inadvertently initiated a reduction in total feedwater flow to

the reactor vessel. Subsequently, the rapid decrease of the water level in the reactor vessel

caused an automatic scram. As the water level of the reactor vessel continued to decrease

during the event, the HPCI and RCIC systems automatically started at -38 inches, as designed.

Following initiation, the HPCI and RCIC systems experienced abnormal system flow oscillations

from no-flow to full-flow (5,600 gallons per minute for the HPCI system and 600 gallons per

minute for the RCIC system) for 3.4 seconds and 1.2 seconds, respectively. Additionally, the

common suction source for both systems unexpectedly swapped from the CST to the

suppression pool due to pressure oscillations in the common suction piping. Approximately

2 minutes following the scram, the operators placed both HPCI and RCIC flow controllers into

manual control and continued to restore reactor water level. Both systems responded to

manual control as expected, and the flow oscillations ceased. The licensee subsequently

determined it had incorrectly adjusted the flow controller gain and reset settings to the values

outside the expected range by a factor of 10. Additional information is available in Limerick

Licensee Event Report 50-353/2007-003, dated June 22, 2007 (which can be found on the

NRCs public Web site in the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

(ADAMS) under Accession No. ML071730270).

Root Cause

In each of the above examples, one of the causes of the flow oscillations was improper flow

controller tuning of the HPCS, HPCI, and RCIC systems. Licensee test programs and

surveillance procedures did not identify this deficiency. Surveillance testing of HPCS, HPCI,

and RCIC pumps is performed while at power with the systems drawing water from the CST and

discharging through a full-flow test return line back to the CST, also known as a CST-to-CST

alignment. However, when these systems are called upon to perform their safety function, these systems draw water from the CST and inject into the reactor vessel. Industry operating

experience has demonstrated that HPCS, HPCI and RCIC system response is slower when

operating in a CST-to-CST alignment compared to actual injection operation. Therefore, these

systems need to be tuned and maintained appropriately to account for the difference in

response during actual vessel injection. General Electric/Hitachi Report 0000-0079-1103, Revision 1, delineates that RCIC operability of the flow control loop can be assured by

maintaining RCIC flow controller tuning settings used during successful reactor pressure vessel

injections.

DISCUSSION

The HPCS, HPCI, and RCIC systems are required to be operable as specified in plant technical

specifications. As illustrated above, failure to establish adequate procedures to properly tune

system flow controllers as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)

Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings can result in these systems being rendered inoperable. In addition, surveillance testing did not reveal that systems

were inoperable and could not perform their safety function to inject water to the reactor vessel, which is contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control.

CONTACT

This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this

matter to the technical contact listed below or to the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation (NRR) project manager.

/RA by TQuay for/

Timothy J. McGinty, Director

Division of Policy and Rulemaking

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Pong Chung, NRR

301-415-2473 E-mail: Pong.Chung@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections. systems being rendered inoperable. In addition, surveillance testing did not reveal that systems

were inoperable and could not perform their safety function to inject to the reactor vessel, which

is contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control.

CONTACT

This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this

matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation (NRR) project manager.

/RA by TQuay for/

Timothy J. McGinty, Director

Division of Policy and Rulemaking

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Pong Chung, NRR

301-415-2473 E-mail: Pong.Chung@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.

ADAMS Accession Number: ML091050027

TAC No.: ME0622 OFFICE

EICB:DE

TECH EDITOR

BC:EICB:DE

D:DE

PGCB:DPR

PGCB:DPR

NAME

PChung

KAzariah-Kribbs

WKemper

PHiland

DBeaulieu

CHawes

DATE

5/12/09

4/15/09 email

5/26/09

5/28/09

6/3/09

6/3/09 OFFICE

BC:PGCB:DPR

D:DPR

NAME

MMurphy

TMcGinty

DATE

6/16/09

6/19/09

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY