ML20134B624: Difference between revisions
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| number = ML20134B624 | | number = ML20134B624 | ||
| issue date = 08/09/1995 | | issue date = 08/09/1995 | ||
| title = Event Tracking & Follow Up Assignment Sheet of 950802 Event Re | | title = Event Tracking & Follow Up Assignment Sheet of 950802 Event Re UE Declaration Resulting from Two Stages of Reactor Rc Pump Seal Failures w/2 Gpm Identified Leakage | ||
| author name = Koshy T | | author name = Koshy T | ||
| author affiliation = NRC | | author affiliation = NRC | ||
Line 18: | Line 18: | ||
=Text= | =Text= | ||
{{#Wiki_filter:-m | {{#Wiki_filter:-m g)..,- | ||
CEAB EVENT TRACKING SHEET EWE r >= 29153 & Event Ntaber <= 29153 l | |||
CEAB EVENT TRACKING SHEET EWE | l Plant! | ||
l | SAINT LUCIE Unit: | ||
l l | Engineer: | ||
50.72# | KOSHY T. | ||
l l | |||
EvCnt: | |||
08/02/95 Morning Report: | |||
Briefing: | |||
50.72# | |||
29153 LER#: | |||
050000009500000 PN#: | |||
1 Othcr Notification: | 1 Othcr Notification: | ||
System: | System: | ||
OPERATING NODE | Component: | ||
OPERATING NODE SIGNIFICANCE | |||
CAUSE | - Operation A - Reactor Protection System 2 Startup B - Safety-Related Cooling System Hot Stan@y C - fuel Cladding 4 - Hot Shutdown | ||
Preptsed By: | @-ReactorCoolantPressureBoundary 5 Cold Shutdown E Containment 6 - Refueling F - Plant Power 7 - Other G Unexpected Plant Performance H - Other: | ||
Engineer | CAUSE EVENT E 25 h Equipment Failure | ||
$1G - Significant Event 2 Design or Installation Error EDI - Event of Interest 3 - Operating Error TBD - To Be Determined h other 4 - Maintenance Error 5 External 6 - Other POTENTIAL AO: | |||
EVENTS ASSESSMENT PANEL | Criterion: | ||
Preptsed By: | |||
roswy T. | |||
Engineer 3h f | |||
5 Apprcved: | |||
Section Leader A. Chaffee Branch Chief | |||
{ | |||
/(s16 EVENTS ASSESSMENT PANEL First Screening: | |||
significance | |||
== Description:== | == Description:== | ||
UE declaration resulting from two stages of Reactor coolant ptmp seat feitures with 2gpm identified leakage. | UE declaration resulting from two stages of Reactor coolant ptmp seat feitures with 2gpm identified leakage. | ||
3 >[ | |||
[3 | @( | ||
A | |||
[3 d'k'AA Y | |||
08/09/95 ETS 02 Page:1 F~' ' t B!!B COPY A | |||
1 i | |||
G:\0ECB\ETS I | G:\\0ECB\\ETS I | ||
EVENT FOLLOW-UP ASSIGNMENT SMEET | EVENT FOLLOW-UP ASSIGNMENT SMEET PSE - _ YES | ||
PSE - _ YES | _x NO l | ||
ASSIGNMENT DATE: | I ASSIGNMENT DATE: | ||
EVENT DATE: | 8-2-95 ASSIGNED T0: | ||
OTHER REPORT: | T Koshy PLANT & UNIT: | ||
Saint Lucie 4 | |||
EVENT DATE: | |||
8-2-95 2 | |||
50.72 REPORT NO: | |||
29153 MR NO: | |||
OTHER REPORT: | |||
SPECIALTY CODE: | |||
EVENT | EVENT | ||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
1 UE declaration resulting from two stages of Reactor coolant pump seal failures | 1 UE declaration resulting from two stages of Reactor coolant pump seal failures with 2gpm identified leaktge. | ||
4 | |||
] | ] | ||
DETERMINE DETAILS, EVALUATE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE AND GENERIC IMPLICATIONS. | SPECIFIC F0LLOW-UP ASSIGNMENT DETERMINE DETAILS, EVALUATE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE AND GENERIC IMPLICATIONS. | ||
IN j | |||
ADDITION, ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC CONCERNS: | |||
e ASSIGNMENT OPTIONS | e ASSIGNMENT OPTIONS | ||
* IDENTIFY DISCREPANCIES FROM INITIAL EVENT INFORMATION: _ YES | * IDENTIFY DISCREPANCIES FROM INITIAL EVENT INFORMATION: _ YES | ||
* PERFORM RISK ASSESSMENT: _ YES | _ N0 | ||
ESTIMATE CONDITIONAL CORE DAMAGE PROBABILITY: _ YES | _ N/A | ||
* COMPARE WITH PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS: _ YES | * PERFORM RISK ASSESSMENT: _ YES | ||
* RELATE TO ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: _ YES | _ NO | ||
* RELATE TO USI GSI (NUREG-0933): _ YES | _ N/A i | ||
PREPARE TO BRIEF: _ YES | ESTIMATE CONDITIONAL CORE DAMAGE PROBABILITY: _ YES | ||
_ NO | |||
_ N/A | |||
* COMPARE WITH PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS: _ YES | |||
_ N0 | |||
_ N/A PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS: | |||
* RELATE TO ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: _ YES | |||
_ NO | |||
_ N/A j | |||
* RELATE TO USI GSI (NUREG-0933): _ YES | |||
_ NO | |||
_ N/A RELEVANT USI GSI: | |||
PREPARE TO BRIEF: _ YES | |||
_ NO | |||
* TARGET CLOSE00T SCHEDULE: | * TARGET CLOSE00T SCHEDULE: | ||
.I | |||
I | I | ||
'9 l | |||
l m | |||
l | |||
* INITIAL SCREENING PANEL EVENT / CONDITION SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: _ OTH _ E0I _ SIG _ A0 i | |||
* INITIAL SCREENING PANEL | |||
EVENT / CONDITION SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: _ OTH _ E0I _ SIG _ A0 | |||
* REMAINING OR ADDITIONAL FOLLOW-UP ITEMS: | * REMAINING OR ADDITIONAL FOLLOW-UP ITEMS: | ||
1 l | 1 l | ||
* FINAL PANEL ASSESSMENT EVENT / CONDITION SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: _ OTH _ E01 _ SIG _ A0 | * FINAL PANEL ASSESSMENT EVENT / CONDITION SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: _ OTH _ E01 _ SIG _ A0 | ||
* BASIS: _ RISK _ PROGRAMMATIC _ MARGIN _ N/A | * BASIS: _ RISK _ PROGRAMMATIC _ MARGIN _ N/A | ||
* GENERIC FOLLOW-UP ACTION RECOMMENDED: _ YES | * GENERIC FOLLOW-UP ACTION RECOMMENDED: _ YES | ||
_ IN | _ N0 | ||
The attempt was not successful this time and it is believed to have caused the second stage of RCP seal failure. Such " restaging seal" was not attempted when the plant conditions were 370F and 530 psi. The higher temperature and pressure could be the cause for the second stage seal failure. The licensee plans to perform further failure analysis. | _ PRIORITY (1,2,3,4)' | ||
The station black out analysis assumes 25gpm. The failures were within the analyzed bases. No further follow up is required. | _ IN | ||
FILE: G:\T Wr 4 %'r s s c_ | _ BUL | ||
_ GL CLOSE0VT During the plant restart following the hurricane warning, the operator noticed the first stage seal failure. | |||
The licensee attempted to " restage the seal" using a previously successful method. | |||
The process involved transfering the full pressure to stage two and relieving pressure in stage 3. | |||
The attempt was not successful this time and it is believed to have caused the second stage of RCP seal failure. | |||
Such " restaging seal" was not attempted when the plant conditions were 370F and 530 psi. | |||
The higher temperature and pressure could be the cause for the second stage seal failure. | |||
The licensee plans to perform further failure analysis. | |||
The station black out analysis assumes 25gpm. | |||
The failures were within the analyzed bases. | |||
No further follow up is required. | |||
Classified as other. | |||
FILE: G:\\T Wr 4 %'r s s c_ | |||
BRIEF # | BRIEF # | ||
GENERIC RESPONSE: IN # | GENERIC RESPONSE: IN # | ||
BUL # | |||
GL # | |||
: 1. Priority endnote: | : 1. Priority endnote: | ||
PRIORITY 1: Innediate assignment of resources (e.g., for highly risk-significant saf ety concerns) | PRIORITY 1: Innediate assignment of resources (e.g., for highly risk-significant saf ety concerns) | ||
Line 88: | Line 139: | ||
PRIORITY 3: Long-term action (e.g., issues of moderate to low safety significance) | PRIORITY 3: Long-term action (e.g., issues of moderate to low safety significance) | ||
PRIORITY 4: Resource dependent action (e.g., items that can be deferred) | PRIORITY 4: Resource dependent action (e.g., items that can be deferred) | ||
_,}} |
Latest revision as of 05:48, 12 December 2024
Text
-m g)..,-
CEAB EVENT TRACKING SHEET EWE r >= 29153 & Event Ntaber <= 29153 l
l Plant!
SAINT LUCIE Unit:
Engineer:
KOSHY T.
l l
EvCnt:
08/02/95 Morning Report:
Briefing:
50.72#
29153 LER#:
050000009500000 PN#:
1 Othcr Notification:
System:
Component:
OPERATING NODE SIGNIFICANCE
- Operation A - Reactor Protection System 2 Startup B - Safety-Related Cooling System Hot Stan@y C - fuel Cladding 4 - Hot Shutdown
@-ReactorCoolantPressureBoundary 5 Cold Shutdown E Containment 6 - Refueling F - Plant Power 7 - Other G Unexpected Plant Performance H - Other:
CAUSE EVENT E 25 h Equipment Failure
$1G - Significant Event 2 Design or Installation Error EDI - Event of Interest 3 - Operating Error TBD - To Be Determined h other 4 - Maintenance Error 5 External 6 - Other POTENTIAL AO:
Criterion:
Preptsed By:
roswy T.
Engineer 3h f
5 Apprcved:
Section Leader A. Chaffee Branch Chief
{
/(s16 EVENTS ASSESSMENT PANEL First Screening:
significance
Description:
UE declaration resulting from two stages of Reactor coolant ptmp seat feitures with 2gpm identified leakage.
3 >[
@(
A
[3 d'k'AA Y
08/09/95 ETS 02 Page:1 F~' ' t B!!B COPY A
1 i
G:\\0ECB\\ETS I
EVENT FOLLOW-UP ASSIGNMENT SMEET PSE - _ YES
_x NO l
I ASSIGNMENT DATE:
8-2-95 ASSIGNED T0:
T Koshy PLANT & UNIT:
Saint Lucie 4
EVENT DATE:
8-2-95 2
50.72 REPORT NO:
29153 MR NO:
OTHER REPORT:
SPECIALTY CODE:
EVENT
SUMMARY
1 UE declaration resulting from two stages of Reactor coolant pump seal failures with 2gpm identified leaktge.
4
]
SPECIFIC F0LLOW-UP ASSIGNMENT DETERMINE DETAILS, EVALUATE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE AND GENERIC IMPLICATIONS.
IN j
ADDITION, ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC CONCERNS:
e ASSIGNMENT OPTIONS
- IDENTIFY DISCREPANCIES FROM INITIAL EVENT INFORMATION: _ YES
_ N0
_ N/A
- PERFORM RISK ASSESSMENT: _ YES
_ NO
_ N/A i
ESTIMATE CONDITIONAL CORE DAMAGE PROBABILITY: _ YES
_ NO
_ N/A
- COMPARE WITH PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS: _ YES
_ N0
_ N/A PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:
- RELATE TO ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: _ YES
_ NO
_ N/A j
- RELATE TO USI GSI (NUREG-0933): _ YES
_ NO
_ N/A RELEVANT USI GSI:
PREPARE TO BRIEF: _ YES
_ NO
- TARGET CLOSE00T SCHEDULE:
.I
I
'9 l
l m
l
- INITIAL SCREENING PANEL EVENT / CONDITION SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: _ OTH _ E0I _ SIG _ A0 i
- REMAINING OR ADDITIONAL FOLLOW-UP ITEMS:
1 l
- FINAL PANEL ASSESSMENT EVENT / CONDITION SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: _ OTH _ E01 _ SIG _ A0
- BASIS: _ RISK _ PROGRAMMATIC _ MARGIN _ N/A
- GENERIC FOLLOW-UP ACTION RECOMMENDED: _ YES
_ N0
_ PRIORITY (1,2,3,4)'
_ IN
_ BUL
_ GL CLOSE0VT During the plant restart following the hurricane warning, the operator noticed the first stage seal failure.
The licensee attempted to " restage the seal" using a previously successful method.
The process involved transfering the full pressure to stage two and relieving pressure in stage 3.
The attempt was not successful this time and it is believed to have caused the second stage of RCP seal failure.
Such " restaging seal" was not attempted when the plant conditions were 370F and 530 psi.
The higher temperature and pressure could be the cause for the second stage seal failure.
The licensee plans to perform further failure analysis.
The station black out analysis assumes 25gpm.
The failures were within the analyzed bases.
No further follow up is required.
Classified as other.
FILE: G:\\T Wr 4 %'r s s c_
BRIEF #
GENERIC RESPONSE: IN #
BUL #
GL #
- 1. Priority endnote:
PRIORITY 1: Innediate assignment of resources (e.g., for highly risk-significant saf ety concerns)
PRIORITY 2: Wear -term action (e.g., significant safety issues not warranting inmediate action)
PRIORITY 3: Long-term action (e.g., issues of moderate to low safety significance)
PRIORITY 4: Resource dependent action (e.g., items that can be deferred)
_,