Information Notice 2023-04, Operating Experience Related to Fire Events at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants in the United States: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
← Older edit
VisualWikitext
StriderTol Bot change
StriderTol Bot change
 
Line 14: Line 14:
| page count = 5
| page count = 5
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
{{#Wiki_filter:ML23088A143 UNITED STATES


NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Line 22: Line 22:
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION


WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001  


September 13, 2023
September 13, 2023  


NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2023-04:                       OPERATING EXPERIENCE RELATED T O FIRE
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2023-04: OPERATING EXPERIENCE RELATED TO FIRE


EVENTS AT DECOMMISSIONING NUCLEAR
EVENTS AT DECOMMISSIONING NUCLEAR
Line 33: Line 33:


==ADDRESSEES==
==ADDRESSEES==
All holders of and applicants for an operating license or const  ruction permit for a nuclear power
All holders of and applicants for an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power


reactor issued under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic
reactor issued under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic


licensing of production and utilization facilities, including   those that have permanently ceased
licensing of production and utilization facilities, including those that have permanently ceased


operations and certified that fuel has been permanently removed   from the reactor vessel.
operations and certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.


All holders of and applicants for a power reactor combined lice  nse, standard design approval, or
All holders of and applicants for a power reactor combined license, standard design approval, or


manufacturing license under 10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, certific  ations, and approvals for
manufacturing license under 10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, certifications, and approvals for


nuclear power plants. All applicants for a standard design cer  tification, including such
nuclear power plants. All applicants for a standard design certification, including such


applicants after initial issuance of a design certification rul  e.
applicants after initial issuance of a design certification rule.


==PURPOSE==
==PURPOSE==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this in formation notice (IN) to inform
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform


addressees of fire events in radiologically controlled areas; p  osted radiologically contaminated
addressees of fire events in radiologically controlled areas; posted radiologically contaminated


areas; instances of failure to control combustible material and /or perform adequate fire watches;
areas; instances of failure to control combustible material and/or perform adequate fire watches;  
or implement other fire protection activities at decommissionin  g power reactor sites. These fire
or implement other fire protection activities at decommissioning power reactor sites. These fire


events have been documented in NRC decommissioning reactor insp ection reports from 2018 to 2023. While the focus of this IN is based on fire incidents   at, and the regulations for, decommissioning reactors; the root causes are not reactor-speci  fic activities, and this
events have been documented in NRC decommissioning reactor inspection reports from 2018 to 2023. While the focus of this IN is based on fire incidents at, and the regulations for, decommissioning reactors; the root causes are not reactor-specific activities, and this


operational experience can be applicable to any operating or de  commissioning nuclear power
operational experience can be applicable to any operating or decommissioning nuclear power


plant. The significance of these events is the potential for th  e release of radionuclides, in and
plant. The significance of these events is the potential for the release of radionuclides, in and


outside of controlled areas of the site (outside of a restricte  d area but inside the site boundary)
outside of controlled areas of the site (outside of a restricted area but inside the site boundary)  
and potentially to publicly accessible areas, occupational radi  ation exposure, and the impact on
and potentially to publicly accessible areas, occupational radiation exposure, and the impact on


industrial safety. The NRC expects that recipients of this IN w  ill review this information for
industrial safety. The NRC expects that recipients of this IN will review this information for


applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appr  opriate. The INs may not impose new
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate. The INs may not impose new


requirements, and nothing in this IN should be interpreted to r  equire specific action.
requirements, and nothing in this IN should be interpreted to require specific action.


==BACKGROUND==
==BACKGROUND==
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(f)(1), licensees that have sub  mitted the certifications required
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(f)(1), licensees that have submitted the certifications required


under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) shall maintain a fire protection progr  am to address the potential for
under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) shall maintain a fire protection program to address the potential for


ML23088A143 IN 23-04 fires that could cause the release or spread of radioactive mat  erials (i.e., that could result in a
IN 23-04 fires that could cause the release or spread of radioactive materials (i.e., that could result in a


radiological hazard).
radiological hazard).


Fire protection for nuclear power plants uses the concept of de  fense-in-depth to achieve the
Fire protection for nuclear power plants uses the concept of defense-in-depth to achieve the


required degree of reactor safety by using echelons of administ  rative controls, fire prevention, fire detection, and suppression systems. These systems are reli  ed upon by licensees to achieve
required degree of reactor safety by using echelons of administrative controls, fire prevention, fire detection, and suppression systems. These systems are relied upon by licensees to achieve


compliance with NRC fire protection requirements in 10 CFR 50.4  8, Fire protection, to protect
compliance with NRC fire protection requirements in 10 CFR 50.48, Fire protection, to protect


safety-related and important to safety structures, systems, and   components (SSCs) that are
safety-related and important to safety structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that are


needed to achieve safe shutdown of the reactor in the event of   a fire and to minimize radioactive
needed to achieve safe shutdown of the reactor in the event of a fire and to minimize radioactive


release to the environment in the event of a fire.
release to the environment in the event of a fire.


In accordance with 10 CFR 50.48, each operating nuclear power p  lant is required to have a fire
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.48, each operating nuclear power plant is required to have a fire


protection plan. The plan should establish the fire protection   policy for the protection of SSCs at
protection plan. The plan should establish the fire protection policy for the protection of SSCs at


each plant and the procedures, equipment, and personnel require  d to implement the program at
each plant and the procedures, equipment, and personnel required to implement the program at


the plant site. The primary fire protection concern for permane  ntly shutdown plants is protecting
the plant site. The primary fire protection concern for permanently shutdown plants is protecting


the integrity of the remaining spent nuclear fuel in the spent   fuel pool and preventing or
the integrity of the remaining spent nuclear fuel in the spent fuel pool and preventing or


minimizing the release of radioactive material, resulting from   fires involving contaminated plant
minimizing the release of radioactive material, resulting from fires involving contaminated plant


SSCs or radioactive waste.
SSCs or radioactive waste.


The fire protection program for an operating reactor provides t  he basis for developing the fire
The fire protection program for an operating reactor provides the basis for developing the fire


protection program for the decommissioning phase. The goal of t  he fire protection program
protection program for the decommissioning phase. The goal of the fire protection program


during decommissioning of nuclear power plants is to provide an   appropriate level of defense-in- depth protection against the threat of fires. Defense-in-depth   for fire protection involves a
during decommissioning of nuclear power plants is to provide an appropriate level of defense-in- depth protection against the threat of fires. Defense-in-depth for fire protection involves a


comprehensive program of administrative controls, physical fire   protection features, emergency
comprehensive program of administrative controls, physical fire protection features, emergency


response capabilities, and protection of SSCs necessary to prev  ent or mitigate the potential of
response capabilities, and protection of SSCs necessary to prevent or mitigate the potential of


an unacceptable release of radioactive materials. This combinat  ion of elements reduces both
an unacceptable release of radioactive materials. This combination of elements reduces both


the probability and consequences of fire events, and it ensures   that the failure of any one
the probability and consequences of fire events, and it ensures that the failure of any one


element within the fire protection program is adequately compen  sated for by the others, thereby
element within the fire protection program is adequately compensated for by the others, thereby


minimizing the risk to the public, environment, and plant perso  nnel.
minimizing the risk to the public, environment, and plant personnel.


For those plants that are permanently shut down, are undergoing   decommissioning, or both, the
For those plants that are permanently shut down, are undergoing decommissioning, or both, the


licensing basis changes must be in accordance with the requirem  ents in 10 CFR 50.82, Termination of License. For permanently shutdown reactors, 10   CFR 50.48(f) and Regulatory
licensing basis changes must be in accordance with the requirements in 10 CFR 50.82, Termination of License. For permanently shutdown reactors, 10 CFR 50.48(f) and Regulatory


Guide 1.191, Revision 1, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear P ower Plants During
Guide 1.191, Revision 1, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Plants During


Decommissioning (Agencywide Documents Access and Management Sy  stem (ADAMS) at
Decommissioning (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) at


Accession No. ML20287A199), relate to fire protection.
Accession No. ML20287A199), relate to fire protection.


The objectives of the fire protection program listed in 10 CFR   50.48(f)(1) are to: (1) reasonably
The objectives of the fire protection program listed in 10 CFR 50.48(f)(1) are to: (1) reasonably


prevent fires from occurring, (2) rapidly detect, control, and   extinguish those fires that do occur
prevent fires from occurring, (2) rapidly detect, control, and extinguish those fires that do occur


and that could result in a radiological hazard, and (3) ensure   that the risk of fire-induced
and that could result in a radiological hazard, and (3) ensure that the risk of fire-induced


radiological hazards to the public, environment, and plant pers  onnel is minimized. In addition, a
radiological hazards to the public, environment, and plant personnel is minimized. In addition, a


fire protection program that complies with 10 CFR 50.48(c),   National Fire Protection
fire protection program that complies with 10 CFR 50.48(c), National Fire Protection


Association Standard NFPA 805 , incorporates by reference, with exceptions, modifications, and supplementation, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA ) Standard 805, Performance- Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Elec  tric Generating Plants. The
Association Standard NFPA 805, incorporates by reference, with exceptions, modifications, and supplementation, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805, Performance- Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants. The


2001 Edition is deemed to be acceptable for complying with the   requirements of 10 CFR
2001 Edition is deemed to be acceptable for complying with the requirements of 10 CFR


50.48(f).
50.48(f).
Line 154: Line 154:


==DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES==
==DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES==
Recent fire events at decommissioning power reactor sites provi  de useful lessons concerning
Recent fire events at decommissioning power reactor sites provide useful lessons concerning


fire protection program implementation. These events are select  ed and summarized from
fire protection program implementation. These events are selected and summarized from


reports of NRC inspections performed from August 2018 to May 20 23. During that period the
reports of NRC inspections performed from August 2018 to May 2023. During that period the


NRC assessed six reported occurrences of fires in radiologicall  y controlled areas or potentially
NRC assessed six reported occurrences of fires in radiologically controlled areas or potentially


radiologically contaminated areas at decommissioning power reac  tor sites. The six incidents are
radiologically contaminated areas at decommissioning power reactor sites. The six incidents are


described in the following NRC inspection reports:
described in the following NRC inspection reports:  


*                                             Accelerated Decommissioning Partners (ADP) CR3, LLC, Crystal R  iver Unit 3 - NRC
*  
Accelerated Decommissioning Partners (ADP) CR3, LLC, Crystal River Unit 3 - NRC


Inspection Report Nos. 05000302/2021004, January 24, 2022, and   05000302/2022001, May 3, 2022 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML22011A005 and ML22116A183,   respectively)
Inspection Report Nos. 05000302/2021004, January 24, 2022, and 05000302/2022001, May 3, 2022 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML22011A005 and ML22116A183, respectively)  


*                                             Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Pilgrim Nuclear Pow  er Station - NRC
*  
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - NRC


Inspection Report No. 05000293/2022004, February 15, 2023 (ADAM  S Accession
Inspection Report No. 05000293/2022004, February 15, 2023 (ADAMS Accession


No. ML23031A208)
No. ML23031A208)  


*                                             Fort Calhoun Station, NRC Inspection Reports 050-00285/2021-00  1, February 17, 2021,
*  
      050-00285/2022-001, February 25, 2022, and 050-00285/2022-002,   April 28, 2022 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML21048A322, ML22055A979 and ML22112A158, respectively)
Fort Calhoun Station, NRC Inspection Reports 050-00285/2021-001, February 17, 2021,  
050-00285/2022-001, February 25, 2022, and 050-00285/2022-002, April 28, 2022 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML21048A322, ML22055A979 and ML22112A158, respectively)  


The NRC also assessed four instances of failure to properly imp lement fire protection
The NRC also assessed four instances of failure to properly implement fire protection


procedures at decommissioning power reactor sites. The four inc  idents are described in the
procedures at decommissioning power reactor sites. The four incidents are described in the


following NRC inspection reports:
following NRC inspection reports:  


*                                             Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Indian Point Energy   Center Units 1, 2 and 3
*  
      - NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2022004, 05000247/2022004 ,
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Indian Point Energy Center Units 1, 2 and 3  
      05000286/2022004, and 07200051/2022002, March 13, 2023 (ADAMS A  ccession
- NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2022004, 05000247/2022004,  
05000286/2022004, and 07200051/2022002, March 13, 2023 (ADAMS Accession


No. ML23047A154)
No. ML23047A154)  


*                                             San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, NRC Inspection Reports   05000361/2018-002 and 05000362/2018-002, August 10, 2018, and 05000361/2022-001 a  nd
*  
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, NRC Inspection Reports 05000361/2018-002 and 05000362/2018-002, August 10, 2018, and 05000361/2022-001 and


05000362/2022-001, March 14, 2022 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML18219  B607 and
05000362/2022-001, March 14, 2022 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML18219B607 and


ML22068A233, respectively)
ML22068A233, respectively)  


*                                             Fort Calhoun Station - NRC Inspection Report 05000285/2023-003 , July 5, 2023 (ADAMS Accession No. ML23177A119)
*  
Fort Calhoun Station - NRC Inspection Report 05000285/2023-003, July 5, 2023 (ADAMS Accession No. ML23177A119)  


At Crystal River Unit 3, as described in above NRC inspection r  eports (ADAMS Accession
At Crystal River Unit 3, as described in above NRC inspection reports (ADAMS Accession


Nos. ML22011A005 and ML22116A183), NRC inspection staff identif  ied incidents where the
Nos. ML22011A005 and ML22116A183), NRC inspection staff identified incidents where the


licensee did not properly implement fire procedures during hot   work activities. For example, an
licensee did not properly implement fire procedures during hot work activities. For example, an


area was left without a fire watch for the required amount of t  ime after the completion of hot
area was left without a fire watch for the required amount of time after the completion of hot


work.
work.


At Fort Calhoun Station in September 2020 (ADAMS Accession No.   ML21048A322), hot work in
At Fort Calhoun Station in September 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML21048A322), hot work in


containment caused a fire because slag from torch cutting fell   through multiple elevations into a
containment caused a fire because slag from torch cutting fell through multiple elevations into a


high radiation area and ignited combustible material.
high radiation area and ignited combustible material.


IN 23-04 Also, at Fort Calhoun Station in January 2022, as described in   the above NRC inspection report
IN 23-04 Also, at Fort Calhoun Station in January 2022, as described in the above NRC inspection report


(ADAMS Accession No. ML22055A979), a fire started when the trav eling river water screen was
(ADAMS Accession No. ML22055A979), a fire started when the traveling river water screen was


being cut with a torch for removal. The workers thought the scr  een was constructed of stainless
being cut with a torch for removal. The workers thought the screen was constructed of stainless


steel. However, the screen was made of a polyethylene-type mate rial, which reacted to the use
steel. However, the screen was made of a polyethylene-type material, which reacted to the use


of a torch resulting in a fire. The fire watch immediately resp onded, but an offsite fire department
of a torch resulting in a fire. The fire watch immediately responded, but an offsite fire department


was requested to assist the site.
was requested to assist the site.


In February 2022 (ADAMS Accession No. ML22068A233) at, at San O  nofre Nuclear Generating
In February 2022 (ADAMS Accession No. ML22068A233) at, at San Onofre Nuclear Generating


Station NRC inspectors found Class A combustible materials, i  ncluding non-covered wooden
Station NRC inspectors found Class A combustible materials, including non-covered wooden


planks, within the licensees procedural exclusion area or dire  ctly under where hot work was
planks, within the licensees procedural exclusion area or directly under where hot work was


being performed.
being performed.


In July 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18219B607), also at San Ono  fre Nuclear Generating
In July 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18219B607), also at San Onofre Nuclear Generating


Station, NRC inspectors found that combustible materials were n ot removed from a room that
Station, NRC inspectors found that combustible materials were not removed from a room that


supported active plant equipment after work was completed. Debr  is, bags of waste, and leftover
supported active plant equipment after work was completed. Debris, bags of waste, and leftover


distribution cables were stored in a cable tray that was locate  d directly below active cable trays
distribution cables were stored in a cable tray that was located directly below active cable trays


without the required vertical separation from combustible mater  ials.
without the required vertical separation from combustible materials.


In May 2022 (ADAMS Accession No. ML23031A208), NRC inspectors i  dentified the licensees
In May 2022 (ADAMS Accession No. ML23031A208), NRC inspectors identified the licensees


failure to utilize a hot work permit to control the use of a ha  logen lamp in one room of the
failure to utilize a hot work permit to control the use of a halogen lamp in one room of the


radioactive waste facility at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. Th  is led to a fire when the lamp
radioactive waste facility at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. This led to a fire when the lamp


ignited combustible material.
ignited combustible material.


In October 2022 (ADAMS Accession No. ML23047A154) at Indian Poi  nt Nuclear Generating
In October 2022 (ADAMS Accession No. ML23047A154) at Indian Point Nuclear Generating


Station Units 1, 2 and 3, NRC inspectors determined that the li  censee had failed to implement a
Station Units 1, 2 and 3, NRC inspectors determined that the licensee had failed to implement a


fire protection equipment surveillance procedure. Specifically,   the piping associated with the
fire protection equipment surveillance procedure. Specifically, the piping associated with the


high-pressure fire water system had not been flow tested within   the required surveillance
high-pressure fire water system had not been flow tested within the required surveillance


interval.
interval.


At Fort Calhoun Station in 2023, (ADAMS Accession No. ML23177A1 19) NRC inspectors found
At Fort Calhoun Station in 2023, (ADAMS Accession No. ML23177A119) NRC inspectors found


that the licensee failed to perform and/or record all fire watc  h inspections in parts of the
that the licensee failed to perform and/or record all fire watch inspections in parts of the


decommissioning area without fire detection.
decommissioning area without fire detection.


==DISCUSSION==
==DISCUSSION==
The operating experience events de scribed in this IN highlight the importance of:
The operating experience events described in this IN highlight the importance of:  
*
adequate procedures and field practices to ensure that combustible materials were


*                                             adequate procedures and field practices to ensure that combust  ible materials were
spaced the required minimum distance from hot work;
*  
appropriate implementation of fire prevention control measures during use of heat, spark


spaced the required minimum distance from hot work;
or open flame for activities such as cutting, welding, and grinding;  
  *                                             appropriate implementation of fire prevention control measures  during use of heat, spark
*  
the proper implementation of fire watch procedures for hot work and fire protection


or open flame for activities such as cutting, welding, and grin ding;
equipment surveillance procedures, and;  
  *                                            the proper implementation of fire watch procedures for hot wor  k and fire protection
*  
 
appropriate storage requirements for transient combustible materials near energized
equipment surveillance procedures, and;
  *                                             appropriate storage requirements for transient combustible mat  erials near energized


plant equipment.
plant equipment.


Regulatory Guide 1.191 and, NUREG/BR-0522, Revision 1, Fire Pr otection for Operating
Regulatory Guide 1.191 and, NUREG/BR-0522, Revision 1, Fire Protection for Operating


Nuclear Power Plants and Decommissioning Reactors (ADAMS Acces  sion No. ML22340A499)
Nuclear Power Plants and Decommissioning Reactors (ADAMS Accession No. ML22340A499)  
provides an overview of the fire protection requirements of 10   CFR 50.48 for decommissioning
provides an overview of the fire protection requirements of 10 CFR 50.48 for decommissioning


facilities. The NFPA Standard 51B, Standard for Fire Preventio  n During Welding, Cutting, and
facilities. The NFPA Standard 51B, Standard for Fire Prevention During Welding, Cutting, and


ML15226A446), can also be u  seful references for
ML15226A446), can also be useful references for


fire protection programs for decommissioning facilities.
fire protection programs for decommissioning facilities.


==CONTACT==
==CONTACT==
Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical   contact listed below.
Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below.
 
/RA/
 
/RA/


/RA/                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        /RA/
Jane Marshall, Director
                                      Jane Marshall, Director                                                                                                                                                                  Russell Felts, Director


Division of Decommissioning, Uranium                                                                                                                                                     Division of Reactor Oversight
Division of Decommissioning, Uranium


Recovery and Waste Programs                                                                                                                                                               Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Recovery and Waste Programs


Office of Nuclear Material Safety
Office of Nuclear Material Safety


and Safeguards
and Safeguards
Russell Felts, Director
Division of Reactor Oversight
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


===Technical Contact:===
===Technical Contact:===
Jack D. Parrott, NMSS
(301) 415-6634
E-mail:  Jack.Parrott@nrc.gov
ADAMS Accession No.:  ML23088A143
EPID No. L-2023-GEN-0002 OFFICE
QTE
NMSS/DUWP/RDB
NRR/DRA/APLB
NMSS/DUWP/RDB
OE/EB
NRR/DRA/APLB
NAME
JDoughety
JParrott
NIqbal
SAndrson
JPeralta
SMehta
DATE
4/10/2023
4/18/2023
8/11/2023
4/27/2023
8/4/2023
4/18/2023 OFFICE
NRR/DRO/IOLB
NRR/DRO/IOEB
NMSS/DUWP
NRR/DRO/IOEB
NMSS/DUWP
NRR/DRO
NAME


===Jack D. Parrott, NMSS===
IBetts
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                (301) 415-6634 E-mail:  Jack.Parrott@nrc.gov


AD AMS  Accession No.:  ML23088A143    EPIDNo.L-2023-GEN-0002
PClark


OFFICE                                                  QTE                                                                                                                                                                                                                        NMSS/DUWP/RDB                                    NRR/DRA/APLB                                            NMSS/DUWP/RDB                                    OE/EB                                                                                                                                        NRR/DRA/APLB
MFerdas


NAME                                                                          JDoughety                                                                                                                                JParrott                                                                                                                                                                                                          NIqbal                                                                                                                                                                                              SAndrson                                                                                                                                                                              JPeralta                                                                                                                    SMehta
LRegner


DATE                                                                                  4/10/2023                                                                                                                                            4/18/2023                                                                                                                                                                            8/11/2023                                                                                                                                            4/27/2023                                                                                                                                                                            8/4/2023                                                                                                            4/18/2023
JMarshall


OFFICE                                                  NRR/DRO/IOLB                                                NRR/DRO/IOEB                                                                              NMSS/DUWP                                                                                  NRR/DRO/IOEB                                                                              NMSS/DUWP                                NRR/DRO
RFelts


NAME                                                                          IBetts                                                                                                                                                                                                        PClark                                                                                                                                                                                                                          MFerdas                                                                                                                                                            LRegner                                                                                                                                                                                                JMarshall                                                                                                RFelts
DATE


DATE                                                                                  8/16/2023                                                                                                                                           7/3/2023                                                                                                                                                                                                           8/4/2023                                                                                                                                                                           9/8/2023                                                                                                                                                                                                             9/12/2023                                                                                           9/13/2023}}
8/16/2023  
7/3/2023  
8/4/2023  
9/8/2023  
9/12/2023  
9/13/2023}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 08:39, 27 November 2024

Operating Experience Related to Fire Events at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants in the United States
ML23088A143
Person / Time
Issue date: 09/13/2023
From: Russell Felts, John Marshall
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Reactor Decommissioning Branch
To:
References
IN 2023-04
Download: ML23088A143 (5)
v • d • e


ML23088A143 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001

September 13, 2023

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2023-04: OPERATING EXPERIENCE RELATED TO FIRE

EVENTS AT DECOMMISSIONING NUCLEAR

POWER PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES

ADDRESSEES

All holders of and applicants for an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power

reactor issued under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic

licensing of production and utilization facilities, including those that have permanently ceased

operations and certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.

All holders of and applicants for a power reactor combined license, standard design approval, or

manufacturing license under 10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, certifications, and approvals for

nuclear power plants. All applicants for a standard design certification, including such

applicants after initial issuance of a design certification rule.

PURPOSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform

addressees of fire events in radiologically controlled areas; posted radiologically contaminated

areas; instances of failure to control combustible material and/or perform adequate fire watches;

or implement other fire protection activities at decommissioning power reactor sites. These fire

events have been documented in NRC decommissioning reactor inspection reports from 2018 to 2023. While the focus of this IN is based on fire incidents at, and the regulations for, decommissioning reactors; the root causes are not reactor-specific activities, and this

operational experience can be applicable to any operating or decommissioning nuclear power

plant. The significance of these events is the potential for the release of radionuclides, in and

outside of controlled areas of the site (outside of a restricted area but inside the site boundary)

and potentially to publicly accessible areas, occupational radiation exposure, and the impact on

industrial safety. The NRC expects that recipients of this IN will review this information for

applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate. The INs may not impose new

requirements, and nothing in this IN should be interpreted to require specific action.

BACKGROUND

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(f)(1), licensees that have submitted the certifications required

under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) shall maintain a fire protection program to address the potential for

IN 23-04 fires that could cause the release or spread of radioactive materials (i.e., that could result in a

radiological hazard).

Fire protection for nuclear power plants uses the concept of defense-in-depth to achieve the

required degree of reactor safety by using echelons of administrative controls, fire prevention, fire detection, and suppression systems. These systems are relied upon by licensees to achieve

compliance with NRC fire protection requirements in 10 CFR 50.48, Fire protection, to protect

safety-related and important to safety structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that are

needed to achieve safe shutdown of the reactor in the event of a fire and to minimize radioactive

release to the environment in the event of a fire.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.48, each operating nuclear power plant is required to have a fire

protection plan. The plan should establish the fire protection policy for the protection of SSCs at

each plant and the procedures, equipment, and personnel required to implement the program at

the plant site. The primary fire protection concern for permanently shutdown plants is protecting

the integrity of the remaining spent nuclear fuel in the spent fuel pool and preventing or

minimizing the release of radioactive material, resulting from fires involving contaminated plant

SSCs or radioactive waste.

The fire protection program for an operating reactor provides the basis for developing the fire

protection program for the decommissioning phase. The goal of the fire protection program

during decommissioning of nuclear power plants is to provide an appropriate level of defense-in- depth protection against the threat of fires. Defense-in-depth for fire protection involves a

comprehensive program of administrative controls, physical fire protection features, emergency

response capabilities, and protection of SSCs necessary to prevent or mitigate the potential of

an unacceptable release of radioactive materials. This combination of elements reduces both

the probability and consequences of fire events, and it ensures that the failure of any one

element within the fire protection program is adequately compensated for by the others, thereby

minimizing the risk to the public, environment, and plant personnel.

For those plants that are permanently shut down, are undergoing decommissioning, or both, the

licensing basis changes must be in accordance with the requirements in 10 CFR 50.82, Termination of License. For permanently shutdown reactors, 10 CFR 50.48(f) and Regulatory

Guide 1.191, Revision 1, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Plants During

Decommissioning (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) at

Accession No. ML20287A199), relate to fire protection.

The objectives of the fire protection program listed in 10 CFR 50.48(f)(1) are to: (1) reasonably

prevent fires from occurring, (2) rapidly detect, control, and extinguish those fires that do occur

and that could result in a radiological hazard, and (3) ensure that the risk of fire-induced

radiological hazards to the public, environment, and plant personnel is minimized. In addition, a

fire protection program that complies with 10 CFR 50.48(c), National Fire Protection

Association Standard NFPA 805, incorporates by reference, with exceptions, modifications, and supplementation, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805, Performance- Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants. The

2001 Edition is deemed to be acceptable for complying with the requirements of 10 CFR

50.48(f).

IN 23-04

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

Recent fire events at decommissioning power reactor sites provide useful lessons concerning

fire protection program implementation. These events are selected and summarized from

reports of NRC inspections performed from August 2018 to May 2023. During that period the

NRC assessed six reported occurrences of fires in radiologically controlled areas or potentially

radiologically contaminated areas at decommissioning power reactor sites. The six incidents are

described in the following NRC inspection reports:

Accelerated Decommissioning Partners (ADP) CR3, LLC, Crystal River Unit 3 - NRC

Inspection Report Nos. 05000302/2021004, January 24, 2022, and 05000302/2022001, May 3, 2022 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML22011A005 and ML22116A183, respectively)

Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - NRC

Inspection Report No. 05000293/2022004, February 15, 2023 (ADAMS Accession

No. ML23031A208)

Fort Calhoun Station, NRC Inspection Reports 050-00285/2021-001, February 17, 2021,

050-00285/2022-001, February 25, 2022, and 050-00285/2022-002, April 28, 2022 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML21048A322, ML22055A979 and ML22112A158, respectively)

The NRC also assessed four instances of failure to properly implement fire protection

procedures at decommissioning power reactor sites. The four incidents are described in the

following NRC inspection reports:

Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Indian Point Energy Center Units 1, 2 and 3

- NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2022004, 05000247/2022004,

05000286/2022004, and 07200051/2022002, March 13, 2023 (ADAMS Accession

No. ML23047A154)

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, NRC Inspection Reports 05000361/2018-002 and 05000362/2018-002, August 10, 2018, and 05000361/2022-001 and

05000362/2022-001, March 14, 2022 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML18219B607 and

ML22068A233, respectively)

Fort Calhoun Station - NRC Inspection Report 05000285/2023-003, July 5, 2023 (ADAMS Accession No. ML23177A119)

At Crystal River Unit 3, as described in above NRC inspection reports (ADAMS Accession

Nos. ML22011A005 and ML22116A183), NRC inspection staff identified incidents where the

licensee did not properly implement fire procedures during hot work activities. For example, an

area was left without a fire watch for the required amount of time after the completion of hot

work.

At Fort Calhoun Station in September 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML21048A322), hot work in

containment caused a fire because slag from torch cutting fell through multiple elevations into a

high radiation area and ignited combustible material.

IN 23-04 Also, at Fort Calhoun Station in January 2022, as described in the above NRC inspection report

(ADAMS Accession No. ML22055A979), a fire started when the traveling river water screen was

being cut with a torch for removal. The workers thought the screen was constructed of stainless

steel. However, the screen was made of a polyethylene-type material, which reacted to the use

of a torch resulting in a fire. The fire watch immediately responded, but an offsite fire department

was requested to assist the site.

In February 2022 (ADAMS Accession No. ML22068A233) at, at San Onofre Nuclear Generating

Station NRC inspectors found Class A combustible materials, including non-covered wooden

planks, within the licensees procedural exclusion area or directly under where hot work was

being performed.

In July 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18219B607), also at San Onofre Nuclear Generating

Station, NRC inspectors found that combustible materials were not removed from a room that

supported active plant equipment after work was completed. Debris, bags of waste, and leftover

distribution cables were stored in a cable tray that was located directly below active cable trays

without the required vertical separation from combustible materials.

In May 2022 (ADAMS Accession No. ML23031A208), NRC inspectors identified the licensees

failure to utilize a hot work permit to control the use of a halogen lamp in one room of the

radioactive waste facility at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. This led to a fire when the lamp

ignited combustible material.

In October 2022 (ADAMS Accession No. ML23047A154) at Indian Point Nuclear Generating

Station Units 1, 2 and 3, NRC inspectors determined that the licensee had failed to implement a

fire protection equipment surveillance procedure. Specifically, the piping associated with the

high-pressure fire water system had not been flow tested within the required surveillance

interval.

At Fort Calhoun Station in 2023, (ADAMS Accession No. ML23177A119) NRC inspectors found

that the licensee failed to perform and/or record all fire watch inspections in parts of the

decommissioning area without fire detection.

DISCUSSION

The operating experience events described in this IN highlight the importance of:

adequate procedures and field practices to ensure that combustible materials were

spaced the required minimum distance from hot work;

appropriate implementation of fire prevention control measures during use of heat, spark

or open flame for activities such as cutting, welding, and grinding;

the proper implementation of fire watch procedures for hot work and fire protection

equipment surveillance procedures, and;

appropriate storage requirements for transient combustible materials near energized

plant equipment.

Regulatory Guide 1.191 and, NUREG/BR-0522, Revision 1, Fire Protection for Operating

Nuclear Power Plants and Decommissioning Reactors (ADAMS Accession No. ML22340A499)

provides an overview of the fire protection requirements of 10 CFR 50.48 for decommissioning

facilities. The NFPA Standard 51B, Standard for Fire Prevention During Welding, Cutting, and

ML15226A446), can also be useful references for

fire protection programs for decommissioning facilities.

CONTACT

Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below.

/RA/

/RA/

Jane Marshall, Director

Division of Decommissioning, Uranium

Recovery and Waste Programs

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Russell Felts, Director

Division of Reactor Oversight

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Jack D. Parrott, NMSS

(301) 415-6634

E-mail: Jack.Parrott@nrc.gov

ADAMS Accession No.: ML23088A143

EPID No. L-2023-GEN-0002 OFFICE

QTE

NMSS/DUWP/RDB

NRR/DRA/APLB

NMSS/DUWP/RDB

OE/EB

NRR/DRA/APLB

NAME

JDoughety

JParrott

NIqbal

SAndrson

JPeralta

SMehta

DATE

4/10/2023

4/18/2023

8/11/2023

4/27/2023

8/4/2023

4/18/2023 OFFICE

NRR/DRO/IOLB

NRR/DRO/IOEB

NMSS/DUWP

NRR/DRO/IOEB

NMSS/DUWP

NRR/DRO

NAME

IBetts

PClark

MFerdas

LRegner

JMarshall

RFelts

DATE

8/16/2023

7/3/2023

8/4/2023

9/8/2023

9/12/2023

9/13/2023


Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=Information_Notice_2023-04,_Operating_Experience_Related_to_Fire_Events_at_Decommissioning_Nuclear_Power_Plants_in_the_United_States&oldid=3778798"