The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of
Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for the licensees failure to ensure operators could perform time-critical steps for fire events. Specifically, on July 4, 2015, the licensee failed to implement written procedures to ensure that an equipment operator can complete certain post-fire safeshutdown actions within 10 minutes. In response to this conclusion, the licensee initiated Action Request 332747 to document the inability to meet the post-fire safe-shutdown actions in accordance with procedure
PPM 1.3.1, Operating Policy, Programs, and Practices, Revision 119. Additionally, the licensee issued Night Order 1655, reminding all operating crews of the requirements of procedure
PPM 1.3.1 for leaving the protected area. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Mitigating System Cornerstone and affected the cornerstones objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. A senior reactor analyst performed a detailed
significance determination process review using NRC
Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination
dated September 20, 2013 and NRC Inspection Manual 0308, Attachment 3, Appendix F, Technical Basis Fire Protection
Significance Determination Process (Supplemental Guidance for Implementing
IMC 0609, Appendix F) At Power Operations, dated February 28, 2005. The senior reactor analyst determined that the failure of the equipment operator to perform the certain post-fire safe-shutdown actions within 10 minutes would not adversely affect a quantitative risk assessment, and therefore this finding was of very low safety significance (Green). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Teamwork, because the licensee failed to communicate and to coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. Specifically, the equipment operator spoke with the shift technical advisor about the need to exit the protected area at the morning turnover meeting but neither individual spoke with the control room supervisor. Communication was ineffective in that the Equipment Operator believed permission was granted and proceeded to exit the protected area [H.4].
