05000315/FIN-2015001-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.07 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.07 | ||
| Inspector = J Ellegood, J Mancuso, K Riemer, L Rodriguez, M Mitchell, N Feliz | | Inspector = J Ellegood, J Mancuso, K Riemer, L Rodriguez, M Mitchell, N Feliz-Adorno, R Walton, T Taylor | ||
| CCA = H.11 | | CCA = H.11 | ||
| INPO aspect = QA.2 | | INPO aspect = QA.2 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very-low safety significance, and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to follow the containment spray (CS) heat exchanger inspection procedure. Specifically, the licensee did not develop acceptance criteria applicable for the visual inspection of these heat exchangers. The licensee entered this finding into their CAP to evaluate and resolve, including developing applicable visual inspection acceptance criteria for the CS heat exchangers. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity cornerstone attribute of structures, systems, components (SSCS), and barrier performance, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) can protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding screened as very-low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, or heat removal components, and did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. The inspectors determined this finding had an associated cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance because the licensee did not stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Specifically, the licensee did not develop shell-side visual inspection acceptance criteria because they did not challenge the applicability of the guidance contained in their procedures. [H.11] | | description = The inspectors identified a finding of very-low safety significance, and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to follow the containment spray (CS) heat exchanger inspection procedure. Specifically, the licensee did not develop acceptance criteria applicable for the visual inspection of these heat exchangers. The licensee entered this finding into their CAP to evaluate and resolve, including developing applicable visual inspection acceptance criteria for the CS heat exchangers. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity cornerstone attribute of structures, systems, components (SSCS), and barrier performance, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) can protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding screened as very-low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, or heat removal components, and did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. The inspectors determined this finding had an associated cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance because the licensee did not stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Specifically, the licensee did not develop shell-side visual inspection acceptance criteria because they did not challenge the applicability of the guidance contained in their procedures. [H.11] | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:52, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Cook  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000315/2015001 Section 1R07 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2015 (2015Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.07 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Ellegood J Mancuso K Riemer L Rodriguez M Mitchell N Feliz-Adorno R Walton T Taylor |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.11, Challenge the Unknown |
| INPO aspect | QA.2 |
| ' | |