05000266/FIN-2012005-06: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | ||
| Inspector = A Dahbur, A Shaikh, D Mcneil, J Laughlin, K Carrington, K Walton, M Kunowski, M Munir, M Phalen, M Thorpe, | | Inspector = A Dahbur, A Shaikh, D Mcneil, J Laughlin, K Carrington, K Walton, M Kunowski, M Munir, M Phalen, M Thorpe Kavanaugh, R Langstaff, S Burton, S Sheldon, V Myers | ||
| CCA = H.12 | | CCA = H.12 | ||
| INPO aspect = QA.4 | | INPO aspect = QA.4 | ||
| description = A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 3.8.2, Condition B, Required Action 1 (Immediately) was self-revealed when the licensees outage-related activities rendered both Unit 2 safety-related buses inoperable. Specifically, the licensees outage-related activities involved tagging out direct current control power to Unit 2 train A and train B safeguards relay circuitry in order to support termination of wiring. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as action request AR01639531 for evaluation and development of corrective actions. The finding was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Design Control, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 1 for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, dated June 19, 2012. The inspectors answered Yes to Exhibit 2, Question A.1 in Appendix A for mitigating structures, systems, and components, and functionality. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because at no point were all four emergency diesel generators inoperable. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, human error prevention techniques, because the licensee failed to validate the impact of the underlying assumptions associated with the clearance orders on the Technical Specification requirements so that the equipment affected were not rendered inoperable | | description = A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 3.8.2, Condition B, Required Action 1 (Immediately) was self-revealed when the licensees outage-related activities rendered both Unit 2 safety-related buses inoperable. Specifically, the licensees outage-related activities involved tagging out direct current control power to Unit 2 train A and train B safeguards relay circuitry in order to support termination of wiring. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as action request AR01639531 for evaluation and development of corrective actions. The finding was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Design Control, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 1 for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, dated June 19, 2012. The inspectors answered Yes to Exhibit 2, Question A.1 in Appendix A for mitigating structures, systems, and components, and functionality. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because at no point were all four emergency diesel generators inoperable. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, human error prevention techniques, because the licensee failed to validate the impact of the underlying assumptions associated with the clearance orders on the Technical Specification requirements so that the equipment affected were not rendered inoperable | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:46, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Point Beach  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000266/2012005 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Dahbur A Shaikh D Mcneil J Laughlin K Carrington K Walton M Kunowski M Munir M Phalen M Thorpe Kavanaugh R Langstaff S Burton S Sheldon V Myers |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
| ' | |