05000266/FIN-2012002-02
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | |
| Description | On September 2, 2011, the licensee initiated CR01683509, identifying that portions of EC258482 (EC12054), Feedwater Regulating Valve Upgrade U2, may not have been fully implemented. Specifically, the CR identified that the electrical logic wiring for the slugging feature for the post-reactor trip response was not implemented. The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective actions from the CR and noted these included only a prompt operability on this specific condition related to the MFRVs and not an extent-of-condition regarding the EC itself. The inspectors questioned the licensee regarding whether additional portions of the EC were completed as designed, or if other adverse conditions existed. In response to the inspectors inquiry, on September 13, 2011, the licensee generated CR01685732, identifying that the PMT of the MFRV AMSAC limit switches was not performed. Instead, the MFRV AMSAC limit switches were calibrated on March 2, 2011, prior to the installation of the modification. The limit switches were subsequently removed from service to allow for the installation of EC258482. Upon completion of the valve installation of the EC258482, the MFRV AMSAC limit switches were reinstalled and accepted as part of the licensees partial turnover process when all aspects of the EC were not yet completed. The aspects that were not tested include wiring disturbances from the re-installation activity and the relative position of the switches to the actuation mechanism on the valve to assure actuation occurred appropriately. However, the licensee used the fact that the limit switches were attached to the wiring board with wiring intact and labeling maintained as the basis for functionality of the AMSAC switches. The licensee plans to perform the PMT at the next available opportunity. The inspectors were concerned about the reliability of AMSAC as required by 10 CFR 50.62 (Requirements for reduction of risk from anticipated transients without a reactor scram) because some aspects of the PMT were not performed. The inspectors considered the lack of a successful PMT unresolved pending successful performance of the test at the first available opportunity, either during a forced or refueling outage. |
| Site: | Point Beach  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000266/2012002 Section 1R19 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.19 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Phalen M Thorpe Kavanaugh S Burton V Myers J Jandovitz K Barclay M Kunowskia Dahbura Shaikh D Mcneil J Laughlin K Carrington K Walton M Kunowski M Munir M Phalen M Thorpe Kavanaugh R Langstaff S Burton S Sheldon V Myers |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |
Finding - Point Beach - IR 05000266/2012002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Point Beach) @ 2012Q1
Self-Identified List (Point Beach)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||