05000266/FIN-2012005-03: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.12 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.12 | ||
| Inspector = A Dahbur, A Shaikh, D Mcneil, J Laughlin, K Carrington, K Walton, M Kunowski, M Munir, M Phalen, M Thorpe, | | Inspector = A Dahbur, A Shaikh, D Mcneil, J Laughlin, K Carrington, K Walton, M Kunowski, M Munir, M Phalen, M Thorpe Kavanaugh, R Langstaff, S Burton, S Sheldon, V Myers | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(2)(i), because the licensee failed to adequately scope a non-safety-related component relied upon to mitigate accidents or transients. Specifically, the licensee failed to include the non-safety-related electrohydraulic control system over-pressure delta temperature (OPAT) and over-temperature delta temperature (OTAT) automatic runback features, as part of their maintenance effectiveness monitoring program. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as action request AR01804588 for evaluation and development of corrective actions. The finding was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, failure to monitor the performance or condition of the electrohydraulic control system could impact the ability of the system to initiate a runback and respond to an event in the desired manner. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, Tables 2 and 3, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2 for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, dated June 19, 2012. The inspectors answered No to the Appendix A, Exhibit 1 questions for mitigating structures, systems, and components, and functionality. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance. The inspectors determined that since the scoping of the systems had occurred more than 2 years in the past, and the opportunity to reevaluate system scoping had not occurred recently, that the finding did not represent current plant performance, and therefore did not have a cross-cutting aspect associated with it. | | description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(2)(i), because the licensee failed to adequately scope a non-safety-related component relied upon to mitigate accidents or transients. Specifically, the licensee failed to include the non-safety-related electrohydraulic control system over-pressure delta temperature (OPAT) and over-temperature delta temperature (OTAT) automatic runback features, as part of their maintenance effectiveness monitoring program. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as action request AR01804588 for evaluation and development of corrective actions. The finding was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, failure to monitor the performance or condition of the electrohydraulic control system could impact the ability of the system to initiate a runback and respond to an event in the desired manner. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, Tables 2 and 3, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2 for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, dated June 19, 2012. The inspectors answered No to the Appendix A, Exhibit 1 questions for mitigating structures, systems, and components, and functionality. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance. The inspectors determined that since the scoping of the systems had occurred more than 2 years in the past, and the opportunity to reevaluate system scoping had not occurred recently, that the finding did not represent current plant performance, and therefore did not have a cross-cutting aspect associated with it. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:46, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Point Beach  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000266/2012005 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Dahbur A Shaikh D Mcneil J Laughlin K Carrington K Walton M Kunowski M Munir M Phalen M Thorpe Kavanaugh R Langstaff S Burton S Sheldon V Myers |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |