05000440/FIN-2012003-01: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = H.2 | | CCA = H.2 | ||
| INPO aspect = LA.2 | | INPO aspect = LA.2 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance when the licensee failed to identify logged readings on the Daily Surveillance Requirements Sheets which were above Operational Decision Making Issue (ODMI) trigger points and subsequently failed to take actions in accordance with the ODMI. Specifically, from April 16 through April 26, 2012, the logged leak rate on the 5A feedwater heater drain valve line exceeded an ODMI trigger point and no action was taken by several different operating crews which were on watch over that time span. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 2012-06660. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it is similar to example 4.h of Appendix E to IMC 0612 and it impacted the Human Performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone, adversely affecting the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. In addition, if left uncorrected, this issue could lead to a more significant safety concern. In accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1, Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) by answering no to the questions in the Initiating Events column of Table 4a, since the finding does not contribute to both a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions will not be available. This finding was associated with a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Planning (H.4(c)) component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because licensee supervisory personnel failed to make risk-significant decisions when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions to ensure safety was maintained. Specifically, the licensee's supervisory oversight of the daily surveillance logs did not recognize readings above the ODMI trigger points and as a result, took no actions to correct an out-of-specification condition as logged for more than 10 days. | | description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance when the licensee failed to identify logged readings on the Daily Surveillance Requirements Sheets which were above Operational Decision Making Issue (ODMI) trigger points and subsequently failed to take actions in accordance with the ODMI. Specifically, from April 16 through April 26, 2012, the logged leak rate on the 5A feedwater heater drain valve line exceeded an ODMI trigger point and no action was taken by several different operating crews which were on watch over that time span. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 2012-06660. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it is similar to example 4.h of Appendix E to IMC 0612 and it impacted the Human Performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone, adversely affecting the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. In addition, if left uncorrected, this issue could lead to a more significant safety concern. In accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1, Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) by answering no to the questions in the Initiating Events column of Table 4a, since the finding does not contribute to both a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions will not be available. This finding was associated with a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Planning (H.4(c)) component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because licensee supervisory personnel failed to make risk-significant decisions when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions to ensure safety was maintained. Specifically, the licensee\'s supervisory oversight of the daily surveillance logs did not recognize readings above the ODMI trigger points and as a result, took no actions to correct an out-of-specification condition as logged for more than 10 days. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:45, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Perry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000440/2012003 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Cassidy M Marshfield M Phalen D Jones J Nance |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
| ' | |