05000263/FIN-2013007-03: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = H.13 | | CCA = H.13 | ||
| INPO aspect = DM.1 | | INPO aspect = DM.1 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to maintain seismic qualification of safety-related undervoltage (UV) relay 27-43A, where the UV relay's coil was replaced without proper analysis and documentation. Specifically, the licensee did not ensure there was proper test analysis and documentation in-place that specified the requirements to allow replacement of the UV relays coil to maintain its seismic qualification. The licensee entered this finding into their Corrective Action Program to address the cause that lead to this issue. The relay had previously been replaced with a qualified component prior to this inspection. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding screened as very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a design deficiency that did not result in a loss of operability or functionality. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Decision-Making because the licensee did not make safety significant decisions using a systematic process, especially when faced with unexpected plant conditions, to ensure safety is maintained. Specifically, the licensee failed to recognize that to maintain seismic qualification, proper analysis and documentation must be in-place to identify those components that are authorized to be replaced without invalidating the seismic qualification analysis. | | description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to maintain seismic qualification of safety-related undervoltage (UV) relay 27-43A, where the UV relay\'s coil was replaced without proper analysis and documentation. Specifically, the licensee did not ensure there was proper test analysis and documentation in-place that specified the requirements to allow replacement of the UV relays coil to maintain its seismic qualification. The licensee entered this finding into their Corrective Action Program to address the cause that lead to this issue. The relay had previously been replaced with a qualified component prior to this inspection. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding screened as very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a design deficiency that did not result in a loss of operability or functionality. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Decision-Making because the licensee did not make safety significant decisions using a systematic process, especially when faced with unexpected plant conditions, to ensure safety is maintained. Specifically, the licensee failed to recognize that to maintain seismic qualification, proper analysis and documentation must be in-place to identify those components that are authorized to be replaced without invalidating the seismic qualification analysis. | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:00, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Monticello  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000263/2013007 Section 1R17 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.17 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Dunlop G Hausman I Hafeez R Daley |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
| ' | |