05000263/FIN-2013003-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Safety Relief Valve Tailpipe Sensing Line Isolation Valve Found Closed |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.6.3, Low-Low Set (LLS) Instrumentation, was self-revealed when the licensee discovered during the performance of an unrelated surveillance test that an isolation valve, which impacts the operation of two differential pressure switches, associated with the E LLS safety relief valve (SRV) was found closed. Specifically, valve MS-44-2B, the root valve for the E SRV tailpipe pressure sensing line was discovered closed between June 28, 2011 and April 12, 2013. The licensee took corrective actions to restore MS-44-2B to its required open position. Additional corrective actions included plans to revise a standing SRV maintenance procedure which provided incorrect restoration guidance, post-maintenance, for four of the eight SRVs. The inspectors determined that this issue was more than minor because it impacted the configuration control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and affected the cornerstones objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors applied IMC 0609, Appendix A to this finding and evaluated the issue under the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone, utilizing Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, to screen the finding. The inspectors answered No to both Reactor Containment screening questions, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance. The inspectors determined that this finding was cross-cutting in the Human Performance, resources area, and involved aspects associated with having complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation, procedures, and work packages, and correct labeling of components to assure nuclear safety. |
| Site: | Monticello  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000263/2013003 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | K Riemer S Thomas J Tapp P Voss I Hafeez S Bell M Ziolkowski |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Monticello - IR 05000263/2013003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Monticello) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Monticello)
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