05000263/FIN-2013002-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | 14 RHR Power Cable Inadvertently Cut |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was self-revealed when the licensee failed to provide adequate work instructions for work on the 12 core spray (CS) pump, to ensure that the correct power cable was cut during cable removal activities. Specifically, the work package did not contain plant drawings or steps requiring use of positive cable identification tools, and contained cable routing information which did not accurately reflect configuration of the 12 CS motor electrical power cable. This resulted in the field workers relying on informal labeling and the incorrect cable routing information to identify and cut the cable. As a direct result, the work group incorrectly cut the 14 RHR pump power cable, which unintentionally disabled a pump being credited as available in the licensees shutdown safety risk assessment at the time of the error. Once identified, the licensee took prompt action to stop work on this job and all activities associated with the demolition of cabling 480V and higher. Before resuming work, the licensee developed a list of positive identification tools for cutting cable, and incorporated the use of these tools as requirements into all work packages associated with cutting 480V and higher voltage cables. The licensee also assembled a root cause evaluation team, reset the site human performance clock, and provided site wide communication of the details of the event. This event was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP 01374981). The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to adequately identify and cut the correct cable during the 12 CS pump cable removal activity was a performance deficiency, because it was the result of the failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V; the cause was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct; and should have been prevented. The inspectors screened the performance deficiency per Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, and determined that the issue was more than minor because it impacted the equipment and human performance attributes of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstones objective to ensure the availability reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). In this instance, the performance deficiency resulted in the unintentional unavailability of the 14 RHR pump and subjected workers to a potentially energized 4160V power source. At the time of the error, 14 RHR was one of the pumps being credited in support of the shutdown safety functions of core heat removal and inventory control. As a result, this finding was evaluated under the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Since the plant was shut down and defueled, the inspectors applied NRC IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination, Attachment 1, to this finding. The inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance because it did not adversely affect core heat removal; inventory control; power availability; containment control; or reactivity guidelines. The inspectors determined that the contributing cause that provided the most insight into the performance deficiency was associated with the cross-cutting area of human performance, having resources components, and involving aspects associated with having complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation, procedures, and work packages, and correct labeling of components to assure nuclear safety. |
| Site: | Monticello  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000263/2013002 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Bilik S Thomas J Neurauter P Voss I Hafeez S Bell K Riemer |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
| ' | |
Finding - Monticello - IR 05000263/2013002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Monticello) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Monticello)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||