Information Notice 2011-08, Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake Effects on Japanese Nuclear Power Plants - for Fuel Cycle Facilities: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
Line 15: Line 15:
| page count = 4
| page count = 4
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:ML110830824 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS WASHINGTON, DC  20555-0001 March 31, 2011
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES


NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2011-08: TOHOKU-TAIHEIYOU-OKI EARTHQUAKE EFFECTS ON JAPANESE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS - FOR FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS
 
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 March 31, 2011 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2011-08:                 TOHOKU-TAIHEIYOU-OKI EARTHQUAKE
 
EFFECTS ON JAPANESE NUCLEAR POWER
 
PLANTS - FOR FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES


==ADDRESSEES==
==ADDRESSEES==
All licensees, applicants, and holders of a construction authorization and/or certificate issued by
All licensees, applicants, and holders of a construction authorization and/or certificate issued by


the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for fuel cycle facilities including fuel manufacturing facilities, mixed oxide facilities, and uranium enrichment facilities licensed under Title 10 of the
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for fuel cycle facilities including fuel
 
manufacturing facilities, mixed oxide facilities, and uranium enrichment facilities licensed under
 
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 70, Domestic Licensing of Special


Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 70, "Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material"; gaseous diffusion plants certified under 10 CFR Part 76, "Certification of
Nuclear Material; gaseous diffusion plants certified under 10 CFR Part 76, Certification of


Gaseous Diffusion Plants"; and uranium conversion/de-conversion facilities licensed under 10 CFR Part 40, "Domestic Licensing of Source Material" (i.e., Honeywell Metropolis Works).
Gaseous Diffusion Plants; and uranium conversion/de-conversion facilities licensed under 10
CFR Part 40, Domestic Licensing of Source Material (i.e., Honeywell Metropolis Works).


==PURPOSE==
==PURPOSE==
The NRC is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform addressees of effects of the Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki earthquake on nuclear power plants in Japan. The NRC expects that recipients
The NRC is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform addressees of effects of the Tohoku- Taiheiyou-Oki earthquake on nuclear power plants in Japan. The NRC expects that recipients


will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to ensure that features and preparations necessary to withstand or respond to severe external
will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to ensure that features and preparations necessary to withstand or respond to severe external


events from natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes, tsunami, floods, tornadoes, and hurricanes) are reasonable. The suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
events from natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes, tsunami, floods, tornadoes, and hurricanes)
are reasonable. The suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no
 
specific action or written response is required.


==DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES==
==DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES==
The following summary of events is based on the best information available at this time. The
The following summary of events is based on the best information available at this time. The


situation in Japan regarding recovery efforts for the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
situation in Japan regarding recovery efforts for the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
Line 42: Line 58:
continues to evolve.
continues to evolve.


On March 11, 2011, the Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki earthquake occurred near the east coast of Honshu, Japan. This magnitude 9.0 earthquake and the subsequent tsunami caused significant
On March 11, 2011, the Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki earthquake occurred near the east coast of
 
Honshu, Japan. This magnitude 9.0 earthquake and the subsequent tsunami caused significant


damage to at least four of the six units of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station as the
damage to at least four of the six units of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station as the


result of a sustained loss of both the offsite and onsite power systems. Efforts to restore power
result of a sustained loss of both the offsite and onsite power systems. Efforts to restore power


to emergency equipment were hampered and impeded by damage to the surrounding areas due to the tsunami and earthquake.
to emergency equipment were hampered and impeded by damage to the surrounding areas


Units 1, 2 and 3 were operating at the time of the earthquake. Following the loss of electric
due to the tsunami and earthquake.


power to normal and emergency core cooling systems and the subsequent failure of backup decay heat removal systems, water injection into the cores of all three reactors was compromised, and reactor decay heat removal could not be maintained. The operator of the plant, Tokyo Electric Power Company, injected sea water and boric acid into the reactor vessels of these three units, in an effort to cool the fuel and ensure that the reactors remained shut
Units 1, 2 and 3 were operating at the time of the earthquake. Following the loss of electric


down.  However, the fuel in the reactor cores became partially uncovered.  Hydrogen gas built up in Units 1 and 3 as a result of exposed, overheated fuel reacting with water.  Following gas
power to normal and emergency core cooling systems and the subsequent failure of backup


venting from the primary containment to relieve
decay heat removal systems, water injection into the cores of all three reactors was


pressure, hydrogen explosions occurred in both units and damaged the secondary containments.
compromised, and reactor decay heat removal could not be maintained. The operator of the
 
plant, Tokyo Electric Power Company, injected sea water and boric acid into the reactor vessels
 
of these three units, in an effort to cool the fuel and ensure that the reactors remained shut
 
down. However, the fuel in the reactor cores became partially uncovered. Hydrogen gas built
 
up in Units 1 and 3 as a result of exposed, overheated fuel reacting with water. Following gas
 
venting from the primary containment to relieve pressure, hydrogen explosions occurred in both
 
units and damaged the secondary containments.


Units 3 and 4 were reported to have low spent fuel pool (SFP) water levels.
Units 3 and 4 were reported to have low spent fuel pool (SFP) water levels.


Fukushima Daiichi Units 4, 5 and 6 were shut down for refueling outages at the time of the earthquake. The fuel assemblies for Unit 4 had recently been offloaded from the reactor core to the SFP. The SFPs for Units 5 and 6 appear to be intact. Emergency power is available to
Fukushima Daiichi Units 4, 5 and 6 were shut down for refueling outages at the time of the
 
earthquake. The fuel assemblies for Unit 4 had recently been offloaded from the reactor core to
 
the SFP. The SFPs for Units 5 and 6 appear to be intact. Emergency power is available to


provide cooling water flow through the SFPs for Units 5 and 6.
provide cooling water flow through the SFPs for Units 5 and 6.


The damage to Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station appears to have been caused by initiating events beyond the design basis of the facilities.
The damage to Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station appears to have been caused by
 
initiating events beyond the design basis of the facilities.


==BACKGROUND==
==BACKGROUND==
Subpart H, "Additional Requirements for Certain Licensees Authorized to Possess a Critical
Subpart H, Additional Requirements for Certain Licensees Authorized to Possess a Critical


Mass of Special Nuclear Material," of 10 CFR Part 70 requires certain major fuel cycle facilities
Mass of Special Nuclear Material, of 10 CFR Part 70 requires certain major fuel cycle facilities


to perform, maintain, and annually update an integrated safety analysis that identifies controls to
to perform, maintain, and annually update an integrated safety analysis that identifies controls to


address potential accident sequences, both internal events and credible external events, including natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and tsunami. Certificate holders under 10 CFR Part 76 also have requirements to address the implications of
address potential accident sequences, both internal events and credible external events, including natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and tsunami.
 
Certificate holders under 10 CFR Part 76 also have requirements to address the implications of


such events.
such events.
Line 82: Line 120:
The events at Fukushima Daiichi remind us that highly unlikely events caused by severe natural
The events at Fukushima Daiichi remind us that highly unlikely events caused by severe natural


phenomena hazards can initiate accidents of concern under 10 CFR Part 70 Subpart H, Part 76, and Part 40 and can present multiple challenges, such as recovery from loss of power and other services caused by the event.  In addition, these severe events may lead to additional events, such as fires, explosions, or chemical releases that could lead to accidents of concern under
phenomena hazards can initiate accidents of concern under 10 CFR Part 70 Subpart H, Part 76, and Part 40 and can present multiple challenges, such as recovery from loss of power and other


10 CFR Part 70 Subpart H or other parts of the regulations. Compliance with the regulatory
services caused by the event. In addition, these severe events may lead to additional events, such as fires, explosions, or chemical releases that could lead to accidents of concern under
 
10 CFR Part 70 Subpart H or other parts of the regulations. Compliance with the regulatory


requirements to prevent or mitigate regulated hazards may require that facilities be prepared, or
requirements to prevent or mitigate regulated hazards may require that facilities be prepared, or


possess equipment, to provide these safety functions despite multiple challenges and degraded or disabled resources.  The degradations could include long term loss of such functions as offsite power, onsite emergency power, transportation by road or rail to access offsite
possess equipment, to provide these safety functions despite multiple challenges and degraded


resources, loss of offsite water supply, and loss of other offsite services.  For events with advanced warning, plant personnel key to coping with regulated hazards may have evacuated
or disabled resources. The degradations could include long term loss of such functions as


the site, and then be unable to return.  The tragic events in Japan are a reminder of the
offsite power, onsite emergency power, transportation by road or rail to access offsite


complexities and challenges of performing an ISA for scenarios resulting from such severe and widespread natural phenomena.
resources, loss of offsite water supply, and loss of other offsite services. For events with
 
advanced warning, plant personnel key to coping with regulated hazards may have evacuated
 
the site, and then be unable to return. The tragic events in Japan are a reminder of the
 
complexities and challenges of performing an ISA for scenarios resulting from such severe and
 
widespread natural phenomena.


===PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT===
===PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT===
This Information Notice does not contain any information collections and, therefore, is not subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).
This Information Notice does not contain any information collections and, therefore, is not
 
subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).


Public Protection Notification
Public Protection Notification


The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget control number.
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for
 
information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a
 
currently valid Office of Management and Budget control number.


==CONTACT==
==CONTACT==
S
S


This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any


questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of
questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of
Line 112: Line 166:
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards project manager.
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards project manager.


/RA/       John Kinneman, Director
/RA/
                                              John Kinneman, Director
 
Division of Fuel Cycle Safety
 
and Safeguards


Division of Fuel Cycle Safety          and Safeguards        Office of Nuclear Material Safety
Office of Nuclear Material Safety


and Safeguards
and Safeguards


===Technical Contact:===
===Technical Contact:===
Dennis Damon, FCSS


301-492-3126  
===Dennis Damon, FCSS===
                        301-492-3126 e-mail: Dennis.Damon@nrc.gov


e-mail: Dennis.Damon@nrc.gov
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.


Note:  NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
===PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT===
This Information Notice does not contain any information collections and, therefore, is not


===PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT===
subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).
This Information Notice does not contain any information collections and, therefore, is not subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).


Public Protection Notification
Public Protection Notification


The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget control number.
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for
 
information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a
 
currently valid Office of Management and Budget control number.


==CONTACT==
==CONTACT==
S
S


This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any


questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of
questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of
Line 143: Line 206:
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards project manager.
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards project manager.


/RA/             John Kinneman, Director
/RA/
                                                John Kinneman, Director


Division of Fuel Cycle Safety         and Safeguards         Office of Nuclear Material Safety
Division of Fuel Cycle Safety
 
and Safeguards
 
Office of Nuclear Material Safety


and Safeguards
and Safeguards


===Technical Contact:===
===Technical Contact:===
Dennis Damon, FCSS


301-492-3126  
===Dennis Damon, FCSS===
                        301-492-3126 e-mail: Dennis.Damon@nrc.gov
 
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.


e-mail: Dennis.Damon@nrc.gov
DISTRIBUTION:
FCSS r/f


Note:  NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
ML110830824 OFFICE      NMSS/FCSS      NMSS/FCSS      QTE              NSIR/DSP      NMSS/FCSS  NMSS/FCSS


DISTRIBUTION
NAME        DDamon          PJenifer      JDougherty      MLayton      MBailey    JKinneman


: FCSS r/f ML110830824 OFFICE NMSS/FCSS NMSS/FCSS QTE NSIR/DSP NMSS/FCSS NMSS/FCSS NAME DDamon PJenifer JDougherty
Via-email        Via e-mail


Via-email MLayton Via e-mail MBailey JKinneman DATE 03/29/2011 03/ 25/2011 3/28/2011 04/04/2011 03/30/2011 03/31/2011 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY}}
DATE       03/29/2011     03/ 25/2011   3/28/2011       04/04/2011   03/30/2011 03/31/2011 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 02:45, 13 November 2019

Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake Effects on Japanese Nuclear Power Plants - for Fuel Cycle Facilities
ML110830824
Person / Time
Issue date: 03/31/2011
From: Kinneman J
NRC/NMSS/FCSS
To:
Damon, Dennis
References
NRC-2011-0008 IN-11-008
Download: ML110830824 (4)
v • d • e


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 March 31, 2011 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2011-08: TOHOKU-TAIHEIYOU-OKI EARTHQUAKE

EFFECTS ON JAPANESE NUCLEAR POWER

PLANTS - FOR FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES

ADDRESSEES

All licensees, applicants, and holders of a construction authorization and/or certificate issued by

the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for fuel cycle facilities including fuel

manufacturing facilities, mixed oxide facilities, and uranium enrichment facilities licensed under

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 70, Domestic Licensing of Special

Nuclear Material; gaseous diffusion plants certified under 10 CFR Part 76, Certification of

Gaseous Diffusion Plants; and uranium conversion/de-conversion facilities licensed under 10 CFR Part 40, Domestic Licensing of Source Material (i.e., Honeywell Metropolis Works).

PURPOSE

The NRC is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform addressees of effects of the Tohoku- Taiheiyou-Oki earthquake on nuclear power plants in Japan. The NRC expects that recipients

will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to ensure that features and preparations necessary to withstand or respond to severe external

events from natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes, tsunami, floods, tornadoes, and hurricanes)

are reasonable. The suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no

specific action or written response is required.

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

The following summary of events is based on the best information available at this time. The

situation in Japan regarding recovery efforts for the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

continues to evolve.

On March 11, 2011, the Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki earthquake occurred near the east coast of

Honshu, Japan. This magnitude 9.0 earthquake and the subsequent tsunami caused significant

damage to at least four of the six units of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station as the

result of a sustained loss of both the offsite and onsite power systems. Efforts to restore power

to emergency equipment were hampered and impeded by damage to the surrounding areas

due to the tsunami and earthquake.

Units 1, 2 and 3 were operating at the time of the earthquake. Following the loss of electric

power to normal and emergency core cooling systems and the subsequent failure of backup

decay heat removal systems, water injection into the cores of all three reactors was

compromised, and reactor decay heat removal could not be maintained. The operator of the

plant, Tokyo Electric Power Company, injected sea water and boric acid into the reactor vessels

of these three units, in an effort to cool the fuel and ensure that the reactors remained shut

down. However, the fuel in the reactor cores became partially uncovered. Hydrogen gas built

up in Units 1 and 3 as a result of exposed, overheated fuel reacting with water. Following gas

venting from the primary containment to relieve pressure, hydrogen explosions occurred in both

units and damaged the secondary containments.

Units 3 and 4 were reported to have low spent fuel pool (SFP) water levels.

Fukushima Daiichi Units 4, 5 and 6 were shut down for refueling outages at the time of the

earthquake. The fuel assemblies for Unit 4 had recently been offloaded from the reactor core to

the SFP. The SFPs for Units 5 and 6 appear to be intact. Emergency power is available to

provide cooling water flow through the SFPs for Units 5 and 6.

The damage to Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station appears to have been caused by

initiating events beyond the design basis of the facilities.

BACKGROUND

Subpart H, Additional Requirements for Certain Licensees Authorized to Possess a Critical

Mass of Special Nuclear Material, of 10 CFR Part 70 requires certain major fuel cycle facilities

to perform, maintain, and annually update an integrated safety analysis that identifies controls to

address potential accident sequences, both internal events and credible external events, including natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and tsunami.

Certificate holders under 10 CFR Part 76 also have requirements to address the implications of

such events.

DISCUSSION

The events at Fukushima Daiichi remind us that highly unlikely events caused by severe natural

phenomena hazards can initiate accidents of concern under 10 CFR Part 70 Subpart H, Part 76, and Part 40 and can present multiple challenges, such as recovery from loss of power and other

services caused by the event. In addition, these severe events may lead to additional events, such as fires, explosions, or chemical releases that could lead to accidents of concern under

10 CFR Part 70 Subpart H or other parts of the regulations. Compliance with the regulatory

requirements to prevent or mitigate regulated hazards may require that facilities be prepared, or

possess equipment, to provide these safety functions despite multiple challenges and degraded

or disabled resources. The degradations could include long term loss of such functions as

offsite power, onsite emergency power, transportation by road or rail to access offsite

resources, loss of offsite water supply, and loss of other offsite services. For events with

advanced warning, plant personnel key to coping with regulated hazards may have evacuated

the site, and then be unable to return. The tragic events in Japan are a reminder of the

complexities and challenges of performing an ISA for scenarios resulting from such severe and

widespread natural phenomena.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT

This Information Notice does not contain any information collections and, therefore, is not

subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).

Public Protection Notification

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for

information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a

currently valid Office of Management and Budget control number.

CONTACT

S

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any

questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards project manager.

/RA/

John Kinneman, Director

Division of Fuel Cycle Safety

and Safeguards

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Technical Contact:

Dennis Damon, FCSS

301-492-3126 e-mail: Dennis.Damon@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT

This Information Notice does not contain any information collections and, therefore, is not

subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).

Public Protection Notification

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for

information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a

currently valid Office of Management and Budget control number.

CONTACT

S

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any

questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards project manager.

/RA/

John Kinneman, Director

Division of Fuel Cycle Safety

and Safeguards

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Technical Contact:

Dennis Damon, FCSS

301-492-3126 e-mail: Dennis.Damon@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.

DISTRIBUTION:

FCSS r/f

ML110830824 OFFICE NMSS/FCSS NMSS/FCSS QTE NSIR/DSP NMSS/FCSS NMSS/FCSS

NAME DDamon PJenifer JDougherty MLayton MBailey JKinneman

Via-email Via e-mail

DATE 03/29/2011 03/ 25/2011 3/28/2011 04/04/2011 03/30/2011 03/31/2011 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY


Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=Information_Notice_2011-08,_Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki_Earthquake_Effects_on_Japanese_Nuclear_Power_Plants_-_for_Fuel_Cycle_Facilities&oldid=2119929"