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{{#Wiki_filter:Printed: ES-401 Facility: Wolf Creek  PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 2 1 2 1 4 5 5 4 5 4 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 2 3 RO K/A Category Points Tier Group Total K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 A1 A2 A3 A4 K6 G* 1. Emergency & Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1 1 2 2 Tier Totals Tier Totals 2. Plant Systems 1 2 3 4 3. Generic Knowledge And Abilities Categories
{{#Wiki_filter:ES-401                                           PWR Examination Outline                                         Form ES-401-2 Facility:      Wolf Creek                                                                                  Printed:
Date of Exam: 08/29/2011 RO K/A Category Points                                          SRO-Only Points Tier      Group K1 K2 K3 K4 K5                  K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* Total                        A2          G*    Total
: 1.          1      3     3   3                   3     3                 3   18            0          0      0 Emergency 2      1     2   2                   1     2                 1   9            0          0      0
      &                                        N/A                    N/A Abnormal Tier Plant Totals    4     5   5                   4     5                 4   27            0          0      0 Evolutions 1      3     2   3   3     2   2   3     3   2     2     3     28            0          0      0 2.
2      0     1   1   1     1   1   1     1   1     1     1   10        0        0      0      0 Plant Systems          Tier                                                                                0          0      0 3     3   4   4     3   3   4     4   3     3     4   38 Totals 1        2           3         4                1     2   3     4
: 3. Generic Knowledge And 10                                0 Abilities Categories 3        2          2        3                0    0    0    0 Note:
: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals" in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
: 2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.
: 2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.
The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO
The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
-only exam must total 25 points.
: 3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
: 4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
: 4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
: 3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site
: 5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
-specific  systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES
-401  for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
: 5. Absent a plant
-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO
-only portions, respectively.
Note: Date of Exam: 08/29/2011 28  18  9  27  10  38  10 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO
-only outline, the "Tier Totals"  in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES
-401 for  the applicable K/As.
: 8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO
-only exam, enter it on the lef t  side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
SRO-Only Points A2 G*  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 1 2 3 4  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions,  IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES
-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
: 6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.
: 6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.
N/A N/A Total  0  0 1 K1 KA Topic Imp. K2 K3 A1 A2 G Points Printed:
7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.
ES - 401 Facility: Wolf Creek  E/APE # / Name / Safety Function Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions
: 8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
- Tier 1 / Group 1 PWR RO Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 EK2.03 - Reactor trip status panel 3.5 1 X 000007 Reactor Trip
: 9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3.       Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
- Stabilization
1
- Recovery / 1 AK2.02 - Sensors and detectors 2.7* 1 X 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 EK2.03 - S/Gs 3.0 1 X 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 EA2.04 - Significance of PZR readings 3.7 1 X 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 AA2.01 - Cause of RCP failure 3.0 1 X 000015/000017 RCP Malfunctions / 4 AK1.0 2 - Relationship of charging flow to press. diff. between charging and RCS 2.7 1 X 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 AK3.02 - Isolation of RHR low
 
-pressure piping prior to pressure increase above specified level 3.3 1 X 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 2.4.2 - Knowledge of system set points, interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions
PWR RO Examination Outline                                  Printed:
. 4.5 1 X 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 2.2.22 - Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
Facility:    Wolf Creek ES - 401                                Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 1                     Form ES-401-2 E/APE # / Name / Safety Function              K1 K2    K3 A1 A2      G    KA Topic                                  Imp. Points 000007 Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery      X                    EK2.03 - Reactor trip status panel            3.5    1
4.0 1 X 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 EA1.15 - AFW source level and capacity (chart) 3.9 1 X 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 AK1.03 - RCS shrink and consequent depressurization 3.8 1 X 000040 Steam Line Rupture
/1 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3         X                    AK2.02 - Sensors and detectors                2.7*    1 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3                         X                    EK2.03 - S/Gs                                  3.0     1 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3                                      X       EA2.04 - Significance of PZR readings          3.7    1 000015/000017 RCP Malfunctions / 4                               X        AA2.01 - Cause of RCP failure                  3.0     1 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2          X                          AK1.02 - Relationship of charging flow         2.7    1 to press. diff. between charging and RCS 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4                            X                AK3.02 - Isolation of RHR low-pressure         3.3    1 piping prior to pressure increase above specified level 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8                            X 2.4.2 - Knowledge of system set points,         4.5    1 interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions.
- Excessive Heat Transfer / 4 AK1.02 - Effects of feedwater introduction on dry S/G 3.6 1 X 000054 Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 EA1.01 - In-core thermocouple temperatures 3.7 1 X 000055 Station Blackout / 6 2.1.2 8 - Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls. 4.1 1 X 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 AA2.0 9 - Operational status of emergency diesel generators 3.9 1 X 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 EA1.2 - Operating behavior characteristics of the facility 3.6 1 X W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 EK3.2 - Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with Loss of Secondary Heat Sink 3.7 1 X W/E05 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 2
000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System                            X 2.2.22 - Knowledge of limiting conditions       4.0    1 Malfunction / 3                                                          for operations and safety limits.
K1 KA Topic Imp. K2 K3 A1 A2 G Points Printed:
000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3                          X             EA1.15 - AFW source level and capacity         3.9     1 (chart) 000040 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat    X                          AK1.03 - RCS shrink and consequent             3.8     1 Transfer / 4                                                              depressurization 000054 Loss of Main Feedwater / 4             X                          AK1.02 - Effects of feedwater                 3.6    1 introduction on dry S/G 000055 Station Blackout / 6                                 X             EA1.01 - In-core thermocouple                 3.7     1 temperatures 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4                                  X 2.1.28 - Knowledge of the purpose and           4.1    1 function of major system components and controls.
ES - 401 Facility: Wolf Creek   E/APE # / Name / Safety Function Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions  
000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid                      X        AA2.09 - Operational status of emergency       3.9     1 Disturbances / 6                                                         diesel generators W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3                          X            EA1.2 - Operating behavior                     3.6    1 characteristics of the facility W/E05 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4                    X                EK3.2 - Normal, abnormal and                   3.7    1 emergency operating procedures associated with Loss of Secondary Heat Sink 2
- Tier 1 / Group 1 PWR RO Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 EK3.2 - Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation 3.5 1 X W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 18  3  3  3  3  3  3 K/A Category Totals:
 
Group Point Total: 3 K1 KA Topic Imp. K2 K3 A1 A2 G Points Printed:
PWR RO Examination Outline                              Printed:
ES - 401 Facility: Wolf Creek   E/APE # / Name / Safety Function Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions  
Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401                          Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 1                 Form ES-401-2 E/APE # / Name / Safety Function          K1 K2  K3 A1 A2      G    KA Topic                              Imp. Points W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4         X                EK3.2 - Normal, abnormal and              3.5    1 emergency operating procedures associated with Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation K/A Category Totals:   3  3   3  3    3  3                                Group Point Total:  18 3
- Tier 1 / Group 2 PWR RO Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 AK2.06 - T-ave./ref. deviation meter 3.0* 1 X 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 AA2.02 - Signal inputs to rod control system 2.7 1 X 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 AK3.01 - Boration and emergency boration in the event of a stuck rod during trip or normal evolutions 4.0 1 X 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 AK2.03 - Controllers and positioners 2.6 1 X 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 AA1.0 4 - Condensate air ejector exhaust radiation monitor and failure indicator 3.6 1 X 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 2.4.31 - Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures.
 
4.2 1 X 00005 1 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 AK3.02 - Guidance contained in alarm response for ARM system 3.4 1 X 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 AK1.01 - Effect of pressure on leak rate 2.6 1 X 000069 Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 EA2.2 - Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments 3.3 1 X W/E01 Rediagnosis / 3 9  1 2 2 1 2 1 K/A Category Totals:
PWR RO Examination Outline                                      Printed:
Group Point Total:
Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401                              Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 2                         Form ES-401-2 E/APE # / Name / Safety Function            K1 K2    K3 A1 A2      G    KA Topic                                      Imp. Points 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1               X                    AK2.06 - T-ave./ref. deviation meter            3.0*    1 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1                                 X        AA2.02 - Signal inputs to rod control            2.7    1 system 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1                 X                AK3.01 - Boration and emergency                  4.0    1 boration in the event of a stuck rod during trip or normal evolutions 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2           X                    AK2.03 - Controllers and positioners              2.6     1 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3                       X            AA1.04 - Condensate air ejector exhaust          3.6    1 radiation monitor and failure indicator 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4                                  X 2.4.31 - Knowledge of annunciator                   4.2    1 alarms, indications, or response procedures.
4 K1 KA Topic Imp. K2 K3 A1 A2 G Points Printed:
000061 ARM System Alarms / 7                            X               AK3.02 - Guidance contained in alarm             3.4     1 response for ARM system 000069 Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5            X                          AK1.01 - Effect of pressure on leak rate         2.6     1 W/E01 Rediagnosis / 3                                          X        EA2.2 - Adherence to appropriate                 3.3    1 procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments K/A Category Totals:    1   2   2   1   2   1                                     Group Point Total:     9 4
K4 K5 A3 K6 A4 ES - 401 Sys/Evol # / Name Facility:
 
Wolf Creek  PWR RO Examination Outline Plant Systems  
PWR RO Examination Outline                                          Printed:
- Tier 2 / Group 1 Form ES-401-2 K2.01 - RCPS 3.1 1 X 003 Reactor Coolant Pump A4.05 - RCP seal leakage detection instrumentation 3.1 1 X 003 Reactor Coolant Pump K3.0 7 - PZR level and pressure 3.8 1 X 004 Chemical and Volume Control K2.03 - RCS pressure boundary motor
Facility:  Wolf Creek ES - 401                                   Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 1                                         Form ES-401-2 Sys/Evol # / Name                K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G KA Topic                                          Imp. Points 003 Reactor Coolant Pump              X                                        K2.01 - RCPS                           3.1     1 003 Reactor Coolant Pump                                                   X    A4.05 - RCP seal leakage               3.1     1 detection instrumentation 004 Chemical and Volume Control          X                                     K3.07 - PZR level and                 3.8     1 pressure 005 Residual Heat Removal              X                                       K2.03 - RCS pressure                 2.7*      1 boundary motor-operated valves 005 Residual Heat Removal                                                   X  A4.01 - Controls and 3.6*     1 indication for RHR pumps 006 Emergency Core Cooling                X                                     K3.01 - RCS                           4.1*     1 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank                                            X 2.1.32 - Ability to explain             3.8    1 and apply system limits and precautions.
-operated valves 2.7* 1 X 005 Residual Heat Removal A4.0 1 - Controls and indication for RHR pumps 3.6* 1 X 005 Residual Heat Removal K3.01 - RCS 4.1* 1 X 006 Emergency Core Cooling 2.1.3 2 - Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions
007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank                                 X            A2.01 - Stuck-open PORV or             3.9     1 code safety 008 Component Cooling Water        X                                           K1.02 - Loads cooled by               3.3     1 CCWS 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control                  X                             K5.01 - Determination of               3.5    1 condition of fluid in PZR, using steam tables 012 Reactor Protection                        X                                 K4.08 - Logic matrix testing         2.8*     1 013 Engineered Safety Features                X                                 K4.09 - Spurious trip                 2.7     1 Actuation                                                                        protection 022 Containment Cooling                                      X                   A1.04 - Cooling water flow             3.2     1 022 Containment Cooling                                               X        A3.01 - Initiation of                 4.1    1 safeguards mode of operation 026 Containment Spray                                            X             A2.07 - Loss of Ctmt Spray             3.6    1 pump suction when in recirc.
. 3.8 1 X 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank A2.01 - Stuck-open PORV or code safety 3.9 1 X 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank K1.02 - Loads cooled by CCWS 3.3 1 X 008 Component Cooling Water K5.01 - Determination of condition of fluid in PZR, using steam tables 3.5 1 X 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control K4.08 - Logic matrix testing 2.8* 1 X 012 Reactor Protection K4.09 - Spurious trip protection 2.7 1 X 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation A1.04 - Cooling water flow 3.2 1 X 022 Containment Cooling A3.01 - Initiation of safeguards mode of operation 4.1 1 X 022 Containment Cooling A2.07 - Loss of Ctmt Spray pump suction when in recirc. mode 3.6 1 X 026 Containment Spray K5.08 - Effect of steam removal on reactivity 3.6 1 X 039 Main and Reheat Steam K4.17 - Increased feedwater flow following a reactor trip 2.5* 1 X 059 Main Feedwater K6.01 - Controllers and positioners 2.5 1 X 061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater A1.03 - Effect on instrumentation and controls of switching power supplies 2.5 1 X 062 AC Electrical Distribution K3.02 - Components using DC control power 3.5 1 X 063 DC Electrical Distribution 2.1.31 - Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup
mode 039 Main and Reheat Steam                          X                             K5.08 - Effect of steam               3.6     1 removal on reactivity 059 Main Feedwater                            X                                 K4.17 - Increased feedwater           2.5*    1 flow following a reactor trip 061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater                      X                         K6.01 - Controllers and               2.5     1 positioners 062 AC Electrical Distribution                              X                  A1.03 - Effect on                     2.5    1 instrumentation and controls of switching power supplies 063 DC Electrical Distribution           X                                      K3.02 - Components using               3.5     1 DC control power 063 DC Electrical Distribution                                               X 2.1.31 - Ability to locate             4.6    1 control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup.
. 4.6 1 X 063 DC Electrical Distribution 5
5
K1 KA Topic Imp. K2 K3 A1 A2 G Points Printed:
 
K4 K5 A3 K6 A4 ES - 401 Sys/Evol # / Name Facility:
PWR RO Examination Outline                                        Printed:
Wolf Creek  PWR RO Examination Outline Plant Systems  
Facility:  Wolf Creek ES - 401                                     Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 1                                     Form ES-401-2 Sys/Evol # / Name                  K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G KA Topic                                        Imp. Points 064 Emergency Diesel Generator                          X                        K6.08 - Fuel oil storage tanks       3.2     1 073 Process Radiation Monitoring                                                X 2.1.30 - Ability to locate and       4.4      1 operate components, including local controls.
- Tier 2 / Group 1 Form ES-401-2 K6.08 - Fuel oil storage tanks 3.2 1 X 064 Emergency Diesel Generator 2.1.30 - Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls
073 Process Radiation Monitoring     X                                            K1.01 - Those systems served         3.6     1 by PRMs 076 Service Water                                              X                 A1.02 - Reactor and turbine        2.6*      1 building closed cooling water temperatures 078 Instrument Air                                                      X       A3.01 - Air pressure                 3.1     1 078 Instrument Air                   X                                            K1.04 - Cooling wtr to comp.         2.6     1 103 Containment                                                      X           A2.04 - Containment                 3.5*      1 evacuation (including recognition of the alarm)
. 4.4 1 X 073 Process Radiation Monitoring K1.01 - Those systems served by PRMs 3.6 1 X 073 Process Radiation Monitoring A1.02 - Reactor and turbin e building closed cooling water temperatures 2.6* 1 X 076 Service Water A3.01 - Air pressure 3.1 1 X 078 Instrument Air K1.04 - Cooling wtr to comp.
K/A Category Totals: 3  2  3    3    2    2    3    3  2   2 3                    Group Point Total:       28 6
2.6 1 X 078 Instrument Air A2.04 - Containment evacuation (including recognition of the alarm) 3.5* 1 X 103 Containment 28  3  2  3  3  3  3 K/A Category Totals:
 
3  2  2 2 Group Point Total:
PWR RO Examination Outline                                      Printed:
6 K1 KA Topic Imp. K2 K3 A1 A2 G Points Printed:
Facility:  Wolf Creek ES - 401                                     Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 2                                     Form ES-401-2 Sys/Evol # / Name                  K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G KA Topic                                        Imp. Points 002 Reactor Coolant                            X                                K4.01 - Filling and draining       2.7     1 the RCS 011 Pressurizer Level Control                            X                       K6.04 - Operation of PZR           3.1     1 level controllers 014 Rod Position Indication                                    X                  A1.04 - Axial and radial           3.5     1 power distribution 015 Nuclear Instrumentation                X                                     K3.02 - CRDS                       3.3*     1 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation                      X                           K5.01 - Separation of control     2.7*     1 and protection circuits 027 Containment Iodine Removal          X                                         K2.01 - Fans                       3.1*     1 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and                                          X           A2.01 - Hydrogen recombiner       3.4*      1 Purge Control                                                                    power setting, determined by using plant data book 029 Containment Purge                                                        X  A4.01 - Containment purge           2.5     1 flow rate 034 Fuel Handling Equipment                                                    X 2.2.12 - Knowledge of               3.7     1 surveillance procedures.
K4 K5 A3 K6 A4 ES - 401 Sys/Evol # / Name Facility:
035 Steam Generator                                                      X        A3.01 - S/G water level             4.0     1 control K/A Category Totals:  0 1  1   1   1    1    1    1  1  1 1                  Group Point Total:       10 7
Wolf Creek  PWR RO Examination Outline Plant Systems  
 
- Tier 2 / Group 2 Form ES-401-2 K4.01 - Filling and draining the RCS 2.7 1 X 002 Reactor Coolant K6.04 - Operation of PZR level controllers 3.1 1 X 011 Pressurizer Level Control A1.0 4 - Axial and radial power distribution 3.5 1 X 014 Rod Position Indication K3.02 - CRDS 3.3* 1 X 015 Nuclear Instrumentation K5.01 - Separation of control and protection circuits 2.7* 1 X 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation K2.01 - Fans 3.1* 1 X 027 Containment Iodine Removal A2.01 - Hydrogen recombiner power setting, determined by using plant data book 3.4* 1 X 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control A4.01 - Containment purge flow rate 2.5 1 X 029 Containment Purge 2.2.1 2 - Knowledge of surveillance procedures
Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)
. 3.7 1 X 034 Fuel Handling Equipment A3.01 - S/G water level control 4.0 1 X 035 Steam Generator 10  0  1  1  1  1  1 K/A Category Totals:
PWR RO Examination Outline                                      Printed:
1 1 1  1 1 Group Point Total:
Facility:  Wolf Creek                                                                                Form ES-401-3 Generic Category                      KA      KA Topic                                                  Imp. Points Conduct of Operations                2.1.18 Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise logs,           3.6      1 records, status boards, and reports.
7 Facility: Wolf Creek  Generic Category KA KA Topic Imp. Points Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)
2.1.36 Knowledge of procedures and limitations involved             3.0      1 in core alterations.
Form ES-401-3   Printed: PWR RO Examination Outline 2.1.18 Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise logs, records, status boards, and reports.
2.1.45 Ability to identify and interpret diverse indications       4.3      1 to validate the response of another indication.
3.6 1 Conduct of Operations 2.1.36 Knowledge of procedures and limitations involved in core alterations.
Category Total:                 3 Equipment Control                    2.2.41 Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and       3.5      1 mechanical drawings.
3.0 1 2.1.45 Ability to identify and interpret diverse indications to validate the response of another indication.
2.2.43  Knowledge of the process used to track inoperable           3.0     1 alarms.
4.3 1 3 Category Total:
Category Total:                 2 Radiation Control                      2.3.7 Ability to comply with radiation work permit                 3.5      1 requirements during normal or abnormal conditions.
2.2.41 Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings
2.3.12  Knowledge of radiological safety principles                 3.2      1 pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.
. 3.5 1 Equipment Control 2.2.4 3 Knowledge of the process used to track inoperable alarms. 3.0 1 2 Category Total:
Category Total:                 2 Emergency Procedures/Plan              2.4.9 Knowledge of low power /shutdown implications in             3.8      1 accident (e.g. LOCA or loss of RHR) mitigation strategies.
2.3.7 Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions.
2.4.21 Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to               4.0      1 assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc.
3.5 1 Radiation Control 2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high
2.4.47 Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an               4.2      1 accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material.
-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.
Category Total:                 3 Generic Total:               10 8
3.2 1 2 Category Total:
 
2.4.9 Knowledge of low power /shutdown implications in accident (e.g. LOCA or loss of RHR) mitigation strategies.
ES-401                                           PWR Examination Outline                                         Form ES-401-2 Facility:      Wolf Creek                                                                                  Printed:
3.8 1 Emergency Procedures/Plan 2.4.21 Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc.
Date Of Exam: 08/29/2011 RO K/A Category Points                                          SRO-Only Points Tier      Group K1 K2 K3 K4 K5                  K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* Total                        A2          G*    Total
4.0 1 2.4.47 Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material.
: 1.          1      0     0   0                   0     0                 0   0             3          3      6 Emergency 2      0     0   0                   0     0                 0   0             2          2      4
4.2 1 3 Category Total:
      &                                        N/A                    N/A Abnormal Tier Plant Totals    0     0   0                   0     0                 0   0             5          5      10 Evolutions 1      0     0   0   0     0   0   0     0   0     0     0     0             3          2      5 2.
10 Generic Total:
2      0     0   0   0     0   0   0     0   0     0     0     0       0       2      1      3 Plant Systems          Tier                                                                                 5          3      8 0      0    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    0      0    0 Totals 1        2           3        4                1     2   3     4
8 Printed: ES-401 Facility: Wolf Creek  PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 0  0  0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 RO K/A Category Points Tier Group Total K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 A1 A2 A3 A4 K6 G* 1. Emergency & Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1 1 2 2 Tier Totals Tier Totals 2. Plant Systems 1 2 3 4 3. Generic Knowledge And Abilities Categories
: 3. Generic Knowledge And 0                                7 Abilities Categories 0        0          0        0                2    1    2    2 Note:
: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals" in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
: 2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.
: 2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.
The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO
The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
-only exam must total 25 points.
: 3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
: 4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
: 4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
: 3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site
: 5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
-specific  systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES
-401  for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
: 5. Absent a plant
-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher   shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO
-only portions, respectively.
Note: Date Of Exam:
08/29/2011 0  0  0  0  0  0  0 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO  and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO
-only outline, the "Tier Totals"  in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES
-401 for  the applicable K/As.
: 8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO
-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
SRO-Only Points A2 G*  3  3  2  2  5  5  3  2  2  1  3  2  1  2  2 1 2 3 4  10  4  6  5  3  8  7 9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions,  IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES
-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
: 6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.
: 6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.
N/A N/A Total  0  5 9 K1 KA Topic Imp. K2 K3 A1 A2 G Points Printed:
7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.
ES - 401 Facility: Wolf Creek   E/APE # / Name / Safety Function Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions  
: 8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
- Tier 1 / Group 1 PWR SRO Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 EA2.0 1 - Reactor nuclear instrumentation 4.7 1 X 000029 ATWS / 1 AA2.0 3 - Operational status of safety injection pump 3.9 1 X 000056 Loss of Off
: 9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3.      Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
-site Power / 6 2.4.8 - Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOP's
9
. 4.5 1 X 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 2.4.3 - Ability to identify post
 
-accident instrumentation
PWR SRO Examination Outline                                  Printed:
. 3.9 1 X 000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 AA2.01 - Cause and effect of low
Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401                              Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 1                     Form ES-401-2 E/APE # / Name / Safety Function            K1 K2    K3 A1 A2      G    KA Topic                                  Imp. Points 000029 ATWS / 1                                                X        EA2.01 - Reactor nuclear instrumentation     4.7     1 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6                              X       AA2.03 - Operational status of safety         3.9     1 injection pump 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6                               X 2.4.8 - Knowledge of how abnormal               4.5    1 operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.
-pressure instrument air alarm 3.2 1 X 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 2.4.18 - Knowledge of the specific bases for EOP's. 4.0 1 X W/E12 - Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators
000058 Loss of DC Power / 6                                         X 2.4.3 - Ability to identify post-accident       3.9     1 instrumentation.
/ 4 6  0 0 0 0 3 3 K/A Category Totals:
000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8                              X        AA2.01 - Cause and effect of low-             3.2    1 pressure instrument air alarm W/E12 - Uncontrolled Depressurization of all                        X 2.4.18 - Knowledge of the specific bases       4.0     1 Steam Generators / 4                                                    for EOPs.
Group Point Total:
K/A Category Totals:  0   0   0   0   3   3                                 Group Point Total:     6 10
10 K1 KA Topic Imp. K2 K3 A1 A2 G Points Printed:
 
ES - 401 Facility: Wolf Creek   E/APE # / Name / Safety Function Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions  
PWR SRO Examination Outline                                      Printed:
- Tier 1 / Group 2 PWR SRO Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 2.2.25 - Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. 4.2 1 X 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 EA2.01 - Subcooling Margin 4.9 1 X 000074 Inad. Core Cooling / 4 E A2.2 - Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.
Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401                              Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 2                         Form ES-401-2 E/APE # / Name / Safety Function            K1 K2    K3 A1 A2      G      KA Topic                                    Imp. Points 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7                            X    2.2.25 - Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety             4.2     1 limits.
3.4 1 X W/E 13 Steam Generator Over
000074 Inad. Core Cooling / 4                                  X       EA2.01 - Subcooling Margin                       4.9     1 W/E 13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4                       X        EA2.2 - Adherence to appropriate                 3.4      1 procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments.
-pressure / 4 2.4.1 - Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and immediate action steps.
W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5                                      X 2.4.1 - Knowledge of EOP entry                     4.8    1 conditions and immediate action steps.
4.8 1 X W/E1 5 Containment Flooding
K/A Category Totals:   0   0   0   0   2   2                                   Group Point Total:     4 11
/ 5 4  0  0  0  0  2  2 K/A Category Totals:
Group Point Total:
1 1 K1 KA Topic Imp. K2 K3 A1 A2 G Points Printed:
K4 K5 A3 K6 A4 ES - 401 Sys/Evol # / Name Facility:
Wolf Creek  PWR SRO Examination Outline Plant Systems
- Tier 2 / Group 1 Form ES-401-2 2.4.6 - Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.
4.7 1 X 006 Emergency Core Cooling A2.0 5 - Effect of loss of inst. and cont. air on the position of the CCW valves 3.5 1 X 008 Component Cooling Water A2.03 - PORV failures 4.2 1 X 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control 2.1.25 - Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.
4.2 1 X 062 AC Electrical Distribution A2.06 - Operating unloaded, lightly loaded, and highly loaded time limit 3.3 1 X 064 Emergency Diesel Generator 5  0 0 0 0  3  2 K/A Category Totals:
0  0  0  0  0 Group Point Total:
1 2 K1 KA Topic Imp. K2 K3 A1 A2 G Points Printed:
K4 K5 A3 K6 A4 ES - 401 Sys/Evol # / Name Facility:
Wolf Creek  PWR SRO Examination Outline Plant Systems
- Tier 2 / Group 2 Form ES-401-2 A2.1 7 - Malfunction of electrohydraulic control 2.9* 1 X 045 Main Turbine Generator 2.1.20 - Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps
. 4.6 1 X 068 Liquid Radwaste A2.0 4 - Positioning of axial shaping rods and their effect on SDM 3.8* 1 X 001 Rod Control 3  0  0  0  0  2 1 K/A Category Totals:
0  0  0  0  0 Group Point Total:
1 3 Facility: Wolf Creek  Generic Category KA KA Topic Imp. Points Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)
Form ES-401-3    Printed: PWR SRO Examination Outline 2.1.4 Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements, "no
-solo" operation, maintenance of active license status, 10CFR55, etc.
3.8 1 Conduct of Operations 2.1.35 Knowledge of the fuel
-handling responsibilities of SROs. 3.9 1 2 Category Total:
2.2.38 Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license.
4.5 1 Equipment Control 1 Category Total:
2.3.5 Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personal monitoring equipment, etc.
2.9 1 Radiation Control 2.3.13 Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high
-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.
3.8 1 2 Category Total:
2.4.38 Ability to take actions called for in the facility emergency plan, including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator if required.
4.4 1 Emergency Procedures/Plan 2.4.45 Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm.
4.3 1 2 Category Total:
7 Generic Total:
1 4 ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4  Tier / Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection S 1 / 1 056 AA2.02 Components not installed at WC. Randomly selected AA 2.03 2 / 1 005 A4.05 Component not utilized at WCNOC. Randomly selected A4.01 S 2 / 1  008 A2.01 No real actions for SRO Question. Randomly selected A2.05 2 / 1 026 A2.02 Not applicable to WC, replaced with A2.0 7 2 / 1 078 K1.05 Not applicable to WC, replaced with K1.04 1 / 2 059 2.4.31 Due to overlap with other RMS K/A's replaced topic with 051, kept same generic S 1 / 2 076 AA2.01 Due to overlap with other RMS K/A's replaced with E13 EA2.2 S 1 / 2 E16 2.4.1 Due to overlap with other RMS K/A's replaced topic with E15, kept same generic 1 / 1 022 AK1.01 Due to overlap with other RCP K/A's, replaced with AK1.02 2 / 1 004 K3.08 Due to overlap with other RCP K/A's, replaced with K3.07 1 / 1 077 AA2.04 Replaced with AA2.09, topic too similar to SRO topic 0 62 1 / 2 037 AA1.05 Replaced with AA1.04, lack of components to meet K/A S 1 / 1 029 EA2.02 Replaced with EA2.01, unable to get to appropriate SRO level with limited distractors S 2 / 2 079 A2.01 Replaced with 001 A2.04, topic too similar to RO 078 topi c                               


FINAL 1 of 3 ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1  Facility: Wolf Creek Date of Examination:
PWR SRO Examination Outline                                        Printed:
Aug.- Sept. 2011 Examination Level:  RO SRO    Operating Test Number:
Facility:  Wolf Creek ES - 401                                    Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 1                                      Form ES-401-2 Sys/Evol # / Name                  K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G KA Topic                                          Imp. Points 006 Emergency Core Cooling                                                    X 2.4.6 - Knowledge of EOP            4.7      1 mitigation strategies.
Administrative Topic (see Note) Type Code* Describe activity to be performed Conduct of Operations R.A.1.a S.A.1.a  N, R M, R R.A.1.a  Refuel/ Reduced Inventory:  Perform the time to core uncovery estimation using the OFN EJ
008 Component Cooling Water                                        X              A2.05 - Effect of loss of inst. 3.5      1 and cont. air on the position of the CCW valves 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control                                    X            A2.03 - PORV failures              4.2      1 062 AC Electrical Distribution                                                    2.1.25 - Ability to interpret       4.2      1 X
-015, LOSS OF RHR COOLING, step 31. Requires use of Figures 5 (time to boil) and 6 (time to uncovery).
reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.
2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves tables, etc. (CFR 41.10/43.5/45.12 RO = 3.9 SRO = 4.2)
064 Emergency Diesel Generator                                      X            A2.06 - Operating unloaded,         3.3      1 lightly loaded, and highly loaded time limit K/A Category Totals:  0  0  0    0    0    0    0    3   0   0 2                       Group Point Total:      5 12
S.A.1.a  Review/Approve/Evaluate the Reactor Operator's completed manual calculation of RTP; STS SE-002, MANUAL CALCULATION OF REACTOR THERMAL POWER. Requires discovery of errors made by Reactor Operator.
2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps. (CFR 41.10/43.5/45.12 RO = 4.6 SRO = 4.6)
Conduct of Operations R A.1.b      S.A.1.b   N, R N, R R.A.1.b   Determine the shutdown margin using STS RE-004, SHUTDOWN MARGIN DETERINATION, Attachment A, Shutdown Margin Calculation Short form. 2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management (CFR 41.1/43.6/45.6 RO = 4.3 SRO = 4.6)


S.A.1.b   Review/Approve/Verify the Reactor Operator's completed manual calculation of the shutdown margi n per STS RE
PWR SRO Examination Outline                                        Printed:
-004, SHUTDOWN MARGIN DETERINATION, Attachment A, Shutdown Margin Calculation Short form.
Facility:  Wolf Creek ES - 401                                      Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 2                                      Form ES-401-2 Sys/Evol # / Name                  K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G KA Topic                                          Imp. Points 045 Main Turbine Generator                                            X            A2.17 - Malfunction of              2.9*    1 electrohydraulic control 068 Liquid Radwaste                                                              X 2.1.20 - Ability to interpret        4.6    1 and execute procedure steps.
001 Rod Control                                                      X            A2.04 - Positioning of axial shaping rods and their effect      3.8*    1 on SDM K/A Category Totals:  0  0  0    0    0    0    0    2  0  0 1                    Group Point Total:        3 13
 
Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)
PWR SRO Examination Outline                                      Printed:
Facility:  Wolf Creek                                                                                  Form ES-401-3 Generic Category                      KA        KA Topic                                                  Imp. Points Conduct of Operations                  2.1.4  Knowledge of individual licensed operator                    3.8      1 responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements, "no-solo" operation, maintenance of active license status, 10CFR55, etc.
2.1.35  Knowledge of the fuel-handling responsibilities of            3.9      1 SROs.
Category Total:                2 Equipment Control                    2.2.38  Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the                4.5      1 facility license.
Category Total:                1 Radiation Control                      2.3.5  Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as          2.9      1 fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personal monitoring equipment, etc.
2.3.13  Knowledge of radiological safety procedures                  3.8      1 pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.
Category Total:                2 Emergency Procedures/Plan            2.4.38  Ability to take actions called for in the facility            4.4      1 emergency plan, including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator if required.
2.4.45  Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of      4.3      1 each annunciator or alarm.
Category Total:                2 Generic Total:                  7 14
 
ES-401                  Record of Rejected K/As                          Form ES-401-4 Tier /    Randomly                        Reason for Rejection Group    Selected K/A S1/1  056 AA2.02    Components not installed at WC. Randomly selected AA2.03 2/1    005 A4.05      Component not utilized at WCNOC. Randomly selected A4.01 S2/1  008 A2.01      No real actions for SRO Question. Randomly selected A2.05 2/1    026 A2.02      Not applicable to WC, replaced with A2.07 2/1    078 K1.05      Not applicable to WC, replaced with K1.04 1/2    059 2.4.31    Due to overlap with other RMS K/As replaced topic with 051, kept same generic S1/2  076 AA2.01    Due to overlap with other RMS K/As replaced with E13 EA2.2 S1/2  E16 2.4.1      Due to overlap with other RMS K/As replaced topic with E15, kept same generic 1/1    022 AK1.01    Due to overlap with other RCP K/As, replaced with AK1.02 2/1    004 K3.08      Due to overlap with other RCP K/As, replaced with K3.07 1/1    077 AA2.04    Replaced with AA2.09, topic too similar to SRO topic 062 1/2    037 AA1.05    Replaced with AA1.04, lack of components to meet K/A S1/1  029 EA2.02    Replaced with EA2.01, unable to get to appropriate SRO level with limited distractors S2/2  079 A2.01      Replaced with 001 A2.04, topic too similar to RO 078 topic
 
ES-301                    Administrative Topics Outline                        Form ES-301-1 Facility:  Wolf Creek                                Date of Examination:    Aug.- Sept.
2011 Examination Level: RO    SRO                      Operating Test Number:
Administrative Topic  Type                  Describe activity to be performed (see Note)      Code*
R.A.1.a Refuel/ Reduced Inventory: Perform the time N, R    to core uncovery estimation using the OFN EJ-015, LOSS OF RHR COOLING, step 31. Requires use of Conduct of Operations              Figures 5 (time to boil) and 6 (time to uncovery).
R.A.1.a                            2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves tables, etc. (CFR 41.10/43.5/45.12 RO =
3.9 SRO = 4.2)
M, R S.A.1.a Review/Approve/Evaluate the Reactor S.A.1.a                            Operators completed manual calculation of RTP; STS SE-002, MANUAL CALCULATION OF REACTOR THERMAL POWER. Requires discovery of errors made by Reactor Operator.
2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.
(CFR 41.10/43.5/45.12 RO = 4.6 SRO = 4.6)
R.A.1.b Determine the shutdown margin using STS N, R    RE-004, SHUTDOWN MARGIN DETERINATION, Attachment A, Shutdown Margin Calculation Short form.
Conduct of Operations 2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or R A.1.b                            limitations associated with reactivity management (CFR 41.1/43.6/45.6 RO = 4.3 SRO = 4.6)
N, R    S.A.1.b Review/Approve/Verify the Reactor Operators S.A.1.b                            completed manual calculation of the shutdown margin per STS RE-004, SHUTDOWN MARGIN DETERINATION, Attachment A, Shutdown Margin Calculation Short form.
2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management (CFR 41.1/43.6/45.6 RO = 4.3 SRO = 4.6)
2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management (CFR 41.1/43.6/45.6 RO = 4.3 SRO = 4.6)
FINAL                              1 of 3


FINAL 2 of 3  Equipment Control R.A.2    S.A.2  N, R    N, R R.A.2   Complete STS AL
R.A.2 Complete STS AL-211, TURB DRIVEN AUX N, R  FDWTR SYS FLOW PATH VERIFICATION &
-211, TURB DRIVEN AUX FDWTR SYS FLOW PATH VERIFICATION & INSERVICE CHEC VALVE TEST, Attachment A Data Sheet.
INSERVICE CHEC VALVE TEST, Attachment A Data Equipment Control        Sheet.
R.A.2                    2.2.12, Knowledge of surveillance procedures (CFR 41.10/45.13 RO = 3.7 SRO = 4.1)
S.A.2                    S.A.2 Review/Approve/Evaluate the Reactor N, R Operators completed STS EF-100A, ESW SYSTEM INSERVICE PUMP A & ESW A DISCHARGE CHECK VALVE TEST, Attachment A Data Sheet.
2.2.12, Knowledge of surveillance procedures (CFR 41.10/45.13 RO = 3.7 SRO = 4.1)
2.2.12, Knowledge of surveillance procedures (CFR 41.10/45.13 RO = 3.7 SRO = 4.1)
S.A.2   Review/Approve/Evaluate the Reactor Operator's completed STS EF-100A, ESW SYSTEM INSERVICE PUMP A & ESW A DISCHARGE CHECK VALVE TEST
S.A.3 The Containment Purge permit that was in N, R   progress was stopped. Determine/Authorize the restart for the Containment Purge Permit. (AP 07B-001, Radiation Control        Radioactive Releases, see section 6.2.4.6)
, Attachment A Data Sheet.
S.A.3                    2.3.6 Ability to approve release permits (CFR 41.13/43.4/45.9 RO = 2.0 SRO = 3.8) and/or 2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases (CFR 41.11/43.4/45.10 RO = 3.8 SRO = 4.3)
FINAL                  2 of 3


2.2.12, Knowledge of surveillance procedures (CFR 41.10/45.13 RO = 3.7 SRO = 4.1)
R.A.4 Determine percentage of Control Room N, R      annunciator loss using OFN PK-029, LOSS OF NON-VITAL 125VDC BUS PK01, PK02, PK03, PK04, AND Emergency Procedures/Plan                      ANNUNCIATORS.
Radiation Control S.A.3 N, R S.A.3  The Containment Purge permit that was in progress was stopped. Determine/Authorize the restart for the Containment Purge Permit.  (AP 07B
R.A.4                                          2.4.32 Knowledge of operator response to loss of all annunciators. (CFR 41.10/43.5/45.13 RO = 3.6 SRO
-001, Radioactive Releases, see section 6.2.4.6) 2.3.6 Ability to approve release permits (CFR 41.13/43.4/45.9 RO = 2.0 SRO = 3.8) and/or 2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases (CFR 41.11/43.4/45.10 RO = 3.8 SRO = 4.3)
                                                = 4.0)
 
S.A.4 (In the classroom setting) Determine the E-Plan classification and Protective action recommendations, if S.A.4                                D, R any.
FINAL 3 of 3  Emergency Procedures/Plan R.A.4 S.A.4  N, R D, R R.A.4  Determine percentage of Control Room annunciator loss using OFN PK
2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications. (CFR 41.10/43.5/45.11 RO = 2.9 SRO = 4.6) and 2.4.44 Knowledge of emergency plan protective action recommendations. (CFR 41.10/41.12/43.5/45.11 RO =
-029, LOSS OF NON
-VITAL 125VDC BUS PK01, PK02, PK03, PK04, AND ANNUNCIATORS.
2.4.32 Knowledge of operator response to loss of all annunciators. (CFR 41.10/43.5/45.13   RO = 3.6 SRO = 4.0)
S.A.4 (In the classroom setting) Determine the E
-Plan classification and Protective action recommendations, if any.
2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications. (CFR 41.10/43.5/45.11 RO = 2.9 SRO = 4.6) and 2.4.44 Knowledge of emergency plan protective actio n recommendations. (CFR 41.10/41.12/43.5/45.11 RO =
2.4 SRO = 4.4)
2.4 SRO = 4.4)
NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.
NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.
* Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( (N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( (P)revious 2 exams (
* Type Codes & Criteria:         (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs;  4 for SROs & RO retakes)
FINAL 1 of 6 ES-301 Control Room/In
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)
-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2   Facility: Wolf Creek Date of Examination:
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)
Aug. -Sept. 2011 Examination Level:   RO SRO   Operating Test Number:
FINAL                                         3 of 3
Control Room Systems
 
@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO
ES-301                   Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline               Form ES-301-2 Facility: Wolf Creek                                   Date of Examination: Aug. -Sept.
-I); (2 or 3 for SRO
2011 Examination Level: RO         SRO                   Operating Test Number:
-U, including 1 ESF)
Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
Bolded is an Alternate Success Path JPM.
Bolded is an Alternate Success Path JPM.
System / JPM Title Type Code*
System / JPM Title                         Type Code*       Safety Function
Safety Function a. S1: 001 - Control Rod Drive System Perform the actions of STS SF
: a. S1: 001 - Control Rod Drive System                               N, S            1 Perform the actions of STS SF-001, CONTROL AND SHUTDOWN ROD OPERABILITY VERIFICATION, for Control Bank A.
-001, CONTROL AND SHUTDOWN ROD OPERABILITY VERIFICATION, for Control Bank A. 001 2.2.12   Knowledge of surveillance procedures. (3.7/4.1)
001 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures. (3.7/4.1)
RO/SRO-I N, S  1  b. S2: 013  
RO/SRO-I
- Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)
: b. S2: 013 - Engineered Safety Features Actuation               N, EN, A, S        2 System (ESFAS)
Perform actions to ensure CRVIS actuation using ALR 00
Perform actions to ensure CRVIS actuation using ALR 00-062D, FBIS and ALR 00-063A, CRVIS.
-062D, FBIS and ALR 00
-063A, CRVIS.
PRA: ESFAS is a Risk Significant System at Wolf Creek.
PRA: ESFAS is a Risk Significant System at Wolf Creek.
013 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room ESFAS
013 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room ESFAS-initiated equipment which fails to actuate. (4.5/4.8)
-initiated equipment which fails to actuate. (4.5/4.8)
RO/SRO-I/SRO-U FINAL                                   1 of 6
RO/SRO-I/SRO-U N, EN, A, S 2
: c. S3: 006 - Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)             D, A, S  3 Perform actions to increase level in an Accumulator using a Safety Injection Pump per procedure SYS EP-200, SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATOR OPERATIONS (see sections 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 or 6.4), however, gas voiding is diagnosed due to SIP oscillations and OFN BG-045, GAS BINDING OF CCPS OR SI PUMPS, is entered and performed.
FINAL 2 of 6 c. S3: 006  
SOER 97-1, Potential Loss of High Pressure Injection and Charging Capability from Gas Intrusion 006 A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (2) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: improper discharge pressure. (3.4/3.8) 006 A2.05 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (2) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: improper amperage to the pump motor.
- Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
(3.4/3.5) 006 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: pumps. (4.1/3.9)
Perform actions to increase level in an Accumulator using a Safety Injection Pump per procedure SYS EP
RO/SRO-I/SRO-U
-200, SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATOR OPERATIONS (see sections 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 or 6.4), however, gas voiding is diagnosed due to SIP oscillations and OFN BG
: d. S4: 041 - Steam Dump System and Turbine Bypass             M, L, S 4S Control Perform actions to establish a maximum rate cooldown using the ARVs per EMG E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE.
-045, GAS BINDING OF CCPS OR SI PUMPS, is entered and performed.
041 A4.06 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Atmospheric relief valve controllers. (2.9/3.1)
SOER 97-1, Potential Loss of High Pressure Injection and Charging Capability from Gas Intrusion 006 A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (2) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: improper discharge pressure. (3.4/3.8) 006 A2.05 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (2) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: improper amperage to the pump motor. (3.4/3.5) 006 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: pumps. (4.1/3.9)
RO/SRO-I FINAL                                     2 of 6
RO/SRO-I/SRO-U D, A, S  3  d. S4: 041  
: e. S5: 003 - Reactor Coolant Pumps System                   N, L, A, S 4P Align alternate seal injection and place excess letdown into service per OFN KA-019, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR.
- Steam Dump System and Turbine Bypass Control Perform actions to establish a maximum rate cooldown using the ARV's per EMG E
003 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Seal injection (3.3/3.2)
-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE. 041 A4.06 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Atmospheric relief valve controllers. (2.9/3.1)
RO/SRO-I/SRO-U
RO/SRO-I M, L, S  4S FINAL 3 of 6 e. S5: 003  
: f. S6: 103 - Containment Systems                               D, S    5 Perform actions to startup the Containment Purge System per SYS GT-120, CONTAINMENT MINI PURGE SYSTEM OPERATIONS, sections 6.1 and 6.2.
- Reactor Coolant Pumps System Align alternate seal injection and place excess letdown into service per OFN KA
103 A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the containment system controls including:
-019, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT A IR. 003 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Seal injection (3.3/3.2) RO/SRO-I/SRO-U N, L, A, S 4P  f. S6: 103  
Containment pressure, temperature, and humidity. (3.7/4.1)
- Containment Systems Perform actions to startup the Containment Purge System per SYS GT-120, CONTAINMENT MINI PURGE SYSTEM OPERATIONS, sections 6.1 and 6.2.
RO
103 A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the containment system controls including: Containment pressure, temperature, and humidity. (3.7/4.1)
: g. S7: 015 - Nuclear Instrumentation                           D, S    7 Perform actions to bypass a failed Power Range nuclear instrumentation channel using OFN SB-008, INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTIONS, Attachment R (see step R4).
RO D, S  5  g. S7: 015  
- Nuclear Instrumentation Perform actions to bypass a failed Power Range nuclear instrumentation channel using OFN SB
-008, INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTIONS, Attachment R (see step R4).
015 A4.03 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Trip bypasses. (3.8/3.9)
015 A4.03 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Trip bypasses. (3.8/3.9)
RO/SRO-I D, S  7 FINAL 4 of 6 h. S8: 008 - Component Cooling Water System (CCW)
RO/SRO-I FINAL                                     3 of 6
Perform actions of ALR 00
: h. S8: 008 - Component Cooling Water System (CCW)               M, A, S  8 Perform actions of ALR 00-052A, CCW TO RCP FLOW LO, to respond to a loss of a CCW pump.
-052A, CCW TO RCP FLOW LO , to respond to a loss of a CCW pump.
A4.01 Ability to operate and/or monitor in the control room: CCW indications and controls. (3.3/3.1)
A4.01 Ability to operate and/or monitor in the control room: CCW indications and controls. (3.3/3.1)
A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCWS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of a CCW pump. (3.3/3.6)
A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCWS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of a CCW pump. (3.3/3.6)
PRA: Component Cooling Water is a Risk Significant System at Wolf Creek.
PRA: Component Cooling Water is a Risk Significant System at Wolf Creek.
 
RO/SRO-I In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
RO/SRO-I M, A, S 8 In-Plant Systems
: i. P1: 004 - Chemical and Volume Control System                 D, A, R, E 1 Perform local actions to borate the Reactor Coolant System. (See OFN BG-009, EMERGENCY BORATION, Attachment A, Establishing Alternate Boration Flowpath.)
@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO
-I); (3 or 2 for SRO
-U) i. P1: 004  
- Chemical and Volume Control System Perform local actions to borate the Reactor Coolant System. (See OFN BG
-009, EMERGENCY BORATION , Attachment A, Establishing Alternate Boration Flowpath.)
004 A2.14 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations. (3.8/3.9)
004 A2.14 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations. (3.8/3.9)
APE 024 AA1.04 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Emergency Boration: Manual boration valve. (3.6/3.7)
APE 024 AA1.04 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Emergency Boration: Manual boration valve. (3.6/3.7)
RO/SRO-I/SRO-U D, A, R, E 1
RO/SRO-I/SRO-U FINAL                                   4 of 6
FINAL 5 of 6 j. P2: 061  
: j. P2: 061 - Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater System                         N            4S Perform actions of STN FC-002, AUX FEEDWATER TURBINE OVERSPEED TEST section 8.1.6.
- Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater System Perform actions of STN FC
061 2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.
-002, AUX FEEDWATER TURBINE OVERSPEED TEST section 8.1.6.
(4.4/4.6))
061 2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps. (4.4/4.6))
PRA: Auxiliary Feedwater (AL) is a Risk Significant System at Wolf Creek.
PRA: Auxiliary Feedwater (AL) is a Risk Significant System at Wolf Creek.
RO/SRO-I D, A            6
: k. P3: 064 - Emergency Diesel Generators Perform actions of ALR 00-020D, DG NE01 TROUBLE alarm. Local alarm response procedure ALR 501, STANDBY DIESEL ENGINE SYSTEM CONTROL PANEL KJ-121, Attachment A, Fuel Oil Press Low and Attachment C, Fuel Strain Diff Press High, are performed.
064 K1.03 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationship between the ED/G system and the following systems: Diesel fuel oil supply system.
(3.6/4.0)
PRA: Diesel Fuel Oil (JE) is a Risk Significant System at Wolf Creek.
RO/SRO-I/SRO-U All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
* Type Codes                          Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U FINAL                                        5 of 6


RO/SRO-I N  4S  k. P3:  064
(A)lternate path                                    4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank                                  9/8/4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant                    1/1/1 (EN)gineered safety feature                          - / - / 1 (control room system)
- Emergency Diesel Generators Perform actions of ALR 00
(L)ow-Power / Shutdown                              1/1/1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)        2/2/1 (P)revious 2 exams                                  3 /  3 / 2 (randomly selected)
-020D, DG NE01 TROUBLE alarm. Local alarm response procedure ALR 501, STANDBY DIESEL ENGINE SYSTEM CONTROL PANEL KJ-121, Attachment A, Fuel Oil Press Low and Attachment C, Fuel Strain Diff Press High, are performed.
(R)CA                                              1/1/1 (S)imulator FINAL                                        6 of 6
064 K1.03 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationship between the ED/G system and the following systems: Diesel fuel oil supply system.
(3.6/4.0) PRA: Diesel Fuel Oil (JE) is a Risk Significant System at Wolf Creek.


RO/SRO-I/SRO-U D, A  6  All RO and SRO
Appendix D                                     Scenario Outline                                 Form ES-D-1 Facility: ___Wolf Creek_______________ Scenario No.: ___1_____                     Op-Test No.: _______
-I control room (and in
Examiners: ____________________________ Operators:                     _____________________________
-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO
____________________________                           _____________________________
-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
____________________________                           _____________________________
* Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO
-I / SRO-U FINAL 6 of 6 (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank  (E)mergency or abnormal in
-plant  (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power / Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)
(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA  (S)imulator 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3      -  /  -  /      d)
FINAL 1 of 5 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1   Facility: ___Wolf Creek_______________ Scenario No.: ___1_____
Op-Test No.: _______
Examiners: ____________________________   Operators:
_____________________________
____________________________
_____________________________
____________________________
_____________________________
Initial Conditions: MOL, 100%
Initial Conditions: MOL, 100%
Turnover: Red train CCW (pumps A/C secured due to leakage). TS 3.7.7 Cond A entered (72 hrs to restore). Welding on CCW A Surge tank outlet. Expected return in 24 hours. TS 3.5.2 Cond A entered (72 hrs to restore). (ESFAS alarms are illuminated). Red train ECCS pumps are DNO'd or have a TEST/CAUTION (TC) tag and pumps are in Pull
Turnover: Red train CCW (pumps A/C secured due to leakage). TS 3.7.7 Cond A entered (72 hrs to restore). Welding on CCW A Surge tank outlet. Expected return in 24 hours. TS 3.5.2 Cond A entered (72 hrs to restore). (ESFAS alarms are illuminated). Red train ECCS pumps are DNOd or have a TEST/CAUTION (TC) tag and pumps are in Pull-to-Lock (PTL). This includes: CCW A (DNO), CCW C (DNO), CCP A (TC), SIP A (TC) and RHR A (TC). DNO tags are on EG HV-11 and 13, EG HIS-1 and EG ZL-15 and 53. Perform a power reduction and turbine load decrease to 900 MWE NET using OFN MA-038, RAPID PLANT SHUTDOWN at a rate of 1%/minute.
-to-Lock (PTL). This includes: CCW "A" (DNO), CCW "C" (DNO), CCP "A" (TC), SIP "A" (TC) and RHR "A" (TC). DNO tags are on EG HV
Event        Malf. Event                                        Event No.         No.       Type*                                       Description 1                   R-           The Crew commences a power decrease and turbine load ATC,        reduction to 900 MWE NET (945 MWE GROSS) per OFN MA-038, SRO          RAPID PLANT SHUTDOWN at a rate of 1%/minute.
-11 and 13, EG HIS
N - BOP 2       mAB01D     I - BOP,     Steam Generator D pressure channel AB PT-545 fails low 2          SRO TS determined & entered. TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Fu 1e and 4e.
-1 and EG ZL
Cond A (Immediately) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistables) are entered.
-15 and 53. Perform a power reduction and turbine load decrease to 900 MWE NET using OFN MA
3       mBB21B     I - ATC,     Pressurizer pressure channel BB PI-456 fails high SRO TS determined & entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 6, 8.a and 8.b. Cond A (Immediately), Cond E (72 hrs to trip bistables) and Cond M (72 hrs to trip bistables) are entered.
-038, RAPID PLANT SHUTDOWN at a rate of 1%/minute.
TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Fu 1.d, 3.a.3, 5.d, 6.e and 8.b. Cond A (Immediately) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistables), and Cond L (1 hr to verify interlock (P-11)).
Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 R - ATC, SRO N - BOP The Crew commences a power decrease and turbine load reduction to 900 MWE NET (945 MWE GROSS) per OFN MA-038, RAPID PLANT SHUTDOWN at a rate of 1%/minute
4       mBB06C     M-           Large Break LOCA: cold leg break on Loop C CREW 5       mEJ13B     C - ATC,     Post trip malfunction #1: Autostart failure of RHR B pump.
. 2 mAB01D 2 I - BOP, SRO Steam Generator "D" pressure channel AB PT
SRO          Manual start is available.
-545 fails low TS determined & entered. TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2
6       mSA27E     C-           Post trip malfunction #2: Auto closure of EC HIS-12, SFP HX B C02        ATC,        CCW OUTLET VLV, failure to close. Manual closure available.
-1, Fu 1e and 4e. Cond A (Immediately) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistables) are entered. 3 mBB21B I - ATC, SRO Pressurizer pressure channel BB PI
SRO
-456 fails high TS determined & entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1
*         (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument,   (C)omponent,   (M)ajor FINAL                                              1 of 5
-1, Fu 6, 8.a and 8.b. Cond A (Immediately), Cond E (72 hrs to trip bistables) and Cond M (72 hrs to trip bistables) are entered.
TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2
-1, Fu 1.d, 3.a.3, 5.d, 6.e and 8.b. Cond A (Immediately) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistables), and Cond L (1 hr to verify interlock (P
-11)). 4 mBB06C M - CREW Large Break LOCA: cold leg break on Loop "C" 5 mEJ13B C - ATC, SRO Post trip malfunction #1: Autostart failure of RHR "B" pump. Manual start is available.
6 mSA27E C02 C - ATC, SRO Post trip malfunction #2: Auto closure of EC HIS
-12, SFP HX B CCW OUTLET VLV, failure to close. Manual closure available.   * (N)ormal,   (R)eactivity,   (I)nstrument,   (C)omponent,   (M)ajor


FINAL 2 of 5 Scenario summary:
Scenario summary:
The unit is at 100% power, middle of life. Turnover items include CCW pumps "A" and "C" (Red train) are secured due to leakage. Welding on CCW "A" Surge tank outlet is ongoing. Technical Specification 3.7.7 Condition A was entered (72 hrs to restore). Expected return to service is 24 hours. Red train ECCS pumps are DNO'd or have a TEST/CAUTION (TC) tag and pumps are in Pull-to-Lock (PTL). This includes: CCW "A" (DNO), CCW "C" (DNO), CCP "A" (TC), SIP "A" (TC) and RHR "A" (TC). DNO tags are on EG HV
The unit is at 100% power, middle of life. Turnover items include CCW pumps A and C (Red train) are secured due to leakage. Welding on CCW A Surge tank outlet is ongoing. Technical Specification 3.7.7 Condition A was entered (72 hrs to restore). Expected return to service is 24 hours. Red train ECCS pumps are DNOd or have a TEST/CAUTION (TC) tag and pumps are in Pull-to-Lock (PTL). This includes: CCW A (DNO), CCW C (DNO), CCP A (TC), SIP A (TC) and RHR A (TC). DNO tags are on EG HV-11 and 13, EG HIS-1 and EG ZL-15 and 53.
-11 and 13, EG HIS
Topeka Dispatch/System Operator called to inform Wolf Creek that 345-50 KV Benton line will be removed from service in 20 minutes for four hours. Directive #300 was performed. Per Directive
-1 and EG ZL
#300 Wolf Creek will be divorced from the Athens line (also opening 69-14 Breaker). Reduce power and decrease turbine load to less than 900 MWE NET.
-15 and 53.
The Call Superintendent has directed the crew to use OFN MA-038, RAPID PLANT SHUTDOWN to maneuver the unit at a rate of 1%/minute.
Topeka Dispatch/System Operator called to inform Wolf Creek that 345
Event 1: The Crew commences a power reduction and turbine load reduction to 900 MWE NET (945 MWE GROSS) per OFN MA-038, RAPID PLANT SHUTDOWN at a rate of 1%/minute.
-50 KV Benton line will be removed from service in 20 minutes for four hours. Directive #300 was performed. Per Directive #300 Wolf Creek will be divorced from the Athens line (also opening 69
Event 2: Steam Generator D pressure channel AB PT-545 fails low. Meter indications change, and Main Control Board alarms annunciate. ALRs 00-111C, SG D FLOW MISMATCH or 00-111B SG D LEV DEV, may be entered and performed. OFN SB-008, INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTIONS, is entered and Attachment C performed. These procedures diagnose and mitigate the instrument failure.
-14 Breaker). Reduce power and decrease turbine load to less than 900 MWE NET.
The Call Superintendent has directed the crew to use OFN MA
-038, RAPID PLANT SHUTDOWN to maneuver the unit at a rate of 1%/minute.
Event 1: The Crew commences a power reduction and turbine load reduction to 900 MWE NET (945 MWE GROSS) per OFN MA
-038, RAPID PLANT SHUTDOWN at a rate of 1%/minute. Event 2: Steam Generator "D" pressure channel AB PT
-545 fails low. Meter indications change, and Main Control Board alarms annunciate. ALRs 00
-111C, SG D FLOW MISMATCH or 00
-111B SG D LEV DEV, may be entered and performed. OFN SB
-008, INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTIONS, is entered and Attachment C performed. These procedures diagnose and mitigate the instrument failure.
The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.
The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.
Event 3: Pressurizer (PZR) pressure channel BB PI
Event 3: Pressurizer (PZR) pressure channel BB PI-456 fails high. The PZR spray valves close, meter indications change and various Main Control Board alarms annunciate. ALRs 00-034B, PZR PRESS HI, 00-034C, PZR PORV BLOCK; 00-034E, PRT PRESS HI; 00-035B, PORV OPEN; 00-035D, PZR PORV DISCH TEMP HI; 00-083C, RX PARTIAL TRIP annunciate. OFN SB-008, INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTIONS, is entered and Attachment K performed. These procedures diagnose and mitigate the instrument failure.
-456 fails high. The PZR spray valves close, meter indications change and various Main Control Board alarms annunciate. ALRs 00
-034B, PZR PRESS HI, 00
-034C, PZR PORV BLOCK; 00
-034E, PRT PRESS HI; 00
-035B, PORV OPEN; 00-035D, PZR PORV DISCH TEMP HI; 00
-083C, RX PARTIAL TRIP annunciate. OFN SB-008, INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTIONS, is entered and Attachment K performed. These procedures diagnose and mitigate the instrument failure.
The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.
The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.
Event 4: The Main Event is a Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident.
Event 4: The Main Event is a Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident.
Diagnostics include: PZR level decreases and RCS pressure decreases. OFN BB
Diagnostics include: PZR level decreases and RCS pressure decreases. OFN BB-007, SG/RCS LEAKAGE HIGH, may be entered & performed. A Reactor trip and Safety Injection occur. EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, is entered & performed.
-007, SG/RCS LEAKAGE HIGH, may be entered & performed. A Reactor trip and Safety Injection occur. EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, is entered & performed.
RCPs are tripped per EMG E-0 Foldout page criteria.
RCP's are tripped per EMG E
-0 Foldout page criteria.
 
EMG-E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT is entered & performed.
EMG-E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT is entered & performed.
Eventually 36% Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) level is achieved and Main Control Board alarm ALR 00
Eventually 36% Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) level is achieved and Main Control Board alarm ALR 00-047C, RWST LEV LOLO 1 AUTO XFR actuates. ALR 00-047C directs performance of EMG ES-12, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION.
-047C, RWST LEV LOLO 1 AUTO XFR actuates. ALR 00
The crew transitions to EMG ES-12, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION. The procedure is performed through step 10 to establish cold leg recirculation/ECCS recirculation.
-047C directs performance of EMG ES
FINAL                                          2 of 5
-12, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION.


The crew transitions to EMG ES
Post trip malfunctions:
-12, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION. The procedure is performed through step 10 to establish cold leg recirculation/ECCS recirculation.
Event 5: Autostart failure of RHR B pump. Manual start is available. This component failure is procedurally addressed in Attachment F of EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
However, the pump can be started after the Immediate Actions of EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, are performed and concurrence of the CRS is obtained.
Event 6: Auto closure of EC HIS-12, SFP HX B CCW OUTLET VLV, fails to close. Manual closure is available. This component failure is procedurally addressed in EMG ES-12, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, at step 3.
Scenario Critical Tasks (CT):
Event 2: CT: take manual control, select alternate controlling channel prior to actuation of the Reactor Protection System Event 4: CT: using EMG ES-12, steps 1 through 10, transfer to cold leg recirculation to establish ECCS recirculation Event 5: CT: start RHR B pump, as this is the only low head injection pump available for decay heat removal for a Large Break LOCA.
FINAL                                          3 of 5


FINAL 3 of 5 Post trip malfunctions:
Probabilistic Risk Analysis for this scenario includes:
Event 5: Autostart failure of RHR "B" pump. Manual start is available. This component failure is procedurally addressed in Attachment F of EMG E
Core Damage Frequency by Initiating Event Initiating Event    Core Damage      CDF Percent Initiating Event                  Frequency (/yr)    Frequency (/yr)  Contribution Loss of Offsite Power                          2.88E-02          6.59E-06          36.51%
-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. However, the pump can be started after the Immediate Actions of EMG E
Small LOCA                                                                            29.63%
-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, are performed and concurrence of the CRS is obtained.
3.00E-03          5.35E-06 Interfacing Systems LOCA                                          1.93E-06          10.69%
Event 6: Auto closure of EC HIS
Very Small LOCA                                                                      7.03%
-12, SFP HX B CCW OUTLET VLV, fails to close. Manual closure is available. This component failure is procedurally addressed in EMG ES
6.20E-03          1.27E-06 Transients With Power Conversion Systems Available                                  1.05E+00          9.88E-07          5.47%
-12, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, at step 3.
Steam Generator Tube Rupture                    3.67E-03          8.77E-07          4.86%
Reactor Vessel Failure                          3.00E-07          3.00E-07          1.66%
Steamline Break                                1.13E-02          1.88E-07          1.04%
Transients Without Power Conversion 1.15E-01          1.71E-07          0.95%
Systems Available Medium LOCA                                    6.10E-05          1.46E-07          0.81%
Loss of All Service Water                      6.86E-06          8.30E-08          0.46%
Loss of Component Cooling Water                2.14E-04          5.79E-08          0.32%
Loss of Vital DC Bus NK04                      2.64E-03          4.32E-08          0.24%
Large LOCA                                      7.20E-06          2.80E-08          0.16%
Feedwater Line Break                            3.17E-03          2.06E-08          0.11%
Loss of Vital DC Bus NK01                      2.64E-03          1.12E-08          0.06%
Top Risk Significant Systems EF          Essential Service Water KJ/NE          Onsite Emergency Power EG            Component Cooling Water AL          Aux Feedwater EJ          Residual Heat Removal JE          Diesel Fuel Oil NB            Lower Medium Voltage NK            125 V DC BB            Reactor Coolant System GM            Diesel Building HVAC GD            ESW HVAC GL            Aux Building HVAC BN            Refueling Water Storage Tank SA/SB          ESFAS/Reactor Protection FINAL                                            4 of 5


Scenario Critical Tasks (CT):
Technical Specifications exercised:
Event 2: CT: take manual control, select alternate controlling channel prior to actuation of the Reactor Protection System Event 4: CT: using EMG ES
Event 2: TS determined & entered. TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Fu 1e and 4e. Cond A (Immediately) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistables) are entered.
-12, steps 1 through 10, transfer to cold leg recirculation to establish ECCS recirculation Event 5: CT: start RHR "B" pump, as this is the only low head injection pump available for decay heat removal for a Large Break LOCA.
Event 3: TS determined & entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 6, 8.a and 8.b. Cond A (Immediately), Cond E (72 hrs to trip bistables) and Cond M (72 hrs to trip bistables) are entered.
 
TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Fu 1.d, 3.a.3, 5.d, 6.e and 8.b. Cond A (Immediately) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistables), and Cond L (1 hr to verify interlock (P-11)).
FINAL 4 of 5 Probabilistic Risk Analysis for this scenario includes:
FINAL                                            5 of 5
Core Damage Frequency by Initiating Event Initiating Event Initiating Event Frequency (/yr)
Core Damage Frequency (/yr)
CDF Percent Contribution Loss of Offsite Power 2.88E-02 6.59E-06 36.51% Small LOCA 3.00E-03 5.35E-06 29.63% Interfacing Systems LOCA 1.93E-06 10.69% Very Small LOCA 6.20E-03 1.27E-06 7.03% Transients With Power Conversion Systems Available 1.05E+00 9.88E-07 5.47% Steam Generator Tube Rupture 3.67 E-03 8.77E-07 4.86% Reactor Vessel Failure 3.00E-07 3.00E-07 1.66% Steamline Break 1.13E-02 1.88E-07 1.04% Transients Without Power Conversion Systems Available 1.15E-01 1.71E-07 0.95% Medium LOCA 6.10E-05 1.46E-07 0.81% Loss of All Service Water 6.86 E-06 8.30E-08 0.46% Loss of Component Cooling Water 2.14E-04 5.79E-08 0.32% Loss of Vital DC Bus NK04 2.64E-03 4.32E-08 0.24% Large LOCA 7.20E-06 2.80E-08 0.16% Feedwater Line Break 3.17E-03 2.06E-08 0.11% Loss of Vital DC Bus NK01 2.64E-03 1.12E-08 0.06%  Top Risk Significant Systems EF Essential Service Water KJ/NE Onsite Emergency Power EG Component Cooling Water AL Aux Feedwater EJ Residual Heat Removal JE Diesel Fuel Oil NB Lower Medium Voltage NK 125 V DC BB Reactor Coolant System GM Diesel Building HVAC GD ESW HVAC GL Aux Building HVAC BN Refueling Water Storage Tank SA/SB ESFAS/Reactor Protection


FINAL 5 of 5 Technical Specifications exercised:
Appendix D                                   Scenario Outline                                 Form ES-D-1 Facility: _________Wolf Creek_________ Scenario No.: ____2____                     Op-Test No.: _______
Event 2:  TS determined & entered. TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2
Examiners: ____________________________ Operators:                     _____________________________
-1, Fu 1e and 4e. Cond A (Immediately) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistables) are entered.
____________________________                           _____________________________
Event 3: TS determined & entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1
____________________________                           _____________________________
-1, Fu 6, 8.a and 8.b. Cond A (Immediately), Cond E (72 hrs to trip bistables) and Cond M (72 hrs to trip bistables) are entered.
TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Fu 1.d, 3.a.3, 5.d, 6.e and 8.b. Cond A (Immediately) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistables), and Cond L (1 hr to verify interlock (P
-11)).
FINAL 1 of 4 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1   Facility: _________Wolf Creek_________ Scenario No.: ____2____
Op-Test No.: _______
Examiners: ____________________________   Operators:
_____________________________
____________________________
_____________________________
____________________________
_____________________________
Initial Conditions: Middle Of Life, ~74%
Initial Conditions: Middle Of Life, ~74%
Turnover: Monitor MFP B vibration. Started the downpower and are currently on HOLD at ~74%
waiting an Engineering Evaluation. Annunciator 00-058B, VCT VLV NOT IN VCT POS, due to recent 200-gallon dilution to hold power. Diluting ~100 gallons every 10-15 minutes. No equipment is out of service.
Event        Malf. Event                                        Event No.        No.      Type*                                      Description 1        mBB01E      I - ATC,    Loop A, BB TI-411, Tcold fails high SRO TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 6 and 7, Cond A (Immediately) and Cond E (72 hrs to trip bistables) 2        mAE15C      I - BOP,    Steam Generator C controlling level channel AE LI-553 failure 4          SRO          high TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 14, Cond A (Immediately) and Cond E (72 hrs to trip bistables)
TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Fu 5.c and 6.d, Cond A (Immediately),
Cond I (72 hrs to trip bistable) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistable) 3        msovBB      C-          PORV BB PCV-455A fails to 25% open due to control circuitry PCV455      ATC,        problems, PZR pressure begins to decrease A          SRO TS determined and entered. TS 3.4.11 Cond. B.1 (1 hour close seal valve) and B.2 (1 hour to de-energize seal valve) and B.3 (72 hours to repair PORV) 4        mAB03A      M-          Steam line break inside Containment (Steam Generator A)
CREW Adverse Containment 5        mSNF01      C-          Malfunction post Reactor Trip and Safety Injection: LOCA A          ATC,        Sequencer A failure at five second time.
SRO 6        mNF01A      C-          Malfunction post Reactor Trip and Safety Injection: Main Generator BOP,        and Exciter breakers fail to automatically trip.
SRO
*        (N)ormal,  (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument,  (C)omponent,    (M)ajor FINAL                                            1 of 4


Turnover:  Monitor MFP "B" vibration. Started the downpower and are currently on HOLD at ~74% waiting an Engineering Evaluation. Annunciator 00
Scenario Summary:
-058B, VCT VLV NOT IN VCT POS, due to recent 200-gallon dilution to hold power. Diluting ~100 gallons every 10
The unit is at ~74% power, middle of life. Monitor MFP B vibration. Started the downpower and are currently on HOLD at ~74% waiting an Engineering Evaluation. Annunciator 00-058B, VCT VLV NOT IN VCT POS, due to recent 200-gallon dilution to hold power. Diluting ~100 gallons every 10-15 minutes. No equipment is out of service.
-15 minutes. No equipment is out of service.
Event 1: RCS Loop A BB TI-411 Tcold fails high. Meter indication changes and the Control Rods insert - the Reactor Operator (RO) places control rods in MANUAL, stopping the insertion.
Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 mBB01E I - ATC, SRO Loop "A," BB TI
Many Main Control Board alarms annunciate: 00-065C, 00-065E, 00-066B, 00-067D, 00-068D, 00-069D, 00-082B and 00-083C. OFN SB-008, INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTIONS, is entered and Attachment L performed. This procedure will diagnose and mitigate the instrument failure.
-411, Tcold fails high TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1
-1, Fu 6 and 7, Cond A (Immediately) and Cond E (72 hrs to trip bistables) 2 mAE15C 4 I - BOP, SRO Steam Generator "C" controlling level channel AE LI
-553 failure high  TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1
-1, Fu 14, Cond A (Immediately) and Cond E (72 hrs to trip bistables)
TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2
-1, Fu 5.c and 6.d, Cond A (Immediately), Cond I (72 hrs to trip bistable) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistable) 3 msovBBPCV455 A C - ATC, SRO PORV BB PCV
-455A fails to 25% open due to control circuitry problems, PZR pressure begins to decrease TS determined and entered. TS 3.4.11 Cond. B.1 (1 hour close seal valve) and B.2 (1 hour to de
-energize seal valve) and B.3 (72 hours to repair PORV) 4 mAB03A M - CREW Steam line break inside Containment (Steam Generator "A")
Adverse Containment 5 mSNF01 A C - ATC, SRO Malfunction post Reactor Trip and Safety Injection:  LOCA Sequencer "A" failure at five second time.
6 mNF01A C - BOP, SRO Malfunction post Reactor Trip and Safety Injection:  Main Generator and Exciter breakers fail to automatically trip.
* (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor
 
FINAL 2 of 4 Scenario Summary:
The unit is at ~74% power, middle of life. Monitor MFP "B" vibration. Started the downpower and are currently on HOLD at ~74% waiting an Engineering Evaluation. Annunciator 00
-058B, VCT VLV NOT IN VCT POS, due to recent 200
-gallon dilution to hold power. Diluting ~100 gallons every 10-15 minutes.
No equipment is out of service.
Event 1: RCS Loop "A" BB TI
-411 Tcold fails high. Meter indication changes and the Control Rods insert  
- the Reactor Operator (RO) places control rods in MANUAL, stopping the insertion. Many Main Control Board alarms annunciate: 00
-065C, 00-065E, 00-066B, 00-067D, 00-068D, 00-069D, 00-082B and 00
-083C. OFN SB
-008, INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTIONS, is entered and Attachment L performed. This procedure will diagnose and mitigate the instrument failure.
 
The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.
The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.
 
Event 2: Steam Generator C controlling level channel AE LI-553 fails high. Meter indications change and Main Control Board alarms, 00-110A, SG C LEV HI/LO and 00-110B, SG C LEV DEV, annunciate. ALR 00-110A, SG C LEV HI/LO, or 00-110B, SG C LEV DEV, may be entered and performed. OFN SB-008, INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTIONS, is entered and Attachment F is performed. These procedures diagnose and mitigate the instrument failure.
Event 2: Steam Generator "C" controlling level channel AE LI
-553 fails high. Meter indications change and Main Control Board alarms, 00
-110A, SG C LEV HI/LO and 00
-110B, SG C LEV DEV, annunciate. ALR 00
-110A, SG C LEV HI/LO, or 00
-110B, SG C LEV DEV, may be entered and performed. OFN SB
-008, INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTIONS, is entered and Attachment F is performed. These procedures diagnose and mitigate the instrument failure.
The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.
The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.
Event 3: Pressurizer Pilot Operated Relief Valve (PORV) BB PCV
Event 3: Pressurizer Pilot Operated Relief Valve (PORV) BB PCV-455A fails to 25% open due to control circuitry problems. Diagnostic parameters include dual indication on hand indicating switch BB HIS-455A, and alarms 00-035B, PORV OPEN, 00-035C, PZR SFTY DISCH TEMP HI, 00-035D, PZR PORV DISCH TEMP HI, 00-034E, PRT PRESS HI annunciating. ALR 00-035B may be entered and performed to close the PZR Seal Iso Valve using BB HIS-8000A. This action mitigates the event.
-455A fails to 25% open due to control circuitry problems. Diagnostic parameters include dual indication on hand indicating switch BB HIS
-455A, and alarms 00
-035B, PORV OPEN, 00
-035C, PZR SFTY DISCH TEMP HI, 00-035D, PZR PORV DISCH TEMP HI, 00
-034E, PRT PRESS HI annunciating. ALR 00
-035B may be entered and performed to close the PZR Seal Iso Valve using BB HIS
-8000A. This action mitigates the event.
 
The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.
The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.
Event 4: The Main Event is a Steam line break inside Containment (Steam Generator A).
Diagnostic parameters include Secondary steam flow to feed flow meters mismatch, increasing SG steam flow, Containment pressure and humidity while it decreases Main Turbine load and RCS pressure and temperature. OFN AB-041, STEAMLINE OR FEEDLINE LEAK may be entered. A Reactor trip and Safety Injection occurs. EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, is entered and performed. The faulted SG is identified and isolated (EMG E-0 foldout page criteria). Adverse Containment is identified and setpoints for various parameters are used. The Crew transitions to EMG E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION.
Eventually the Crew transitions to EMG ES-03, SI TERMINATION, to mitigate PZR overfill and RCS high pressure.
Post trip malfunctions:
: 1. Event 5: LOCA Sequencer A failure at five second time interval frame. This component failure requires the Crew to start ECCS equipment per EMG E-0 Attachment F.
: 2. Event 6: Main Generator and Exciter breakers fail to automatically trip. This component failure requires the BOP to permit MA HS-5, SWYD 345-50/60 MAN TRIP PERMIT switch, BEFORE opening the breakers per EMG step 6RNO. (NOTE: MA HS-5, SWYD 345-50/60 MAN TRIP PERMIT is a new switch added to Panel RL005 during Refuel 18).
FINAL                                          2 of 4


Event 4: The Main Event is a Steam line break inside Containment (Steam Generator "A"). Diagnostic parameters include Secondary steam flow to feed flow meters mismatch, increasing SG steam flow, Containment pressure and humidity while it decreases Main Turbine load and RCS pressure and temperature. OFN AB
Scenario Critical Tasks (CT)
-041, STEAMLINE OR FEEDLINE LEAK may be entered. A Reactor trip and Safety Injection occurs. EMG E
Event 1: CT - place rods to manual prior to actuation of the Reactor Protection System Event 2 - CT - take manual control, select alternate controlling channel prior to actuation of the Reactor Protection System Event 4 - CT - isolate the faulted Steam Generator before an Orange path integrity challenge develops FINAL                                          3 of 4
-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, is entered and performed. The faulted SG is identified and isolated (EMG E
-0 foldout page criteria). Adverse Containment is identified and setpoints for various parameters are used. The Crew transitions to EMG E
-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION.
Eventually the Crew transitions to EMG ES
-03, SI TERMINATION, to mitigate PZR overfill and RCS high pressure.
Post trip malfunctions:
: 1. Event 5:  LOCA Sequencer "A" failure at five second time interval frame. This component failure requires the Crew to start ECCS equipment per EMG E
-0 Attachment F.
: 2. Event 6:  Main Generator and Exciter breakers fail to automatically trip. This component failure requires the BOP to "permit" MA HS
-5, SWYD 345
-50/60 MAN TRIP PERMIT switch, BEFORE opening the breakers per EMG step 6RNO.  (NOTE: MA HS
-5, SWYD 345-50/60 MAN TRIP PERMIT is a new switch added to Panel RL005 during Refuel 18).


FINAL 3 of 4 Scenario Critical Tasks (CT)
Probabilistic Risk Analysis for this scenario includes:
Event 1: CT
Core Damage Frequency by Initiating Event Initiating Event     Core Damage              CDF Percent Initiating Event                   Frequency (/yr)     Frequency (/yr)         Contribution Loss of Offsite Power                           2.88E-02           6.59E-06                 36.51%
- place rods to manual prior to actuation of the Reactor Protection System Event 2 - CT - take manual control, select alternate controlling channel prior to actuation of the Reactor Protection System Event 4 - CT - isolate the faulted Steam Generator before an Orange path integrity challenge develops FINAL 4 of 4 Probabilistic Risk Analysis for this scenario includes:
Small LOCA                                                                                   29.63%
Core Damage Frequency by Initiating Event Initiating Event Initiating Event Frequency (/yr)
3.00E-03           5.35E-06 Interfacing Systems LOCA                                           1.93E-06                 10.69%
Core Damage Frequency (/yr)
Very Small LOCA                                                                               7.03%
CDF Percent Contribution Loss of Offsite Power 2.88E-02 6.59E-06 36.51% Small LOCA 3.00E-03 5.35E-06 29.63% Interfacing Systems LOCA 1.93E-06 10.69% Very Small LOCA 6.20E-03 1.27E-06 7.03% Transients With Power Conversion Systems Available 1.05E+00 9.88E-07 5.47% Steam Generator Tube Rupture 3.67E-03 8.77E-07 4.86% Reactor Vessel Failure 3.00E-07 3.00E-07 1.66% Steamline Break 1.13E-02 1.88E-07 1.04% Transients Without Power Conversion Systems Available 1.15E-01 1.71E-07 0.95% Medium LOCA 6.10E-05 1.46E-07 0.81% Loss of All Service Water 6.86E-06 8.30E-08 0.46% Loss of Component Cooling Water 2.14E-04 5.79E-08 0.32% Loss of Vital DC Bus NK04 2.64E-03 4.32E-08 0.24% Large LOCA 7.20E-06 2.80E-08 0.16% Feedwater Line Break 3.17E-03 2.06E-08 0.11% Loss of Vital DC Bus NK01 2.6 4E-03 1.12E-08 0.06%   Technical Specifications exercised:
6.20E-03           1.27E-06 Transients With Power Conversion Systems Available                                   1.05E+00           9.88E-07                 5.47%
Event 1 - TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1
Steam Generator Tube Rupture                   3.67E-03           8.77E-07                 4.86%
-1, Fu 6 and 7, Cond A (Immediately) and Cond E (72 hrs to trip bistables)
Reactor Vessel Failure                         3.00E-07           3.00E-07                 1.66%
Event 2 - TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1
Steamline Break                                 1.13E-02           1.88E-07                 1.04%
-1, Fu 14, Cond A (Immediately) and Cond E (72 hrs to trip bistables)
Transients Without Power Conversion 1.15E-01           1.71E-07                 0.95%
TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2
Systems Available Medium LOCA                                     6.10E-05           1.46E-07                 0.81%
-1, Fu 5.c and 6.d, Cond A (Immediately), Cond I (72 hrs to trip bistable) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistable)
Loss of All Service Water                       6.86E-06           8.30E-08                 0.46%
Event 3 - TS determined and entered. TS 3.4.11 Cond. B.1 (1 hour close seal valve) and B.2 (1 hour to de
Loss of Component Cooling Water                 2.14E-04           5.79E-08                 0.32%
-energize seal valve) and B.3 (72 hours to repair PORV)
Loss of Vital DC Bus NK04                       2.64E-03           4.32E-08                 0.24%
Large LOCA                                     7.20E-06           2.80E-08                 0.16%
Feedwater Line Break                           3.17E-03           2.06E-08                 0.11%
Loss of Vital DC Bus NK01                       2.64E-03           1.12E-08                 0.06%
Technical Specifications exercised:
Event 1 - TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 6 and 7, Cond A (Immediately) and Cond E (72 hrs to trip bistables)
Event 2 - TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 14, Cond A (Immediately) and Cond E (72 hrs to trip bistables)
TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Fu 5.c and 6.d, Cond A (Immediately), Cond I (72 hrs to trip bistable) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistable)
Event 3 - TS determined and entered. TS 3.4.11 Cond. B.1 (1 hour close seal valve) and B.2 (1 hour to de-energize seal valve) and B.3 (72 hours to repair PORV)
FINAL                                            4 of 4


FINAL 1 of 4 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1   Facility: ______Wolf Creek____________ Scenario No.: ____3____
Appendix D                                     Scenario Outline                                 Form ES-D-1 Facility: ______Wolf Creek____________ Scenario No.: ____3____                     Op-Test No.: _______
Op-Test No.: _______
Examiners: ____________________________ Operators:                     _____________________________
Examiners: ____________________________   Operators:
____________________________                             _____________________________
_____________________________
____________________________                             _____________________________
____________________________
Initial Conditions: BOL ~10% power Turnover: Power ascension in progress, negative MTC. Perform step 6.40 through step 6.46 of GEN 00-003, HOT STANDBY TO MINIMUM LOAD. Use SYS AC-120, MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR STARTUP to synchronize the Main Generator to the grid. Increase power to ~15% immediately after synchronizing Main Turbine Generator to the grid.
_____________________________
Event        Malf. Event                                          Event No.         No.       Type*                                     Description 1                   N-           Per GEN 00-003, HOT STANDBY TO MINIMUM LOAD, from step CREW        6.40 through step 6.46.
____________________________
Step 6.40 directs SYS AC-120, MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR STARTUP (synchronize Main Generator to grid).
_____________________________
Initial Conditions: BOL -~10% power Turnover: Power ascension in progress, negative MTC. Perform step 6.40 through step 6.46 of GEN 00-003, HOT STANDBY TO MINIMUM LOAD. Use SYS AC
-120, MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR STARTUP to synchronize the Main Generator to the grid. Increase power to ~15% immediately after synchronizing Main Turbine Generator to the grid.
Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 N - CREW Per GEN 00
-003, HOT STANDBY TO MINIMUM LOAD, from step 6.40 through step 6.46. Step 6.40 directs SYS AC
-120, MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR STARTUP (synchronize Main Generator to grid).
GEN 00-003 steps 6.41 through 6.46: valve alignments, increase turbine load using load potentiometer, verify Permissive states etc.
GEN 00-003 steps 6.41 through 6.46: valve alignments, increase turbine load using load potentiometer, verify Permissive states etc.
2 mNN02 C - CREW Loss of NN02 (White train)
2       mNN02       C-           Loss of NN02 (White train)
TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1  
CREW TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1 - Protective Interlocks in correct state; Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 18; Cond A (Immediately); Cond T for P-7, P-8, P-9 and P-13 (Verify interlock in required state within one hour); Cond S for P-10 (Verify interlock in required state within one hour).
- Protective Interlocks i n correct state; Table 3.3.1
-1, Fu 18; Cond A (Immediately); Cond T for P-7, P-8, P-9 and P-13 (Verify interlock in required state within one hour); Cond S for P
-10 (Verify interlock in required state within one hour).
TS 3.8.7, Cond A (restore to operable within twenty four hours)
TS 3.8.7, Cond A (restore to operable within twenty four hours)
TS 3.8.9, Cond C (restore to operable status within two hours) 3 mAB07 G C - BOP, SRO Atmospheric Relief Valve (ARV) "C" fails PARTIALLY open; manual control unavailable TS determined and entered. TS 3.7.4 Cond A (restore to operable within seven days) 4   Precursor: Seismic event  Main Feed Pump trip  Reactor trip 5 mSF17A mSF17B M - CREW Reactor fails to trip in automatic or manual. Anticipated Transient Without Trip (ATWT) 6 mAC02B C - BOP, SRO Post trip malfunction #1: Turbine will not manually trip.
TS 3.8.9, Cond C (restore to operable status within two hours) 3       mAB07       C-           Atmospheric Relief Valve (ARV) C fails PARTIALLY open; manual G          BOP,        control unavailable SRO TS determined and entered. TS 3.7.4 Cond A (restore to operable within seven days) 4                                 Precursor: Seismic event  Main Feed Pump trip  Reactor trip 5       mSF17A     M-           Reactor fails to trip in automatic or manual. Anticipated Transient CREW        Without Trip (ATWT) mSF17B 6       mAC02B     C-           Post trip malfunction #1: Turbine will not manually trip.
7 p01024 C C - ATC, SRO Post trip malfunction #2: BG HV
BOP, SRO 7       p01024     C-           Post trip malfunction #2: BG HV-8104 does not open (see step 6 of C          ATC,        EMG FR-S1) RNO performed: aligns RWST to charging pump SRO          suction
-8104 does not open (see step 6 of EMG FR-S1) RNO performed: aligns RWST to charging pump suction * (N)ormal,   (R)eactivity,   (I)nstrument,   (C)omponent,   (M)ajor FINAL 2 of 4 Scenario summary:
*         (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent,     (M)ajor FINAL                                             1 of 4
Unit is at ~ 10 % power, beginning of life. Power ascension in progress, negative MTC. Perform step 6.40 through step 6.46 of GEN 00
 
-003, HOT STANDBY TO MINIMUM LOAD. Use SYS AC
Scenario summary:
-120, MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR STARTUP to synchronize the Main Generator to the grid. Increase power to ~15% immediately after synchronizing Main Turbine Generator to the grid.
Unit is at ~ 10 % power, beginning of life. Power ascension in progress, negative MTC. Perform step 6.40 through step 6.46 of GEN 00-003, HOT STANDBY TO MINIMUM LOAD. Use SYS AC-120, MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR STARTUP to synchronize the Main Generator to the grid.
Event 1: The Crew, using GEN 00-003, HOT STANDBY TO MINIMUM LOAD, from step 6.40 through step 6.46 will synchronize Main Generator to the grid, verify valve alignments, increase turbine load using load potentiometer, and verify Permissive states etc.
Increase power to ~15% immediately after synchronizing Main Turbine Generator to the grid.
Event 2: Loss of NN02 occurs. White train meter indications change and many Main Control Board alarms annunciate aid in diagnosing the component failure. The Crew may enter ALR 00
Event 1: The Crew, using GEN 00-003, HOT STANDBY TO MINIMUM LOAD, from step 6.40 through step 6.46 will synchronize Main Generator to the grid, verify valve alignments, increase turbine load using load potentiometer, and verify Permissive states etc.
-026A, NN02 INST BUS UV. The Crew enters OFN NN
Event 2: Loss of NN02 occurs. White train meter indications change and many Main Control Board alarms annunciate aid in diagnosing the component failure. The Crew may enter ALR 00-026A, NN02 INST BUS UV. The Crew enters OFN NN-021, LOSS OF VITAL 120VAC INSTRUMENT BUS, and performs Attachment B to restore power.
-021, LOSS OF VITAL 120VAC INSTRUMENT BUS, and performs Attachment B to restore power.
The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.
The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.
Event 3: Atmospheric Relief Valve (ARV) "C" fails PARTIALLY open and manual control is unavailable. The Crew enters OFN AB
Event 3: Atmospheric Relief Valve (ARV) C fails PARTIALLY open and manual control is unavailable. The Crew enters OFN AB-041, STEAMLINE OR FEEDLINE BREAK to mitigate the component failure. An Operator is dispatched to locally close the valve.
-041, STEAMLINE OR FEEDLINE BREAK to mitigate the component failure. An Operator is dispatched to locally close the valve.
The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.
The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.
Event 4: A Seismic event occurs. Main Control Board alarms 00
Event 4: A Seismic event occurs. Main Control Board alarms 00-098D, OBE and 00-098E, SEISMIC RECORDER ON, annunciate. OFN SG-003, NATURAL EVENTS, is entered. The only running Main Feed Pump trips three minutes later. Main Control Board alarm 00-123A, MFP B TRIP, annunciates. The Crew determines a Reactor trip is necessary. A Reactor trip condition occurs; only the reactor fails to trip.
-098D, OBE and 00
-098E, SEISMIC RECORDER ON, annunciate. OFN SG
-003, NATURAL EVENTS, is entered. The only running Main Feed Pump trips three minutes later. Main Control Board alarm 00
-123A, MFP B TRIP, annunciates. The Crew determines a Reactor trip is necessary. A Reactor trip condition occurs; only the reactor fails to trip.
Event 5: The Main Event is an Anticipated Transient Without Trip (ATWT).
Event 5: The Main Event is an Anticipated Transient Without Trip (ATWT).
The Crew enters EMG E
The Crew enters EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, and from step 1RNO transitions to EMG FR-S1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS.
-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, and from step 1RNO transitions to EMG FR
Event 6: The turbine will not trip manually - the BOP must manually trip the turbine within thirty seconds to prevent an uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS due to steam flow that the turbine would require (2RNO EMG FR-S1 and EMG E-0).
-S1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS.
Event 7: When aligning emergency boration, BG HV-8104 does not open. The ATC aligns Refueling Water Storage Tank to charging pump suction instead (6RNO of EMG FR-S1).
Event 6: The turbine will not trip manually  
- the BOP must manually trip the turbine within thirty seconds to prevent an uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS due to steam flow that the turbine would require (2RNO EMG FR
-S1 and EMG E
-0).
Event 7: When aligning emergency boration, BG HV
-8104 does not open. The ATC aligns Refueling Water Storage Tank to charging pump suction instead (6RNO of EMG FR
-S1).
Successful mitigation strategy requires the Crew continues performance of EMG FR-S1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS.
Successful mitigation strategy requires the Crew continues performance of EMG FR-S1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS.
FINAL                                          2 of 4


FINAL 3 of 4 Post trip malfunction:
Post trip malfunction:
: 1. Event 6: Post trip malfunction #1: The turbine will not trip manually.
: 1. Event 6: Post trip malfunction #1: The turbine will not trip manually. As part of Immediate Actions of EMG FR-S1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS, step 2RNO, the BOP must trip the turbine.
As part of Immediate Actions of EMG FR
: 2. Event 7: Post trip malfunction #2: EMER BORATE TO CHG PUMP SUCT BG HIS-8104 does not open (see step 6 of EMG FR-S1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS). RNO performed: aligns RWST to charging pump suction.
-S1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS, step 2RNO, the BOP must trip the turbine.
: 2. Event 7: Post trip malfunction #2: EMER BORATE TO CHG PUMP SUCT BG HIS
-8104 does not open (see step 6 of EMG FR-S1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS). RNO performed: aligns RWST to charging pump suction.
Scenario Critical Tasks (CT):
Scenario Critical Tasks (CT):
Event 5: CT: Insert negative reactivity into the core by at least one of the following methods before the Steam Generators dry
Event 5: CT: Insert negative reactivity into the core by at least one of the following methods before the Steam Generators dry-out:
-out: De-energize the control rod drive MG sets Manually insert control rods
* De-energize the control rod drive MG sets
* Manually insert control rods Event 6: CT: Manually trip the turbine to prevent an uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS due to steam flow that the turbine would require.
FINAL                                            3 of 4


Event 6: CT: Manually trip the turbine to prevent an uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS due to steam flow that the turbine would require. 
Probabilistic Risk Analysis for this scenario includes:
 
Core Damage Frequency by Event Tree Core Damage              Percent Event Tree                                                             Frequency (/yr)         Contribution Station Blackout                                                         6.46E-06               35.79%
FINAL 4 of 4 Probabilistic Risk Analysis for this scenario includes:
Small LOCA                                                               5.35E-06               29.65%
Core Damage Frequency by Event Tree Event Tree Core Damage Frequency (/yr)
Interfacing Systems LOCA                                                 1.93E-06               10.68%
Percent Contribution Station Blackout 6.46E-06 35.79% Small LOCA 5.35E-06 29.65% Interfacing Systems LOCA 1.93E-06 10.68% Very Small LOCA 1.27E-06 7.05% Steam Generator Tube Rupture 8.77E-07 4.86% Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Cooling Following a Transient Initiator 5.91E-07 3.28% Transients With Power Conversion Systems Available 3.30E-07 1.83% Reactor Vessel Failure 3.00E-0 7 1.66% Steamline Break 1.88E-07 1.40% Transients Without Power Conversion Systems Available 1.71E-07 0.95% Medium LOCA 1.46E-07 0.81% Loss of All Service Water 8.30E-08 0.46% Anticipated Transient Without Scram 6.67E-08 0.37% Loss of Component Cooling Water 5.79E-08 0.32% Loss of Offsite Power 4.98E-08 0.28% Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Cooling With At Least One CCW Train Available 5.03E-08 0.28% Loss of Vital DC Bus NK04 4.32E-08 0.24% Large LOCA 2.80E-08 0.16% Feedwater Line Break 2.06E-0 8 0.11% Stuck Open Pressurizer PORV Following a Transient Initiator 3.14E-08 0.17% Loss of Vital DC Bus NK01 1.12E-08 0.06%   Technical Specifications exercised:
Very Small LOCA                                                           1.27E-06                 7.05%
Event 2: TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1  
Steam Generator Tube Rupture                                             8.77E-07                 4.86%
- Protective Interlocks in correct state; Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 18; Cond A (Immediately); Cond T for P
Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Cooling Following a Transient Initiator                                                   5.91E-07                 3.28%
-7, P-8, P-9 and P-13 (Verify interlock in required state within one hour); Cond S for P
Transients With Power Conversion Systems Available                       3.30E-07                 1.83%
-10 (Verify interlock in required state within one hour). TS 3.8.7, Cond A (restore to operable within twenty four hours) TS 3.8.9, Cond C (restore to operable status within two hours)
Reactor Vessel Failure                                                   3.00E-07                1.66%
 
Steamline Break                                                           1.88E-07                 1.40%
Event 3: TS determined and entered. TS 3.7.4 Cond A (restore to operable within seven days)}}
Transients Without Power Conversion Systems Available                     1.71E-07                 0.95%
Medium LOCA                                                               1.46E-07                 0.81%
Loss of All Service Water                                                 8.30E-08                 0.46%
Anticipated Transient Without Scram                                       6.67E-08                 0.37%
Loss of Component Cooling Water                                           5.79E-08                 0.32%
Loss of Offsite Power                                                     4.98E-08                 0.28%
Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Cooling With At Least One CCW Train Available                                               5.03E-08                 0.28%
Loss of Vital DC Bus NK04                                                 4.32E-08                 0.24%
Large LOCA                                                               2.80E-08                 0.16%
Feedwater Line Break                                                     2.06E-08                0.11%
Stuck Open Pressurizer PORV Following a Transient Initiator               3.14E-08                 0.17%
Loss of Vital DC Bus NK01                                                 1.12E-08                 0.06%
Technical Specifications exercised:
Event 2: TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1 - Protective Interlocks in correct state; Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 18; Cond A (Immediately); Cond T for P-7, P-8, P-9 and P-13 (Verify interlock in required state within one hour); Cond S for P-10 (Verify interlock in required state within one hour).
TS 3.8.7, Cond A (restore to operable within twenty four hours)
TS 3.8.9, Cond C (restore to operable status within two hours)
Event 3: TS determined and entered. TS 3.7.4 Cond A (restore to operable within seven days)
FINAL                                            4 of 4}}

Revision as of 14:07, 12 November 2019

2011-08-Final Outlines
ML112700886
Person / Time
Site: Wolf Creek Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation icon.png
Issue date: 08/26/2011
From:
NRC Region 4
To:
References
50-482/11-08
Download: ML112700886 (38)


Text

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: Wolf Creek Printed:

Date of Exam: 08/29/2011 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* Total A2 G* Total

1. 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 0 0 0 Emergency 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 9 0 0 0

& N/A N/A Abnormal Tier Plant Totals 4 5 5 4 5 4 27 0 0 0 Evolutions 1 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 28 0 0 0 2.

2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 0 0 0 0 Plant Systems Tier 0 0 0 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 38 Totals 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4

3. Generic Knowledge And 10 0 Abilities Categories 3 2 2 3 0 0 0 0 Note:
1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals" in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.

The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

1

PWR RO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 1 Form ES-401-2 E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G KA Topic Imp. Points 000007 Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery X EK2.03 - Reactor trip status panel 3.5 1

/1 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 X AK2.02 - Sensors and detectors 2.7* 1 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X EK2.03 - S/Gs 3.0 1 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 X EA2.04 - Significance of PZR readings 3.7 1 000015/000017 RCP Malfunctions / 4 X AA2.01 - Cause of RCP failure 3.0 1 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 X AK1.02 - Relationship of charging flow 2.7 1 to press. diff. between charging and RCS 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 X AK3.02 - Isolation of RHR low-pressure 3.3 1 piping prior to pressure increase above specified level 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 X 2.4.2 - Knowledge of system set points, 4.5 1 interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions.

000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System X 2.2.22 - Knowledge of limiting conditions 4.0 1 Malfunction / 3 for operations and safety limits.

000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 X EA1.15 - AFW source level and capacity 3.9 1 (chart) 000040 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat X AK1.03 - RCS shrink and consequent 3.8 1 Transfer / 4 depressurization 000054 Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 X AK1.02 - Effects of feedwater 3.6 1 introduction on dry S/G 000055 Station Blackout / 6 X EA1.01 - In-core thermocouple 3.7 1 temperatures 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 X 2.1.28 - Knowledge of the purpose and 4.1 1 function of major system components and controls.

000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid X AA2.09 - Operational status of emergency 3.9 1 Disturbances / 6 diesel generators W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 X EA1.2 - Operating behavior 3.6 1 characteristics of the facility W/E05 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 X EK3.2 - Normal, abnormal and 3.7 1 emergency operating procedures associated with Loss of Secondary Heat Sink 2

PWR RO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 1 Form ES-401-2 E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G KA Topic Imp. Points W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 X EK3.2 - Normal, abnormal and 3.5 1 emergency operating procedures associated with Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation K/A Category Totals: 3 3 3 3 3 3 Group Point Total: 18 3

PWR RO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 2 Form ES-401-2 E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G KA Topic Imp. Points 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 X AK2.06 - T-ave./ref. deviation meter 3.0* 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 X AA2.02 - Signal inputs to rod control 2.7 1 system 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 X AK3.01 - Boration and emergency 4.0 1 boration in the event of a stuck rod during trip or normal evolutions 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 X AK2.03 - Controllers and positioners 2.6 1 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 X AA1.04 - Condensate air ejector exhaust 3.6 1 radiation monitor and failure indicator 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 X 2.4.31 - Knowledge of annunciator 4.2 1 alarms, indications, or response procedures.

000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 X AK3.02 - Guidance contained in alarm 3.4 1 response for ARM system 000069 Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 X AK1.01 - Effect of pressure on leak rate 2.6 1 W/E01 Rediagnosis / 3 X EA2.2 - Adherence to appropriate 3.3 1 procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments K/A Category Totals: 1 2 2 1 2 1 Group Point Total: 9 4

PWR RO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401 Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 1 Form ES-401-2 Sys/Evol # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G KA Topic Imp. Points 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X K2.01 - RCPS 3.1 1 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X A4.05 - RCP seal leakage 3.1 1 detection instrumentation 004 Chemical and Volume Control X K3.07 - PZR level and 3.8 1 pressure 005 Residual Heat Removal X K2.03 - RCS pressure 2.7* 1 boundary motor-operated valves 005 Residual Heat Removal X A4.01 - Controls and 3.6* 1 indication for RHR pumps 006 Emergency Core Cooling X K3.01 - RCS 4.1* 1 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank X 2.1.32 - Ability to explain 3.8 1 and apply system limits and precautions.

007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank X A2.01 - Stuck-open PORV or 3.9 1 code safety 008 Component Cooling Water X K1.02 - Loads cooled by 3.3 1 CCWS 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control X K5.01 - Determination of 3.5 1 condition of fluid in PZR, using steam tables 012 Reactor Protection X K4.08 - Logic matrix testing 2.8* 1 013 Engineered Safety Features X K4.09 - Spurious trip 2.7 1 Actuation protection 022 Containment Cooling X A1.04 - Cooling water flow 3.2 1 022 Containment Cooling X A3.01 - Initiation of 4.1 1 safeguards mode of operation 026 Containment Spray X A2.07 - Loss of Ctmt Spray 3.6 1 pump suction when in recirc.

mode 039 Main and Reheat Steam X K5.08 - Effect of steam 3.6 1 removal on reactivity 059 Main Feedwater X K4.17 - Increased feedwater 2.5* 1 flow following a reactor trip 061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater X K6.01 - Controllers and 2.5 1 positioners 062 AC Electrical Distribution X A1.03 - Effect on 2.5 1 instrumentation and controls of switching power supplies 063 DC Electrical Distribution X K3.02 - Components using 3.5 1 DC control power 063 DC Electrical Distribution X 2.1.31 - Ability to locate 4.6 1 control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup.

5

PWR RO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401 Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 1 Form ES-401-2 Sys/Evol # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G KA Topic Imp. Points 064 Emergency Diesel Generator X K6.08 - Fuel oil storage tanks 3.2 1 073 Process Radiation Monitoring X 2.1.30 - Ability to locate and 4.4 1 operate components, including local controls.

073 Process Radiation Monitoring X K1.01 - Those systems served 3.6 1 by PRMs 076 Service Water X A1.02 - Reactor and turbine 2.6* 1 building closed cooling water temperatures 078 Instrument Air X A3.01 - Air pressure 3.1 1 078 Instrument Air X K1.04 - Cooling wtr to comp. 2.6 1 103 Containment X A2.04 - Containment 3.5* 1 evacuation (including recognition of the alarm)

K/A Category Totals: 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 Group Point Total: 28 6

PWR RO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401 Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 2 Form ES-401-2 Sys/Evol # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G KA Topic Imp. Points 002 Reactor Coolant X K4.01 - Filling and draining 2.7 1 the RCS 011 Pressurizer Level Control X K6.04 - Operation of PZR 3.1 1 level controllers 014 Rod Position Indication X A1.04 - Axial and radial 3.5 1 power distribution 015 Nuclear Instrumentation X K3.02 - CRDS 3.3* 1 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation X K5.01 - Separation of control 2.7* 1 and protection circuits 027 Containment Iodine Removal X K2.01 - Fans 3.1* 1 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and X A2.01 - Hydrogen recombiner 3.4* 1 Purge Control power setting, determined by using plant data book 029 Containment Purge X A4.01 - Containment purge 2.5 1 flow rate 034 Fuel Handling Equipment X 2.2.12 - Knowledge of 3.7 1 surveillance procedures.

035 Steam Generator X A3.01 - S/G water level 4.0 1 control K/A Category Totals: 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Group Point Total: 10 7

Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)

PWR RO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek Form ES-401-3 Generic Category KA KA Topic Imp. Points Conduct of Operations 2.1.18 Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise logs, 3.6 1 records, status boards, and reports.

2.1.36 Knowledge of procedures and limitations involved 3.0 1 in core alterations.

2.1.45 Ability to identify and interpret diverse indications 4.3 1 to validate the response of another indication.

Category Total: 3 Equipment Control 2.2.41 Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and 3.5 1 mechanical drawings.

2.2.43 Knowledge of the process used to track inoperable 3.0 1 alarms.

Category Total: 2 Radiation Control 2.3.7 Ability to comply with radiation work permit 3.5 1 requirements during normal or abnormal conditions.

2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety principles 3.2 1 pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

Category Total: 2 Emergency Procedures/Plan 2.4.9 Knowledge of low power /shutdown implications in 3.8 1 accident (e.g. LOCA or loss of RHR) mitigation strategies.

2.4.21 Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to 4.0 1 assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc.

2.4.47 Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an 4.2 1 accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material.

Category Total: 3 Generic Total: 10 8

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: Wolf Creek Printed:

Date Of Exam: 08/29/2011 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* Total A2 G* Total

1. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 6 Emergency 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 4

& N/A N/A Abnormal Tier Plant Totals 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 10 Evolutions 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 5 2.

2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 Plant Systems Tier 5 3 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Totals 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4

3. Generic Knowledge And 0 7 Abilities Categories 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 Note:
1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals" in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.

The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

9

PWR SRO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 1 Form ES-401-2 E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G KA Topic Imp. Points 000029 ATWS / 1 X EA2.01 - Reactor nuclear instrumentation 4.7 1 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 X AA2.03 - Operational status of safety 3.9 1 injection pump 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 X 2.4.8 - Knowledge of how abnormal 4.5 1 operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.

000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 X 2.4.3 - Ability to identify post-accident 3.9 1 instrumentation.

000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 X AA2.01 - Cause and effect of low- 3.2 1 pressure instrument air alarm W/E12 - Uncontrolled Depressurization of all X 2.4.18 - Knowledge of the specific bases 4.0 1 Steam Generators / 4 for EOPs.

K/A Category Totals: 0 0 0 0 3 3 Group Point Total: 6 10

PWR SRO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 2 Form ES-401-2 E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G KA Topic Imp. Points 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 X 2.2.25 - Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety 4.2 1 limits.

000074 Inad. Core Cooling / 4 X EA2.01 - Subcooling Margin 4.9 1 W/E 13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 X EA2.2 - Adherence to appropriate 3.4 1 procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments.

W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5 X 2.4.1 - Knowledge of EOP entry 4.8 1 conditions and immediate action steps.

K/A Category Totals: 0 0 0 0 2 2 Group Point Total: 4 11

PWR SRO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401 Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 1 Form ES-401-2 Sys/Evol # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G KA Topic Imp. Points 006 Emergency Core Cooling X 2.4.6 - Knowledge of EOP 4.7 1 mitigation strategies.

008 Component Cooling Water X A2.05 - Effect of loss of inst. 3.5 1 and cont. air on the position of the CCW valves 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control X A2.03 - PORV failures 4.2 1 062 AC Electrical Distribution 2.1.25 - Ability to interpret 4.2 1 X

reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

064 Emergency Diesel Generator X A2.06 - Operating unloaded, 3.3 1 lightly loaded, and highly loaded time limit K/A Category Totals: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 Group Point Total: 5 12

PWR SRO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek ES - 401 Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 2 Form ES-401-2 Sys/Evol # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G KA Topic Imp. Points 045 Main Turbine Generator X A2.17 - Malfunction of 2.9* 1 electrohydraulic control 068 Liquid Radwaste X 2.1.20 - Ability to interpret 4.6 1 and execute procedure steps.

001 Rod Control X A2.04 - Positioning of axial shaping rods and their effect 3.8* 1 on SDM K/A Category Totals: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 Group Point Total: 3 13

Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)

PWR SRO Examination Outline Printed:

Facility: Wolf Creek Form ES-401-3 Generic Category KA KA Topic Imp. Points Conduct of Operations 2.1.4 Knowledge of individual licensed operator 3.8 1 responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements, "no-solo" operation, maintenance of active license status, 10CFR55, etc.

2.1.35 Knowledge of the fuel-handling responsibilities of 3.9 1 SROs.

Category Total: 2 Equipment Control 2.2.38 Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the 4.5 1 facility license.

Category Total: 1 Radiation Control 2.3.5 Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as 2.9 1 fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personal monitoring equipment, etc.

2.3.13 Knowledge of radiological safety procedures 3.8 1 pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

Category Total: 2 Emergency Procedures/Plan 2.4.38 Ability to take actions called for in the facility 4.4 1 emergency plan, including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator if required.

2.4.45 Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of 4.3 1 each annunciator or alarm.

Category Total: 2 Generic Total: 7 14

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A S1/1 056 AA2.02 Components not installed at WC. Randomly selected AA2.03 2/1 005 A4.05 Component not utilized at WCNOC. Randomly selected A4.01 S2/1 008 A2.01 No real actions for SRO Question. Randomly selected A2.05 2/1 026 A2.02 Not applicable to WC, replaced with A2.07 2/1 078 K1.05 Not applicable to WC, replaced with K1.04 1/2 059 2.4.31 Due to overlap with other RMS K/As replaced topic with 051, kept same generic S1/2 076 AA2.01 Due to overlap with other RMS K/As replaced with E13 EA2.2 S1/2 E16 2.4.1 Due to overlap with other RMS K/As replaced topic with E15, kept same generic 1/1 022 AK1.01 Due to overlap with other RCP K/As, replaced with AK1.02 2/1 004 K3.08 Due to overlap with other RCP K/As, replaced with K3.07 1/1 077 AA2.04 Replaced with AA2.09, topic too similar to SRO topic 062 1/2 037 AA1.05 Replaced with AA1.04, lack of components to meet K/A S1/1 029 EA2.02 Replaced with EA2.01, unable to get to appropriate SRO level with limited distractors S2/2 079 A2.01 Replaced with 001 A2.04, topic too similar to RO 078 topic

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Wolf Creek Date of Examination: Aug.- Sept.

2011 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number:

Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

R.A.1.a Refuel/ Reduced Inventory: Perform the time N, R to core uncovery estimation using the OFN EJ-015, LOSS OF RHR COOLING, step 31. Requires use of Conduct of Operations Figures 5 (time to boil) and 6 (time to uncovery).

R.A.1.a 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves tables, etc. (CFR 41.10/43.5/45.12 RO =

3.9 SRO = 4.2)

M, R S.A.1.a Review/Approve/Evaluate the Reactor S.A.1.a Operators completed manual calculation of RTP; STS SE-002, MANUAL CALCULATION OF REACTOR THERMAL POWER. Requires discovery of errors made by Reactor Operator.

2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

(CFR 41.10/43.5/45.12 RO = 4.6 SRO = 4.6)

R.A.1.b Determine the shutdown margin using STS N, R RE-004, SHUTDOWN MARGIN DETERINATION, Attachment A, Shutdown Margin Calculation Short form.

Conduct of Operations 2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or R A.1.b limitations associated with reactivity management (CFR 41.1/43.6/45.6 RO = 4.3 SRO = 4.6)

N, R S.A.1.b Review/Approve/Verify the Reactor Operators S.A.1.b completed manual calculation of the shutdown margin per STS RE-004, SHUTDOWN MARGIN DETERINATION, Attachment A, Shutdown Margin Calculation Short form.

2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management (CFR 41.1/43.6/45.6 RO = 4.3 SRO = 4.6)

FINAL 1 of 3

R.A.2 Complete STS AL-211, TURB DRIVEN AUX N, R FDWTR SYS FLOW PATH VERIFICATION &

INSERVICE CHEC VALVE TEST, Attachment A Data Equipment Control Sheet.

R.A.2 2.2.12, Knowledge of surveillance procedures (CFR 41.10/45.13 RO = 3.7 SRO = 4.1)

S.A.2 S.A.2 Review/Approve/Evaluate the Reactor N, R Operators completed STS EF-100A, ESW SYSTEM INSERVICE PUMP A & ESW A DISCHARGE CHECK VALVE TEST, Attachment A Data Sheet.

2.2.12, Knowledge of surveillance procedures (CFR 41.10/45.13 RO = 3.7 SRO = 4.1)

S.A.3 The Containment Purge permit that was in N, R progress was stopped. Determine/Authorize the restart for the Containment Purge Permit. (AP 07B-001, Radiation Control Radioactive Releases, see section 6.2.4.6)

S.A.3 2.3.6 Ability to approve release permits (CFR 41.13/43.4/45.9 RO = 2.0 SRO = 3.8) and/or 2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases (CFR 41.11/43.4/45.10 RO = 3.8 SRO = 4.3)

FINAL 2 of 3

R.A.4 Determine percentage of Control Room N, R annunciator loss using OFN PK-029, LOSS OF NON-VITAL 125VDC BUS PK01, PK02, PK03, PK04, AND Emergency Procedures/Plan ANNUNCIATORS.

R.A.4 2.4.32 Knowledge of operator response to loss of all annunciators. (CFR 41.10/43.5/45.13 RO = 3.6 SRO

= 4.0)

S.A.4 (In the classroom setting) Determine the E-Plan classification and Protective action recommendations, if S.A.4 D, R any.

2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications. (CFR 41.10/43.5/45.11 RO = 2.9 SRO = 4.6) and 2.4.44 Knowledge of emergency plan protective action recommendations. (CFR 41.10/41.12/43.5/45.11 RO =

2.4 SRO = 4.4)

NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

  • Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

FINAL 3 of 3

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Wolf Creek Date of Examination: Aug. -Sept.

2011 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number:

Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

Bolded is an Alternate Success Path JPM.

System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function

a. S1: 001 - Control Rod Drive System N, S 1 Perform the actions of STS SF-001, CONTROL AND SHUTDOWN ROD OPERABILITY VERIFICATION, for Control Bank A.

001 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures. (3.7/4.1)

RO/SRO-I

b. S2: 013 - Engineered Safety Features Actuation N, EN, A, S 2 System (ESFAS)

Perform actions to ensure CRVIS actuation using ALR 00-062D, FBIS and ALR 00-063A, CRVIS.

PRA: ESFAS is a Risk Significant System at Wolf Creek.

013 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room ESFAS-initiated equipment which fails to actuate. (4.5/4.8)

RO/SRO-I/SRO-U FINAL 1 of 6

c. S3: 006 - Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) D, A, S 3 Perform actions to increase level in an Accumulator using a Safety Injection Pump per procedure SYS EP-200, SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATOR OPERATIONS (see sections 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 or 6.4), however, gas voiding is diagnosed due to SIP oscillations and OFN BG-045, GAS BINDING OF CCPS OR SI PUMPS, is entered and performed.

SOER 97-1, Potential Loss of High Pressure Injection and Charging Capability from Gas Intrusion 006 A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (2) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: improper discharge pressure. (3.4/3.8) 006 A2.05 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (2) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: improper amperage to the pump motor.

(3.4/3.5) 006 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: pumps. (4.1/3.9)

RO/SRO-I/SRO-U

d. S4: 041 - Steam Dump System and Turbine Bypass M, L, S 4S Control Perform actions to establish a maximum rate cooldown using the ARVs per EMG E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE.

041 A4.06 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Atmospheric relief valve controllers. (2.9/3.1)

RO/SRO-I FINAL 2 of 6

e. S5: 003 - Reactor Coolant Pumps System N, L, A, S 4P Align alternate seal injection and place excess letdown into service per OFN KA-019, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR.

003 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Seal injection (3.3/3.2)

RO/SRO-I/SRO-U

f. S6: 103 - Containment Systems D, S 5 Perform actions to startup the Containment Purge System per SYS GT-120, CONTAINMENT MINI PURGE SYSTEM OPERATIONS, sections 6.1 and 6.2.

103 A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the containment system controls including:

Containment pressure, temperature, and humidity. (3.7/4.1)

RO

g. S7: 015 - Nuclear Instrumentation D, S 7 Perform actions to bypass a failed Power Range nuclear instrumentation channel using OFN SB-008, INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTIONS, Attachment R (see step R4).

015 A4.03 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Trip bypasses. (3.8/3.9)

RO/SRO-I FINAL 3 of 6

h. S8: 008 - Component Cooling Water System (CCW) M, A, S 8 Perform actions of ALR 00-052A, CCW TO RCP FLOW LO, to respond to a loss of a CCW pump.

A4.01 Ability to operate and/or monitor in the control room: CCW indications and controls. (3.3/3.1)

A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCWS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of a CCW pump. (3.3/3.6)

PRA: Component Cooling Water is a Risk Significant System at Wolf Creek.

RO/SRO-I In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. P1: 004 - Chemical and Volume Control System D, A, R, E 1 Perform local actions to borate the Reactor Coolant System. (See OFN BG-009, EMERGENCY BORATION, Attachment A, Establishing Alternate Boration Flowpath.)

004 A2.14 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations. (3.8/3.9)

APE 024 AA1.04 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Emergency Boration: Manual boration valve. (3.6/3.7)

RO/SRO-I/SRO-U FINAL 4 of 6

j. P2: 061 - Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater System N 4S Perform actions of STN FC-002, AUX FEEDWATER TURBINE OVERSPEED TEST section 8.1.6.

061 2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

(4.4/4.6))

PRA: Auxiliary Feedwater (AL) is a Risk Significant System at Wolf Creek.

RO/SRO-I D, A 6

k. P3: 064 - Emergency Diesel Generators Perform actions of ALR 00-020D, DG NE01 TROUBLE alarm. Local alarm response procedure ALR 501, STANDBY DIESEL ENGINE SYSTEM CONTROL PANEL KJ-121, Attachment A, Fuel Oil Press Low and Attachment C, Fuel Strain Diff Press High, are performed.

064 K1.03 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationship between the ED/G system and the following systems: Diesel fuel oil supply system.

(3.6/4.0)

PRA: Diesel Fuel Oil (JE) is a Risk Significant System at Wolf Creek.

RO/SRO-I/SRO-U All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U FINAL 5 of 6

(A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/8/4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/1/1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/1/1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/2/1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1/1/1 (S)imulator FINAL 6 of 6

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: ___Wolf Creek_______________ Scenario No.: ___1_____ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

____________________________ _____________________________

____________________________ _____________________________

Initial Conditions: MOL, 100%

Turnover: Red train CCW (pumps A/C secured due to leakage). TS 3.7.7 Cond A entered (72 hrs to restore). Welding on CCW A Surge tank outlet. Expected return in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. TS 3.5.2 Cond A entered (72 hrs to restore). (ESFAS alarms are illuminated). Red train ECCS pumps are DNOd or have a TEST/CAUTION (TC) tag and pumps are in Pull-to-Lock (PTL). This includes: CCW A (DNO), CCW C (DNO), CCP A (TC), SIP A (TC) and RHR A (TC). DNO tags are on EG HV-11 and 13, EG HIS-1 and EG ZL-15 and 53. Perform a power reduction and turbine load decrease to 900 MWE NET using OFN MA-038, RAPID PLANT SHUTDOWN at a rate of 1%/minute.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 R- The Crew commences a power decrease and turbine load ATC, reduction to 900 MWE NET (945 MWE GROSS) per OFN MA-038, SRO RAPID PLANT SHUTDOWN at a rate of 1%/minute.

N - BOP 2 mAB01D I - BOP, Steam Generator D pressure channel AB PT-545 fails low 2 SRO TS determined & entered. TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Fu 1e and 4e.

Cond A (Immediately) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistables) are entered.

3 mBB21B I - ATC, Pressurizer pressure channel BB PI-456 fails high SRO TS determined & entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 6, 8.a and 8.b. Cond A (Immediately), Cond E (72 hrs to trip bistables) and Cond M (72 hrs to trip bistables) are entered.

TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Fu 1.d, 3.a.3, 5.d, 6.e and 8.b. Cond A (Immediately) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistables), and Cond L (1 hr to verify interlock (P-11)).

4 mBB06C M- Large Break LOCA: cold leg break on Loop C CREW 5 mEJ13B C - ATC, Post trip malfunction #1: Autostart failure of RHR B pump.

SRO Manual start is available.

6 mSA27E C- Post trip malfunction #2: Auto closure of EC HIS-12, SFP HX B C02 ATC, CCW OUTLET VLV, failure to close. Manual closure available.

SRO

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor FINAL 1 of 5

Scenario summary:

The unit is at 100% power, middle of life. Turnover items include CCW pumps A and C (Red train) are secured due to leakage. Welding on CCW A Surge tank outlet is ongoing. Technical Specification 3.7.7 Condition A was entered (72 hrs to restore). Expected return to service is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Red train ECCS pumps are DNOd or have a TEST/CAUTION (TC) tag and pumps are in Pull-to-Lock (PTL). This includes: CCW A (DNO), CCW C (DNO), CCP A (TC), SIP A (TC) and RHR A (TC). DNO tags are on EG HV-11 and 13, EG HIS-1 and EG ZL-15 and 53.

Topeka Dispatch/System Operator called to inform Wolf Creek that 345-50 KV Benton line will be removed from service in 20 minutes for four hours. Directive #300 was performed. Per Directive

  1. 300 Wolf Creek will be divorced from the Athens line (also opening 69-14 Breaker). Reduce power and decrease turbine load to less than 900 MWE NET.

The Call Superintendent has directed the crew to use OFN MA-038, RAPID PLANT SHUTDOWN to maneuver the unit at a rate of 1%/minute.

Event 1: The Crew commences a power reduction and turbine load reduction to 900 MWE NET (945 MWE GROSS) per OFN MA-038, RAPID PLANT SHUTDOWN at a rate of 1%/minute.

Event 2: Steam Generator D pressure channel AB PT-545 fails low. Meter indications change, and Main Control Board alarms annunciate. ALRs 00-111C, SG D FLOW MISMATCH or 00-111B SG D LEV DEV, may be entered and performed. OFN SB-008, INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTIONS, is entered and Attachment C performed. These procedures diagnose and mitigate the instrument failure.

The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.

Event 3: Pressurizer (PZR) pressure channel BB PI-456 fails high. The PZR spray valves close, meter indications change and various Main Control Board alarms annunciate. ALRs 00-034B, PZR PRESS HI, 00-034C, PZR PORV BLOCK; 00-034E, PRT PRESS HI; 00-035B, PORV OPEN; 00-035D, PZR PORV DISCH TEMP HI; 00-083C, RX PARTIAL TRIP annunciate. OFN SB-008, INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTIONS, is entered and Attachment K performed. These procedures diagnose and mitigate the instrument failure.

The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.

Event 4: The Main Event is a Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident.

Diagnostics include: PZR level decreases and RCS pressure decreases. OFN BB-007, SG/RCS LEAKAGE HIGH, may be entered & performed. A Reactor trip and Safety Injection occur. EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, is entered & performed.

RCPs are tripped per EMG E-0 Foldout page criteria.

EMG-E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT is entered & performed.

Eventually 36% Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) level is achieved and Main Control Board alarm ALR 00-047C, RWST LEV LOLO 1 AUTO XFR actuates. ALR 00-047C directs performance of EMG ES-12, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION.

The crew transitions to EMG ES-12, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION. The procedure is performed through step 10 to establish cold leg recirculation/ECCS recirculation.

FINAL 2 of 5

Post trip malfunctions:

Event 5: Autostart failure of RHR B pump. Manual start is available. This component failure is procedurally addressed in Attachment F of EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

However, the pump can be started after the Immediate Actions of EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, are performed and concurrence of the CRS is obtained.

Event 6: Auto closure of EC HIS-12, SFP HX B CCW OUTLET VLV, fails to close. Manual closure is available. This component failure is procedurally addressed in EMG ES-12, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, at step 3.

Scenario Critical Tasks (CT):

Event 2: CT: take manual control, select alternate controlling channel prior to actuation of the Reactor Protection System Event 4: CT: using EMG ES-12, steps 1 through 10, transfer to cold leg recirculation to establish ECCS recirculation Event 5: CT: start RHR B pump, as this is the only low head injection pump available for decay heat removal for a Large Break LOCA.

FINAL 3 of 5

Probabilistic Risk Analysis for this scenario includes:

Core Damage Frequency by Initiating Event Initiating Event Core Damage CDF Percent Initiating Event Frequency (/yr) Frequency (/yr) Contribution Loss of Offsite Power 2.88E-02 6.59E-06 36.51%

Small LOCA 29.63%

3.00E-03 5.35E-06 Interfacing Systems LOCA 1.93E-06 10.69%

Very Small LOCA 7.03%

6.20E-03 1.27E-06 Transients With Power Conversion Systems Available 1.05E+00 9.88E-07 5.47%

Steam Generator Tube Rupture 3.67E-03 8.77E-07 4.86%

Reactor Vessel Failure 3.00E-07 3.00E-07 1.66%

Steamline Break 1.13E-02 1.88E-07 1.04%

Transients Without Power Conversion 1.15E-01 1.71E-07 0.95%

Systems Available Medium LOCA 6.10E-05 1.46E-07 0.81%

Loss of All Service Water 6.86E-06 8.30E-08 0.46%

Loss of Component Cooling Water 2.14E-04 5.79E-08 0.32%

Loss of Vital DC Bus NK04 2.64E-03 4.32E-08 0.24%

Large LOCA 7.20E-06 2.80E-08 0.16%

Feedwater Line Break 3.17E-03 2.06E-08 0.11%

Loss of Vital DC Bus NK01 2.64E-03 1.12E-08 0.06%

Top Risk Significant Systems EF Essential Service Water KJ/NE Onsite Emergency Power EG Component Cooling Water AL Aux Feedwater EJ Residual Heat Removal JE Diesel Fuel Oil NB Lower Medium Voltage NK 125 V DC BB Reactor Coolant System GM Diesel Building HVAC GD ESW HVAC GL Aux Building HVAC BN Refueling Water Storage Tank SA/SB ESFAS/Reactor Protection FINAL 4 of 5

Technical Specifications exercised:

Event 2: TS determined & entered. TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Fu 1e and 4e. Cond A (Immediately) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistables) are entered.

Event 3: TS determined & entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 6, 8.a and 8.b. Cond A (Immediately), Cond E (72 hrs to trip bistables) and Cond M (72 hrs to trip bistables) are entered.

TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Fu 1.d, 3.a.3, 5.d, 6.e and 8.b. Cond A (Immediately) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistables), and Cond L (1 hr to verify interlock (P-11)).

FINAL 5 of 5

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: _________Wolf Creek_________ Scenario No.: ____2____ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

____________________________ _____________________________

____________________________ _____________________________

Initial Conditions: Middle Of Life, ~74%

Turnover: Monitor MFP B vibration. Started the downpower and are currently on HOLD at ~74%

waiting an Engineering Evaluation. Annunciator 00-058B, VCT VLV NOT IN VCT POS, due to recent 200-gallon dilution to hold power. Diluting ~100 gallons every 10-15 minutes. No equipment is out of service.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 mBB01E I - ATC, Loop A, BB TI-411, Tcold fails high SRO TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 6 and 7, Cond A (Immediately) and Cond E (72 hrs to trip bistables) 2 mAE15C I - BOP, Steam Generator C controlling level channel AE LI-553 failure 4 SRO high TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 14, Cond A (Immediately) and Cond E (72 hrs to trip bistables)

TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Fu 5.c and 6.d, Cond A (Immediately),

Cond I (72 hrs to trip bistable) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistable) 3 msovBB C- PORV BB PCV-455A fails to 25% open due to control circuitry PCV455 ATC, problems, PZR pressure begins to decrease A SRO TS determined and entered. TS 3.4.11 Cond. B.1 (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> close seal valve) and B.2 (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to de-energize seal valve) and B.3 (72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to repair PORV) 4 mAB03A M- Steam line break inside Containment (Steam Generator A)

CREW Adverse Containment 5 mSNF01 C- Malfunction post Reactor Trip and Safety Injection: LOCA A ATC, Sequencer A failure at five second time.

SRO 6 mNF01A C- Malfunction post Reactor Trip and Safety Injection: Main Generator BOP, and Exciter breakers fail to automatically trip.

SRO

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor FINAL 1 of 4

Scenario Summary:

The unit is at ~74% power, middle of life. Monitor MFP B vibration. Started the downpower and are currently on HOLD at ~74% waiting an Engineering Evaluation. Annunciator 00-058B, VCT VLV NOT IN VCT POS, due to recent 200-gallon dilution to hold power. Diluting ~100 gallons every 10-15 minutes. No equipment is out of service.

Event 1: RCS Loop A BB TI-411 Tcold fails high. Meter indication changes and the Control Rods insert - the Reactor Operator (RO) places control rods in MANUAL, stopping the insertion.

Many Main Control Board alarms annunciate: 00-065C, 00-065E, 00-066B, 00-067D, 00-068D, 00-069D, 00-082B and 00-083C. OFN SB-008, INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTIONS, is entered and Attachment L performed. This procedure will diagnose and mitigate the instrument failure.

The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.

Event 2: Steam Generator C controlling level channel AE LI-553 fails high. Meter indications change and Main Control Board alarms, 00-110A, SG C LEV HI/LO and 00-110B, SG C LEV DEV, annunciate. ALR 00-110A, SG C LEV HI/LO, or 00-110B, SG C LEV DEV, may be entered and performed. OFN SB-008, INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTIONS, is entered and Attachment F is performed. These procedures diagnose and mitigate the instrument failure.

The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.

Event 3: Pressurizer Pilot Operated Relief Valve (PORV) BB PCV-455A fails to 25% open due to control circuitry problems. Diagnostic parameters include dual indication on hand indicating switch BB HIS-455A, and alarms 00-035B, PORV OPEN, 00-035C, PZR SFTY DISCH TEMP HI, 00-035D, PZR PORV DISCH TEMP HI, 00-034E, PRT PRESS HI annunciating. ALR 00-035B may be entered and performed to close the PZR Seal Iso Valve using BB HIS-8000A. This action mitigates the event.

The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.

Event 4: The Main Event is a Steam line break inside Containment (Steam Generator A).

Diagnostic parameters include Secondary steam flow to feed flow meters mismatch, increasing SG steam flow, Containment pressure and humidity while it decreases Main Turbine load and RCS pressure and temperature. OFN AB-041, STEAMLINE OR FEEDLINE LEAK may be entered. A Reactor trip and Safety Injection occurs. EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, is entered and performed. The faulted SG is identified and isolated (EMG E-0 foldout page criteria). Adverse Containment is identified and setpoints for various parameters are used. The Crew transitions to EMG E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION.

Eventually the Crew transitions to EMG ES-03, SI TERMINATION, to mitigate PZR overfill and RCS high pressure.

Post trip malfunctions:

1. Event 5: LOCA Sequencer A failure at five second time interval frame. This component failure requires the Crew to start ECCS equipment per EMG E-0 Attachment F.
2. Event 6: Main Generator and Exciter breakers fail to automatically trip. This component failure requires the BOP to permit MA HS-5, SWYD 345-50/60 MAN TRIP PERMIT switch, BEFORE opening the breakers per EMG step 6RNO. (NOTE: MA HS-5, SWYD 345-50/60 MAN TRIP PERMIT is a new switch added to Panel RL005 during Refuel 18).

FINAL 2 of 4

Scenario Critical Tasks (CT)

Event 1: CT - place rods to manual prior to actuation of the Reactor Protection System Event 2 - CT - take manual control, select alternate controlling channel prior to actuation of the Reactor Protection System Event 4 - CT - isolate the faulted Steam Generator before an Orange path integrity challenge develops FINAL 3 of 4

Probabilistic Risk Analysis for this scenario includes:

Core Damage Frequency by Initiating Event Initiating Event Core Damage CDF Percent Initiating Event Frequency (/yr) Frequency (/yr) Contribution Loss of Offsite Power 2.88E-02 6.59E-06 36.51%

Small LOCA 29.63%

3.00E-03 5.35E-06 Interfacing Systems LOCA 1.93E-06 10.69%

Very Small LOCA 7.03%

6.20E-03 1.27E-06 Transients With Power Conversion Systems Available 1.05E+00 9.88E-07 5.47%

Steam Generator Tube Rupture 3.67E-03 8.77E-07 4.86%

Reactor Vessel Failure 3.00E-07 3.00E-07 1.66%

Steamline Break 1.13E-02 1.88E-07 1.04%

Transients Without Power Conversion 1.15E-01 1.71E-07 0.95%

Systems Available Medium LOCA 6.10E-05 1.46E-07 0.81%

Loss of All Service Water 6.86E-06 8.30E-08 0.46%

Loss of Component Cooling Water 2.14E-04 5.79E-08 0.32%

Loss of Vital DC Bus NK04 2.64E-03 4.32E-08 0.24%

Large LOCA 7.20E-06 2.80E-08 0.16%

Feedwater Line Break 3.17E-03 2.06E-08 0.11%

Loss of Vital DC Bus NK01 2.64E-03 1.12E-08 0.06%

Technical Specifications exercised:

Event 1 - TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 6 and 7, Cond A (Immediately) and Cond E (72 hrs to trip bistables)

Event 2 - TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 14, Cond A (Immediately) and Cond E (72 hrs to trip bistables)

TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Fu 5.c and 6.d, Cond A (Immediately), Cond I (72 hrs to trip bistable) and Cond D (72 hrs to trip bistable)

Event 3 - TS determined and entered. TS 3.4.11 Cond. B.1 (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> close seal valve) and B.2 (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to de-energize seal valve) and B.3 (72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to repair PORV)

FINAL 4 of 4

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: ______Wolf Creek____________ Scenario No.: ____3____ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

____________________________ _____________________________

____________________________ _____________________________

Initial Conditions: BOL ~10% power Turnover: Power ascension in progress, negative MTC. Perform step 6.40 through step 6.46 of GEN 00-003, HOT STANDBY TO MINIMUM LOAD. Use SYS AC-120, MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR STARTUP to synchronize the Main Generator to the grid. Increase power to ~15% immediately after synchronizing Main Turbine Generator to the grid.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N- Per GEN 00-003, HOT STANDBY TO MINIMUM LOAD, from step CREW 6.40 through step 6.46.

Step 6.40 directs SYS AC-120, MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR STARTUP (synchronize Main Generator to grid).

GEN 00-003 steps 6.41 through 6.46: valve alignments, increase turbine load using load potentiometer, verify Permissive states etc.

2 mNN02 C- Loss of NN02 (White train)

CREW TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1 - Protective Interlocks in correct state; Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 18; Cond A (Immediately); Cond T for P-7, P-8, P-9 and P-13 (Verify interlock in required state within one hour); Cond S for P-10 (Verify interlock in required state within one hour).

TS 3.8.7, Cond A (restore to operable within twenty four hours)

TS 3.8.9, Cond C (restore to operable status within two hours) 3 mAB07 C- Atmospheric Relief Valve (ARV) C fails PARTIALLY open; manual G BOP, control unavailable SRO TS determined and entered. TS 3.7.4 Cond A (restore to operable within seven days) 4 Precursor: Seismic event Main Feed Pump trip Reactor trip 5 mSF17A M- Reactor fails to trip in automatic or manual. Anticipated Transient CREW Without Trip (ATWT) mSF17B 6 mAC02B C- Post trip malfunction #1: Turbine will not manually trip.

BOP, SRO 7 p01024 C- Post trip malfunction #2: BG HV-8104 does not open (see step 6 of C ATC, EMG FR-S1) RNO performed: aligns RWST to charging pump SRO suction

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor FINAL 1 of 4

Scenario summary:

Unit is at ~ 10 % power, beginning of life. Power ascension in progress, negative MTC. Perform step 6.40 through step 6.46 of GEN 00-003, HOT STANDBY TO MINIMUM LOAD. Use SYS AC-120, MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR STARTUP to synchronize the Main Generator to the grid.

Increase power to ~15% immediately after synchronizing Main Turbine Generator to the grid.

Event 1: The Crew, using GEN 00-003, HOT STANDBY TO MINIMUM LOAD, from step 6.40 through step 6.46 will synchronize Main Generator to the grid, verify valve alignments, increase turbine load using load potentiometer, and verify Permissive states etc.

Event 2: Loss of NN02 occurs. White train meter indications change and many Main Control Board alarms annunciate aid in diagnosing the component failure. The Crew may enter ALR 00-026A, NN02 INST BUS UV. The Crew enters OFN NN-021, LOSS OF VITAL 120VAC INSTRUMENT BUS, and performs Attachment B to restore power.

The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.

Event 3: Atmospheric Relief Valve (ARV) C fails PARTIALLY open and manual control is unavailable. The Crew enters OFN AB-041, STEAMLINE OR FEEDLINE BREAK to mitigate the component failure. An Operator is dispatched to locally close the valve.

The Control Room Supervisor determines Technical Specifications.

Event 4: A Seismic event occurs. Main Control Board alarms 00-098D, OBE and 00-098E, SEISMIC RECORDER ON, annunciate. OFN SG-003, NATURAL EVENTS, is entered. The only running Main Feed Pump trips three minutes later. Main Control Board alarm 00-123A, MFP B TRIP, annunciates. The Crew determines a Reactor trip is necessary. A Reactor trip condition occurs; only the reactor fails to trip.

Event 5: The Main Event is an Anticipated Transient Without Trip (ATWT).

The Crew enters EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, and from step 1RNO transitions to EMG FR-S1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS.

Event 6: The turbine will not trip manually - the BOP must manually trip the turbine within thirty seconds to prevent an uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS due to steam flow that the turbine would require (2RNO EMG FR-S1 and EMG E-0).

Event 7: When aligning emergency boration, BG HV-8104 does not open. The ATC aligns Refueling Water Storage Tank to charging pump suction instead (6RNO of EMG FR-S1).

Successful mitigation strategy requires the Crew continues performance of EMG FR-S1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS.

FINAL 2 of 4

Post trip malfunction:

1. Event 6: Post trip malfunction #1: The turbine will not trip manually. As part of Immediate Actions of EMG FR-S1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS, step 2RNO, the BOP must trip the turbine.
2. Event 7: Post trip malfunction #2: EMER BORATE TO CHG PUMP SUCT BG HIS-8104 does not open (see step 6 of EMG FR-S1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS). RNO performed: aligns RWST to charging pump suction.

Scenario Critical Tasks (CT):

Event 5: CT: Insert negative reactivity into the core by at least one of the following methods before the Steam Generators dry-out:

  • Manually insert control rods Event 6: CT: Manually trip the turbine to prevent an uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS due to steam flow that the turbine would require.

FINAL 3 of 4

Probabilistic Risk Analysis for this scenario includes:

Core Damage Frequency by Event Tree Core Damage Percent Event Tree Frequency (/yr) Contribution Station Blackout 6.46E-06 35.79%

Small LOCA 5.35E-06 29.65%

Interfacing Systems LOCA 1.93E-06 10.68%

Very Small LOCA 1.27E-06 7.05%

Steam Generator Tube Rupture 8.77E-07 4.86%

Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Cooling Following a Transient Initiator 5.91E-07 3.28%

Transients With Power Conversion Systems Available 3.30E-07 1.83%

Reactor Vessel Failure 3.00E-07 1.66%

Steamline Break 1.88E-07 1.40%

Transients Without Power Conversion Systems Available 1.71E-07 0.95%

Medium LOCA 1.46E-07 0.81%

Loss of All Service Water 8.30E-08 0.46%

Anticipated Transient Without Scram 6.67E-08 0.37%

Loss of Component Cooling Water 5.79E-08 0.32%

Loss of Offsite Power 4.98E-08 0.28%

Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Cooling With At Least One CCW Train Available 5.03E-08 0.28%

Loss of Vital DC Bus NK04 4.32E-08 0.24%

Large LOCA 2.80E-08 0.16%

Feedwater Line Break 2.06E-08 0.11%

Stuck Open Pressurizer PORV Following a Transient Initiator 3.14E-08 0.17%

Loss of Vital DC Bus NK01 1.12E-08 0.06%

Technical Specifications exercised:

Event 2: TS determined and entered. TS 3.3.1 - Protective Interlocks in correct state; Table 3.3.1-1, Fu 18; Cond A (Immediately); Cond T for P-7, P-8, P-9 and P-13 (Verify interlock in required state within one hour); Cond S for P-10 (Verify interlock in required state within one hour).

TS 3.8.7, Cond A (restore to operable within twenty four hours)

TS 3.8.9, Cond C (restore to operable status within two hours)

Event 3: TS determined and entered. TS 3.7.4 Cond A (restore to operable within seven days)

FINAL 4 of 4