Information Notice 2016-08, Inadequate Work Practices Resulting in Faulted Circuit Breaker Connection: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:ML16104A214 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES


OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS  WASHINGTON, D.C.  20555-0001
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


June 17, 2016
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION


NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2016-08: INADEQUATE WORK PRACTICES RESULTING IN FAULTED CIRCUIT BREAKER CONNECTIONS
OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS
 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 June 17, 2016 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2016-08:                 INADEQUATE WORK PRACTICES RESULTING
 
IN FAULTED CIRCUIT BREAKER
 
CONNECTIONS


==ADDRESSEES==
==ADDRESSEES==
All holders of an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power reactor under
All holders of an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power reactor under


Title 10 of the
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of


Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," except t
Production and Utilization Facilities, except those that have permanently ceased operations


hose that have permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.
and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.


All holders of and applicants for a power reactor early site permit, combined license, standard
All holders of and applicants for a power reactor early site permit, combined license, standard


design approval, or manufacturing license under 10 CFR Part 52, "Licenses, Certifications, and
design approval, or manufacturing license under 10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and


Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.All applicants for a standard design certification, including
Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants. All applicants for a standard design certification, including


such applicants after initial issuance of a design certification rule.
such applicants after initial issuance of a design certification rule.


==PURPOSE==
==PURPOSE==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is is
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform


suing this information notice (IN) to inform addressees of operating experience related to circuit breaker overheating and fires caused by
addressees of operating experience related to circuit breaker overheating and fires caused by


inadequate and high-resistance connections. Information from these events may apply to the
inadequate and high-resistance connections. Information from these events may apply to the


design, installation, testing, inspection, and maintenance of circuit breakers. The NRC expects that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities, and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
design, installation, testing, inspection, and maintenance of circuit breakers. The NRC expects
 
that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities, and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this IN are not
 
NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.


==DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES==
==DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES==
Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1


===Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1===
On June 7, 2011, at Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 a fire occurred in the feeder breaker for a
On June 7, 2011, at Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 a fire occurred in the feeder breaker for a


safety-related 480-volt bus. The fire resulted in significant damage to the breaker, bus, and an extended facility shutdown.  The fire occurred in a low-voltage breaker that had been installed in 2009 as part of a design modification to replace obsolete breakers.  The new breaker assembly
safety-related 480-volt bus. The fire resulted in significant damage to the breaker, bus, and an


consisted of a Square D
extended facility shutdown. The fire occurred in a low-voltage breaker that had been installed in


breaker and Masterpact
2009 as part of a design modification to replace obsolete breakers. The new breaker assembly


cradle assembly that served as the interface between the breaker and cubicle.  Licensee investigation revealed that the main cause of the
consisted of a Square D breaker and Masterpact cradle assembly that served as the interface


fire was inadequate engagement of the breaker cradle primary disconnect assembly (PDA)
between the breaker and cubicle. Licensee investigation revealed that the main cause of the
fingers and the bus stabs. Licensee inspection of Masterpact


cradles installed in the other safety-related buses revealed that the fingers on the cradles were longer than the original breaker fingers. The point where the fingers of the new cradle engaged the bus extended past the silver-plated portion on the copper bus stab, in an area that contained hardened grease.  This likely led to high resistance, overheating, and ultimately the fire.  During the design change process associated with the new breaker configuration, the licensee did not consider new failure
fire was inadequate engagement of the breaker cradle primary disconnect assembly (PDA)
fingers and the bus stabs. Licensee inspection of Masterpact cradles installed in the other


modes caused by the new finger-stab connections. Additionally, the installation procedures did not require post-modification testing to verify the resistance of the connections between the
safety-related buses revealed that the fingers on the cradles were longer than the original
 
breaker fingers. The point where the fingers of the new cradle engaged the bus extended past
 
ML16104A214 the silver-plated portion on the copper bus stab, in an area that contained hardened grease.
 
This likely led to high resistance, overheating, and ultimately the fire. During the design change
 
process associated with the new breaker configuration, the licensee did not consider new failure
 
modes caused by the new finger-stab connections. Additionally, the installation procedures did
 
not require post-modification testing to verify the resistance of the connections between the


cradle PDA fingers and bus stabs.
cradle PDA fingers and bus stabs.
Line 72: Line 94:
The licensee took corrective actions as a result of this event that included repairing the affected
The licensee took corrective actions as a result of this event that included repairing the affected


bus, inspecting and testing the other breakers and buses, silver-plating the affected 480-volt bus stabs, and revising maintenance procedures to enhance installation and post-installation
bus, inspecting and testing the other breakers and buses, silver-plating the affected 480-volt bus
 
stabs, and revising maintenance procedures to enhance installation and post-installation


inspection.
inspection.


Additional information regarding this event is available in Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000285-2011-008 Revision 1, dated October 27, 2011 (Agencywide Documents Access and
Additional information regarding this event is available in Licensee Event Report (LER)
05000285-2011-008 Revision 1, dated October 27, 2011 (Agencywide Documents Access and


Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML113010208, and NRC Special Inspection Report 05000285/2011014, dated March 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12072A128).
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML113010208, and NRC Special Inspection


Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3
Report 05000285/2011014, dated March 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12072A128).


===Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3===
On November 4, 2013, an operator at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3 noted the smell of
On November 4, 2013, an operator at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3 noted the smell of


smoke coming from a 480-volt bus. Further licensee inspection revealed hotspots on the bus
smoke coming from a 480-volt bus. Further licensee inspection revealed hotspots on the bus


feeder breaker. This breaker was a Square D
feeder breaker. This breaker was a Square D breaker with Masterpact cradle assembly


breaker with Masterpact
(similar to the breaker assembly at Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 described above). The bus was


cradle assembly (similar to the breaker assembly at Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 described above).
transferred to the alternate feeder source, and the normal supply breaker was removed for


The bus was transferred to the alternate feeder source, and the normal supply breaker was removed for
inspection. The licensee found the cradle PDA fingers discolored from excessive heat. The


inspection.  The licensee found the cradle PDA fingers discolored from excessive heat. The
licensee sent the affected Masterpact cradle and breaker to the supplier, Nuclear Logistics Inc.


licensee sent the affected Masterpact
(NLI), for failure analysis. NLI determined the direct cause of the overheating primary


cradle and breaker to the supplier, Nuclear Logistics Inc. (NLI), for failure analysis.  NLI determined the direct cause of the overheating primary disconnects was the loss of vertical movement (float) on the primary disconnects of the breaker cradle.  The cradle primary disconnects are designed to account for vertical misalignment of the
disconnects was the loss of vertical movement (float) on the primary disconnects of the breaker


stabs in the switchgear. The primary disconnect fingers have vertical float that maintains the
cradle. The cradle primary disconnects are designed to account for vertical misalignment of the
 
stabs in the switchgear. The primary disconnect fingers have vertical float that maintains the


finger pressure on the bus stabs when the bus stabs are not completely aligned in the vertical
finger pressure on the bus stabs when the bus stabs are not completely aligned in the vertical


bus. The loss of vertical float was caused by an incorrectly specified tolerance in the PDA's fabrication drawing.  The licensee's installation procedures did not include steps to inspect for freedom of vertical float of the primary disconnects.  Additionally, the supplier did not provide guidance for testing freedom of vertical float of primary disconnects.
bus. The loss of vertical float was caused by an incorrectly specified tolerance in the PDAs


Because of this event, the licensee performed inspections on the installed Masterpact
fabrication drawing. The licensees installation procedures did not include steps to inspect for


cradle assembly PDAs for signs of overheating, and to verify freedom of vertical float of primary disconnects. NLI generated a technical bulletin, and alerted licensees to inspect the affected assemblies for the manufacturing defect, and submitted a report under 10 CFR Part 21,
freedom of vertical float of the primary disconnects. Additionally, the supplier did not provide
"Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance." 


Additional information regarding this event is available in 10 CFR Part 21 Report 2014-09-00,
guidance for testing freedom of vertical float of primary disconnects.
dated February 26, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14069A467), and NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2012004, 05000260/2012004, and 05000296/2012004, dated November 13, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12319A182).


Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 On August 21, 2015, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 used an incorrectly configured
Because of this event, the licensee performed inspections on the installed Masterpact cradle


grounding cart that caused damage to the line-side connections in a 4160-volt breaker cubicle. A grounding cart is a device used to apply grounds to switchgear assemblies during maintenance activities to ensure personnel protection. The grounding cart used in this case
assembly PDAs for signs of overheating, and to verify freedom of vertical float of primary
 
disconnects. NLI generated a technical bulletin, and alerted licensees to inspect the affected
 
assemblies for the manufacturing defect, and submitted a report under 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance.
 
Additional information regarding this event is available in 10 CFR Part 21 Report 2014-09-00,
dated February 26, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14069A467), and NRC Integrated
 
Inspection Report 05000259/2012004, 05000260/2012004, and 05000296/2012004, dated
 
November 13, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12319A182).
 
===Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2===
On August 21, 2015, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 used an incorrectly configured
 
grounding cart that caused damage to the line-side connections in a 4160-volt breaker cubicle. A grounding cart is a device used to apply grounds to switchgear assemblies during
 
maintenance activities to ensure personnel protection. The grounding cart used in this case


was configured for-2000 amp stabs versus the 1200-amp stabs required for the breaker cubicle.
was configured for-2000 amp stabs versus the 1200-amp stabs required for the breaker cubicle.
Line 122: Line 166:
There was no procedure for ensuring that the stabs on the grounding cart were the proper size
There was no procedure for ensuring that the stabs on the grounding cart were the proper size


for their intended application. As a result, the stabs that were installed on the cart were one
for their intended application. As a result, the stabs that were installed on the cart were one
 
inch larger in diameter than the stabs required for the breaker cubicle. The larger stabs caused
 
damage to the draw-out connections on the load side of the breaker cubicle. Workers did not
 
observe the damage following maintenance and removal of the grounding cart, and proceeded
 
with breaker re-installation. When the breaker was re-energized, an arc flash occurred as a


inch larger in diameter than the stabs required for the breaker cubicle. The larger stabs caused damage to the draw-out connections on the load side of the breaker cubicle.  Workers did not observe the damage following maintenance and removal of the grounding cart, and proceeded
result of the damaged connections. This led to loss of the switchgear, loss of an electric fire


with breaker re-installation.  When the breaker was re-energized, an arc flash occurred as a
pump, loss of a feedwater drain pump, and an unplanned 10 percent downpower transient on


result of the damaged connections. This led to loss of the switchgear, loss of an electric fire
the reactor. The cause of this event was determined to be the lack of procedural guidance for


pump, loss of a feedwater drain pump, and an unplanned 10 percent downpower transient on the reactor.  The cause of this event was determined to be the lack of procedural guidance for using the grounding cart in the breaker cubicle.
using the grounding cart in the breaker cubicle.


As a result of this event, the licensee took corrective actions that included implementing
As a result of this event, the licensee took corrective actions that included implementing


procedural guidance to compare the configured grounding cart to the respective breaker cubicle, rather than relying on "skill-of-the-craft" knowledge.
procedural guidance to compare the configured grounding cart to the respective breaker
 
cubicle, rather than relying on skill-of-the-craft knowledge.
 
Additional information regarding this event is available in NRC Integrated Inspection Report


Additional information regarding this event is available in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000220/2015003 and 05000410/2015003, dated November 9, 2015 (ADAMS Accession
05000220/2015003 and 05000410/2015003, dated November 9, 2015 (ADAMS Accession


No. ML15314A506).
No. ML15314A506).


Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 On September 16, 2015, at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2, a breaker arc
===Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2===
On September 16, 2015, at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2, a breaker arc


flash and rapid combustion occurred, resulting in the licensee declaring a Notification of
flash and rapid combustion occurred, resulting in the licensee declaring a Notification of


Unusual Event (under the NRC's emergency classification system for grouping off-normal events or conditions). When racking in a non-class 1E load center 480-volt circuit breaker, operators unknowingly caused damage to the breaker's internal connections. During
Unusual Event (under the NRCs emergency classification system for grouping off-normal
 
events or conditions). When racking in a non-class 1E load center 480-volt circuit breaker, operators unknowingly caused damage to the breakers internal connections. During


installation, vertical misalignment between the ground clip and ground stab damaged the clip, causing the clip to spread apart as the breaker was racked in. One side of the ground clip came
installation, vertical misalignment between the ground clip and ground stab damaged the clip, causing the clip to spread apart as the breaker was racked in. One side of the ground clip came


into contact with one of the phases of the line side of the breaker. When the operator locally
into contact with one of the phases of the line side of the breaker. When the operator locally


shut the breaker, an arc flash occurred, causing significant damage to the back door of the cubicle, and creating an occupational safety hazard to the operator.  The supply breaker to the bus tripped, de-energizing the fault.  This breaker supplied power to non-essential loads, and its
shut the breaker, an arc flash occurred, causing significant damage to the back door of the


failure did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant. The licensee declared a
cubicle, and creating an occupational safety hazard to the operator. The supply breaker to the
 
bus tripped, de-energizing the fault. This breaker supplied power to non-essential loads, and its
 
failure did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant. The licensee declared a


notification of unusual event as a result of the explosion in the breaker cubicle; however, the
notification of unusual event as a result of the explosion in the breaker cubicle; however, the


operator was dressed out for 4160-volt work, and avoided serious injury. The cause of this incorrect installation was a lack of procedural guidance to verify proper breaker alignment during racking of the breaker.  Several months prior, a similar event had occurred on a different
operator was dressed out for 4160-volt work, and avoided serious injury. The cause of this


breaker at Palo Verde. However, in this event, the ground clip was forced outward instead of
incorrect installation was a lack of procedural guidance to verify proper breaker alignment during
 
racking of the breaker. Several months prior, a similar event had occurred on a different
 
breaker at Palo Verde. However, in this event, the ground clip was forced outward instead of


inward toward the breaker, and therefore did not come into contact with the phase on the line
inward toward the breaker, and therefore did not come into contact with the phase on the line
Line 164: Line 231:
side of breaker.
side of breaker.


The licensee found that misalignment of the breaker ground clip to the cubicle ground stab was limited to ABB K-Line 480-volt circuit breakers.  The
The licensee found that misalignment of the breaker ground clip to the cubicle ground stab was


licensee took corrective actions as a result of the September 16, 2015 event, which included revising procedures to check alignment of the
limited to ABB K-Line 480-volt circuit breakers. The licensee took corrective actions as a result


breaker ground clip to cubicle ground stab while racking in 480-volt breakers. Additional information regarding this event is available in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000528/2015003, 05000529/2015003, and 05000530/2015003, dated October 22, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15295A435).
of the September 16, 2015 event, which included revising procedures to check alignment of the
 
breaker ground clip to cubicle ground stab while racking in 480-volt breakers. Additional information regarding this event is available in NRC Integrated Inspection Report
 
05000528/2015003, 05000529/2015003, and 05000530/2015003, dated October 22, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15295A435).


==BACKGROUND==
==BACKGROUND==
Related NRC Generic Communications


NRC IN 2002-27, "Recent Fires at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States,"
===Related NRC Generic Communications===
dated September 20, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML022630147). The NRC issued this IN to
NRC IN 2002-27, Recent Fires at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States, dated September 20, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML022630147). The NRC issued this IN to
 
alert addressees of several fire events, one of which was caused by a poor electrical connection
 
between the breaker PDA and the bus stabs.


alert addressees of several fire events, one of which was caused by a poor electrical connection between the breaker PDA and the bus stabs.
NRC IN 2007-34, Operating Experience Regarding Electrical Circuit Breakers, dated


NRC IN 2007-34, "Operating Experience Regarding Electrical Circuit Breakers," dated October 22, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML072390061). The NRC issued this IN to alert
October 22, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML072390061). The NRC issued this IN to alert


addressees of several circuit breaker problems including deficient fit-ups, inadequate maintenance practices, and issues with design changes.
addressees of several circuit breaker problems including deficient fit-ups, inadequate


NRC IN 2008-18, "Loss of a Safety-Related Motor Control Center Caused by a Bus Fault,"
maintenance practices, and issues with design changes.
dated December 1, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082540130). The NRC issued this IN to
 
NRC IN 2008-18, Loss of a Safety-Related Motor Control Center Caused by a Bus Fault, dated December 1, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082540130). The NRC issued this IN to


alert addressees of an electrical fire caused by a bus fault, which resulted in the loss of
alert addressees of an electrical fire caused by a bus fault, which resulted in the loss of


safety-related equipment. The fault was caused by inadequate contact of a motor control center's stab fingers to its bus bars.
safety-related equipment. The fault was caused by inadequate contact of a motor control


NRC IN 2010-25, "Inadequate Electrical Connections," dated November 17, 2010 (ADAMS
centers stab fingers to its bus bars.


Accession No. ML102530012).  The NRC issued this
NRC IN 2010-25, Inadequate Electrical Connections, dated November 17, 2010 (ADAMS


IN to alert addressees of operating experience involving loose electrical connection that resulted in unanticipated plant transients and failures or unavailability of safety-related equipment.
Accession No. ML102530012). The NRC issued this IN to alert addressees of operating
 
experience involving loose electrical connection that resulted in unanticipated plant transients
 
and failures or unavailability of safety-related equipment.


==DISCUSSION==
==DISCUSSION==
Circuit breakers are relied upon to provide electrical power to equipment credited in accident
Circuit breakers are relied upon to provide electrical power to equipment credited in accident


analyses. Industry operating experience has shown that effective breaker maintenance procedures should include provisions to ensure proper alignment during installation, and steps to ensure that there are no high resistance connections in the interface between breakers and
analyses. Industry operating experience has shown that effective breaker maintenance
 
procedures should include provisions to ensure proper alignment during installation, and steps
 
to ensure that there are no high resistance connections in the interface between breakers and
 
electrical buses following breaker installation. The examples provided in this IN illustrate how


electrical buses following breaker installation. The examples provided in this IN illustrate how
inadequate breaker connections can result in adverse impacts to safety-related equipment, introduce occupational safety concerns, and present fire hazards. These examples illustrate the


inadequate breaker connections can result in adverse impacts to safety-related equipment, introduce occupational safety concerns, and present fire hazards.  These examples illustrate the importance of adequate breaker testing, inspection, maintenance procedures, and the proper licensee oversight of physical modifications to circuit breaker designs.
importance of adequate breaker testing, inspection, maintenance procedures, and the proper
 
licensee oversight of physical modifications to circuit breaker designs.


==CONTACT==
==CONTACT==
S This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this
S
 
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this
 
matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor


matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager.
Regulation project manager.


/ra/       /ra/  
/ra/                                                 /ra/
Michael C. Cheok, Director
Michael C. Cheok, Director                            Louise Lund, Director


Louise Lund, Director    Division of Construction Inspection   Division of Policy and Rulemaking   and Operational Programs    Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Division of Construction Inspection                   Division of Policy and Rulemaking


Office of New Reactors
and Operational Programs                            Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
===Office of New Reactors===


===Technical Contact:===
===Technical Contact:===
Jesse Robles, NRR  301-415-2940  E-mail: Jesse.Robles@nrc.gov


Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
===Jesse Robles, NRR===
                      301-415-2940
                      E-mail: Jesse.Robles@nrc.gov
 
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
 
ML16104A214                      *concurred via e-mail                      TAC MF7575 OFFICE  QTE*          NRR/DIRS/IOEB/TL* NRR/DIRS/IOEB/BC*  NRR/DE/EEEB/BC *    NRO/DCIP/QVIB1/BC* NRO/DEIA/ICE/BC*  NRR/DIRS/D
 
NAME    CHsu          JRobles          HChernoff          JZimmerman          TJackson          DCurtis, acting    SMorris
 
DATE    04/13/16      04/20/16          04/20/16          05/02/2016          04/20/2016        04/25/2016        04/20/2016 OFFICE  NRR/DE/D*      NRO/DEIA/D*      NRR/DPR/PGCB/LA    NRR/DPR/PGCB/PM*    NRR/DPR/PGCB/BC*  NRO/DCIP/D        NRR/DPR/D


ML16104A214  *concurred via e-mail  TAC MF7575 OFFICE QTE* NRR/DIRS/IOEB/TL* NRR/DIRS/IOEB/BC* NRR/DE/EEEB/BC
NAME    JLubinski      MMayfield        ELee              ASchwab              SStuchell          MCheok            LLund


* NRO/DCIP/QVIB1/BC* NRO/DEIA/ICE/BC* NRR/DIRS/D NAME CHsu JRobles HChernoff JZimmerman TJackson DCurtis, acting SMorris DATE 04/13/16 04/20/16 04/20/16 05/02/2016 04/20/2016 04/25/2016 04/20/2016 OFFICE NRR/DE/D* NRO/DEIA/D* NRR/DPR/PGCB/LA NRR/DPR/PGCB/PM* NRR/DPR/PGCB/BC* NRO/DCIP/D NRR/DPR/D NAME JLubinski MMayfield ELee ASchwab SStuchell MCheok LLund DATE 05/31/2016 05/31/2016 06/07/2016 06/01/2016 06/08/2016 06/16/2016 06/17/2016}}
DATE   05/31/2016     05/31/2016       06/07/2016         06/01/2016           06/08/2016         06/16/2016         06/17/2016}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Revision as of 21:02, 30 October 2019

Inadequate Work Practices Resulting in Faulted Circuit Breaker Connection
ML16104A214
Person / Time
Issue date: 06/17/2016
From: Michael Cheok, Louise Lund
Division of Construction Inspection and Operational Programs, Division of Policy and Rulemaking
To:
Schwab A
References
IN-16-008
Download: ML16104A214 (6)


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 June 17, 2016 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2016-08: INADEQUATE WORK PRACTICES RESULTING

IN FAULTED CIRCUIT BREAKER

CONNECTIONS

ADDRESSEES

All holders of an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power reactor under

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of

Production and Utilization Facilities, except those that have permanently ceased operations

and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.

All holders of and applicants for a power reactor early site permit, combined license, standard

design approval, or manufacturing license under 10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and

Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants. All applicants for a standard design certification, including

such applicants after initial issuance of a design certification rule.

PURPOSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform

addressees of operating experience related to circuit breaker overheating and fires caused by

inadequate and high-resistance connections. Information from these events may apply to the

design, installation, testing, inspection, and maintenance of circuit breakers. The NRC expects

that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities, and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this IN are not

NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1

On June 7, 2011, at Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 a fire occurred in the feeder breaker for a

safety-related 480-volt bus. The fire resulted in significant damage to the breaker, bus, and an

extended facility shutdown. The fire occurred in a low-voltage breaker that had been installed in

2009 as part of a design modification to replace obsolete breakers. The new breaker assembly

consisted of a Square D breaker and Masterpact cradle assembly that served as the interface

between the breaker and cubicle. Licensee investigation revealed that the main cause of the

fire was inadequate engagement of the breaker cradle primary disconnect assembly (PDA)

fingers and the bus stabs. Licensee inspection of Masterpact cradles installed in the other

safety-related buses revealed that the fingers on the cradles were longer than the original

breaker fingers. The point where the fingers of the new cradle engaged the bus extended past

ML16104A214 the silver-plated portion on the copper bus stab, in an area that contained hardened grease.

This likely led to high resistance, overheating, and ultimately the fire. During the design change

process associated with the new breaker configuration, the licensee did not consider new failure

modes caused by the new finger-stab connections. Additionally, the installation procedures did

not require post-modification testing to verify the resistance of the connections between the

cradle PDA fingers and bus stabs.

The licensee took corrective actions as a result of this event that included repairing the affected

bus, inspecting and testing the other breakers and buses, silver-plating the affected 480-volt bus

stabs, and revising maintenance procedures to enhance installation and post-installation

inspection.

Additional information regarding this event is available in Licensee Event Report (LER)

05000285-2011-008 Revision 1, dated October 27, 2011 (Agencywide Documents Access and

Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML113010208, and NRC Special Inspection

Report 05000285/2011014, dated March 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12072A128).

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3

On November 4, 2013, an operator at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3 noted the smell of

smoke coming from a 480-volt bus. Further licensee inspection revealed hotspots on the bus

feeder breaker. This breaker was a Square D breaker with Masterpact cradle assembly

(similar to the breaker assembly at Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 described above). The bus was

transferred to the alternate feeder source, and the normal supply breaker was removed for

inspection. The licensee found the cradle PDA fingers discolored from excessive heat. The

licensee sent the affected Masterpact cradle and breaker to the supplier, Nuclear Logistics Inc.

(NLI), for failure analysis. NLI determined the direct cause of the overheating primary

disconnects was the loss of vertical movement (float) on the primary disconnects of the breaker

cradle. The cradle primary disconnects are designed to account for vertical misalignment of the

stabs in the switchgear. The primary disconnect fingers have vertical float that maintains the

finger pressure on the bus stabs when the bus stabs are not completely aligned in the vertical

bus. The loss of vertical float was caused by an incorrectly specified tolerance in the PDAs

fabrication drawing. The licensees installation procedures did not include steps to inspect for

freedom of vertical float of the primary disconnects. Additionally, the supplier did not provide

guidance for testing freedom of vertical float of primary disconnects.

Because of this event, the licensee performed inspections on the installed Masterpact cradle

assembly PDAs for signs of overheating, and to verify freedom of vertical float of primary

disconnects. NLI generated a technical bulletin, and alerted licensees to inspect the affected

assemblies for the manufacturing defect, and submitted a report under 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance.

Additional information regarding this event is available in 10 CFR Part 21 Report 2014-09-00,

dated February 26, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14069A467), and NRC Integrated

Inspection Report 05000259/2012004, 05000260/2012004, and 05000296/2012004, dated

November 13, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12319A182).

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2

On August 21, 2015, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 used an incorrectly configured

grounding cart that caused damage to the line-side connections in a 4160-volt breaker cubicle. A grounding cart is a device used to apply grounds to switchgear assemblies during

maintenance activities to ensure personnel protection. The grounding cart used in this case

was configured for-2000 amp stabs versus the 1200-amp stabs required for the breaker cubicle.

There was no procedure for ensuring that the stabs on the grounding cart were the proper size

for their intended application. As a result, the stabs that were installed on the cart were one

inch larger in diameter than the stabs required for the breaker cubicle. The larger stabs caused

damage to the draw-out connections on the load side of the breaker cubicle. Workers did not

observe the damage following maintenance and removal of the grounding cart, and proceeded

with breaker re-installation. When the breaker was re-energized, an arc flash occurred as a

result of the damaged connections. This led to loss of the switchgear, loss of an electric fire

pump, loss of a feedwater drain pump, and an unplanned 10 percent downpower transient on

the reactor. The cause of this event was determined to be the lack of procedural guidance for

using the grounding cart in the breaker cubicle.

As a result of this event, the licensee took corrective actions that included implementing

procedural guidance to compare the configured grounding cart to the respective breaker

cubicle, rather than relying on skill-of-the-craft knowledge.

Additional information regarding this event is available in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000220/2015003 and 05000410/2015003, dated November 9, 2015 (ADAMS Accession

No. ML15314A506).

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

On September 16, 2015, at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2, a breaker arc

flash and rapid combustion occurred, resulting in the licensee declaring a Notification of

Unusual Event (under the NRCs emergency classification system for grouping off-normal

events or conditions). When racking in a non-class 1E load center 480-volt circuit breaker, operators unknowingly caused damage to the breakers internal connections. During

installation, vertical misalignment between the ground clip and ground stab damaged the clip, causing the clip to spread apart as the breaker was racked in. One side of the ground clip came

into contact with one of the phases of the line side of the breaker. When the operator locally

shut the breaker, an arc flash occurred, causing significant damage to the back door of the

cubicle, and creating an occupational safety hazard to the operator. The supply breaker to the

bus tripped, de-energizing the fault. This breaker supplied power to non-essential loads, and its

failure did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant. The licensee declared a

notification of unusual event as a result of the explosion in the breaker cubicle; however, the

operator was dressed out for 4160-volt work, and avoided serious injury. The cause of this

incorrect installation was a lack of procedural guidance to verify proper breaker alignment during

racking of the breaker. Several months prior, a similar event had occurred on a different

breaker at Palo Verde. However, in this event, the ground clip was forced outward instead of

inward toward the breaker, and therefore did not come into contact with the phase on the line

side of breaker.

The licensee found that misalignment of the breaker ground clip to the cubicle ground stab was

limited to ABB K-Line 480-volt circuit breakers. The licensee took corrective actions as a result

of the September 16, 2015 event, which included revising procedures to check alignment of the

breaker ground clip to cubicle ground stab while racking in 480-volt breakers. Additional information regarding this event is available in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000528/2015003, 05000529/2015003, and 05000530/2015003, dated October 22, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15295A435).

BACKGROUND

Related NRC Generic Communications

NRC IN 2002-27, Recent Fires at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States, dated September 20, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML022630147). The NRC issued this IN to

alert addressees of several fire events, one of which was caused by a poor electrical connection

between the breaker PDA and the bus stabs.

NRC IN 2007-34, Operating Experience Regarding Electrical Circuit Breakers, dated

October 22, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML072390061). The NRC issued this IN to alert

addressees of several circuit breaker problems including deficient fit-ups, inadequate

maintenance practices, and issues with design changes.

NRC IN 2008-18, Loss of a Safety-Related Motor Control Center Caused by a Bus Fault, dated December 1, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082540130). The NRC issued this IN to

alert addressees of an electrical fire caused by a bus fault, which resulted in the loss of

safety-related equipment. The fault was caused by inadequate contact of a motor control

centers stab fingers to its bus bars.

NRC IN 2010-25, Inadequate Electrical Connections, dated November 17, 2010 (ADAMS

Accession No. ML102530012). The NRC issued this IN to alert addressees of operating

experience involving loose electrical connection that resulted in unanticipated plant transients

and failures or unavailability of safety-related equipment.

DISCUSSION

Circuit breakers are relied upon to provide electrical power to equipment credited in accident

analyses. Industry operating experience has shown that effective breaker maintenance

procedures should include provisions to ensure proper alignment during installation, and steps

to ensure that there are no high resistance connections in the interface between breakers and

electrical buses following breaker installation. The examples provided in this IN illustrate how

inadequate breaker connections can result in adverse impacts to safety-related equipment, introduce occupational safety concerns, and present fire hazards. These examples illustrate the

importance of adequate breaker testing, inspection, maintenance procedures, and the proper

licensee oversight of physical modifications to circuit breaker designs.

CONTACT

S

This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this

matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation project manager.

/ra/ /ra/

Michael C. Cheok, Director Louise Lund, Director

Division of Construction Inspection Division of Policy and Rulemaking

and Operational Programs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Office of New Reactors

Technical Contact:

Jesse Robles, NRR

301-415-2940

E-mail: Jesse.Robles@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.

ML16104A214 *concurred via e-mail TAC MF7575 OFFICE QTE* NRR/DIRS/IOEB/TL* NRR/DIRS/IOEB/BC* NRR/DE/EEEB/BC * NRO/DCIP/QVIB1/BC* NRO/DEIA/ICE/BC* NRR/DIRS/D

NAME CHsu JRobles HChernoff JZimmerman TJackson DCurtis, acting SMorris

DATE 04/13/16 04/20/16 04/20/16 05/02/2016 04/20/2016 04/25/2016 04/20/2016 OFFICE NRR/DE/D* NRO/DEIA/D* NRR/DPR/PGCB/LA NRR/DPR/PGCB/PM* NRR/DPR/PGCB/BC* NRO/DCIP/D NRR/DPR/D

NAME JLubinski MMayfield ELee ASchwab SStuchell MCheok LLund

DATE 05/31/2016 05/31/2016 06/07/2016 06/01/2016 06/08/2016 06/16/2016 06/17/2016