ML15314A661

LER 15-002-00 for Surry, Unit 2, Regarding Unanticipated Start of EDG 2 During Testing

ML15314A661
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	11/04/2015
From:	Lane N L Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
15-509 LER 15-002-00
Download: ML15314A661 (5)

Text

10OCFR50.73Virginia Electric and Power CompanySurry Power Station5570 Hog Island RoadSurry, Virginia 23883November 4, 2015U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.: 15-509Attention: Document Control Desk SPS: JSAWashington, D. C. 20555-0001 Docket No.: 50-281License No.: DRP-37Pursuant to I0CFR5O.73, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits thefollowing Licensee Event Report applicable to Surry Power Station Unit 2.Report No. 50-281/2015-002-00This report has been reviewed by the Station Facility Safety Review Committee and willbe forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.Very truly yours,N. L. LaneSite Vice PresidentSurry Power StationEnclosureCommitment contained in this letter: Nonecc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IIMarquis One Tower, Suite 1200245 Peachtree Center Ave., NEAtlanta, GA 30303-1257NRC Senior Resident InspectorSurry Power Station NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 0113112017(02-2014)burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />., Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry." .comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections..... LICE SE EVE NT RE PORT (LE R Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or byLIC ~~ 0 ) internet e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and(See Page 2 for required number of Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DCdgt/hacesfor each block) 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MBdigis/caracerscontrol number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a parson is not required'to respond to,the information collection.1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 13. PAGESurry Power Station, Unit 2 05000281 1 OF 44. TITLEUnanticipated Start of EDG 2 During Testing5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVEDMNH AY YASEUNILRV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBERYER NME 1O MNH DY yA 0500009 16 205 2015 -002 -00 I 1 0 05 FACILITYNAME DOCKET NUMBER0509. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10OCFR §: (Check all that apply)E] 20.2201(b) [] 20.2203(a)(3)(i) [] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(Ci D] 50.73(a)(2)(vii)[] 20.2201(d) [] 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) [] 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) [] 50.73(a)(2)(Viii)(A)N D 20.2203(a)(1) W] 20.2203(a)(4) LI 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) [] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)[] 20.2203(a)(2)(i) [] 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) [] 50.73(a)(2)(iii) LI 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)10. POWER LEVEL LI 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) LI 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) [] 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) [] 50.73(a)(2)(x)LI 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) LI 50.36(c)(2) LI 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) LI 73.71(a)(4)LI 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) LI 50.46(a)(3)(ii) LI 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) LI 73.71(a)(5)10 L 20.2203(a)(2)(v) [] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) LI 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) LI OTHERLI 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) [] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) LI 50 73(a)(2)(v)(D) Specify in Abstract below or in12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LERLICENSEE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)N. L. Lane, Site Vice President (757) 365-200113. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORTI ANU REOTAL LIMN- RPRALCAUSEB SYSTEME COMPONENTRL FACTURERw 2 TOYEPIX CAU SE SYTE COPNN OTFACTURER D TO EPIX14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED "15.SUMSSoEXPECTED MNH DY YEARLI YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) [] NO DATEABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)On September 16, 2015, at 2014 hours0.0233 days <br />0.559 hours <br />0.00333 weeks <br />7.66327e-4 months <br /> with Units I and 2 operating at 100 percent power,Emergency Diesel Generator 2 automatically started and assumed power to the Unit 2 'H'emergency bus. The event occurred during quarterly performance of the Emergency BusUndervoltage and Degraded Voltage Protection Test. The direct cause of the event was thedefective "A" single phase relay sticking and preventing the relay contacts from changingstate. The procedures for Emergency Bus Undervoltage and Degraded Voltage ProtectionTests have been revised to physically validate the state of the emergency bus relays prior totesting additional relays. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)for valid actuation of an EmergenCy Diesel Generator.NRC FORM 366 (02-2014)

NRC FORM 366A US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/3112017(02-2014),,..,.,,,,,,., Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.," lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.~Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Pdvacy and information CollectionsBranch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by..." LICENSE EVENT RE O T (LER) internet e-mail to Infocolleots.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of InformationadRegulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget,currently valid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is notrequired to respond to, the information collection.1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEIYER SEQUENTIAL REVYEARNUMBER NO.SurryPower Station 05000 -281 J2 OF 4ij 2015 -002 -00NARRATIVE1.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTThe purpose of the Emergency Bus Undervoltage and Degraded Voltage ProtectionTest is to provide quarterly testing of undervoltage and degraded voltage protectionschemes of the emergency bus trains as required by Surry Technical Specifications.The Undervoltage Protection Channels consist of three individual single phase relays[EIIS-ED-RLY]. These relays provide input to a two out of three coincident relay logic foroperation. One of the functions of the undervoltage circuits is to sense a loss of voltagecondition and place the respective emergency bus on the Emergency Diesel Generator(EDG) [EIIS-EK-DG].On September 16, 2015, at 2014 hours0.0233 days <br />0.559 hours <br />0.00333 weeks <br />7.66327e-4 months <br /> with Units 1 and 2 operating at 100 percentpower, an undervoltage signal was generated during performance of the EmergencyBus Undervoltage and Degraded Voltage Protection Test. As a result, EDG 2 startedand loaded as designed on the Unit 2 'H' emergency bus.During performance of the test, the 'A' phase undervoltage portion of the test wassuccessfully completed and an indication light verified that 'A' phase was left in itsnormal energized condition. At 2014 hours0.0233 days <br />0.559 hours <br />0.00333 weeks <br />7.66327e-4 months <br />, when testing of the 'B' phase began, aundervoltage signal was generated and EDG 2 started and assumed the load of theUnit 2 'H' emergency bus. The test was terminated and operations initiated theabnormal procedure for loss of the Unit 2 'H' emergency bus. At 2216 hours0.0256 days <br />0.616 hours <br />0.00366 weeks <br />8.43188e-4 months <br /> onSeptember 17, 2015, normal source power was restored to the 'H' bus and EDG 2 wasunloaded, taken offline and placed back in automatic at 2244 hours0.026 days <br />0.623 hours <br />0.00371 weeks <br />8.53842e-4 months <br /> on September 17,2015.On September 17, 2015 at 0027 hours3.125e-4 days <br />0.0075 hours <br />4.464286e-5 weeks <br />1.02735e-5 months <br />, an event notification was made to the NRC inaccordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for valid actuation of EDG 2 following loss ofthe Unit 2 'H' emergency bus during performance of the Emergency Bus Undervoltageand Degraded Protection Test.This report is being submitted, pursuant to, 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), for automaticactuation of the EDG.2.0 SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONSThis event resulted in no safety consequences or implications. Appropriate operatoractions were taken in accordance with abnormal operating procedures and the unitremained at 100 percent power. Station equipment was available and responded asdesigned. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.NRC FORM 385A (02-201.4)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION4) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 1 3. PAGEIISEQUENTIAL REV00021 YEAR NUMBER NO.Surry Power Station 0oo-213 O2015 -002 -00 j3 ONARRATIVE3.0 CAUSETroubleshooting determined that upon completion of the 'A' phase undervoltage test,the 'A' single phase relay did not reset. However, an indication light verified that 'A'phase was in its normal powered condition. Therefore, when the 'B' phase undervoltagetest began and the 'B' phase relay was deenergized, the two out of three coincidentlogic was met resulting in the normal power supply breaker to the 'H' bus to open, asdesigned. EDG 2 started and loaded as designed on the Unit 2 'H' emergency bus.The direct cause of the 'A' single phase relay not resetting was debris and warping inthe relay slug chamber and signs of heat damage. These conditions prevented smoothmovement of the relay slug in the chamber and resulted in it sticking and preventing therelay contacts from changing state.The apparent cause of the undervoltage signal and resultant loss of the Unit 2 'H'emergency bus was a procedural deficiency that relied upon a light indication of powerto the relay but did not verify the position of the relay after each step of the undervoltagetest.4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)Normal offsite power was restored to the 'H' bus at 2216 hours0.0256 days <br />0.616 hours <br />0.00366 weeks <br />8.43188e-4 months <br /> on September 17, 2015and EDG 2 was unloaded, taken offline and placed back in automatic. The failed relaywas replaced.5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONSAn apparent cause evaluation was completed to investigate the event.6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCEThe procedures for Emergency Bus Undervoltage and Degraded Voltage ProtectionTests have been revised to physically validate the state of the emergency bus relaYs toensure the two out of three logics will not be satisfied if a relay fails to energize.7.0 SIMILAR EVENTSNone8.0 MANUFACTURER/MODEL NUMBERWestinghouse/ARD440U RNRC FORM 366 (02-2014)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION(02-2014) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGESEQUENTIAL REVYEAR NUMBER NO.Surry Power Station I050o00-281 14 OF 41 _____ 2015 -002 -00NARRATIVE9.0 ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONUnit 1 was at 100% power and remained unaffected by the starting of EDO 2.NRC FORM 366 (02-2014) 10OCFR50.73Virginia Electric and Power CompanySurry Power Station5570 Hog Island RoadSurry, Virginia 23883November 4, 2015U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.: 15-509Attention: Document Control Desk SPS: JSAWashington, D. C. 20555-0001 Docket No.: 50-281License No.: DRP-37Pursuant to I0CFR5O.73, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits thefollowing Licensee Event Report applicable to Surry Power Station Unit 2.Report No. 50-281/2015-002-00This report has been reviewed by the Station Facility Safety Review Committee and willbe forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.Very truly yours,N. L. LaneSite Vice PresidentSurry Power StationEnclosureCommitment contained in this letter: Nonecc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IIMarquis One Tower, Suite 1200245 Peachtree Center Ave., NEAtlanta, GA 30303-1257NRC Senior Resident InspectorSurry Power Station NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 0113112017(02-2014)burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />., Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry." .comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections..... LICE SE EVE NT RE PORT (LE R Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or byLIC ~~ 0 ) internet e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and(See Page 2 for required number of Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DCdgt/hacesfor each block) 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MBdigis/caracerscontrol number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a parson is not required'to respond to,the information collection.1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 13. PAGESurry Power Station, Unit 2 05000281 1 OF 44. TITLEUnanticipated Start of EDG 2 During Testing5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVEDMNH AY YASEUNILRV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBERYER NME 1O MNH DY yA 0500009 16 205 2015 -002 -00 I 1 0 05 FACILITYNAME DOCKET NUMBER0509. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10OCFR §: (Check all that apply)E] 20.2201(b) [] 20.2203(a)(3)(i) [] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(Ci D] 50.73(a)(2)(vii)[] 20.2201(d) [] 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) [] 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) [] 50.73(a)(2)(Viii)(A)N D 20.2203(a)(1) W] 20.2203(a)(4) LI 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) [] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)[] 20.2203(a)(2)(i) [] 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) [] 50.73(a)(2)(iii) LI 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)10. POWER LEVEL LI 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) LI 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) [] 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) [] 50.73(a)(2)(x)LI 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) LI 50.36(c)(2) LI 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) LI 73.71(a)(4)LI 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) LI 50.46(a)(3)(ii) LI 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) LI 73.71(a)(5)10 L 20.2203(a)(2)(v) [] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) LI 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) LI OTHERLI 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) [] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) LI 50 73(a)(2)(v)(D) Specify in Abstract below or in12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LERLICENSEE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)N. L. Lane, Site Vice President (757) 365-200113. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORTI ANU REOTAL LIMN- RPRALCAUSEB SYSTEME COMPONENTRL FACTURERw 2 TOYEPIX CAU SE SYTE COPNN OTFACTURER D TO EPIX14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED "15.SUMSSoEXPECTED MNH DY YEARLI YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) [] NO DATEABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)On September 16, 2015, at 2014 hours0.0233 days <br />0.559 hours <br />0.00333 weeks <br />7.66327e-4 months <br /> with Units I and 2 operating at 100 percent power,Emergency Diesel Generator 2 automatically started and assumed power to the Unit 2 'H'emergency bus. The event occurred during quarterly performance of the Emergency BusUndervoltage and Degraded Voltage Protection Test. The direct cause of the event was thedefective "A" single phase relay sticking and preventing the relay contacts from changingstate. The procedures for Emergency Bus Undervoltage and Degraded Voltage ProtectionTests have been revised to physically validate the state of the emergency bus relays prior totesting additional relays. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)for valid actuation of an EmergenCy Diesel Generator.NRC FORM 366 (02-2014)

NRC FORM 366A US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/3112017(02-2014),,..,.,,,,,,., Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.," lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.~Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Pdvacy and information CollectionsBranch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by..." LICENSE EVENT RE O T (LER) internet e-mail to Infocolleots.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of InformationadRegulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget,currently valid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is notrequired to respond to, the information collection.1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEIYER SEQUENTIAL REVYEARNUMBER NO.SurryPower Station 05000 -281 J2 OF 4ij 2015 -002 -00NARRATIVE1.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTThe purpose of the Emergency Bus Undervoltage and Degraded Voltage ProtectionTest is to provide quarterly testing of undervoltage and degraded voltage protectionschemes of the emergency bus trains as required by Surry Technical Specifications.The Undervoltage Protection Channels consist of three individual single phase relays[EIIS-ED-RLY]. These relays provide input to a two out of three coincident relay logic foroperation. One of the functions of the undervoltage circuits is to sense a loss of voltagecondition and place the respective emergency bus on the Emergency Diesel Generator(EDG) [EIIS-EK-DG].On September 16, 2015, at 2014 hours0.0233 days <br />0.559 hours <br />0.00333 weeks <br />7.66327e-4 months <br /> with Units 1 and 2 operating at 100 percentpower, an undervoltage signal was generated during performance of the EmergencyBus Undervoltage and Degraded Voltage Protection Test. As a result, EDG 2 startedand loaded as designed on the Unit 2 'H' emergency bus.During performance of the test, the 'A' phase undervoltage portion of the test wassuccessfully completed and an indication light verified that 'A' phase was left in itsnormal energized condition. At 2014 hours0.0233 days <br />0.559 hours <br />0.00333 weeks <br />7.66327e-4 months <br />, when testing of the 'B' phase began, aundervoltage signal was generated and EDG 2 started and assumed the load of theUnit 2 'H' emergency bus. The test was terminated and operations initiated theabnormal procedure for loss of the Unit 2 'H' emergency bus. At 2216 hours0.0256 days <br />0.616 hours <br />0.00366 weeks <br />8.43188e-4 months <br /> onSeptember 17, 2015, normal source power was restored to the 'H' bus and EDG 2 wasunloaded, taken offline and placed back in automatic at 2244 hours0.026 days <br />0.623 hours <br />0.00371 weeks <br />8.53842e-4 months <br /> on September 17,2015.On September 17, 2015 at 0027 hours3.125e-4 days <br />0.0075 hours <br />4.464286e-5 weeks <br />1.02735e-5 months <br />, an event notification was made to the NRC inaccordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for valid actuation of EDG 2 following loss ofthe Unit 2 'H' emergency bus during performance of the Emergency Bus Undervoltageand Degraded Protection Test.This report is being submitted, pursuant to, 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), for automaticactuation of the EDG.2.0 SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONSThis event resulted in no safety consequences or implications. Appropriate operatoractions were taken in accordance with abnormal operating procedures and the unitremained at 100 percent power. Station equipment was available and responded asdesigned. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.NRC FORM 385A (02-201.4)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION4) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 1 3. PAGEIISEQUENTIAL REV00021 YEAR NUMBER NO.Surry Power Station 0oo-213 O2015 -002 -00 j3 ONARRATIVE3.0 CAUSETroubleshooting determined that upon completion of the 'A' phase undervoltage test,the 'A' single phase relay did not reset. However, an indication light verified that 'A'phase was in its normal powered condition. Therefore, when the 'B' phase undervoltagetest began and the 'B' phase relay was deenergized, the two out of three coincidentlogic was met resulting in the normal power supply breaker to the 'H' bus to open, asdesigned. EDG 2 started and loaded as designed on the Unit 2 'H' emergency bus.The direct cause of the 'A' single phase relay not resetting was debris and warping inthe relay slug chamber and signs of heat damage. These conditions prevented smoothmovement of the relay slug in the chamber and resulted in it sticking and preventing therelay contacts from changing state.The apparent cause of the undervoltage signal and resultant loss of the Unit 2 'H'emergency bus was a procedural deficiency that relied upon a light indication of powerto the relay but did not verify the position of the relay after each step of the undervoltagetest.4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)Normal offsite power was restored to the 'H' bus at 2216 hours0.0256 days <br />0.616 hours <br />0.00366 weeks <br />8.43188e-4 months <br /> on September 17, 2015and EDG 2 was unloaded, taken offline and placed back in automatic. The failed relaywas replaced.5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONSAn apparent cause evaluation was completed to investigate the event.6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCEThe procedures for Emergency Bus Undervoltage and Degraded Voltage ProtectionTests have been revised to physically validate the state of the emergency bus relaYs toensure the two out of three logics will not be satisfied if a relay fails to energize.7.0 SIMILAR EVENTSNone8.0 MANUFACTURER/MODEL NUMBERWestinghouse/ARD440U RNRC FORM 366 (02-2014)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION(02-2014) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGESEQUENTIAL REVYEAR NUMBER NO.Surry Power Station I050o00-281 14 OF 41 _____ 2015 -002 -00NARRATIVE9.0 ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONUnit 1 was at 100% power and remained unaffected by the starting of EDO 2.NRC FORM 366 (02-2014)