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Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, began the inspection period at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP). On October 3, 2025, operators reduced power to 60 percent RTP for a control rod sequence exchange, control rod testing, and turbine stop and control valve testing. During the subsequent power ascension on October 4, 2025, an issue with the reactor recirculation pump B hydraulic power unit prevented a return to full RTP. The unit remained at approximately 91 percent RTP until repairs were completed. The repairs were followed by a return to 100 percent RTP on October 7, 2025. On October 27, 2025, operators reduced power to approximately 97 percent RTP due to electrohydraulic control fluid leakage associated with the turbine stop and control valves. A control rod pattern adjustment began on November 9, 2025, resulting in a reduction to 80 percent RTP. The unit returned to 100 percent RTP on November 10, 2025. On November 14, 2025, operators reduced power to 50 percent RTP to conduct a steam jet air ejector swap followed by a subsequent return to 100 percent RTP the same day. On December 5, 2025, the station performed a rod pattern adjustment and reduced power to 76 percent RTP with a subsequent return to 100 percent RTP later that day, where the unit remained at or near for the remainder of the inspection period. | Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, began the inspection period at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP). On October 3, 2025, operators reduced power to 60 percent RTP for a control rod sequence exchange, control rod testing, and turbine stop and control valve testing. During the subsequent power ascension on October 4, 2025, an issue with the reactor recirculation pump B hydraulic power unit prevented a return to full RTP. The unit remained at approximately 91 percent RTP until repairs were completed. The repairs were followed by a return to 100 percent RTP on October 7, 2025. On October 27, 2025, operators reduced power to approximately 97 percent RTP due to electrohydraulic control fluid leakage associated with the turbine stop and control valves. A control rod pattern adjustment began on November 9, 2025, resulting in a reduction to 80 percent RTP. The unit returned to 100 percent RTP on November 10, 2025. On November 14, 2025, operators reduced power to 50 percent RTP to conduct a steam jet air ejector swap followed by a subsequent return to 100 percent RTP the same day. On December 5, 2025, the station performed a rod pattern adjustment and reduced power to 76 percent RTP with a subsequent return to 100 percent RTP later that day, where the unit remained at or near for the remainder of the inspection period. | ||
== | == INSPECTION SCOPES== | ||
INSPECTION SCOPES== | |||
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed onsite portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. | Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed onsite portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. | ||
== | == REACTOR SAFETY== | ||
REACTOR SAFETY== | |||
==71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection== | ==71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection== | ||
===Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)=== | ===Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)=== | ||
| Line 139: | Line 137: | ||
: (2) division I diesel generator 24-hour surveillance run on October 22, | : (2) division I diesel generator 24-hour surveillance run on October 22, | ||
== 2025 OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE== | ==2025 OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE== | ||
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below: | ===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below: | ||
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08)=== | MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08)=== | ||
| Line 163: | Line 161: | ||
: (2) LER 05000416/2025-005-00, "Loss of Secondary Containment Due to Unsecured Roof Hatch" (ML25307A235). The circumstances surrounding this LER and a Green NCV are documented in Inspection Report 05000416/2025003 under Inspection Results Section 71153. This LER is Closed. | : (2) LER 05000416/2025-005-00, "Loss of Secondary Containment Due to Unsecured Roof Hatch" (ML25307A235). The circumstances surrounding this LER and a Green NCV are documented in Inspection Report 05000416/2025003 under Inspection Results Section 71153. This LER is Closed. | ||
== | == INSPECTION RESULTS== | ||
INSPECTION RESULTS== | |||
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71111.15 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. | Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71111.15 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. | ||
| Line 179: | Line 176: | ||
Corrective Action References: CR-GGN-2025-03091 Observation: Semiannual Trend Review 71152S For the inspection period, the inspectors noted 26 condition reports concerning plant emergency lights. Of the 26 condition reports, 13 concerned lights as required per 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R, Section III.J. Emergency lighting required by Appendix R is required, in part, to provide emergency lighting in all areas needed for safe operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress to routes thereto. While the inspectors did not identify any performance deficiencies related to emergency lighting, the inspectors observed that 5 of 13 Appendix R emergency light condition reports involved battery replacement. Of the 13 condition reports, three of those reports led to replacement of the battery charging circuit boards. The licensee provided the emergency lighting vendor manual to the inspectors, which describes proper operation of the emergency lights. The emergency lights have three charging modes: a fast-charging mode, an equalizing mode, and a trickle charging mode. During normal operation the charger may enter fast charging, equalize, and then return to trickle charging. Inspectors noted emergency lights are frequently in fast charging. Per the vendor manual, an emergency light that stays in fast charging mode could indicate issues with the battery or the battery charging circuitry. No findings or violations were identified. | Corrective Action References: CR-GGN-2025-03091 Observation: Semiannual Trend Review 71152S For the inspection period, the inspectors noted 26 condition reports concerning plant emergency lights. Of the 26 condition reports, 13 concerned lights as required per 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R, Section III.J. Emergency lighting required by Appendix R is required, in part, to provide emergency lighting in all areas needed for safe operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress to routes thereto. While the inspectors did not identify any performance deficiencies related to emergency lighting, the inspectors observed that 5 of 13 Appendix R emergency light condition reports involved battery replacement. Of the 13 condition reports, three of those reports led to replacement of the battery charging circuit boards. The licensee provided the emergency lighting vendor manual to the inspectors, which describes proper operation of the emergency lights. The emergency lights have three charging modes: a fast-charging mode, an equalizing mode, and a trickle charging mode. During normal operation the charger may enter fast charging, equalize, and then return to trickle charging. Inspectors noted emergency lights are frequently in fast charging. Per the vendor manual, an emergency light that stays in fast charging mode could indicate issues with the battery or the battery charging circuitry. No findings or violations were identified. | ||
== | == EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS== | ||
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS== | |||
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report. | The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report. | ||
* On January 12, 2026, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Brad Kapellas, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. | * On January 12, 2026, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Brad Kapellas, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. | ||
Revision as of 23:53, 21 February 2026
| ML26035A277 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/2026 |
| From: | Douglas Dodson NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/PBC |
| To: | Kapellas B Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR 2025004 | |
| Download: ML26035A277 (0) | |
Text
February 11, 2026
SUBJECT:
GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000416/2025004
Dear Brad Kapellas:
On December 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. On January 12, 2026, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.
A licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV)
consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Douglas E. Dodson II, Chief Reactor Projects Branch C Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000416 License No. NPF-29
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000416
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-004-0008
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Location:
Port Gibson, MS
Inspection Dates:
October 1, 2025, to December 31, 2025
Inspectors:
B. Pannabecker, Resident Inspector
A. Smallwood, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Douglas E. Dodson II, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch C
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 71111.1
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000416/2025-004-00 Standby Gas Treatment System Train Inoperable Which Led to a Failure to Identify Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications 71153 Closed LER 05000416/2025-005-00 Loss of Secondary Containment Due to Unsecured Roof Hatch 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, began the inspection period at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP). On October 3, 2025, operators reduced power to 60 percent RTP for a control rod sequence exchange, control rod testing, and turbine stop and control valve testing. During the subsequent power ascension on October 4, 2025, an issue with the reactor recirculation pump B hydraulic power unit prevented a return to full RTP. The unit remained at approximately 91 percent RTP until repairs were completed. The repairs were followed by a return to 100 percent RTP on October 7, 2025. On October 27, 2025, operators reduced power to approximately 97 percent RTP due to electrohydraulic control fluid leakage associated with the turbine stop and control valves. A control rod pattern adjustment began on November 9, 2025, resulting in a reduction to 80 percent RTP. The unit returned to 100 percent RTP on November 10, 2025. On November 14, 2025, operators reduced power to 50 percent RTP to conduct a steam jet air ejector swap followed by a subsequent return to 100 percent RTP the same day. On December 5, 2025, the station performed a rod pattern adjustment and reduced power to 76 percent RTP with a subsequent return to 100 percent RTP later that day, where the unit remained at or near for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed onsite portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of low Mississippi river level and any effects on the plant service water system on December 9, 2025.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)reactor protection system on October 7, 2025 (2)standby liquid control on October 15, 2025
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)auxiliary building 139-foot elevation, areas 8 and 10, fire zone 1A316, on October 1, 2025 (2)auxiliary building 93-foot elevation hallways, fire zones 1A101 and 1A117, on October 24, 2025
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during control room power ascension following recirculation pump division II hydraulic power unit lockup on October 6, 2025.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator simulator scenario on October 8, 2025.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)reactor core isolation cooling room elevated temperatures on December 2, 2025
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:
- (1) Work Order 00509751, E12-F042A, regenerative heat removal division I injection valve stem nut replacement on October 20, 2025
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Condition Report (CR)-GGN-2025-04535, main turbine stop and control valve increased electrohydraulic control fluid leakage on December 17, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) CR-GGN-2025-04324, division II control room air conditioner trip on October 10, 2025
- (2) CR-GGN-2025-03091, standby gas treatment total system flow, trip unit failure on November 18, 2025
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial Sample)
(1)
(Partial)
The inspectors evaluated the scope and risk assessment review activities for the upcoming RF25 refueling outage and completed pre-outage reviews on December 30, 2025. The inspectors completed inspection procedure 03.01.a.
===71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01)===
(1)standby service water valve P41-F064B stem nut on October 9, 2025 (2)auxiliary building floor drain containment isolation valve P45-F274B on November 6, 2025 (3)standby gas treatment functional relay testing on November 13, 2025 (4)division III residual heat removal 1E12-F406 check valve leak rate test on November 21, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
(1)main steam tunnel high temperature instrumentation calibration on October 19, 2025
- (2) division I diesel generator 24-hour surveillance run on October 22,
2025 OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08)===
- (1) October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (1 Sample)
- (1) October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
(1)quality related oil additions to safety-related systems
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential trends in 10 CFR Appendix R light condition reports that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
71153 - Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000416/2025-004-00, "Standby Gas Treatment System Train Inoperable Which Led to a Failure to Identify Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications" (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML25265A025). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER and a Licensee-Identified NCV are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section 71111.15. This LER is Closed.
- (2) LER 05000416/2025-005-00, "Loss of Secondary Containment Due to Unsecured Roof Hatch" (ML25307A235). The circumstances surrounding this LER and a Green NCV are documented in Inspection Report 05000416/2025003 under Inspection Results Section 71153. This LER is Closed.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71111.15 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Technical Specification 3.6.4.3 requires, in part, two standby gas treatment (SBGT)subsystems to be operable during MODE 1. Condition A.1 of TS 3.6.4.3 specifies that with one subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem shall be returned to operable status within 7 days. Additionally, TS LCO 3.6.4.3, Condition B.1 specifies, in part, that if the required action and associated completion time of Condition A is not met, the licensee shall be in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Contrary to the above, from June 28 to July 14, 2025, one SBGT subsystem was inoperable during MODE 1, the subsystem was not returned to operable status within 7 days in accordance with Condition A.1 of TS 3.6.4.3, the required action and associated completion time of Condition A was not met, and the licensee was not in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Specifically, operators noted that the system flow recorder for SBGT subsystem B was reading 3400 cubic feet per minute while the system was in standby, which indicated an instrumentation deficiency that would have prevented proper automatic operation of system flow control vanes. The flow instrumentation began reading inaccurately on June 21, 2025, at 4:16 a.m., at which point the system became inoperable. With one SBGT subsystem inoperable for 23.36 days, the licensee failed to return it to operable status within 7 days or be in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> at 4:16 p.m. on June 28, 2025.
Significance/Severity: Green. The failure to identify the inoperable SBGT subsystem prior to exceeding the allowed outage time is more than minor because it adversely affected the SSC and Barrier Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions. The inspectors determined the finding only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided by the SBGT system. Therefore, the issue screened to Green.
The disposition of this violation closes LER 05000416/2025-004-00, Standby Gas Treatment System Train Inoperable Which Led to a Failure to Identify Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications.
Corrective Action References: CR-GGN-2025-03091 Observation: Semiannual Trend Review 71152S For the inspection period, the inspectors noted 26 condition reports concerning plant emergency lights. Of the 26 condition reports, 13 concerned lights as required per 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R, Section III.J. Emergency lighting required by Appendix R is required, in part, to provide emergency lighting in all areas needed for safe operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress to routes thereto. While the inspectors did not identify any performance deficiencies related to emergency lighting, the inspectors observed that 5 of 13 Appendix R emergency light condition reports involved battery replacement. Of the 13 condition reports, three of those reports led to replacement of the battery charging circuit boards. The licensee provided the emergency lighting vendor manual to the inspectors, which describes proper operation of the emergency lights. The emergency lights have three charging modes: a fast-charging mode, an equalizing mode, and a trickle charging mode. During normal operation the charger may enter fast charging, equalize, and then return to trickle charging. Inspectors noted emergency lights are frequently in fast charging. Per the vendor manual, an emergency light that stays in fast charging mode could indicate issues with the battery or the battery charging circuitry. No findings or violations were identified.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On January 12, 2026, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Brad Kapellas, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-GGN-YYYY-
NNNN
25-04426, 2025-04628, 2025-04636
Procedures
04-1-01-P44-1
Plant Service Water
21
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-GGN-YYYY-
NNNN
22-10282, 2022-11300, 2023-00609, 2023-01333,
23-02400, 2025-04388, 2025-04390
Procedures
04-1-01-C41-1
29
Procedures
04-1-01-C71-1
Procedures
Work Orders
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-GGN-YYYY-
NNNN
25-04515, 2025-04516, 2025-04517
Fire Plans
1A101, 1A117 Elevation 93 ft, Below Grating
Fire Plans
Area 10-8 Elevation 139
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-GGN-YYYY-
NNNN
25-04230
Procedures
05-1-02-II-2
Offgas Activity High
Procedures
05-1-02-III-3
Reduction in Recirc System Flow
2
Procedures
05-1-02-V-5
Loss of Feedwater Heating
24
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-GGN-YYYY-
NNNN
20-01280, 2021-02695, 2021-02816, 2021-03570,
21-04228, 2022-09293, 2022-09297, 2022-09584,
22-10628, 2022-10687, 2022-10737, 2022-10841,
23-00138, 2023-00144, 2023-00268, 2023-00296,
23-00367, 2023-00553, 2023-01675, 2023-14972,
23-14973, 2023-16457, 2024-00720, 2024-01120,
24-01129, 2024-01673, 2024-02279, 2024-02370,
24-03372, 2024-04017, 2024-04660, 2025-01874,
25-01901, 2025-03254, 2025-03568, 2025-03705,
25-04344
Procedures
Environmental Qualification (EQ) Program
Work Orders
WO 00591202, 00585989, 54193521, 54332796, 54146556
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
EN-FAP-OM-029
Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) Fluid System Leakage from
High Pressure Control Valve Actuators, Attachment "EHC
Fluid System Leakage"
Rev 5,
Work Orders
WO 54100951, 54136027
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-GGN-YYYY-
NNNN
25-04290, 2025-04324, 2025-04341
Work Orders
WO 296834, 54325885
Procedures
EN-FAP-OU-100
Refueling Outage Preparation and Milestones
Procedures
06-OP-1P75-0-
0001-1
Standby Diesel Generator II: Functional Test
100
Work Orders
WO 2903616, 53002620, 53002621, 54067228, 54081391,
202675, 54300179
Work Orders
WO 285404, 54337536, 54305768, 54281340, 54316455
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-GGN-YYYY-
NNNN
25-03396, 2025-03402, 2025-03445, 2025-03862,
25-03878, 2025-03972, 2025-04235, 2025-04624,
25-04644, 2025-04667, 2025-04672, 2025-04813,
25-05251