ML20070N066

Table 2 to Tech Spec Change Request 105,inadvertently Omitted from

ML20070N066
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	01/20/1983
From:	FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20070N034	List: ML20070N030 ML20070N066
References
TAC-49356, NUDOCS 8301250413
Download: ML20070N066 (25)

Text

..

TABLE 1 EVALUATION

SUMMARY

TESTABLE POTENTIAL TEST GROUP W/O MODIFICATIONS ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES 5,6,14 HPI 1 5, 6, 14 HPI2 HPI3 Y

None LPI 1 Y

8 LPI2 Y

None I

RBC1 N

1, 2, 4, 9 RBC 2 N

1,2,7,4,12,11, RBC 3 N

1, 7, 11 RBC 4 N

1,2,4,7,12,13,14 RBC5 N

2,3,4,7,10,12 If methodology can be developed to prevent closure of MUV-64 these groups can be tested without modifications.

1 (1)

Interruption of Cooling Flow to Reactor Coolant Pumps.

(2)

Interruption of Seal Injection Flow to Reactor Coolant Pumps, Motors and Seals.

(3)

Interruption of Cooling Flow to Control Rod Drive Motors.

(4)

Thermal Cycling of Primary Heat Exchanges (Letdown, Bleed Tank, etc.).

l (5)

Loss of Suction to running Makeup /High Pressure Injection pump.

(6)

Thermal cycling of makeup /high pressure injection nozzles if inadvertently aligned with Borated Water Storage Tank.

(7)

Loss of cooling to Reactor Vessel cavity - potential adverse effects on Nuclear Instrumentation (RPS Input).

(8)

Potential overpressurization of low pressure piping (WASH 1400 Event V Scenerio).

(9)

Loss of Cooling Flow to miscellaneous plant equipment (evaporators, waste gas compressors, seal return coolers, etc.).

(10)

Isolation of RM-A6 (RCS leakage detection primary sensor).

(11)

Cross connection of Industrial Cooling and Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Water systems.

(12)

Reduction of Reactor Building cooling capacity.

(13)

Isolate Reactor Building Vent header.

(14)

Interruption of normal Reactor Coolant makeup flow.

8301250413 830120 PDR ADOCK 05000302 P

PDR

Page 1 cf 23 TABLE 2 ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF ES TESTING ON PLANT OPERATIONS DESCRIPTION OF TEST ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ES LEVEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE G R OIIP TAC NO_

IWSCRIPTION FIINCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

HPI-1(A)

MUV-53 MUP minimum flow Permits recirculation Closed M

Stops minimum flow recirculation valve of MUP discharge recirculation causing normal back to MUT duty MUP to overheat if valve fails closed.

HPI-1(A)

MUV-23 HPI line Isolation Permits HPI flow Open H

Each valve stroke causes valve to RCS cold leg potential thermal and mechanical shock to associated HPI nozzle and thermal sleeve.

HPI-1(A)

MUV-24 HPI line Isolatio, Permits HPI flow Open H

Each valve stroke causes salve to RCS cold leg potential thermal and mechanical shock to associated HPI nozzle and thermal sleeve.

HPI-1(A)

MUV-73 BWST suction valve Aligns HPI pump 1 A(IB)

Open M

Testing during Reactor operations to MUP-1A(IB) to take suction from causes potential thermal shock to BWST normal makeup nozzle and reactor coolant pump seal packages.

HPI-1(A)

M UV-64 MUT suction valve Aligns the makeup Closed H

If valve fails shut during test, HPI-1(B) to MUP-1 A(IB, IC)

(HPI) pumps to take all operating makeup (HPI)

HPI-2(A) suction from the pumps would be destroyed in HPI-2(B)

MUT a matter of seconds.

HPI-1(A)

EFP-1 Motor driven emergency Causes EFP-1 to be Tripped L

Motor driven emergency feed trip feed pump trip tripped so it can be pump is unavailable for automatic signal signal subsequently restarted start until test signal is on the emergency diesel reset generator 5 seconds after block 4.

Page 2 cf 23 DESCRIPTION OF TEST ACTUATED EQUlFMENT ES LEVEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE cn OIIP tac Nn_

nFSCHIPTION 1:llNCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

HPI-1(B)

MUV-257 MUP minimum flow Fermits recirculation Closed M

Stops minimum flow recirculation recirculation valve of MUP discharge causing normal duty MUP to i

back to MUT overheat if valve fails closed.

HPI-1(B)

MUV-25 HPI line isolation Permits HPI flow to Open H

Each valve stroke causes valve RCS cold leg potential thermal and mechanical shock to associated HPI nozzle and thermal sleeve.

HPI-1(B)

MUV-26 HPI line isolatio.

Permits HPl flow to Open H

Each valve stroke causes valve.

RCS cold leg potential thermal and mechanical shock to associated HPl nozzle and thermal sleeve.

HPI-1(B)

MUV-53 BWST suction valve Aligns HPI pump IC(IB)

Open M

Testing during reactor operation to MUP-lC(IB) to take suction from causes potential thermal shock to BWST normal makeup nozzle and reactcc coolant pump seal packages.

HPI-2(A)

EDG-A Emergency Diesel Starts diesel generator Running L

Test starts in addition to required Start Generator in anticipation of loss testing on diesels should be of voltage to ES buses minimized to reduce bearing wear.

HPI-2(A)

DHP-1A Decay heat removal Pump is started on HP1 Running L

Frequent test starts on these pump / low pressure signal in anticipation pumps should be avoided to reduce injection pump of a large break LOCA excessive wear. Pump must be requiring low pressure placed in a recirculation lineup for injection this test and is therefore unavailablG for ES operation.

Page 3 cf 23 3

DESCRIPTION OF TEST ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ES LEVEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE GROIIP TAG NO.

DESCRIPTION FIINCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

HPI-2(A)

UVLO 480 Volt ES-A If an undervoltage Tripped or L

Spurious actuation during testing bus undervoltage condition exists or reset depending could cause loads to be stripped lockout EDG-B on whether or from 480 volt ES-A bus. The output breaker not a bus following are examples of loads la closed and an undervoltage affected: spent fuel cooling pump, ES signal is present, condition BWST heaters, chilled water pump, this UVLO device exists or EDG-A 480 volt ES bus tie breaker, control strips non-essential output breaker is complex water chiller, control loads from the 480 closed.

complex fans.

volt ES-A bus.

HPI-2(A)

AHF-1 A Reactor Building ES signal stops the Off L

If fan cannot be restarted in fast (Fast normal and fan if running in fast speed following test, STS 3.6.1.5 Off) emergency cooling speed in anticipation and 3.6.2.3 will force a plant fan of restarting it in shutdown. RB air temperature may slow speed exceed allowable limits.

HPI-2(A)

AHF-1C Reactor Building ES signal stops the Off L

If fan cannot be restarted in fast HPI-2(B)

(Fast normal and fan if running in fast speed following test, STS 3.6.1.5 Off) emergency cooling speed in anticipation and 3.6.2.3 will force a plant fan of restarting it in shutdown. RB air temperature may slow speed exceed allowable limits.

HPI-2(A)

MUP-1 A High Pressure ES Signal starts pump Running H

Pump start causes flow shock to injection pump to initiate HPI flow RCP seals and MU nozzle.

If BWST used for suction supply, thermal shock to HPI nozzle and RCP seals is possible.

If MUT used for suctions, loss of suction is possible since MUV-64 is tested by the same group. Loss of suction will destroy pump in a matter of seconds.

Page 4 cf 23 DESCRIPTION OF TEST ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ES LEVEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE GROIIP TAG NO_

nFSCRIPTION F11NCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

HPI-3(A)

RWP-2A Emergency Nuclear ES signal starts Running L

Services SWP pump to initiate sea water side flow through the Nuclear Services heat exchangers HPI-3(A)

RWP-3A Decay heat service ES signal starts pump Running L

sea water pump to initiate sea water side flow through the decay heat exchanger HPI-3(A)

DCP-1 A Decay heat closed ES signal starts pump Running L

cycle cooling pump to initiate fresh water side flow through the decay heat exchanger HPI-3(A)

SWP-1 A Nuclear Services ES signal starts pump Running L

The large number of essential closed cycle cooling to initiate fresh water heat exchangers served pump side flow through the may be subjected to excessive Nuclear Services heat mechanical flow induced transients exchangers due to frequent testing.

Page 5 cf 23 DESCRIPTION OF TEST ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ES LEVEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE G R OtIP TAG NO_

nFSCRIPTION FIINCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

HPI-3(A)

AHF-15A Fan cooler unit for Provides forced air Running None DCP-1 A cooling to tr.e motor of DCP-1 A HPI-3(A)

AHF-1 A Reactor Building ES signal, restarts Running L

If test not properly conducted, normal and emergency fan in slow speed both fast and slow windings could duty cooling fan af ter stopping it, if be energized, if fan cannot be it is running in fast restarted in fast speed following the test STS 3.6.1.5 and 3.6.2.3 will force a plant shutdown. RB temperature may exceed allowable limits.

HPI-3(A)

AHF-lC Reactor Building ES signal restarts Running L

If test not properly conducted, HPI-3(B)

(slow normal and emergency fan in slow speed both fast and slow windings on) duty cooling fan af ter stopping it, if could be energized, if fan cannot it is running in fast be restarted in fast speed following the test, STS 3.6.1.5 and 3.6.2.3 will-force a plant shutdown. RB temperature may exceed allowable limits.

HPI-3(B)

RWP-2B Emergency Nuclear ES signal starts Running L

Services sea water pump to initiate pump sea water flow through the Nuclear Services heat exchangers s

HPI-3(B)

RWP-3B Decay heat service ES signal starts pump Running L

sea water pump to initiate sea water side flow through the decay heat exchanger

Page 6 cf 23 DESCRIPTION OF TEST ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ES LEVEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE GROIIP TAG NO_

IWSCRIPTION FilNCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

HPI-3(B)

DCP-1B Decay heat closed ES signal starts pump Running L

cycle cooling pump to initiate fresh water side flow through the decay heat exchanger HPI-3(B)

SWP-1B Nuclear Services ES signal starts pump Running L

The large number of essential closed cycle cooling to initiate fresh water heat exchangers served may be pump side flow through the subjected to excessive mechanical /

Nuclear Services heat flow induced transients due to exchangers frequent testing.

HPI-3(B)

AHF-15B Fan cooler unit for Provides forced air Running None DCP-1A cooling to the motor of DCP-1B HPI-3(B)

AHF-1B Reactor Building ES signal restarts Running L

If test not properly conducted normal and fan in slow speed both fast and slow windings could emergency duty after stopping it if it be energized. If fan cannot be cooling fan is running in fast restarted in fast speed following the test, STS 3.6.1.5 and 3.6.2.3 will force a plant shutdown, RB temperature may exceed allowable limits.

Page 7 cf 23 DESCRIPTION OF TEST ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ES LEVEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE GROIIP TAC NO_

nFSCRIPTION FilNCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

LPI-1(A)

DHV-5 Low Pressure LPI signal opens valve Open L

If downstream check valves leak injection valve to permit LPI flow to back, there is some potential for the RCS overpressurizing DH system or lif ting a relief valve. (Wash - 1400, Event V)

LPI-1(A)

DHV-34 BWST suction to LPI signal opens valve Open None LPI pump to permit LPI pump to take suction from DWST LPI-2(A)

DHV-6 Low pressure LPI signal opens valve Open L

If downstream check valves leak injection valve to permit LPI flow to back, there is some potential for the RCS overpressurizing DH system or lif ting a relief valve. (Wash - 1400, Event V)

LPI-2(A)

DHV-35 BWST suction to LPI signal opens valve Open None LPI pump to permit LPI pump to take suction from BWST

Page 8 ef 23 DESCRIPTION OF TEST ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ES LEVEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE G R OllP TAG Nn_

nFSCRIPTION FIINCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

RBC-1(A)

BSV-3 BSP-1 A discharge Permits flow of Open/ Throttled M

Opening this valve routinely could Isolation / control valve building spray to increase the admittance of highly the containment borated water to the RB spray and prevents dump header piping which will enhance /

runout by centrolling promote stress corrosion in the flow at approximately associated piping under stagnant 1500 gpm conditions.

RBC-1(A)

MUV-260 RCP-lC seal return Permits seal return Closed H

If valve fails shut during test, Isolation valve flow from the RCP pressure across all 3 stages of the seal package to the the seal will equalize thereby makeup system.

placing full system pressure across the last seal stage. Operation under these conditions produces a high probability of catastrophic seal failure.

RBC-1(A)

SWV-82 RCP-lC cooling water Provides cooling water Closed H

If valve fails closed during test, RBC-1(B) supply isolation flow io the RCP motor RCP failure will result in 5 minutes and seal package from overheating.

RBC-1(A)

SWV-86 RCP-lC cooling water Provides cooling water Closed H

If valve fails closed during test, RBC-1(B) return isolation flow from the RCP motor RCP failure will result in 5 minutes and seal package from overheating.

RBC-1(A)

SWV-12 Supply header isolation Provides cooling water Closed L

RBC-1(B) to Auxiliary equipment flow to seat return cooling water coolers, RC/ miscellaneous waste evaporator and waste gas compressors.

RBC-1(A)

CAV-1 Pressurizer steam Permits primary sample Closed L

If valve fails closed, one primary sample isolation valve to be drawn from the sample means will be terminated.

pressurized steam space.

2 Page 9 ci 23 DESCRIPTION OF TEST ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ES LEVEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE C R OllP TAG NO_

nFSCRIPTION F11NCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

RBC-1(A)

CFV-Il CFT-1 A sample Permits a sample to be Closed L

If valve fa:Is during test, will isolation valve drawn from CFT-1 A be unable to sample CFT.

RBC-1(A)

WDV-3 RB sump pump Aligns the RB sump to Closed None discharge isolation be pumped to MWST valve i

RBC-1(A)

MUV-40 MUHE-1A outlet Provides RCS water flow Closed H

Experience has shown that cycling isolation valve from the letdown cooler this valve at power subjects the to the purification associated cooler to thermal system.

transients which may result in tube failure / cooler damage, hence a primary to secondary cooling system (SW) leak will occur.

RBC-1(A)

CFV-25 Makeup isolation Provides a means to add Closed None RBC-1(B) valve to CFT-1 A primary grade water to the CFT to makeup for leakage.

RBC-1(B)

BSV-4 BSP-1B discharge Permits flow of building Open/ Throttled M

Opening this valve routinely could isolation / control spray to the contain-increase the admittance of highly valve ment and prevents pump borated water to the RB spray runout by controlling header piping which will enchance/

flow at approximately promote stress corrosion in the 1500 gpin.

associated piping under stagnant conditions.

RBC-1(B)

CFV-29 Combined CFT vent Provides" a vent path for Closed L.

If valve fails during test, isolation to Waste the CFT's to waste gas

. will be unable to vent or Gas depressurize CFT's.

Pag 210 cf 23

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DESCRIPTION OF TEST ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ES LEVEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE G R OllP TAG NO.

DESCRIPTION FIINCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

RBC-1(B)

WDV-4 RB sump pump Aligns the RB sump to Closed L

Inability to pump down the sump discharge isolation be pumped to MWST as a result of valve failure valve does not present a significant safety concern during power operation.

RBC-1(B)

CAV-2 RCS Combined Sample Permits a primary Closed L

Failure of this valve during test isolation valve sample to be taken will prevent sampling of the RCS.

from the RCS.

However, this does not present a significant safety concern while on line. Prolonged inability to sample (724 hrs) will result in the in ability to meet tech spec sampling requirements.

RBC-1(B)

MUV-49 Letdown isolation Provides a means of Closed H

Experience has shown that closure valve letting down primary of this valve at power subjects the coolant to the purifier the letdown coolers to thermal transients which may result in tube failure / cooler damage, hence a primary to secondary cooling system (SW) leak will occur.

RBC-2(A)

BSV-12 BSP-1 A suction from Align the BSP suction to Open None These valves are no longer required sodium thiosulphate the sodium thiosulfate to operate since sodium thiosulfate tank tank for injection into is no longer used for accident the RCS under accident mitigation at this site. These conditions.

valves should be removed from ESFAS.

RBC-2(A)

MUV-261 RCP-10 seal return Permits seal return flow Closed H

If valve fails shut during test, isolation valve.

from the RCP seal pressure will equalize across all package to the makeup seal stages thereby placing full system.

system pressure across the last seal stage. Operation under these conditions produces a very high probability of catastrophic seal failure.

Page 11 cf 23 DESCRIPTION OF TEST ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ES LEVEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE GROIIP TAC NO_

nFSCRIPTION FIINCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

RBC-2(A)

CIV-34 Industrial cooling Containment isolation Closed M

Reactor cavity cooling units are pump 3A supply to valve. Supplies cooling required during power operation to reactor cavity water to reactor cavity maintain a suitable environment cooler.

cooling Unit A.

for operation of excore neutron detectors. Failure of cooling water to these units can result in failed excore detectors.

RBC-2(A)

SWV-353 Nuclear Services ES signal causes RB Open None RBC-2(B) cooling water supply cooling fans / coolers to RB cooling to swap over from CI fans.

to SW cooling. This valve supplies SW to the RB coolers.

RBC-2(A)

SWV-81 RCP-ID cooling Provides cooling water Closed H

If valve fails closed during test, RBC-2(B) water supply.

flow to the RCP motor RCP failure will result in 5 minutes and seal package.

from overheating.

RBC-2(A)

SWV-85 RCP-ID cooling Provides cooling water Closed H

If valve fails closed during test, RBC-2(B) water return flow from the RCP motor RCP failure will result in 5 minutes and seal package.

from overheating.

RBC-2(A)

CAV-3 Pressurizer water Permits primary sample Closed L

If valve fails closed during test, space sample to be drawn from the one primary sample means will be isolation valve pressurizer water space.

terminated.

RBC-2(A)

CFV-12 CFT-1B sample Permits a sample to be Closed L

If valve fails during test, will be.

isolation valve drawn from CFT-1B unable to sample CFT.

...)

Page 12 6123 DESCRIPTION OF TEST ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ES LEVEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE GROUP TAC NO.

DESCRIPTION FUNCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

RBC-2(A)

WDV-60 RCDT discharge to Provides a flow path Closed M

If this valve fails closed during MWST.

to pump down the test, no means will be lef t to RCDT to MWST remove water from RCDT. Operation under these conditions at power for prolonged periods may result in overfilling the tank with RCS leakage and eventually over--

pressurizing the RCDT, hence rupturing the blowout disk.

RBC-2(A)

MUV-41 Letdown cooler IB Provides RCS flow Closed H

Experience has shown that cycling outlet isolation valve from the letdown this valve at power subjects the cooler to the associated cooler to thermal purification system.

transients which may result in tube failure / cooler damage, hence a primary to secondary cooling system (SW) leak will occur.

RBC-2(A)

DWV-160 Demineralized water Provides flushing water Closed L

If valve fails closed, RB activity RBC-2(B) to the RB to RCP seal standpipes will increase due to seal package and serves as fill leakage emission to RB source for RCDT.

atmosphere.

RBC-2(A)

CFV-26 Makeup isolation Provides a means to add Closed None RBC-2(B) valve to CFT-1B primary grade water to the CFT to makeup for leakage.

RBC-2(B)

BSV-Il BSP-1B suction from Align the BSP suction Open None This valve is no longer required sodium thiosulphate to the sodium to operate since sodium thiosulfate tank thiosulfate tank for is no longer used for accident mitiga injection to the tion at this site. These valves RCS under should be removed from ESFAS.

accident conditions.

Page 13 ef 23 DESCRIPTION OF TEST ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ES LEVEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE GR OIIP TAG NO.

nFSCRIPTION FIINCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

RBC-2(B)

CFV-42 Combined CFT Provides a means to Closed L

If valve fails during testing, sample isolation draw a sample from the will be unable to sample CFT's.

valve CFT's.

RBC-2(B)

WDV-61 RCDT discharge to Provides a flow path to Closed M

If valve fails closed during test, MWST pump RCDT to the no means will be available to MWST.

remove water from RCDT.

Operations under these conditions at power for prolonged periods may result in overfilling the tank with RCS leakage and eventual over-pressurizing the RCDT, hence rupturing the blowout disk.

RBC-2(B)

CAV-6 OTSG-1 A sample Permits sampling from Closed L

Failure of this valve during test isolation valve.

OTSG-1 A will prevent the OTSG from being sampled. Prolonged inability to sample will result in tech spec non-compliance and potential forced shutdown.

RBC-3(A)

SWV-80 RCP-1 A cooling water Provides cooling Closed H

If valve fails closed during test, RBC-3(B) supply valve.

water flow to the RCP failure will result in 5 minutes RCP motor and seal from overheating.

package.

RBC-3(A)

SWV-84 RCP-1 A cooling water Provides cooling Closed H

If valve fails closed during test, RBC-3(B) return isolation water flow to the RCP failure will result in 5 minutes RCP motor and seal from overheating.

package.

Page 14 cf 23 DESCRIPTION OF TEST ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ES LEVEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE CROIIP TAC NO_

nFSCRIPTION FIINCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

RBC-3(A)

SWV-354 Nuclear Services ES signal causes RB Open None RBC-3(B) cooling water return cooling fans / coolers from RB cooling to swap over from CI to fans SW cooling. This valve returns SW from the RB coolers.

RBC-3(A)

CIV-35 Industrial cooling Containment isolation Closed M

Reactor cavity cooling units are RBC-3(B) water return valve which returns required during reactor operation isolation from cooling water from to maintain a suitable environment reactor cavity cooler reactor cavity cooling for the excore neutron detectors.

Unit A Failure of cooling water to these units can result in failed excore detectors.

RBC-3(A)

BSV-17 Building Spray pump Permits the building Open None suction isolation spray pump (BSP-1 A) to take suction from the DH header.

RBC-3(A)

MSV-130 OTSG drain / blowdown Permits a flow path for Closed L

Valve is normally closed and should RBC-3(B) line isolation OTSG draining or blow-not be opened during reactor valve down to the hotwell or operation for testing. This is a atmosphere drain tank high energy line normally used only for startup and shutdown.

RBC-3(A)

CFV-15 CFT-B vent isolation Provides a vent path for Closed L

If valve fails closed during test, valve CFT-B to waste gas will be unable to vent or depressurize CFT-B. Valve is normally closed and it is considered inappropriate to open to test close feature.

Pag 215 cf 23 DESCRIPTION OF TEST ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ES LEVEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE GROIIP TAG NO.

DESCRIPTION Fi1NCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

RBC-3(A)

WDV-94 RCDT pump discharge Permits RCDT contents Closed L

If valve fails shut, RCDT will isolation to waste to be pumped to liquid fill slowly due to relief valve disposal waste system for leakage /RCP dumpster flow causing processing plant to shut down to prevent overpressurizing RCDT.

RBC-3(A)

CAV-4 OTSG-1 A sample Permits sampling from Closed L

Failure of this valve during test isolation valve OTSG-1 A will prevent the OTSG from being sampled. Prolonged inability to sample will result in a tech spec non-compliance and potential forced shutdown.

RBC-3(A)

AHV-lC RB purge supply Permits a flowpath for Closed L

Excessive testing of valve causes isolation valve outside air supply to seal wear. Valve is normally shut RB during Reactor operation and would be inappropriate to initiate purge (through a release permit) to test closure.

RBC-3(A)

CFV-27 Nitrogen supply Provides a flowpath Closed L

Testing could cause CFT pressure RBC-3(B) isolation to CFT-B for maintaining CFT to exceed specifications. Valve is pressure 600 + 25 psig normally closed and it is con-with nitrogen sidered inappropriate to open to test close feature.

RBC-3(B)

BSV-16 Building spray pump Permits the building Open None suction isolation spray pump (BSP-1B).

to take a suction from the DH header

Paga 16 cf 23

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DESCRIPTION OF TEST ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ES LEVEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE CROIIP TAG NO_

nFSCRIPTION Ft 1NCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

RBC-3(B)

WDV-62 RCDT pump discharge Permits RCDT contents Closed L

If valve fails shut, RCDT will isolation to waste to be pumped to liquid fill slowly due to relief valve disposal waste system for leakage /RCP dumpster flow causing processing plant to shut down to prevent overpressurizing RCDT.

RBC-3(B)

CAV-7 OTSG-1B sample Permits sampling Closed L

Failure of this valve during test isolation valve from OTSG-1B will prevent the OTSG from being sampled. Prolonged inability to sample will result in a tech spec non-compliance and potential '

forced shutdown.

RBC-3(B)

AHV-ID RB purge supply Permits a flowpath Closed L

Excessive testing of valve causes isolation valve for outside air seal wear. Valve is normally shut supply to RB during Reactor operation and would be inappropriate to initiate purge (through a release permit) to test closure.

RBC-4(A)

BSV-36 Sodium hydroxide Valve opens on ES Open L

Improper valve lineup could result storage tank signal to allow sodium in inadvertent sodium hydroxide isolation valve hydroxide to mix with injection to RCS.

Iow pressure injection flow and building spray flow for ph and iodine control.

RBC-4(A)

CIV-41 Industrial cooling Containment isolation Closed M

Reactor cavity cooling units are RBC-4(B) water supply valve valve. Supplies cooling required during reactor operation to reactor cavity water to reactor cavity to maintain suitable environment cooler cooling unit B for operation of excore neutron detector. Failure of cooling water to these units can result in failed excore detectors.

Paga 17 cf 23 DESCRIPTION OF TEST ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ES LEVEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE CROI JP TAG NO_

DESCRIPTION FtINCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

RBC-4(A)

MUV-258 RCP-1 A seal return Permits seal return Closed H

If valve fails shut during test, isolation valve.

flow from the RCP pressure across all three stages seal package to the of the seal will equalize thereby makeup system.

placing full system pressure across the last seal. Operation under these conditions produces a very high probability of catastrophic seal failure.

RBC-4(A)

SWV-151 RB emergency ES signal causes RB Closed H

Closing this valve causes all normal cooling fan CI emergency fan coolers duty RB cooling to be isolated if return isolation to swap over from CI the valve fails closed, STS 3.6.1.5 valve to SW cooling water.

and 3.6.2.3 will force a plant shut-This valve isolates down. RB temp may exceed allow-CI return able limits.

RBC-4(A)

MUV-27 RCS normal makeup ES signal causes valve Closed H

Closing this valve isolates the RBC-4(B) isolation valve to close to assure full pressurizer level control valve HPI flow / balanced flow and the 15 gpm minimum flow to the -

to HPI nozzles makeup /HPI nozzle thermal sleeve, each open/ closed cycle for testing is a thermal and mechanical shock on this nozzle.

RBC-4(A)

SWV-47 SW cooling water Isolates cooling water Closed H

Closing and opening valve for RBC-4(B) supply valve to to letdown cooler which testing during Reactor operation letdown cooler is non-essential equip-causes thermal and mechanical shock ment during ES actuation to letdown cooler. Leaks were found in both coolers during Cycle 4 and cycling of these valves during Reactor operation may have contributed to the failure.

Pagn 18 cf 23 DESCRIPTION OF TEST ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ES LEVEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE G R OffP TAG NO.

nINCRIPTION FIINCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

RBC-4(A)

SWV-152 RB emergency cooling ES signal causes Closed H

Closing this valve causes all RBC-5(B) fan CI supply RB emergency fan normal duty RB cooling to be isolation valve coolers to swap over isolated. If the valve fails from CI to SW cooling closed, STS 3.6.1.5 and 3.6.2 will water. This valve force a plant shutdown. RB temp isolates Cl supply may exceed allowable limits.

RBC-4(A)

SWV-50 SW cooling water Isolates cooling water Closed H

Closing and opening valve for RBC-4(B) return valve from return from letdown testing during Reactor operation letdown cooler cooler which is non-causes thermal and mechanical essential equipment shock to letdown coolers. Leaks during ES actuation were found in both coolers during Cycle 4 and cycling of these valves during Reactor operation may have contributed to the failure.

RBC-4(A)

SWV-79 RCP-1B cooling Provides cooling Closed H

If valve fails closed during test, RBC-4(B) water supply valve water flow to the RCP failure will result in 5 minutes RCP motor and seal from overheating package RBC-4(A)

SWV-83 RCP-1B cooling Provides cooling Closed H

If valve fails closed during test, RBC-4(B) water return water flow to the RCP will fall in 5 minutes from isolation RCP motor and seal overheating package RBC-4(A)

CAV-5 OTSG-1B sample Permits sampling Closed L

Failure of this valve during test isolation valve from OTSG-1B will prevent the OTSG from being sampled. Prolonged inability to sample will result in a tech spec non-compliance and potential forced shutdown.

I

l Pag 219 cf 23 DESCRIPTION OF j

TEST ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ES LF. VEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE C R OIIP TAC NO_

IWSCRIPTION FIINCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

RBC-4(A)

AHV-1B RB purge exhaust Permits RB ventilation Closed L

Excessive testing of valve causes isolation valve purge exhaust to seal wear. Valve is normally Auxiliary building vent closed during Reactor operation and would be inappropriate to i

initiate purge (through release permit) to test closure.

J l

RBC-4(A)

CFV-23 Nitrogen supply Provides flowpath for Closed L

Testing could cause CFT pressure to l

RBC-4(B) isolation to CFT-A maintaining CFT exceed specifications. Valve is pressure 600 + 25 psig normally closed and seems inappro-with nitrogen priate to open to test close feature.

RBC-4(A)

CFV-16 CFT-A vent Provides a vent path Closed L

If valve fails closed during test, isolation valve for CFT-A to waste gas will be unable to vent or depressurize CFT-A. Valve is l

normally closed and it is considered inappropriate to open l

to test close feature.

i l

j RBC-4(A)

WDV-406 RB vent header Provides a flow path Closed L

Failure of valve in closed isolation to waste to vent various position could result in gaseous gas components located release inside RB or potential inside the RB to the (long term) rupture of RCDT waste gas system rupture disk.

l RBC-4(A)

MSV-143 OTSG drain / blowdown Permits a flow path Closed L

Valve is normally closed and RBC-4(B) line isolation valve for OTSG draining should not be opened for testing l

or blowdown to the during reactor operation. This is hotwell or atmospheric a high energy line normally used drain tank only for startup and shutdown.

1

Pago 20 cf 23 DESCRIPTION OF TEST ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ES LEVEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE GROUP TAG NO.

nFSCRIPTION FtINCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

RBC-4(B)

BSV-37 Sodium hydroxide Valve opens on ES signal Open L

Improper valve lineup could result storage tank to allow sodium in inadvertent sodium hydroxide ise'ation valve hydroxide to mix with injection to RCS.

low pressure injection flow and building spray flow for ph and iodine control RBC-4(B)

SWV-355 RB emergency ES signal causes RB Closed H

Closing this valve causes all cooling fan C1 emergency fan coolers normal duty RB cooling to be return isolation to swap over from CI to isolated. If the valve fails valve SW cooling water.

closed, STS 3.6.1.5 and 3.6.2.3 This valve isolates will force a plant shutdown. RB CI return.

temperature may exceed allowable limits.

RBC-4(B)

AHV-1 A RB purge exhaust Permits RB ventilation Closed L

Excessive testing of valve causes isolation valve purge exhaust to seal wear. Valve is normally Auxiliary building vent closed during Reactor operation and would be inappropriate to initiate purge (through release permit) just to test closure.

RBC-4(B)

WDV-405 RB vent header Provides a flow path to Closed L

Failure of valve in closed position isolation to waste vent various components could result in gaseous release gas located inside the RB inside the RB or potential (long to the waste gas term) failure of the RCDT rupture system disk.

RBC-5(A)

WSV-3 RB Atmosphere sample Provides a flow path to Closed L

Failure closed could cause RMA-6 supply isolation to sample reactor building sample pump to overheat. Failure RMA-6 atmosphere for RCS leak closed would also put plant into detecti,n an immediate shutdown (6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to hot standby) per STS 3.4.6.1.

=.

Page 2! cf 23 DESCRIPTION OF TEST ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ES LEVEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE GROI JP TAG NO.

DESCRIPTION FtJNCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

RBC-5(A)

MUV-259 RCP-1B seal return Permits seal return Closed H

If valve fails shut during test, isolation valve flow from the RCP pressure across all 3 stages of seal package to the the seal will equalize thereby makeup system placing full system pressure across last stage seal. Operation under these conditions produces a high probability of catastrophic seal failure.

RBC-5(A)

CIV-40 Industrial cooling Containment isolation Closed M

Reactor cavity cooling units are RBC-5(B) water return isolation valve which returns required during reactor operation from reactor cavity cooling water from to maintain a suitable environ-cooler reactor cavity cooling ment for the excore neutron Unit B detectors. Failure of cooling water to these units can result in failed excore detectors.

RBC-5(A)

WSV-5 RB atmosphere sample Provides a flowpath Closed L

Failure closed could cause RMA-6 return from RMA-6 to return reactor sample pump to overheat. Failure building atmospheric closed would also require plant samples to the RB to shut down (6 hrs to hot standby)

STS 3.4.6.1.

RBC-5(A) 3ESAR ES Actuation Relay Places control room Recirculation L

Operators must manually start ventilation into emergency control room vent fans.

emergency operation Failure to start these fans mode on receipt of could cause equipment to an ES signal overheat.

RBC-5(A)

SWV-48 SW cooling water Isolates cooling Closed H

Closing and opening valve during RBC-5(B) supply valve to water to letdown Reactor operation causes thermal letdown cooler cooler which is non-and mechanical shock to letdown essential equipment coolers. Leaks were found in both during ES actuation coolers during Cycle 4 and cycling of these valves during reactor operation may have been a contributor.

Paga 22 cf 23 DESCRIPTION OF TEST ACTUATED EQUIPME"iT ES LEVEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE GROUP TAG NO_

nFSCRIPTION FIINCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

RBC-5(A)

SWV-109 SW cooling water Provides flowpath Closed H

Failure closed isolates cooling to RBC-5(B) supply isolation for SW cooling to all control rod drives. Prolonged to control rod control rod drives failure requires a reactor trip, drives increasing the potential for an additional transient.

RBC-5(A)

SWV-Il0 SW cooling water Provides flowpath Closed H

Failure closed isolates cooling to RBC-5(B) return isolation to return cooling all control rod drives. Prolonged from control rod water from control failure requires a reactor trip, drives rod drives increasing the potential for an additional transient.

RBC-5(A)

SWV-49 SW cooling water Isolates cooling Closed H

Closing and opening valve for RBC-5(B) return valve from water return from testing during reactor operation letdown cooler letdown cooler which causes thermal and mechanical is non-essential shock to letdown coolers. Leaks equipment during ES were found in both coolers during actuation Cycle 4 and stroking of these valves during reactor operation may have been a contributor.

RBC-5(A)

LAV-126 RCS letdown sample Permits primary sample Closed L

If valve fails closed during test, isolation to be drawn from one primary sample means will be letdown line terminated.

RBC-5(B)

WSV-4 RB atmosphere sample Provides a flowpath Closed L

Failure closed could cause RMA-6 supply isolation to to sample R6 sample pump to overheat. Failure R MA-f>

atmosphere closed would also put plant into for RCS leak detection action statement of STS 3.4.6.1 requiring hot standby in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Page 23 c.f 23 DESCRIPTION OF TEST ACTUATED EQUIPMENT ES LEVEL POTENTIAL ADVERSE GROIIP TAG NO_

nFSCRIPTION FilNCTION CONDITION OF RISK (1) CONSEQUENCE (2)

RBC-5(B)

MUV-253 Combined seal return Permits seal return Closed H

Of the seal return isolation valves, isolation valve for flow from all four this valve has the most significant all four RCP's RCP's to the impact if it fails closed since it makeup system it affects seal return flow for all four RCP's simultaneously.

If valve fails closed, pressure across all three seal stages will equalize with the RCS placing full system pressure on the last stage. Staging and unstaging of the seals in this fashion results in a high probability of seal failure.

RBC-5(B)

WSV-6 RB atmosphere sample Provides a flowpath Closed L

Failure closed could cause RMA return from RMA-6 to return reactor sample pump to overheat. Failure building atmospheric closed would also require plant to samples to the RB to shut down (6 hrs. to hot standby) per STS 3.4.6.1.

RBC-5(B) 3ESAR ES actuation Places control room Recirculation L

Operators must manually start relay ventilation into emergency control room vent fans.

emergency operating Failure to start these fans could mode on receipt of an cause equipment to overheat.

ES signal.

(1)

This column represents the subjective judgement of appropriate staff as to whether the seriousness and/or probability of the identified consequences are high, moderate or low (H, M, or L).

(2)

This does not include wear associated with a high frequency of testing to meet tech spec, ASME XI, or other testing requirements.

~

ACRONYMS USED IN TABLE 2 AHF Air Handling Fan AHV Air Handling Valve BSP Building Spray Pump BSV Building Spray Valve BWST -

Borated Water Storage Tank CAV Chemical Addition Valve CFT Core Flood Tank CFV Core Flood Valve CI Industrial Cooler Water CIV Industrial Cooler Water Valve DCP Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Pump DH Decay Heat DHP Decay Heat Pump DHV Decay Heat Valve DWV Demineralized Water Supply Valve EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EFP Emergency Feedwater Pump ES Engineered Safeguards HPI High Pressure Injection LOCA -

Loss of Coolant Accident LPI Low Pressure Injection MSV Main Steam Valve MUHE -

Makeup Heat Exchanger MUP Makeup Tank MUV Makeup Valve MWST -

Miscellaneous Waste Storage Tank OTSG -

Once Through Steam Generator RB Reactor Building RBC Reactor Building Isolation & Cooling RCDT -

Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Reactor Coolant Pump RCP RCS Reactor Coolant System RWP Nuclear Service to Decay Heat Sea Water Pump SW Nuclear Service Closed Cycle Cooling SWP Nuclear Service Closed Cycle Cooling Pump SWV Nuclear Service Closed Cycle Cooling Valve UVLO -

Under Voltage Lockout WDV Waster Disposal Valve WSV Containment Monitoring Valve