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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:INITIAL SUBMITTAL
{{#Wiki_filter:INITIAL SUBMITTAL  
      HARRIS EXAM
HARRIS EXAM  
    50-400/2004-301
50-400/2004-301  
              -
FEBRUARY 23 - 27,2004  
  FEBRUARY 23 27,2004
& MARCH 4,2004 (WRITTEN)  
& MARCH 4,2004 (WRITTEN)


    Harris
Harris  
    Draft
Draft  
Operating Exam
Operating Exam  
    2004
2004  


    Harris
Harris  
    Draft
Draft  
  Scenario 1
Scenario 1  
Operating Exam
Operating Exam  
    2004
2004  


Appendix D                                 Simulator Scenario Outline                           FORM ES-D-I
Appendix D  
  -Facility:     HARRIS               Scenario Number:           t           Op-Test Numher:
Simulator Scenario Outline  
        Examiners                                         Operators
FORM ES-D-I  
  Initial Conditions: IC-32: 26% power MOL; AFW Pump A-SA OOS (CPKr026 RACK OUT); INSERT
-  
                      EVENTS 7,8, and 9 DURING SIMULATOR SETUP. Ensure DFH HOLD button is
Facility:  
                      illuminated. Ensure both Condensate Pumps and one Condensate Booster Pump is in
HARRIS  
                      service. Ensure a Reactivity Plan is provided (NOTE - NEW REACTIVITY PLAN
Scenario Number:  
                      REQUIRED FOR SCENARIO - DELETE TIIIS NOTE W O N COMPLETION
t  
                      OF REACTIVITY PLAN).
Op-Test Numher:  
  Turnover:          The unit is at 26% power at MOL, 8 hours following a reactor startup. The plant tripped
Examiners  
                      approximately 20 hours ago (I2 hours before startup).
Operators  
                    Boron concentration is 1166 ppm. Bark D rods are at 108 steps.
Initial Conditions: IC-32: 26% power MOL; AFW Pump A-SA OOS (CPKr026 RACK OUT); INSERT  
                    AFW Pump 'A' was taken out of service 2 hours ago for oil replacement due to
EVENTS 7,8, and 9 DURING SIMULATOR SETUP. Ensure DFH HOLD button is  
                    contaminants and is expected to be returned to service within the next 2 hours. 'Technical
illuminated. Ensure both Condensate Pumps and one Condensate Booster Pump is in  
                    Specification 3.7.1.2 has been entered. Risk level is YELLOW.
service. Ensure a Reactivity Plan is provided (NOTE - NEW REACTIVITY PLAN  
                    Shift orders are to place the second Condensate Booster Pump in service and continue the
REQUIRED FOR SCENARIO - DELETE TIIIS NOTE WON COMPLETION  
                    power ramp to 90% power and restore MW Pump 'A' to service when it hecomes
OF REACTIVITY PLAN).  
                    available. GP-005 is being performed per Step 5.0.1 16.
The unit is at 26% power at MOL, 8 hours following a reactor startup. The plant tripped  
                    An Auxiliary Operator is standing by to start the Condensate Booster Pump. All prestart
approximately 20 hours ago (I2 hours before startup).  
                    check
Boron concentration is 1166 ppm. Bark D rods are at 108 steps.  
      I
AFW Pump 'A' was taken out of service 2 hours ago for oil replacement due to  
            I
contaminants and is expected to be returned to service within the next 2 hours. 'Technical  
Page 1 of 25                                         SCENARIO # I                 NUREG-1021,Revision9, Draft
Specification 3.7.1.2 has been entered. Risk level is YELLOW.  
                                                                                        Pout Validation Revision
Shift orders are to place the second Condensate Booster Pump in service and continue the  
power ramp to 90% power and restore MW Pump 'A' to service when it hecomes  
available. GP-005 is being performed per Step 5.0.1 16.  
An Auxiliary Operator is standing by to start the Condensate Booster Pump. All prestart  
Turnover:
check  
I  
I  
Page 1 of 25  
SCENARIO #I  
NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft  
Pout Validation Revision  


                                Event
Event  
                              -T)'pe*
T)'pe*  
                              C (BOP)       al Loss of Condenser Vacuum
C (BOP)  
                              c (SRO)
R (RO) -
                              R (RO)     NOTE: INITIATE THIS EVENT Oh'SAME THGGER AS
c (SRO)  
                                          EVENT4 DUE TO TIME' UNTIL THISEVENTISNOTED BY
M (ALL)
                                          AVAILABLE CUES. THIS E W M T WIL
M (ALL)
                                          SIMULATOR OPERATOR TO ADJUST
C (BOP)
                              M (ALL)
C (SRO)
                              M (ALL)
c (RO)  
                                          NOTE: AVSERT MALFUNCTION DURING IhTTIAL SETUP
C (SRO)
                              C (BOP)    AFW Pump 'B' trip
al Loss of Condenser Vacuum
                              C (SRO)
NOTE: INITIATE THIS EVENT Oh'SAME THGGER AS  
                              c (RO)
EVENT4 DUE TO TIME' UNTIL THISEVENTISNOTED BY  
                              C (SRO)
AVAILABLE CUES. THIS EWMT WIL  
* (N)orinal, (R)eactivity, (Qnstmment, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
SIMULATOR OPERATOR TO ADJUST  
Page 2 of 25                                     SCENARIO # 1           h W G - I 0 2 I , Revision 9, Draf?
NOTE: AVSERT MALFUNCTION DURING IhTTIAL SETUP  
                                                                                Post Validation Revision
AFW Pump 'B' trip  
* (N)orinal, (R)eactivity, (Qnstmment, (C)omponent, (M)ajor  
Page 2 of 25  
SCENARIO # 1  
h W G - I 0 2 I , Revision 9, Draf?  
Post Validation Revision  


Auuendix Il                       Rewired Ooerator Actions                                 FORM E§-I)-2
Auuendix Il  
  SCEKARIO NIJMBEK: I             EVENT NITvlREK:           1       FACILITY:         Harris
Rewired Ooerator Actions  
  EVENT 1 ISCRIPTION:         Place Second Condensate Rooster Pump in service
FORM E§-I)-2  
              CUE Ishw orders directplacing a second Condensate Booster Pump in service
SCEKARIO NIJMBEK: I  
              BOP   Verify Initial Conditions of OP-134, Section 5.6.1
EVENT NITvlREK:  
                      1. One Condcnsate Booster Pump is in service per Section 5.5 of OP-134
1  
                    2. Condensate Booster Pump E I,ock-Out Relay reset
FACILITY:  
                    Reviews CAUTION: To prevent damaging the CBP recirc valves, do not operate
Harris  
                    the second Condensate Booster Pump for more than 1.5 hours wit11 MFP suction
EVENT 1 ISCRIPTION:  
                    flow less than 4500 kpph.
Place Second Condensate Rooster Pump in service  
                    3. Total feedwater flow is greater than 4500 kpph
CUE  
                    4. CPD Ooerator and Cbemistrv have been notified of potential flow and pressure
I shw orders directplacing a second Condensate Booster Pump in service  
                  -
BOP  
                  1 changes in the C o n d e n s a k m .
Verify Initial Conditions of OP-134, Section 5.6.1  
                    Direct AO to perform prestart checks on Condensate Booster Pump B per
1. One Condcnsate Booster Pump is in service per Section 5.5 of OP-134  
            I BOP
2. Condensate Booster Pump E I,ock-Out Relay reset  
                    Attachment 6                                               ___
Reviews CAUTION: To prevent damaging the CBP recirc valves, do not operate  
                  'Verify CONDENSATE BOOSTbR PUMP B RECIRC, ICE-261 in MODU and
the second Condensate Booster Pump for more than 1.5 hours wit11 MFP suction  
  +-        I BOP
flow less than 4500 kpph.  
              BOP
3. Total feedwater flow is greater than 4500 kpph  
                  IReviews CAUTION:       There are no Condensate Booster h n ~ tripsp to protect the
4. CPD Ooerator and Cbemistrv have been notified of potential flow and pressure  
                    Reviews NOTE: Computer points listed in Section 6.0 of this procedure may be
BOP
                    monitored for information.
I
                    Reviews NOTE: When the Condensate Booster Pump controi switch is placed to
-  
                    the START position, the Aux Lube Oil Pump will start and supply the VSF
1 changes in the C o n d e n s a k m .
                    Coupling with oil until oil pressure is greater than or equal to 20 psig, at which
Direct AO to perform prestart checks on Condensate Booster Pump B per  
                    time the Condensate Booster Pump starts.
Attachment 6  
COMMENTS:
'Verify CONDENSATE BOOSTbR PUMP B RECIRC, ICE-261 in MODU and  
Page 3 of 25                               SCENARIO # 1                   NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Dnft
___
                                                                                    Post Validation Revision
I  
BOP  
I Reviews CAUTION: There are no Condensate Booster h n ~
trips to protect the  
+-
BOP
Reviews NOTE: Computer points listed in Section 6.0 of this procedure may be  
monitored for information.  
Reviews NOTE: When the Condensate Booster Pump controi switch is placed to  
the START position, the Aux Lube Oil Pump will start and supply the VSF  
Coupling with oil until oil pressure is greater than or equal to 20 psig, at which  
time the Condensate Booster Pump starts.  
COMMENTS:  
Page 3 of 25  
SCENARIO # 1
NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Dnft  
Post Validation Revision  


  Appendix D                         Required Operator Actions                                 FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
~~
Required Operator Actions  
    SCENARIO NUMBER 1                 EVENT NUMBER:               1         FACILITY:       Harris
FORM ES-D-2  
              ?SCRIPTION:         Plsce Second Condensate Train in service (CQNTINUJ3D)
~~  
              POSKION                      APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR                                       I
SCENARIO NUMBER 1  
                BOP
EVENT NUMBER:  
                BOP
1  
                BOP
FACILITY:  
                        Reviews CAUTION: The amount of time the associated tecirc valve, 1CE-261 is
Harris  
                        open, should be minimized due to lack of lubrication without Condensate I3ooster
?SCRIPTION:  
                        Pump running.                       __
POSKION
                        Place the control switch CONDEXSATE BOOSTER PlJMP 5 RECIRC, 1CE-261
Plsce Second Condensate Train in service (CQNTINUJ3D)  
                        in the OPEN position immediately prior __
BOP
                        ___-                                          to starting Condensate Booster Pump B
BOP
                        Reviews NOTE: Starting the second Condensate Booster Pump may cause the
BOP
                        previously running pump controller to reject to Manual. This is due to the speed
BOP
                                                                                                              -
BOP
                                                                                                                  I
BOP
                        sensor on the pump being started initially providing a speed input signal that is
BOP
                        based on ekctrical noise. If the running CBP controller rejects to manual, it is
BOP
                        permissible to return the controller to Auto once the CBP being started reaches the
APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
                        no-load speed. If the controller again rejects to manual, then further investigation
I  
                        would be required.
- I
                        _      _    I                      .-                        _________
Reviews CAUTION: The amount of time the associated tecirc valve, 1 CE-261 is  
                BOP    Stalt B Condensate Booster
open, should be minimized due to lack of lubrication without Condensate I3ooster  
                        x__                      ___    Pump         ~.                                      -
Pump running.  
                BOP    Directs AO to locally verify Condensate Booster Pump A Aux Lube Oil Punip has
Place the control switch CONDEXSATE BOOSTER PlJMP 5 RECIRC, 1CE-261  
                        stopped                                       -  I _
___-
                BOP    Directs A 0 to check differential pressure across the Pall Replaceable Duplex
in the OPEN position immediately prior __  
                        Filter, as indicated between PI-OILO-2304Bl and PJ-OlLO-2304B2 is less than 15
to starting Condensate Booster Pump B  
                        PSI. IF differential pressure across the Pall Replaceable Duplex Filter is greater
Reviews NOTE: Starting the second Condensate Booster Pump may cause the  
                        than or equal to 15 PSI, then direct A 0 to swap to the idlehut of service filter per
previously running pump controller to reject to Manual. This is due to the speed  
                        _-
sensor on the pump being started initially providing a speed input signal that is  
                        Section 8 . l n h e r w i s e this StQ -
based on ekctrical noise. If the running CBP controller rejects to manual, it is  
                                            I  _    -  _    is NIA)                                          .-
permissible to return the controller to Auto once the CBP being started reaches the  
                BOP    Slowly increase the demand signal on PK-2308, CNDST B U R PUMP B SPEED
no-load speed. If the controller again rejects to manual, then further investigation  
                        Booster Pump Speed Controller  _    I
would be required.  
                                                                    -
Stalt B Condensate Booster Pump  
                        ::ONTKOI,LER to match the demand simal on the areviouslv running Condensate
Directs AO to locally verify Condensate Booster Pump A Aux Lube Oil Punip has  
                        $ice PK-2308, CNDST BSTR PCMP B SPEED CONI'ROLLER to AUTO when
stopped  
                        I
Directs A 0 to check differential pressure across the Pall Replaceable Duplex  
                        he demand signals are matched
Filter, as indicated between PI-OILO-2304Bl and PJ-OlLO-2304B2 is less than 15  
                              -                                                  --
PSI. IF differential pressure across the Pall Replaceable Duplex Filter is greater  
                        Place the control switch for CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP
than or equal to 15 PSI, then direct A 0 to swap to the idlehut of service filter per  
                        !61 in the MODIJ-on
Slowly increase the demand signal on PK-2308, CNDST B U R PUMP B SPEED  
                        l_l___                       _  _    _ _  I    _
::ONTKOI,LER  
                BOP
to match the demand simal on the areviouslv running Condensate  
  COMMENTS:
__
Page 4 of 25                                       SCENARIO # 1                   NUREG-1021,Revision 9, DraA
.-
                                                                                        Post Validation Revision
_________
__I
x__ ___
~.
-
-I_
Section
_-
8 . l n h e r w i s e 
I_-_
this StQ -
is NIA)
.-
-
Booster Pump Speed Controller
_I
$ice PK-2308, CNDST BSTR PCMP B SPEED CONI'ROLLER to AUTO when  
--
he demand signals are matched  
Place the control switch for CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP  
!61 in the MODIJ-on  
I
-
l_l___  
____I_
COMMENTS:  
Page 4 of 25  
SCENARIO # 1  
NUREG-1021, Revision 9, DraA  
Post Validation Revision  


Appendix D                           Required Operator Actions                               FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
  SCENARIO NUMBER: 1                   EVENT NUMBER:             2       FACILITY:       Harris
Required Operator Actions  
  EVENT      3SCRIPTION:         Pressurizer Level high failure
FORM ES-D-2  
    TIME    POSITION                    APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR                                       I
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1  
                SRO          - high failure of controlling- PRZ level control channel, I.T-459
EVENT NUMBER:  
                        Diagnose
2  
                RO       o   1~1-4~9inciicating 100%
FACILITY: Harris  
                        e   PEL? backup heaters all energized
3SCRIPTION:  
                              Charging flow decreasing on FI-122A. 1
Pressurizer Level high failure  
                              PRZ CONT HIGH LEVEL i?EVIATIONAND HEATERS ON (ALB-009-2-
APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
                              1) alarming
I  
                        e     PRESSURIZER HIGH LEVEL (ALE-009-4-1) alarming
Diagnose high failure of controlling PRZ level control channel, I.T-459  
  I _-
EVENT
                        e    PKESSURIZER HIGH LEVEI, ALERT (ALB-009-4-2)     _.         ahrming
TIME
              SRO      Directs taking manual control of charging and increasing flow
I_-
          -                                            I  _              _.
-
                RO      Takes manual control of charging (CS-23 1, FK-122.1 CHARGING FLOW) and
I_-
            -      .- increases
__-
                        __-          -to maintain PRZ level _I--.-_
_._I
                                    flow
POSITION
              SKO      Enters and directs the performance of O W - K p
SRO
                                                  I I ._
RO
                RO      Selects channels 460/461 on PRZ Level Control Selector (may select per ALB-
SRO
                        009-4-1 or - 4 L     I_______                    __-                            __
RO
              SRO      Directs tripping appropriate bistable~
SKO
                        --                                                      .-                        .-
-
                RO      Restores charging (CS-231, FK-122.1 CHARGING FL.OiV) and places in
.-
                        -- if desired
RO
                        automatic,
SRO
              SKO      Kefers to TS 3.3.1 (6 hr), 3.3.3.5.a (7 day) and 3.3.3.6 ( 7 day) for PRZ level
RO  
                        channel failure
SKO
                        l______l___l_
SRO
              SRO      Initiates repairs
-
  I  _    - -         _-                                                         _ _ _ . -
__I-
  __-       _ _  I  -
-
                                                        __             -             _ -_      I     -
-
  _._    I
o  
  COMMENTS:
1~1-4~9inciicating  
Page 5 of25                                     SCENARIO #1                     NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft
100%  
                                                                                      Post Validation Revision
e  
PEL? backup heaters all energized  
Charging flow decreasing on FI-122A. 1  
1) alarming  
e  
PRESSURIZER HIGH LEVEL (ALE-009-4-1) alarming  
e
PKESSURIZER HIGH LEVEI, ALERT (ALB-009-4-2)  
_.  
ahrming  
Directs taking manual control of charging and increasing flow  
Takes manual control of charging (CS-23 1, FK-122.1 CHARGING FLOW) and  
increases flow to maintain PRZ level  
Enters and directs the performance of OW-Kp
Selects channels 460/461 on PRZ Level Control Selector (may select per ALB-  
009-4-1 or -
4
L
Directs tripping appropriate bistable~  
Restores charging (CS-231, FK-122.1 CHARGING FL.OiV) and places in  
automatic, if desired  
Kefers to TS 3.3.1 (6 hr), 3.3.3.5.a (7 day) and 3.3.3.6 ( 7 day) for PRZ level  
channel failure  
Initiates repairs  
PRZ CONT HIGH LEVEL i?EVIATION AND HEATERS ON (ALB-009-2-  
_.
I_
_-.--I_
__--
_
.
I
I
   
__
I_______
__-
.-
.-  
--
--
l______l___l_
___I_.-
_-  
__  
-  
_-
I
_
-
   
COMMENTS:  
Page 5 of25  
SCENARIO #1  
NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


Appendix D                             Required Operator Actions                             FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
  SCENARIO NCJMRER: 1
Required Operator Actions  
      ~~~  ~                          EVENT NUMBER:           3       FACILITY:       Harris
FORM ES-D-2  
  EVENT DESCRIPTION:               SG Level Low Failure
SCENARIO NCJMRER: 1  
I 7'1R4E 1 POSITION       .                APPLICANT'S ACTIONS..OR BEFIAVIOR
EVENT NUMBER:  
            I SRO   IDiagiose low failure of controlling SG 'B' level channel
3  
                              SG B NR LVWSP NL'EO DE\* (ALE-14-2-1B) a i m i n g
FACILITY:  
                        *
Harris  
                    1:
~~~
                    ~
~
                        0
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                              STEAM GEN B LOU' LVI, (ALB-14-54A) alarming
SG Level Low Failure  
                              STEAM GEN B LOW-LOW LEVEL (ALB-14-54B) alarming
APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEFIAVIOR
                              SG 'B' level, LI-486 SB, indicating 0%
..
                    I   *   S(i I3 PW > SI'M FLOW MISMATCH (AL,B-I4-5-1A) alarming
I 7'1R4E 1 POSITION  
                        *   SG 'I%         ' > steam flow
.  
                                      feed flow
I  
                              SG '5'feed reg vdve opening
SRO  
                    I
I Diagiose low failure of controlling SG 'B' level channel  
                              SG 'B' level rising on operable
~ *
                                __                        -    level channels
SG B NR LVWSP NL'EO DE\\* (ALE-14-2-1B) aiming
                                                              SG -      __-
STEAM GEN B LOU' LVI, (ALB-14-54A) alarming  
                        Enter and direct the actions of .4OP-O10, Feedwater Malfunctions                     -
1:
                    l              _                            _                            _                l
STEAM GEN B LOW-LOW LEVEL (ALB-14-54B) alarming  
                        (IkIMEDIATE ACTION) Check any Main Feedwater Pump tripped
0
                                                      ____
SG 'B' level, LI-486 SB, indicating 0%  
lt+%%+iMMEDIATE                          ACTION) Check initial Reactor power less than 90%.
I *  
                        (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check initial Reactor power less than 80%.
S(i I3 PW > SI'M FLOW MISMATCH (AL,B-I4-5-1A) alarming  
                                                                                                              -
*  
              I _  -                                             -_____--
SG 'I%'  
                                                                                                            -
feed flow > steam flow  
                        *     At least one Main Feedwater Pump running
SG '5' feed reg vdve opening  
                              ALL Steam Generator levels greater than 3W/0
SG 'B' level rising on operable SG level channels  
                            ___I
Enter and direct the actions of .4OP-O10, Feedwater Malfunctions  
                                                                                                              -
(IkIMEDIATE ACTION) Check any Main Feedwater Pump tripped  
                          heck Feedwater Regulator Valves NOT operating
I
                                                I                         .~properly
__
                                                                                ~
--__-
                                                                                      in AUTO  and  p e r f o n
-
                        the following:
l___l
                              Place applicable Feedwater Regulator Valve (FK-488) in MANUAL
____  
                              Maintain Steam Generator levels between 52 and 62% (REDUCE EW
l t + % % + i M M E D I A T E 
                        CRITICAL STEP TO PREVENT PLANT TRIP AS A RESULT OF HIGH-
ACTION) Check initial Reactor power less than 90%.  
COMMENTS:
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check initial Reactor power less than 80%.  
Page 6 of25                                       SCENARIO #l                 h
-  
                                                                              "%
I_-  
                                                                                -      1021. Revision 9, Draft
-_____--  
                                                                                    Post Validation Revision
-  
*  
At least one Main Feedwater Pump running  
___I
ALL Steam Generator levels greater than 3W/0  
-  
heck Feedwater Regulator Valves NOT operating properly in AUTO and perfon
I  
.~  
~  
the following:  
Place applicable Feedwater Regulator Valve (FK-488) in MANUAL  
Maintain Steam Generator levels between 52 and 62% (REDUCE EW  
CRITICAL STEP TO PREVENT PLANT TRIP AS A RESULT OF HIGH-  
COMMENTS:  
Page 6 of25  
SCENARIO #l  
h"%-
102 1. Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


  Aumndix D                               Required Operator Actions                             FORM ES-D-2
Aumndix D  
  -
Required Operator Actions  
    SCENARIO MJMBER: 1
FORM ES-D-2  
            ~
-  
                                        EVENT NUMBER:             3       FACILITY       Harris
SCENARIO MJMBER: 1  
    EVENT DESCRIPTION:               SG Level Low Failure (CONTINUED)
EVENT NUMBER:  
  I TIME     POSIIION [
3  
                              __            APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR DEtIAVIOR
FACILITY  
                            Check the following Pump status:
Harris  
                            0   If any Feedwater Train Piinips tripped, go to Step I 1
~
                            NOTE: OXLII FWPUMP IS OPERATING AT THIS TIME
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                            Go to the applicable section:
SG Level Low Failure (CONTINUED)  
                                All CondensateiFeedwater flow malfunctions (other than pump trips) Section
I TIME  
                          Check the following Recirc and Dump Valves operating properly in blOD1J:
POSIIION [  
                            e   Main Feedwater Pumps
APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR DEtIAVIOR  
                                Condensate Booster Pumps
__
                                Condensate Pumps
Check the following Pump status:  
                            e    1CE-293, Condensate Recirc
0  
                          0     ICE-142, Condensate 1 h 1 T o CST Isolation Valve                    -~
NOTE: OXLII FWPUMP IS OPERATING AT THIS TIME  
                          Check the Condensate and Feedwater System intact
Go to the applicable section:  
                          ---                        _I_                                                      -
If any Feedwater Train Piinips tripped, go to Step I 1 
                          Reviews NOTE: Pumps should be stopped in the order of higher to lower
All CondensateiFeedwater flow malfunctions (other than pump trips) Section  
                          pressure. (To stop a Condensate Pump, stop a Main Feedwater Pump followed by a
Check the following Recirc and Dump Valves operating properly in blOD1J:  
                          Condensate Booster Pump and then the Condensate Iuq.)
e  
                          Check pumps for noma1 opemt~on.
Main Feedwater Pumps  
                          ____                            _-              --
Condensate Pumps  
                          Notify Load Dispatcher of any load limitations.
e
I           I   SRO     I Check Reactor thermal power changed by less than 15% in any one hour period
1 CE-293, Condensate Recirc  
                          _.
0  
                          l__l                                                  ______I
Check the Condensate and Feedwater System intact  
                          Refers to TS 3.3.1 (Items 13 and 14) 6 hour requirement to trip bistables
Reviews NOTE: Pumps should be stopped in the order of higher to lower  
                                                                ~
pressure. (To stop a Condensate Pump, stop a Main Feedwater Pump followed by a  
                                                                                                        __
Condensate Booster Pump and then the Condensate Iuq.)  
                          Initiate repairs
Check pumps for noma1 opemt~on.  
  COMMENTS:
Notify Load Dispatcher of any load limitations.  
Page 7 of 25                                       SCENARIO $1                   NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
Condensate Booster Pumps
                                                                                        Post Validation Revision
-~
ICE-142, Condensate 1 h 1 T o  CST Isolation Valve
-
---
_I_
--
____
_-
I  
I  
SRO  
I Check Reactor thermal power changed by less than 15% in any one hour period  
._l___l_l
______I  
__
Refers to TS 3.3.1 (Items 13 and 14) ~ 6 hour requirement to trip bistables  
Initiate repairs  
COMMENTS:  
Page 7 of 25  
SCENARIO $1  
NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


Appendix D                         Kequired Operator Actions                               FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
  SCENARIO NUMBER: 1               EVENT KUMBER:           4         FACILITY.       Harris
Kequired Operator Actions  
  EVENT DESCRIPTIC             Median Tavg high failure
FORM ES-D-2  
  -
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1  
  TIME      'OSITION
EVENT KUMBER:  
                SRO               .
4  
                                        APPI.ICA"T'S ACTIONS OK BEHAVIOR
FACILITY.  
                KO        Rods irrserting
Harris  
                      I   TR-408 Ked Pen at max output
EVENT DESCRIPTIC  
                      I  RCS I.OOPNBIC TAVG HVLO DEV (AL14-010-6-3A/7-3A/8-3A)                 all
TIME -  
                          aiarmiug
'OSITION  
                          RCS 1WFITAVG HIGH-LOW (AI.B-0 10-6-4B) alarming
SRO  
                      D  PRESSURIZER CONTROL LOW LEVEL DEVIATION (ALB-009-2-2)
KO
                          alarming
I__
                      I  Charging flow FI-122A. 1 increasing
I
                      ___
SRO
                      I  FK-122 *ut      increasing _ _ -                   ~ -
RO
            I
I-
  I  _    _                          I  _
COMMENTS:
                SRO    Enter and direct the actions of AOP-001, Malfunction of Kod Control and
Median Tavg high failure
                      1ndication.stem           -             _____I
APPI.ICA"T'S ACTIONS OK BEHAVIOR  
                      (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check that < 2 control rods are dropped
.
                      __-
Rods irrserting  
                      'IMMEDIATE ACTION) Position Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN
I  
                RO    'IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check Control Bank motion stopped
I
  I                    @
D
                        -
I
                      So to the appropriate section:
I FK-122 *ut
                            Section 3.2, Continuous Spurious Control Bank Motion         -
increasing
                      Manually operate affected control bank to restore the following:
Enter and direct the actions of AOP-001, Malfunction of Kod Control and
                      B  Equilibrium power and temperature conditions
TR-408 Ked Pen at max output  
                      B  Rods above the insertion limits ofTech Spec 3.1.3.6 and PIP-106, Technical
RCS I.OOPNBIC TAVG HVLO DEV (AL14-010-6-3A/7-3A/8-3A)  
                          Specification Equipment List Program and Core Operating Limits Report.
all  
COMMENTS:
RCS 1WFITAVG HIGH-LOW (AI.B-0 10-6-4B) alarming  
Page 8 of25                                   SCENARIO #I                   NUREG-IO21,Revision 9, Draft
PRESSURIZER CONTROL LOW LEVEL DEVIATION (ALB-009-2-2)  
                                                                                  Post Validation Revision
alarming  
Charging flow FI-122A. 1 increasing  
aiarmiug
_ _ -
~ -
___ I_
_____I
1ndication.stem  
-  
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check that < 2 control rods are dropped  
__-  
'IMMEDIATE ACTION) Position Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN  
'IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check Control Bank motion stopped  
So to the appropriate section:  
Manually operate affected control bank to restore the following:
B
B
@
Section 3.2, Continuous Spurious Control Bank Motion  
-  
Equilibrium power and temperature conditions  
Rods above the insertion limits ofTech Spec 3.1.3.6 and PIP-106, Technical  
Specification Equipment List Program and Core Operating Limits Report.  
Page 8 of25  
SCENARIO #I  
NUREG-IO21,  
Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


  Appendix D                           Required Operator Actions                               FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
~~         ~
Required Operator Actions  
    SCENARIO NUMBER: 1                 EVENT NUMBER:           4         FACILITY:       Harris
FORM ES-D-2  
    EVENT     iSCRIPTION:         Median Tavg high failure (CONrINUED)
~~  
              POSITION                    APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OK BEHAVIOR
~  
                  SRO   Check that instrument channel failure has not occurred by observing the following:
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1  
                  KO          RCS Tavg
EVENT NUMBER:  
                              RCSTref
4  
                        0     Power Range NH channels
FACILITY:  
                              Turbine first stage pressure
Harris  
                  SRO    Verify proper operation of the folIowing:
EVENT  
                  KO          C X T S demineralizers
-
                              BTRS
iSCRIPTION:  
                        e
POSITION
                        _
Median Tavg high failure (CONrINUED)  
                              Reactor Makeup Control System
APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OK BEHAVIOR  
                                I
SRO  
                  SRO    Check that this section was not cntered due to control banks moving out and go to
KO
                  SRO    Check that ncither of the following occurred:
SRO
                  RO          Unexplained RClS bontion
KO
                        -  PtJn -lanned RCS dilution
SRO
                                                  ___
SRO
                  SRO    Check that an automatic Rod Control malfiinction occurred
RO
              I  KO  -
SRO
                  RO    Maintain inanual rod contml unlil appropriate corrective action is complete
RO
                  &sect;KO    Exit this orocedure
I KO -
              I
&sect;KO
    -
I
  COMMENTS:
Check that instrument channel failure has not occurred by observing the following:  
Page 9 of 25                                     SCENARIO #I                 N W G - 1 0 2 1 , Revision 9, Draft
RCS Tavg  
                                                                                      Post Validation Revision
RCSTref  
0  
Power Range NH channels  
Turbine first stage pressure  
Verify proper operation of the folIowing:  
C X T S demineralizers  
BTRS  
e  
Reactor Makeup Control System  
Check that this section was not cntered due to control banks moving out and go to  
_I
Check that ncither of the following occurred:  
Unexplained RClS bontion  
tJn lanned RCS dilution  
-P-
___  
Check that an automatic Rod Control malfiinction occurred  
Maintain inanual rod contml unlil appropriate corrective action is complete  
Exit this orocedure  
COMMENTS:  
Page 9 of 25  
SCENARIO #I  
NWG-1021, Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


  Appendix D                           Required Operator Actions                               FC)RM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
~~~~           ~
Required Operator Actions  
      SCENARIO NUMBER: 1               EVENT NUMRER 5                     FACILITY:       Harris
FC)RM ES-D-2  
                                    Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum
~~~~  
              POSITION                      APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
~  
                          Diagnoses lowering main condenser vacuum
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1  
                          e   Decreasing Condenser vacuum indication on MCB
EVENT NUMRER  
                          e    CPdnSR PRE TRP LOWJVACLJUMalarm (A1.B-020-2-4A) alarming
5  
                        - ___  COMPUTER       ALARM MS/TURBINE SYSTEMS (AIB-020-5-5) alanning
FACILITY:  
                                                _  I    _  _  _
Harris  
                  SRO    Enters and directs the actions of AOP-012, Partial Iass of Condenser Vacuum
POSITION
                                                                              I                          _    I
-
              l_l_
SRO
                  BOP    _-
BOP
                          Check Turbine in operation
BOP
                  BOP    Check Condenser pressure in both Zones less than:
l_l_
                          0    7.5 inches Kg absolute and Turbine first stage pressure is greater than 60%
SKO
                                turbine load
BOP
                                -0K-
I30P
                          0    5 inches IIg absolute and Turbine first stage pressure is less than 6OYo turbine
Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum  
                  SKO    Reduce Turbine ioad as necessary to niaintain Condenser vacuum using one of the
APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
                  BOP    follo.rving:
Diagnoses lowering main condenser vacuum  
                          D     GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown from Power Operation to Hot Standby
e  
                          m    AOP-038, Rapid Down-                                            -          I
e
                  I30P  Continue Turbine load reduction until directed otherwise by Unit SCO based on
Enters and directs the actions of AOP-012, Partial Iass of Condenser Vacuum
                          the following:
Check Turbine in operation
                          a     Cause of vacuum loss identified and corrected
Check Condenser pressure in both Zones less than:
                          * Vacuum stable or increasing
0
                          B    Plant conditions require Reactor or Turbine trip
Decreasing Condenser vacuum indication on MCB  
                                                NOTE TO SIMULATOR OPERA TOR:
CPdnSR PRE TRP LOWJ VACLJUM alarm (A1.B-020-2-4A) alarming  
                            ASSOONAS TURBINE LOAD HAS BEENLOWERED INRESPONSE TO
COMPUTER ALARM MS/TURBINE SYSTEMS (AIB-020-5-5) alanning  
                          _  ~
___
                              LOWERING VACUUM, REDUCE MALFhTNCTION SEVERITY TO 5.
_I___
                                  ~   I -   _
I  
                                                                                          I    I  _          - --
_I
                          VOTE: SE VER4L MIhThTESAFTER RILWO VING AfALFUNCTIO.V,
_-  
                          REPORT AS A 0 THAT AIR INLEAKAGE WAS APPARENT CAUSE AND
7.5 inches Kg absolute and Turbine first stage pressure is greater than 60%  
                          I CE-4 75, COhDEhSER VAChi7.W BREz4KER, HAS BEEN FULLY CL OSED.
turbine load  
                          VOISE LEVEL IN AREA HAS DECREASED SUBSTANTPALLX
-0K-  
    COMMENTS:
5 inches IIg absolute and Turbine first stage pressure is less than 6OYo turbine  
Page 10 of 2.5                                   SCENNAKIO # I                   NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
0
                                                                                        Post Validation Revision
Reduce Turbine ioad as necessary to niaintain Condenser vacuum using one of the  
follo.rving:  
D  
GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown from Power Operation to Hot Standby  
Continue Turbine load reduction until directed otherwise by Unit SCO based on  
the following:  
a  
*
Vacuum stable or increasing
B
m
AOP-038, Rapid Down-
-
I
Cause of vacuum loss identified and corrected  
Plant conditions require Reactor or Turbine trip  
NOTE TO SIMULATOR OPERA TOR:  
ASSOONAS TURBINE LOAD HAS BEENLOWERED INRESPONSE TO  
LOWERING VACUUM, REDUCE MALFhTNCTION SEVERITY  
II_---
TO 5.  
_~~I-_  
VOTE: SE VER4L MIhThTES AFTER RILWO VING AfALFUNCTIO.V,  
REPORT AS A 0 THAT AIR INLEAKAGE WAS APPARENT CAUSE AND  
I CE-4 75, COhDEhSER VA Chi7.W BREz4KER, HAS BEEN FULLY CL OSED.  
VOISE LEVEL IN AREA HAS DECREASED SUBSTANTPALL X
COMMENTS:  
Page 10 of 2.5  
SCENNAKIO #I  
NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


  Appendix D                             Required Operator Actions                                 FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
  SCENARIO NIJMBER: 1                   EVENT NUMBER:             5         FACILITY:       Harris
Required Operator Actions  
  EVENT DESCRIPTION:               Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum (CONTINUED)
FORM ES-D-2  
1 TIME       I POSITION                     APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
SCENARIO NIJMBER: 1  
                  BOP                                                       s of Attachment 1
EVENT NUMBER:  
                  BOP
5  
                  SRO                                                 ed and go to Step 11
FACILITY:  
                  SRB                                        0 failure of a Circulating Water System
Harris  
                                                                                                              -
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                  SRO                            solabie leak in Circulating Water System exists and go to Step
Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum (CONTINUED)  
                -           I ,
1 TIME  
                                                            _-.__
I POSITION  
                  SRO      Check NO isolable leak between Condenser Waterbox isolation valves exists and
APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
                            go to Step 20
BOP  
                            Check Circulating Water temperatures using the following EWFIS Computer
s of Attachment 1  
                            Points stable or decreasing:
BOP  
                                'TCVJ1930,Cooling Tower Basin Temp
SRO  
                            0    TCW194OA, Condenser A Circ Water Met Temp
SRB
                          _
SRO
                                TCW1940B, Condenser B Circ .~
ed and go to Step 11  
                                  _      I
0 failure of a Circulating Water System  
                                                                  Water Inlet Temp                   __ps
-  
                  SKQ      Check plant shutdown initiated
solabie leak in Circulating Water System exists and go to Step  
                            Notify Load Dispatcher of reduced load capability
-  
                          -Monitor Turbine vibration leveis
SRO
                                                _    I - - normal                                               -
SKQ
                            Reviews Note: Exhaust IIood Spray may not be effective in reducing Exhaust
_-.__  
                            Hood temxrature above 15% Turbine load
I , 
                                        _    I_    -    -                                  _____--
Check NO isolable leak between Condenser Waterbox isolation valves exists and  
                            Check Exhaust Hood temnerature less than 145'F
Check Circulating Water temperatures using the following EWFIS Computer  
r-           I   SRO   1 Check Keactor thermal power changed by less than 15% in any one hour period
Points stable or decreasing:  
  COMMENTS:
0
Page 1 I of25                                       SCENARIO # I                   NLTKEG-1021, Revision9, Draft
Check plant shutdown initiated
                                                                                          Post Validation Revision
go to Step 20
'TCVJ1930, Cooling Tower Basin Temp  
TCW194OA, Condenser A Circ Water Met Temp  
TCW1940B, Condenser B Circ Water Inlet Temp  
__ps  
.~
__I
Notify Load Dispatcher of reduced load capability  
Monitor Turbine vibration leveis normal  
Reviews Note: Exhaust IIood Spray may not be effective in reducing Exhaust  
Hood temxrature above 15% Turbine load  
Check Exhaust Hood temnerature less than 145'F  
-
-
_I -
-
_____--
_I_-
-
r -
I  
SRO  
1 Check Keactor thermal power changed by less than 15% in any one hour period  
COMMENTS:  
Page 1 I of25  
SCENARIO # I
NLTKEG-1021, Revision9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


Appendix D             Required Operator Actions                     FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
  SCENARIO NUMBER: 1   EVENT NUMBER:           5     FACILITY:   Harris
Required Operator Actions  
  EVENT DESCRIPTION: Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuom (CONTINUED)
FORM ES-D-2  
                                          __l__l____l_
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1  
                                                        ~--___
EVENT NUMBER:  
  COMMENTS:
5  
Page 12 of 25                     SCENARIO #I             NUREG-102 1, Revision 9,Draft
FACILITY:  
                                                              Post Validation Revision
Harris  
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuom (CONTINUED)  
__l__l____l_
~ - - _ _ _ 
COMMENTS:  
Page 12 of 25  
SCENARIO #I  
NUREG-102 1, Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


Amendis D                           Required Operator Actions                               FORM ES-D-2
Amendis D  
  SCENARIO NUMBER: 1                 EVENT NUMBER:             6/ 7     FACILITY:       Harris
Required Operator Actions  
  EVENT DESCRIPTION:             Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip
FORM ES-D-2  
              POSITIOr                   APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1  
                SKO    Diagnoses Main Steam break inside containment
EVENT NUMBER:  
                  RO    e   Reactor power increasing
6 / 7  
                BOP        Steam flow increasing
FACILITY:  
                            Feed flow increasing
Harris  
                        * SG levels decreasing after initial swell
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                        0   Steam pressure decreasing
Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip  
                            RCS temperature decreasing
POSITIOr  
                            Containment pressure increasing
SKO
                        - Containment radiation levels   ---unchanged
RO
                SRO    Orders a reactor trip and safety injection and enters PATH-I
BOP
              -                                                        ___
SRO
                        NOTE: DUE 10 THE FAILURE OF THE AUTOMATIC AND MAATAL
-
                        REACTOR T f f I eA SAFETYINJECTIQNIS LIKELY TO OCCUR BEFORE
-
                    - THE REACTOR CANBE TRIPPED LOCALLY. -
RO
                        I  _                        _  l  _  l  _
RO
                  RO    Determines reactor failed to automatically trip
RO
                        e   Reactor trip breakers closed
RO
                        * Rod bottom lights off
SRO
                        __ Neutron flus NOT decreasing --
RO
                        e
___
                  RO    Attempts manual trip of reactor
APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
                                              _  _  - -  _  _    I _
Diagnoses Main Steam break inside containment  
                                                                        -                            __-
e  
                RO    Determines manual trip NOT successful
Reactor power increasing  
                            Reactor trip breakers closed
Steam flow increasing  
                        e   Rod bottom lights off
Feed flow increasing  
                        e
*  
                        -    Neutron flus NOT decreasing         _-              _ _ I    -
0  
                RO    Informs SRO of' failure of reactor io trip automatically or manually
Steam pressure decreasing  
                SRO    Transitions to and directs the actions of FRP-S. 1, Response to Nuclear Power
RCS temperature decreasing  
                        -
Containment pressure increasing  
                        Generation / ATWS                                  - I _            _-___
Containment radiation levels unchanged  
                RO    (IMMEIXATIi ACTION) Verifies rods inserting automatically or manually inserts
Orders a reactor trip and safety injection and enters PATH-I  
              ___-control rods-                   I_.-____                         -                 I    _
NOTE: DUE 10 THE FAILURE OF THE AUTOMATIC AND MAATAL  
COMMENTS:
REACTOR T f f I e  A SAFETYINJECTIQNIS LIKELY TO OCCUR BEFORE  
Page I 3 of 25                                 SCENAFUO #I                     ?KJREG-I021,Revision9, Draft
Determines reactor failed to automatically trip  
                                                                                      Post Validation Revision
e  
Reactor trip breakers closed  
*  
Rod bottom lights off  
e
Neutron flus NOT decreasing  
Attempts manual trip of reactor  
Determines manual trip NOT successful  
Reactor trip breakers closed  
e  
Rod bottom lights off  
e  
Neutron flus NOT decreasing  
Informs SRO of' failure of reactor io trip automatically or manually  
SG levels decreasing after initial swell
-
---
___
I_
THE REACTOR CANBE _l_l_
TRIPPED LOCALLY. -
--
__
-
__-
__--__I_
_-
__I-
-
Transitions to and directs the actions of FRP-S. 1, Response to Nuclear Power  
(IMMEIXATIi ACTION) Verifies rods inserting automatically or manually inserts  
_-___  
-
Generation / ATWS
-I_
control rods -  
-
I_
I_.-____  
-  
COMMENTS:  
Page I3 of 25  
SCENAFUO #I  
?KJREG-I021,  
Revision9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


Appendix D                         Required Operator Actions                               FORM E&sect;-D-2
Appendix D  
  SCENARIO NUMBER: 1               EVEN?' NUMBER: 6 / 7 / 8           FACILITY:       Harris
Required Operator Actions  
  EVENT DESCRIPTION:           Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip
FORM E&sect;-D-2  
                          All turbine throttle valves shut
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1  
                                                  - shut
EVEN?' NUMBER: 6 / 7 / 8  
                          All turbine governor valves
FACILITY:  
                                      ACTION) Determines neither Motor-Driven AFW pump running
Harris  
                      and verifies Turhine-Driven M W Pump operating___
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                      (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Determines reactor is not tripped and directs operator to
Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip  
                      contact or report to Control Room
All turbine throttle valves shut  
                      CRITICAL STEP TO DIRECT A LOCAL KEACTOR TRKP TO ADD
All turbine governor valves  
                  I,  NEGATIVE REACTIVITY TO CORE.
- shut
                      R'OTE: AFTER API'ROXIWATEL Y 15 SECOIVDDELAK CONTACT
ACTION) Determines neither Motor-Driven AFW pump running  
                      COXTROL ROOM A S THE OPERATOR DIRECTED TO CONTACT/
___
                    REPORT.   __I                    _  - I _  - -                            - -          ~
and verifies Turhine-Driven M W Pump operating
                      Directs operator to locally tnp the reactor by (order of preference):
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Determines reactor is not tripped and directs operator to  
                          Locally opening the reactor trip breakers
contact or report to Control Room  
                    0   Locally trip both rod drive MG set generator output breakers.
CRITICAL STEP TO DIRECT A LOCAL KEACTOR TRKP TO ADD  
                          Locally triEboth rod drive MG set motor breakers
NEGATIVE REACTIVITY TO CORE.  
                                            I___-____
I
                    ,VOTE: APPROXIMATELY 30 SECONDS AFTER BEING DIRECTED TO
,
                    LOCALLY TRIP THE REACTOR, OPEN THE REACTOR TRIP B R E A K E R A
R'OTE: AFTER API'ROXIWATEL Y 15 SECOIVD DELAK CONTACT  
                    Initiate monitoring o f CSFSTs
COXTROL ROOM AS THE OPERATOR DIRECTED TO CONTACT/  
  COMMENTS:
REPORT.  
Page 14 of 25                               SCENARIO #I                     NUREG-1021,Revision 9: Draft
Directs operator to locally tnp the reactor by (order of preference):  
                                                                                    Post Validation Reviision
Locally opening the reactor trip breakers  
0  
Locally trip both rod drive MG set generator output breakers.  
Locally triEboth rod drive MG set motor breakers  
,VOTE: APPROXIMATELY 30 SECONDS AFTER BEING DIRECTED TO  
LOCALLY TRIP THE REACTOR, OPEN THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERA
Initiate monitoring of CSFSTs  
_-I_--
- - ~  
__I
I___-____
COMMENTS:  
Page 14 of 25  
SCENARIO #I  
NUREG-1021, Revision 9: Draft  
Post Validation Reviision  


Appendix D                       Required Operator Actions                             FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
  SCENARIO NUMBER: 1             EVENT NUMBER: 6 / 7 I 9           FACILITY:       Harris
Required Operator Actions  
  EVENT DESCXIPTION:       Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to TI'&?
FORM ES-D-2  
                        Start a boric acid pump
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1  
                  e    Open ICs-278, Emergency Boric Acid Addition \,ahre
EVENT NUMBER: 6 / 7 I 9  
                        Verify > 30 gpm emergency bontion flow
FACILITY:  
                        Verify > 30 gpm CSIP flow to RCS
Harris  
                        Ver&RC&sect;Lressure 2: 2335 psig                               _-
EVENT DESCXIPTION:  
                  I(
Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to TI'&?  
                  NTTZSI ACTUATED           L I G E A N D SEVERAL OTIIER GVEXPECTED
e
                  IiVDICATtOAS WILL BE RECEIVED DUE TO A FAILrJm OF SLAVE
Start a boric acid pump  
                  RELA Y K602B WHICH IS INCL drDEDAS THE INITIATING FAILURE FOR
Open ICs-278, Emergency Boric Acid Addition \\,ahre  
                  THIS EVENT. THE FOLLO WIA'G COMPONEATSARE AFFECTED:
Verify > 30 gpm emergency bontion flow  
                        SI Actuaied light - blinks &e to difference in Train SA & SS - hght
Verify > 30 gpm CSIP flow to RCS  
                        operated by contaet on K40.2 via multiprexer
Ver&RC&sect;Lressure  
                        SI Reset Auto-SI Blocked - blinks when atienapting to reset SI due to Train
2: 2335 psig  
                        SA resei with Trnin SB not able to reset - timer started by contact on K402
_-  
                  e    LCV-II5D does not auto open
NTTZ
                  * LCV-II5E does not auto close
SI ACTUATED  
                        CC-415 does not auto close
L I G E A N D SEVERAL OTIIER GVEXPECTED  
            _-I__
IiVDICATtOAS WILL BE RECEIVED DUE TO A FAILrJm OF SLAVE  
                            __-
RELA Y K602B WHICH IS INCL drDED AS THE INITIATING FAILURE FOR  
                            305 noes not auto close               __-
THIS EVENT. THE FOLLO WIA'G COMPONEATS ARE AFFECTED:  
                    eniify failure of RWST suction to CSPs to open
I(
                        1CS-291 red light off, green light an    __-                    _  I  -  -
SI Actuaied light - blinks &e to difference in Train SA & SS - hght  
                    ttempis to open ICs-291 and reports failure to SKI
operated by contaet on K40.2 via multiprexer  
COMMENTS:
SI Reset Auto-SI Blocked - blinks when atienapting to reset SI due to Train  
Page 15 of25                               SCENARIO #1                 NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft
SA resei with Trnin SB not able to reset - timer started by contact on K402  
                                                                                Post Validation Revision
LCV-II5D does not auto open  
LCV-II5E does not auto close  
CC-415 does not auto close  
e
*
__-  
305 noes not auto close  
__-  
_-I__
eniify failure of RWST suction to CSPs to open  
ttempis to open ICs-291 and reports failure to SKI  
__-
_I-
-
1CS-291 red light off, green light an
COMMENTS:  
Page 15 of25  
SCENARIO #1  
NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


              -~
-~  
Appendix D                           Required Operator Actions                             FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
  SCENARIO NUMBER: 1                 EVENT MJMRER:             6/4     FACILITY:     Harris
Required Operator Actions  
  EVENT DESCRIPTION:             Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to 'kip
FORM ES-D-2  
                                  (CONTINUED)
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1  
                                                entilation valves and dampers shut
EVENT MJMRER:  
              __
6 / 4  
                  RO I ~ e r i f reactor
FACILITY:  
                                v      tri~oeci
Harris  
                BOP 1 Verifies turbine trinued
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                          _        I
Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to 'kip  
                                            I j
(CONTINUED)  
                                                          _              _              I        _          _
entilation valves and dampers shut  
                SRO  Begin monitoring of foldout for FKP-S. I
RO
                                                        --
I ~ e r i f
                BOP  Controls AFW flow to intact S G s to maintain between 40% and 50%
reactor tri~oeci  
                                                                                                _ _-       .-
__
                                                                                          Y 'C'BY THIS
BOP  
                      TIME, PA4RTICULARLY IF iWS ISOLATIOXHAS OCCC'RRED, AND
1 Verifies turbine trinued  
                      -_- TO ISOLATE AFW TO SG %'.
__I__
                      CHOOSE                                              _     l  _      _      _    l  l__
I j
                      Verify All Dilution Paths Isolated
_I
                      * Reactor Makeup Water punips OFF
Begin monitoring of foldout for FKP-S. I  
                            FCV-I14B,Reactor Makeup Water valve SHUT
Controls AFW flow to intact SGs to maintain between 40% and 50%  
                      e      ICS-98, BTRS Bypass valve OPEN
--
                      * Direct A 0 to locdliy verify ICs-510, Boric Acid Batch Tank Outlet valve
SRO
                    __                           I  _  -
BOP
                      Checks for positive reactivity addition due to cooldown
__ -
                      a    Reactor tripped
.-  
                        _  htemediate range startup rate positive
Y 'C' BY THIS  
                                  I      _      _
TIME, PA4RTICULARL Y IF iWS ISOLATIOXHAS OCCC'RRED, AND  
                                                                              --
CHOOSE TO ISOLATE  
                        eteimines a SG is depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner and go to Step
_l___ll__
                                                                    ___I                           ___ 18
AFW TO SG %'.  
                                                  ss valves closed
-_-
                                                    -
Verify All Dilution Paths Isolated  
                            mines S G 'C' faulted due to SG pressure decreasing in an uncontrolled
*  
                      manner or comnlctelv denressurized
e
COMMENTS:
*
Page 16 of 25                                   SCENARIO # I                 NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
Checks for positive reactivity addition due to cooldown
                                                                                    Post Validation Revision
a
Reactor tripped
Reactor Makeup Water punips OFF  
FCV-I14B,  
Reactor Makeup Water valve SHUT  
ICS-98, BTRS Bypass valve OPEN  
Direct A 0 to locdliy verify ICs-510, Boric Acid Batch Tank Outlet valve  
__  
I_-  
_I__
htemediate range startup rate positive  
--  
eteimines a SG is depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner and go to Step 18
___I  
___  
ss valves closed  
-  
mines SG 'C' faulted due to SG pressure decreasing in an uncontrolled  
manner or comnlctelv denressurized  
COMMENTS:  
Page 16 of 25  
SCENARIO #I  
NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


Appendix D                           Required Operator Actions                           FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
  SCENARIO NUMBER: 1                 EVENT NUMBER:             6/7     FACILITY:   Harris
Required Operator Actions  
  EVENT DESCRIPTION:             Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip
FORM ES-D-2  
                                (CONTINUED)
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1  
  TIME      POSITION                    APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
EVENT NUMBER:  
                SRO    Detemiines SG 'A' and SG 'B' NOT faulted
6 / 7  
            __-
FACILITY:  
                BOP    Isolates SG 'G'
Harris  
                            Verifies PORV closed
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                        0   Verifies FW Isolation closed
Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip  
                            Verifies AFW isolated to SG
TIME
                            Closes steam supply to 'B'DAFW Pump
___-
                        E   Verifies before seat drain isolation closed
I_-
                        0   Verifies SG blowdown isolation closed
I_-
                            Verifies steam analyzer isolation closed
POSITION
  ___-                  E   Verifies
SRO
                      ___.._.__-     cheniical addition isolations
__-
                                                                - closed
BOP
                        CRITICAL STEP TO ISOLATE SG 'C' PRIOR TO EXITING FRP-
RO
  I  _    -
RO
                      S.1
SRO
                      -  . TO MINIMIZE PRESSURE _             I
._I
                                                                RISE INSIDE
-
                                                                        ~ . CONTAINMENT.
--
                RO    Verifies core exit thermocouples < 1200 "F
COMMENTS:
  I _    -
(CONTINUED)  
                RO    Verify reactor subcritical
APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
                            Power ranges < 5%
Detemiines SG 'A' and SG 'B' NOT faulted  
                            Intermediate startup rate negative           _  I ___                .__-
Isolates SG 'G'  
                SRO    Implements FWs, a5 required
Verifies PORV closed  
                                                                .___
0  
            ._I  - --
Verifies FW Isolation closed  
COMMENTS:
Verifies AFW isolated to SG  
Page 17 of25                                   SCENARIO W1                 NIJREG-1021,Revisinn9, Draft
Closes steam supply to 'B'DAFW Pump  
                                                                                  Post Validation Kevision
E  
Verifies before seat drain isolation closed  
0  
Verifies SG blowdown isolation closed  
Verifies steam analyzer isolation closed  
E  
Verifies cheniical addition isolations closed
S.1 TO MINIMIZE PRESSURE RISE INSIDE CONTAINMENT.
Verifies core exit thermocouples < 1200 "F
___.._.__-  
--
CRITICAL STEP TO ISOLATE SG 'C' PRIOR TO EXITING FRP-  
-.  
_
I
~
.
Verify reactor subcritical  
Power ranges < 5%  
Intermediate startup rate negative  
Implements FWs, a5 required  
_I___
.__-  
.___
Page 17 of25  
SCENARIO W1  
NIJREG-1021, Revisinn9, Draft  
Post Validation Kevision  


Appendix D                       Required Operator Actions                             FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
  SCENARIO NUMBER: 1             EVENT NUMBER:           6/7     FACILITY:       Harris
Required Operator Actions  
  EVENT DESCRIPTION:         Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip
FORM ES-D-2  
                              (CONTINUED)
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1  
                                    APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
EVENT NUMBER:  
                    Transitions to and directs the actions of FRP-J.1 based on MAGENTA path on
6 / 7  
                    Containment CSFST
FACILITY:  
                    Verifies Phase A isolation valves closed
Harris  
                    Verifies Containment Vent isolation valves closed
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                                                    I                -
Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip  
            BOP    Verifies Containment Spray operation due to pressure     10 psig
(CONTINUED)  
                    * Venfy Spray Pumps running
BOP
                    e   Verify-r     -valve alignment
BOP
            BOP    Verifies Phase B isoiation
RO
                                                    __
SRO
            RO    Stop all KCPs due to loss of cooling flow
APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
                    ___                            I  _    _                                    I_
Transitions to and directs the actions of FRP-J.1 based on MAGENTA path on  
            SRO    Venfies prowr operation of containment fan coolers
Containment CSFST  
                  1 Verifies MSNs and bvuasscs closed
Verifies Phase A isolation valves closed  
                  , Determines SG Cis onlv faulted SG and verifies isolated
Verifies Containment Vent isolation valves closed  
                  1
Verifies Containment Spray operation due to pressure  
                    Check both Spray Pumps running
*  
                  P    -
Venfy Spray Pumps running  
                    Check both ESW Booster Pumps running and orifice bpitss isolation
e  
                  -.valves closed                                                           I  _  _
Verify-r  
                                                                      I  _  -
-  
COMMENTS:
valve alignment  
Page 18 of25                             SCENARIO # I                   NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft
Verifies Phase B isoiation  
                                                                                Post Validation Revision
Stop all KCPs due to loss of cooling flow  
Venfies prowr operation of containment fan coolers  
I
-
10 psig
__
I_
___
I__
1 Verifies MSNs and bvuasscs closed  
1
, Determines SG C is onlv faulted SG and verifies isolated  
Check both Spray Pumps running  
Check both ESW Booster Pumps running and orifice bpitss isolation  
P-
-. valves closed  
I__
I_-  
COMMENTS:  
Page 18 of25  
SCENARIO #I  
NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


Appendix D                       Required Operator Actions                           FOKM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
  SCENARIO NUMBER: 1             EVENT NUMBER             6/7     FACILITY:     Harris
Required Operator Actions  
  EVENT DESCRIPTION:       Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip
FOKM ES-D-2  
                            (CONTINUED)
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1  
  TIhlEIPOS1.rION
EVENT NUMBER  
            I SRO Transitions to and directs the actions of EOP PATH-l
6 / 7  
                  Verifies reactor tnmed
FACILITY:  
                  Verifies turbine tripped
Harris  
                  I    -                                          I_
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
            I BOP Verifies power to AC safeguards buses
Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip  
                    Verifies SI actuated
(CONTINUED)  
                  Begins monitoring of CSFSTs
TIhlEIPOS1.r ION
                  _  _  I  I                    _  I  _  _  _ -  -
I  
                  Begins monitoring of Foldout A
SRO  
                                                __I___
I
              RO  Verifies proper operation of emergency safeguards equipment
BOP
                  * CSIP and RHR pumps running
RO
                  * SI flow z 200 gpm
-+I--
                        Main steam line isolation
-
                  D    Containment pressure above 10 psig, with actions taken
Transitions to and directs the actions of EOP PATH-l  
                  b    AFW flow at least 2 10 KPIB available                                       -
Verifies reactor tnmed  
  -+              I    --
I_
                  I    _                            l    _    _  _    l    l
Verifies turbine tripped  
  -
Verifies power to AC safeguards buses  
COMMEhTS:
I
Page 19 of25                               SCENARIO #1                 NUREG-1021, Kevision9: Dnf?
-
                                                                              Post Validation Revision
Verifies SI actuated  
_I___--
Begins monitoring of CSFSTs  
Begins monitoring of Foldout A  
__II
__I___  
Verifies proper operation of emergency safeguards equipment  
*  
Main steam line isolation
D
b
CSIP and RHR pumps running  
*  
SI flow z 200 gpm  
Containment pressure above 10 psig, with actions taken  
AFW flow at least 2 10 KPIB available  
-  
I_
l___ll
COMMEhTS:  
Page 19 of25  
SCENARIO #1  
NUREG-1021, Kevision9: Dnf?  
Post Validation Revision  


- ... , ~ ...__.-......... ..  -        - __          ~
-
        Aonendix D                             Required Operator Actions                             FORM ES-D-2
-
                            ~~ ~ ~~
~
        SCENARIO NUMBER: I                     EVENT NUMBER:         6/ 7     FACILITY:       Harris
        EVENT DESCRIPTION:                 Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip
__
                                            (CONTINUED)
..
                                                    APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
...  
                                    ESFAS proper alignment using Attachment 6
,  
                                    0  2CsPsrunning
~ ..._ _.-  
                                    -
.........  
                                        2 RHR Pumps running
-  
                                    * 2 CCW Pumps running
Aonendix D  
                                        N1 ESW and ESW Booster Pumps running
Required Operator Actions  
                                        SI Valves properly aligned
FORM ES-D-2  
                                    NOTE: R WST SUCTIO".'S TO CSIPSFAILED TO OPEN ON SI
~~  
                                    ACTLbtTION. ,WAYHAVE BEEA'RECOGMZEI) BY THIS POINTAND
~  
                                    OPERABLE F7AL VE: OPEAED. I F ? V O ~IT IS CRITICAL AT TMIS POI"
~~  
                                    TO OPEV THE VAL YE TO ESTABLISH FLQW.
SCENARIO NUMBER: I  
                                        Phase A proper alignment
EVENT NUMBER:  
                                        Blowdown and SCi sample valves shut
6 / 7  
                                        Main steam lines isolated
FACILITY:  
                                        Containment Spray operation
Harris  
                                        RCPs stopped
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                                        Both FW I'umps tripped
Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip  
                                        FW Isolation valves closed
(CONTINUED)  
                                        XEITIIER MDAFW Pump operating
APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
                                        T D A W Pump operating
ESFAS proper alignment using Attachment 6  
                                        AFW alignment (FLOW ISOLATED TO SG 'C')
2 RHR Pumps running  
                                        Both EDGs running
*  
                                        Containment Fan Coolers - 1 per unit operating in slow speed
2 CCW Pumps running  
                                        Control Room Ventilation in Emergency Recirc
-
                                        AC Ruses 1Al and l B 1 energized
SI Valves properly aligned
                                        Air compressors 1A and 1B in Local Control Mode
0
      Page 20 of 25                                       SCENARIO # 1                 NURE:C-102 1, Revision 9, I h f i
2CsPsrunning
                                                                                              Post Validation Revision
N1 ESW and ESW Booster Pumps running  
NOTE: R WST SUCTIO".'S TO CSIPS FAILED TO OPEN ON SI  
ACTLbtTION. ,WAYHAVE BEEA'RECOGMZEI) BY THIS POINTAND  
OPERABLE F7AL VE: OPEAED. I F ? V O ~
IT IS CRITICAL AT TMIS POI"  
TO OPEV THE VAL YE TO ESTABLISH FLQW.  
Phase A proper alignment  
Blowdown and SCi sample valves shut  
Main steam lines isolated  
Containment Spray operation  
RCPs stopped  
Both FW I'umps tripped  
FW Isolation valves closed  
XEITIIER MDAFW Pump operating  
T D A W Pump operating  
AFW alignment (FLOW ISOLATED TO SG 'C')  
Both EDGs running  
Containment Fan Coolers - 1 per unit operating in slow speed  
Control Room Ventilation in Emergency Recirc  
AC Ruses 1Al and lB 1 energized  
Air compressors 1A and 1B in Local Control Mode  
Page 20 of 25  
SCENARIO #1  
NURE:C-102 1, Revision 9, I h f i
Post Validation Revision  


Appendix H)                         Required Operator Actions                               FORM ES-D-2
Appendix H)  
  SCENARIO NUMBER: I                 EVEKT NUMBER:           6I7      FACILITY Harris
Required Operator Actions  
  EVENT DESCRIPTION:             Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trir,
FORM ES-D-2  
                                (CONTIhWED)
SCENARIO NUMBER: I  
            I'OSITIOI\                  APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR DEIIAVIOR
EVEKT NUMBER:  
                RO    Attempts to stablize RCS temperature using WR Tcold due to no RCPs
6 I 7 
                        NOTE: DUE TO FAULTED sc, ncs TEMPEM TURE IS EXPECTED TO
FACILITY  
                    - -BELOW.
Harris  
                RO    Verifies proper operation of PRZ PORVs
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                        NOTE: SPRAY VALVES N O T__
Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trir,  
                        I  _    _  _                    R F m R E D DUE TO NO RCPSRKVNING.
I'OSITIOI\\
                SRO    Detemiines SG 'C' faulted and transitions to and directs the actions of EPP-014.
RO
                        Faulted Steam Generator Isolation
-
                        NOTE: SG SHOULD AILREADYHAVE BEENISOLATED PER
RO
                        DIRECTIQh'S OF F'RP-S.1,BUT TRANSITIQN TO EPP-014 IS STILL
SRO
            -
I
            I.
-
              -
.-
                        -
                        RXLTRED..     ______
_I_-
            _I  _ -
-
            -
I___.-
            I  ___.-
____-
            ____-
COMMENTS:
COMMENTS:
(CONTIhWED)  
Page21 of25                                                                 NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft
APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR DEIIAVIOR  
                                                                                    Post Validation Revision
Attempts to stablize RCS temperature using WR Tcold due to no RCPs  
NOTE: DUE TO FAULTED sc, ncs TEMPEM TURE IS EXPECTED TO  
-  
BELOW.  
Verifies proper operation of PRZ PORVs  
NOTE:  
I___
SPRAY VALVES N O T R F m R E D
__
DUE TO NO RCPSRKVNING.  
Detemiines SG 'C' faulted and transitions to and directs the actions of EPP-014.  
Faulted Steam Generator Isolation  
NOTE: SG SHOULD AILREADYHAVE BEENISOLATED PER  
DIRECTIQh'S OF F'RP-S.1, BUT TRANSITIQN TO EPP-014 IS STILL  
______
RXLTRED..  
-  
Page21 of25  
NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


.~___ . .... .......___.
~
                      I  .
~.~-I__
                                        ~  ~        .  ~        -  I  _    _
I.
  Appendix D                             Required Operator Actions                       FORM ES-D-2
.~
      SCENARIO NUMBER: 1                 EVENT NUMBER:           6/ 7 FACILITY: Harris
___  
      EVENT DESCRIPTION:             Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip
. .... .......___.  
                                                                                                        I
Appendix D  
                              Check MSIVs and bypass valves shut
Required Operator Actions  
                                                                                          l  _  _ l  _
FORM ES-D-2  
                              Determines SGs A and R are NOT faulted
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1  
                                                                        - _  I _  _-   - - ---
EVENT NUMBER:  
                              etemiines SI Termination Critena are met
6 / 7  
                            *   Subcooling (> 40%)
FACILITY: Harris  
                            0   Heat Sink (SG level > 40%)
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                            e    RCS Pressure (stable / incrcasing)
Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip  
  _        I  -  -
I  
                    _ _  I-
l__l_
                                                                                      O PREVENT
Check MSIVs and bypass valves shut  
                            RCS OVERFILL AND PRESSURIZATION RESULTING IN
Determines SGs A and R are NOT faulted  
                                                                    ND OR SAFETIES.
_I--
  COMMENTS:
-_I_ _------  
Page 22 of 25                                     SCENARIO #1               NIREG-1021,Revision 9,Draft
etemiines SI Termination Critena are met  
                                                                                  Post Validation Revision
*  
Subcooling (> 40%)  
0  
e
Heat Sink (SG level > 40%)  
RCS Pressure (stable / incrcasing)  
__I-  
O PREVENT  
RCS OVERFILL AND PRESSURIZATION RESULTING IN  
ND OR SAFETIES.  
COMMENTS:  
Page 22 of 25  
SCENARIO #1  
NIREG-1021,  
Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


Annendix D                       Required Operator Actions                             FORM ES-D-2
Annendix D  
              ~~
Required Operator Actions  
  SCENARIO NUMBER: 1             EVENT NUMBER:             6/ 4     FACILITY:     Harris
FORM ES-D-2  
  EVENT DESCRIPTION:         Steam Bresk Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip
~~  
                      Reset SI
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1  
                    ___I                              ---               I
EVENT NUMBER:  
                    Manually reali&n safeguards equipment, if required, following a loss of offsite
6 / 4  
                    nower
FACILITY:  
                    Stons all but I CSIP                                                                 I
Harris  
                    Determines KCS nressure stable or increasina                                         I
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                    Check CSIP suction aligned to RWST
Steam Bresk Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip  
                    __-.                      __--
I
                    Opens normal miniflow isolation valves
RO
                    e     1CS-182
COMMENTS:
                    * ICs-196
---  
                    0   ICs-210
I  
                    e   ICs-214       ___- - - ~-                          -
Reset SI
                    Isolates BIT outkt valves
Manually reali&n safeguards equipment, if required, following a loss of offsite  
                          1s-3
nower  
                    e   ISH-4                       I                                  .-          -
___I
                    Verify cold and hot leg injection valves closed
Stons all but I CSIP  
                    * 1SI-52
I  
                          lSI-86
Determines KCS nressure stable or increasina  
                    *   1SI-104                       I
I  
                                                  _-. ____-                              __
Check CSIP suction aligned to RWST  
                    Establishes charging lineup
Opens normal miniflow isolation valves  
                          Closes FK-122.1
e  
                          Opens ICs-235
1CS-182  
                          Opens ICs-238                               ____                     ___
*  
                    Controls charging to maintain pressurizer level using FK-122.1 and maintain flow
ICs-196  
                    __150am            __-                                          _  - -  I  _  -  -
0  
                    Verify PR% level can be maintained stable or increasing
ICs-210  
                    I _ _ _ _ _                    __                                                I
e  
            I    RO Reset Phase A and Phase B Isolation signals
ICs-214  
  COMMENTS:
Isolates BIT outkt valves  
Page 23 of25                               SCENARIO # 1                 NUREG-I02 I Revision 9, Draft
1 s - 3
                                                                                      ~
e  
                                                                                Post Validation Revision
ISH-4  
Verify cold and hot leg injection valves closed  
*  
1SI-52  
lSI-86  
*  
1SI-104  
Establishes charging lineup  
Closes FK-122.1  
__-.
__--
_ _ _- - -
~- - 
I
.-
-
_-.I____-
__
Opens ICs-235  
Opens ICs-238  
____  
___  
Controls charging to maintain pressurizer level using FK-122.1 and maintain flow  
__  
150am
Verify PR% level can be maintained stable or increasing  
Reset Phase A and Phase B Isolation signals  
__-
_--I_-
-
I
__
I _ _ _ _ _  
Page 23 of25  
SCENARIO # 1  
NUREG-I02 I ~ Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


  Appendix D                   Required Operator Actions                         FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
          ~~ ~ ~
Required Operator Actions  
  SCENARIO NIJMBER I           EVEN?' NUMBER:         6/7   FACILITY:       Harris
FORM ES-D-2  
  EVENT DESCRIPTION:       Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip
~~  
                        SI-287
~  
                                                -_
~  
                    ansition to EPP-008, SI Termination
SCENARIO NIJMBER I  
                                  -         ____ __
EVEN?' NUMBER:  
                    TERMINATE n m SCENARIO AFTER TRE TRANSITION TO
6 / 7  
                                        EPP-008 IS ANNOUNCED.
FACILITY:  
                                                ___x_I        I  _
Harris  
                                                                              ____
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
  COMMENTS:
Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip  
Page 24 of25                           SCENARIO #I               MJREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
SI-287  
                                                                        Post Validation Revision
ansition to EPP-008, SI Termination  
-_
____
-
____ __  
TERMINATE nm
SCENARIO AFTER TRE TRANSITION TO  
EPP-008  
___x_I
IS ANNOUNCED.  
I_
COMMENTS:  
Page 24 of25  
SCENARIO #I  
MJREG-1021,  
Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


I # Ol?iVNTJS
I # Ol?iVNTJS  
              -~ . ......
-~  
. . . . . . .  


    Harris
Harris  
    Draft
Draft  
  Scenario 2
Scenario 2  
Operating Exam
Operating Exam  
    2004
2004  


  Appendix D                               Simulator Scenario Outline                             FORM ES-D-I
Appendix D  
  Facility:       HARRlS           Scenario Number:           2           Op-Test Numher:
Simulator Scenario Outline  
      Examiners                                         (&3?dtOrS
FORM ES-D-I  
  Initial Conditions: IC-18; 100% power DOL; AFW Pump A-SA OOS (CFW026 RACK-OUT); HDP A
Op-Test Numher:
                      OOS (CN11065 RACK-OUT); Lower power by 25 MWe and increase boron
Facility:  
                      concentration by 2 ppm: Allow plant to stabilize.
HARRlS  
  Turnover:            The unit is at 100% power at BOL, with equilibrium xenon conditions.
Scenario Number:  
                      Boron concentration is 1238 ppm. Bank D rods are at 218 steps.
2  
                      AFW Pump Awas taken out of service 2 hours ago for oil replacement due to
Examiners  
                      contaminants and is expected to be returned to service within the next 2 hours.
(&3?dtOrS  
                      Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 has been entered. Risk level is YELLOW.
Initial Conditions: IC-18; 100% power DOL; AFW Pump A-SA OOS (CFW026 RACK-OUT); HDP A  
                      IIDP A is tagged out of service for hearing replacement and is not expected back for
OOS (CN11065 RACK-OUT); Lower power by 25 MWe and increase boron  
                      the next several days.
concentration by 2 ppm: Allow plant to stabilize.  
                      Shift orders are to maintain power at 100% and restore AFW Pump Ato service when
The unit is at 100% power at BOL, with equilibrium xenon conditions.  
                      it becomes available. GP-005 has been completed and the plant has been stable for 3
Boron concentration is 1238 ppm. Bank D rods are at 218 steps.  
                      weeks.
AFW Pump A was taken out of service 2 hours ago for oil replacement due to  
                  Eamp 90                     NOTE: MVL TIPLE E VERTS OhSAME TRIGGER.
contaminants and is expected to be returned to service within the next 2 hours.  
                XB 100070
Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 has been entered. Risk level is YELLOW.  
                OFF with I
IIDP A is tagged out of service for hearing replacement and is not expected back for  
Page 1 of 18                                       SCENAIUO R2                   M W G - I O Z I , Revision 9, Draft
the next several days.  
                                                                                          Post Validaticn Revision
Shift orders are to maintain power at 100% and restore AFW Pump A to service when  
it becomes available. GP-005 has been completed and the plant has been stable for 3  
weeks.  
Turnover:
Eamp 90  
XB 100070
OFF with I
NOTE: MVL TIPLE E VERTS Oh
SAME TRIGGER.  
Page 1 of 18  
SCENAIUO R2  
M W G - I O Z I , Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validaticn Revision  


                                            NOTE: MUL TIPL
NOTE: MUL TIPL  
                                            NOTE: THIS E VENT SHOULD BE SET ON SAME
NOTE: THIS E VENT SHOULD BE SET ON SAME  
                                            TRIGGER AS E VENT 7.
TRIGGER AS E VENT 7.  
* (X)orrnai, (K)eactivity, (Onstrurnent, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
* (X)orrnai, (K)eactivity, (Onstrurnent, (C)omponent, (M)ajor  
Page2of18                                       SCENARIO #2           NUREG-1021, Kevision 9, DnA
Page2of18  
                                                                            Post Validation Kevision
SCENARIO #2  
NUREG-1021, Kevision 9, DnA  
Post Validation Kevision  


Appendix D                      Required Operator Actions                           FORM ES-D-2
Required Operator Actions  
  SCENARIO NUMBER: 2           EVENTNUMRER:               1       FACILITY:   Harris
FORM ES-D-2  
~
Appendix D
  EVENT DESCRIPTION:       SIG A PORV Pressure Transmitter PT-308 fails high with failure of
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2  
                  e   SG A PORV open (open indication failed)
EVENTNUMRER:  
                  e  RCS temperature lowering
1  
                  Directs operator to take manuai control of SG A PORV and close per
FACILITY:  
                  requirements of OMM-OOI
Harris  
                  e   Condition / cause communicated to SRO
~  
                      SKC3 p v i d e s concurrence to take manual control
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                      SRO provides control limits
SIG A PORV Pressure Transmitter PT-308 fails high with failure of  
                  e  Appropnatc procedure implemented when plant stabilized
e  
COMMENTS:
e
    Page 3 of 18                              SCENARIO #2                 NIJREG-1021, Revision 9, DnR
RCS temperature lowering
                                                                                Post Validation Revision
SG A PORV open (open indication failed)  
Directs operator to take manuai control of SG A PORV and close per  
requirements of OMM-OOI  
e  
SRO provides control limits
e
Condition / cause communicated to SRO  
SKC3 p v i d e s concurrence to take manual control  
Appropnatc procedure implemented when plant stabilized  
COMMENTS:  
SCENARIO #2  
NIJREG-1021, Revision 9, DnR  
Post Validation Revision  
Page 3 of 18


Auoendix D                         Requircd Operator Actions                               FORM ES-D-2
Auoendix D  
        ~~~
Requircd Operator Actions  
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2               EVENT NUMBER:             2       FACILITY:       Harris
FORM ES-D-2  
EVEKT DESCRIPTION:           LT-112, VCT Level, High Pailure
~~~  
                          ALB-007-5-5. COMPUTER ALARM CIIEM & VOL SYSTEMS
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2  
                                                                          Tank, aligns to HUT
EVENT NUMBER:  
                      Enters and direets the actions of AOP-003. Malfunction of Reactor Makeup
2  
                      Control
FACILITY:  
                      Check 1.4 available
Harris  
            I SKO I Determines LK-I 12 output has failed and noes
EVEKT DESCRIPTION:  
                                                                - to Section 3.1, LT-I 12 or LT-115
LT-112, VCT Level, High Pailure  
                      Malfiinction
ALB-007-5-5. COMPUTER ALARM CIIEM & VOL SYSTEMS  
--+sK(1-k%OUS                          ACTION, Assesses effects of LT-I 12 failure (Attachment 1)
Enters and direets the actions of AOP-003. Malfunction of Reactor Makeup  
            I   RO 1 Determines failure is NOT due to LT-I 15 and EO to Step 8
Control  
                      Determines failure caused by LT-112
Check 1.4 available  
              __-                                        ~  l  _  _    l
Tank, aligns to HUT
                      Monitor VCT level using either:
I  
                                                                                    I
SKO  
                                                      'ntain VCT level above 20% using auto makeup
I Determines LK-I 12 output has failed and noes to Section 3.1, LT-I 12 or LT-115  
                                                      intain VCT level below 7oo/o by manually diverting
-
COMMENTS:
Malfiinction  
  Page 4 of 18                                 SCENARIO #2                   WUTPEG-102I Revision 9, Draft
- - + s K ( 1 - k % O U S 
                                                                                            ~
ACTION, Assesses effects of LT-I 12 failure (Attachment 1)  
                                                                                      Post Validation Revision
I  
RO  
1 Determines failure is NOT due to LT-I 15 and EO to Step 8  
Determines failure caused by LT-112  
Monitor VCT level using either:  
~l__l
__-
I  
'ntain VCT level above 20% using auto makeup  
intain VCT level below 7oo/o by manually diverting  
COMMENTS:  
Page 4 of 18  
SCENARIO #2  
WUTPEG-102
I ~ Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


Appendix D                 Required Operator Actioi~s                     FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2       EVENT NUMBER:           2     FACILITY:   Harris
Required Operator Actioi~s  
EVENT DESCRIPTION     1.T-112, VCT Level, High Failure (CONTINUED)
FORM ES-D-2  
                      n LCV-I i5A III VC'T position
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2  
                  _ I_
EVENT NUMBER:  
                                                          _-   -
2  
COMMENTS:
FACILITY:  
  Page 5 of 18                       SCENARIO #2               NUREG-1021,Revision9: Draft
Harris  
                                                                      Post Validation Revision
EVENT DESCRIPTION  
1.T-112, VCT Level, High Failure (CONTINUED)  
n LCV-I i5A III VC'T position  
_I_
_--  
COMMENTS:  
Page 5 of 18  
SCENARIO #2  
NUREG-1021, Revision9: Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


Appendix D                       Required Operator Actions                           FORM ES-I)-2
Appendix D  
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2              EVENT X W B E R :       3         FACILITY:   Harris
Required Operator Actions  
-
FORM ES-I)-2  
EVENT :SCRIPTION:
EVENT XWBER:  
  TIME POSITION
3  
                            Dropped Control Rod FZ
FACILITY:  
                                      APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR                                 I
Harris  
                    e  ALB-013-4-2, POUER RANGE HIGH NEUTRON FLUX RATE ALERT,
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2
                CUE      alarming
:SCRIPTION:  
                    * ALB-O 13-4-5, POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVLATHON, alarming
Dropped Control Rod FZ  
                        ALH-013-7-4, ONE ROD AT BOTTOM, alarming
I
                    e  ALE-013-8-1, BANK D FULL ROD WITHDRAWAL, alarming
EVENT -
                    * AI,B-013-8-S, COMPUTER ALARM ROD DEVISEQ NIS PWR RANGE
TIME
                        TILTS, alarming
POSITION
                        RCS temperature decreasing
CUE
                    e  Control rods stepping out until C-11 interlock
SRO
                    e   IXWI indicates Rod F2 b o x e d_  I                                        -
RO
                SRO Enters and directs the actions of AOP-001, Malfunction of Rod Conwol and
RO
                    Indication
RO
                    -          System
...
                                  -
SRO
                RO  (1MMEI)IATE ACTION) Check that LESS THAN TWO control rods are dropped
SKO
                                                                          -
APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
                RO  [IMMEDIATEACTION) Position Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN
ALB-013-4-2, POUER RANGE HIGH NEUTRON FLUX RATE ALERT,  
                RO
e
                ... IMMEDIATEACTION) Check Control Bank motion STOPPED
alarming  
                SRO Go To Section 3.1, Dropped Control Rod             -__                          I
ALB-O 13-4-5, POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVLATHON, alarming  
                    ____I__
ALH-013-7-4, ONE ROD AT BOTTOM, alarming  
                SKO Record the time at which the rod dropped
ALE-013-8-1, BANK D FULL ROD WITHDRAWAL, alarming  
                                                                        _  --  I  _              -
AI,B-013-8-S, COMPUTER ALARM ROD DEVISEQ NIS PWR RANGE  
                    Adjust one of the following to equalize Tavg with Tref
TILTS, alarming  
                    e     Turbine load
Control rods stepping out until C-11 interlock  
                        Boron concentrations_---
*
                    Direct an operator to check ALL Rod Control Power and Logic Cabinets for
e  
                    normal operation, as follows
*
                    _   I
RCS temperature decreasing
                    Direct Maintenance to perform corrective action on ALL affected Rod Control
e  
                    Power and LoAc Cabinets
Enters and directs the actions of AOP-001, Malfunction of Rod Conwol and  
                              I
Indication System  
                                                                      __-___I___
(1MMEI)IATE ACTION) Check that LESS THAN TWO control rods are dropped  
                    lheck that ALB-13-7-1, ROD CONTROL URGENT ALARM, is ALARMING,
[IMMEDIATE ACTION) Position Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN  
                    iut do not reset until Maintenance has completed repairs
e
COMMENTS:
IXWI indicates Rod F2 b o x e d 
  Page 6 of 18                                SCENARIO #2                 huREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
_I
                                                                                  Post Validation Revision
-
-
-
-
IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check Control Bank motion STOPPED  
-__
I
Go To Section 3.1, Dropped Control Rod  
Record the time at which the rod dropped  
Adjust one of the following to equalize Tavg with Tref  
e  
Turbine load  
Boron concentration
Direct an operator to check ALL Rod Control Power and Logic Cabinets for  
normal operation, as follows  
____I__
-
_--I_
s_---
_I
Direct Maintenance to perform corrective action on ALL affected Rod Control  
Power and I
LoAc Cabinets  
lheck that ALB-13-7-1, ROD CONTROL URGENT ALARM, is ALARMING,  
iut do not reset until Maintenance has completed repairs  
__-___I___
COMMENTS:  
SCENARIO #2  
huREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  
Page 6 of 18


Appendix D                                 Required Operator Actions                                   FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2                     EVENT NUMBER:                     3     FACILITY:       Harris
Required Operator Actions  
EVENT DESCRIPTIO                 Dropped Control Hod F2 (CONTINUED)
FORM ES-D-2  
  TIME        POSITION -....                   APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2  
                                                                    ..                                   ....
EVENT NUMBER:  
                  SRO  Kcview the fbllowing l:cckfi;ca! Specifications:
3  
                            3.1. I.!, Horation Control - Shutdown Margin. Modes I & 2
FACILITY:  
                            3.1.3.1, hlovablr Control Aswmblies Group Ileiglit
Harris  
                            3 . I . 3 3 , Shi~tdownRod Insertion Limit
EVENT DESCRIPTIO  
                            3.1.3.6, Contrcil Rod Insrrtion Limits
TIME
                      0    3.1.1, Axial Flux IXI'ferencr
_-
                            3.2.4, Quadrant P o w r Tilt Ratio       ~
I
                SRO  Notify the following:
-
                            Manager - C?pentions
                      .~ Reackv E n g i n e        e r i n L ...-.
POSITION
                                                  ....                  .. -. ..-     .. .-.   ..-     ..-.   ..-
SRO
                  RO  CIieck Reactor Power AT OR AROVE P-i0 (IO'%).
SRO
                  KO  Reset any negative rate trip alarm at the NIS cabinets
RO
_-          __--                                                                                                  -
KO
                SRO  Lower turbine load as recommended by Reactor Engineering
SRO
I    -
__--
COMMENTS:
COMMENTS:
    Page 7 of 18                                           SCENARIO #2                       NURIG-1021, Revision 9, Draft
Dropped Control Hod F2 (CONTINUED)  
                                                                                                    Post Validation Revision
....  
APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
-....  
..  
Kcview the fbllowing l:cckfi;ca! Specifications:  
3.1.3.1, hlovablr Control Aswmblies Group Ileiglit
0
3.1.1, Axial Flux IXI'ferencr
Notify the following:
Manager - C?pentions
.~ Reackv EngineerinL
....
CIieck Reactor Power AT OR AROVE P-i0 (IO'%).
3.1. I.!, Horation Control - Shutdown Margin. Modes I & 2  
3.I.33, Shi~tdown Rod Insertion Limit  
3.1.3.6, Contrcil Rod Insrrtion Limits  
3.2.4, Quadrant P o w r Tilt Ratio  
~  
. . . -.  
. . -.  
. .-  
. . . -.  
. .-  
. . -.  
. . -  
Reset any negative rate trip alarm at the NIS cabinets  
Lower turbine load as recommended by Reactor Engineering  
-  
Page 7 of 18  
SCENARIO #2  
NURIG-1021, Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


          ~
~  
Appendix D                         Required Operator Actions                             FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
SCENAKIO NIJMBER: 2               EVENT NIJMBEK:           4       FACILITY:       Harris
Required Operator Actions  
EVENT DESCRIPTIC               Power Reduction
FORM ES-D-2  
            POSITION                  APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
SCENAKIO NIJMBER: 2  
                CUE  Power reduction to less than 90% within the next 20 minutes has been directed
EVENT NIJMBEK:  
                      to dhwfirr- droeped.. Pod P e C l l X
4  
                SKO  Direct the actions of AOP-038, Rapid Downpower after discussing Reactor Trip
FACILITY:  
                      Critena using Attachment I                                                --
Harris  
                SRO  Notify Load Dispatcher that the Unit is reducing load
EVENT DESCRIPTIC  
                SRO  Determine required horic acid addiiion for desired power reduction, as follows:
POSITION
                      * Obtain values from the latest completed OPT-1525, Reactivity Plan
CUE
                          Generation Weekly
SKO
                                      ~.                 -~ 1 at Full Power
SRO
                                                Interval MOIIE                                        -
SRO
                SRO  Notify Radwastc Control Room to be prepared for the increased water processing
SRO
                    - requirements due to boration
SKO -
                                        I                                      -.                   ._
RO
                SKO  Check that a planned load reduction will NOT take the Unit to Turbine shutdown
RO
                      Determine rcactor power change will NOT exceed 15% in a one hour period
BOP
                RO    Check Rod Control in AUTO
BOP
                RO    Energize all available PRZ Backup heaters
Power Reduction  
                      I                                                        .~
APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
                BOP  heck the IIEH System in AUTO
Power reduction to less than 90% within the next 20 minutes has been directed  
                BOP  Perfonn the following at the DEK panel:
Direct the actions of AOP-038, Rapid Downpower after discussing Reactor Trip  
                      B   Depress the h a d Rate MW/MN pushbutton
Notify Load Dispatcher that the Unit is reducing load  
                      D   Enter desired rate in DEMAND display
Determine required horic acid addiiion for desired power reduction, as follows:  
                      D   Depress EXTEK pushbutton
*  
                      D   Depress REF pushhutton
Notify Radwastc Control Room to be prepared for the increased water processing
                      D   Enter desired load in DEMAhD display
Check that a planned load reduction will NOT take the Unit to Turbine shutdown
                      1   Depress ENTER pushbutton
to dhwfirr droeped
                      t   Check IIOLD pushbutton LIT
.. Pod P e C l l X 
                      B   Depress GO pushbutton
-
                      I   Verify the d u e in the REFERENCE display Lowers
Critena using Attachment I
COMMENTS:
--
  Page 8 of 18                                   SCENARIO #2                 NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
Obtain values from the latest completed OPT-1525, Reactivity Plan  
                                                                                      Post Validation Revinion
Generation Weekly  
~.  
Interval MOIIE
-~  
1 at Full Power  
-  
requirements due to  
I boration  
-.  
._  
Determine rcactor power change will NOT exceed 15% in a one hour period  
Check Rod Control in AUTO  
Energize all available PRZ Backup heaters  
heck the IIEH System in AUTO  
.~
I
Perfonn the following at the DEK panel:  
B  
D  
D  
Depress EXTEK pushbutton  
D  
Depress REF pushhutton  
D  
1  
Depress ENTER pushbutton  
t  
Check IIOLD pushbutton LIT  
B  
Depress GO pushbutton  
I  
Depress the h a d  Rate MW/MN pushbutton
Enter desired rate in DEMAND display
Enter desired load in DEMAhD display
Verify the d u e in the REFERENCE display Lowers  
COMMENTS:  
Page 8 of 18  
SCENARIO #2  
NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revinion  


Appendix D                       Kequired OpenltoF Actions                           P O W ES-D-2
Appendix D  
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2             EVENT NUMBER:           4/ 5     FACILITY:       Harris
Kequired OpenltoF Actions  
EVENT DESCRIPTION:         Power Reduction (Continued) /Boric Acid Pump Trip
P O W ES-D-2  
                                      APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2  
                  Commence RCS boration as required to maititam Control Rods above the Kod
EVENT NUMBER:  
                  Insertion Limit
4 / 5  
                  e   ALE-006-8-4, BORIC ACID FI.OB' DEVIATION, alarming
FACILITY:  
                      Boric Acid Pump A-SA tripped
Harris  
                  Directs KO to stat? standby boric acid pump to allow continuing boration
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                  _____
Power Reduction (Continued) /Boric Acid Pump Trip  
                  NOTE: IF OPERA TOR SENT TO INICIESTIGATE, REPORT
----*
                  BREAKER FOR PUMP CLOSED, BUT MOTOR IS EXTREMELY HOT
----*---
----*            TO TOUCH.
APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
                  Starts standby Boric Acid Pump
Commence RCS boration as required to maititam Control Rods above the Kod  
                  Restarts boration flow
Insertion Limit  
                                                        I
e  
                  Initiates repairs to pump
Directs KO to stat? standby boric acid pump to allow continuing boration  
                  Verifv Generator load and Reactor Dower lowering
NOTE: IF OPERA TOR SENT TO INICIESTIGATE, REPORT  
                  Maintain Generator reactive load (VARs)   within guidelines
BREAKER FOR PUMP CLOSED, BUT MOTOR IS EXTREMELY HOT  
                                                _ _ _I _ _ . . ~ -
TO TOUCH.
                  When Turbine load is less than YS%, then dispatch an operator to open 3A and 3B.-
ALE-006-8-4, BORIC ACID FI.OB' DEVIATION, alarming
                  Feedwatet Heater vents per OP-136, Shntdowzn of Feedwater Heatem_. 3A and     3B
Boric Acid Pump A-SA tripped
                                                                                            -.__
_____
                  Check Tavgwithin 5&deg;F of T,,.       ______
I
                  Check Power level at the target value
Starts standby Boric Acid Pump  
---*---
Restarts boration flow  
COMMENTS:
Initiates repairs to pump  
    - 9 of 18
Verifv Generator load and Reactor Dower lowering  
  Page                                      SCENARIO #2                   NUREG-I02 1, Revision 9, Drafi
Maintain Generator reactive load (VARs) within guidelines  
                                                                                  Post Validation Revision
When Turbine load is less than YS%, then dispatch an operator to open 3A and 3B.-  
_ _ _I _ _ . . ~ - 
Feedwatet Heater vents per OP-136, Shntdowzn of Feedwater Heatem
_. 3A and -.__  
3B
Check Tavg within 5&deg;F of T,,.  
Check Power level at the target value  
______
COMMENTS:  
NUREG-I02 1, Revision 9, Drafi
Page 9 of 18  
SCENARIO #2  
-  
Post Validation Revision  


~~
~~  
Appendix 13                           Required Operator Actions                         FORM E&sect;-D-2
Appendix 13  
  SCENARIO NUMBER 2                   EVEKT NUMBER:             6       FACILITY: IIarris
Required Operator Actions  
  EVENT DESCRIPTIC               1,oss of Power to an ESF Bus with Failure of EDG to Load
FORM E&sect;-D-2  
    TIME      POSITION I.                  APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
SCENARIO NUMBER 2  
                          S[.VI!L?\TOH OPERATOR INSTRCCTIONS: INSERT NEXT
EVEKT NUMBER:  
                          MALFUNCTJON FOR LOSS OF PONEH AFTER CHEW H A S
6  
                          REDUCED PO\VER
FACILITY:  
                                    ____._...._...I
IIarris  
                        e   Multiple system alarms
EVENT DESCRIPTIC  
                        e   Loss of power to Bus 1A-SA
TIME
                        e   EDG 1.4-SA fails to load
_I-
                  SRO  Enters and directs the actions of AOP-025. Loss of One Emergency AC Bus
POSITION
    _ I -
SRO
                        ( 6 1 or o n e Emergency DC Bus ( I 25V)
RO
                                ~
SRO
                    RO  (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Determines no C S P running and isolates letdown by
I_--
              I    _  --
SRO
                        c a a n y open orifice isolation valves                 -                       I
I swo
                  SRO    VERIFY at least one Emergency AC Bus is FNERGIZED      ____-     .-     -
1,oss of Power to an ESF Bus with Failure of EDG to Load  
                        -I________                                         I _
APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
                  SRO    REFER TO the following Tech Specs:
I.
                        e 3.0.3 (Due to loss of2/4 containment rad monitors and CVIS affect on CNMT
S[.VI!L?\\TOH OPERATOR INSTRCCTIONS: INSERT NEXT  
                            vacuum reliefs)
MALFUNCTJON FOR LOSS OF PONEH AFTER CHEW HAS
                        e 3.3.3.1 Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations (Due to inoperable Control
REDUCED PO\\VER  
                            Room Outside Air Intake Monitors)
____._...._...I  
                        s  3.4.6.1 RCS IZdk Detection (Due to Kh4-3502A inup)
e Multiple system alarms  
                        0  3.6.5 Vacuum Relief System
e  
                        0  3.8.1.1 AC Sources Operating
e  
                        _ _
Enters and directs the actions of AOP-025. Loss of One Emergency AC Bus  
                            3.8.3.1
( 6 1 or one Emergency DC Bus (I 25V)  
                            _  .  _
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Determines no CSP running and isolates letdown by  
                                      Onsite
VERIFY at least one Emergency AC Bus is FNERGIZED
                                      I _ _
REFER TO the following Tech Specs:
                                            Power
e
                                            - -
e
                                                    Distribution - Oeerating
s
            I    swo    Go to Section 3.1 for Loss of Emergency Bus 1.4-SA
0
  COMMENTS:
3.6.5 Vacuum Relief System
      Page 10 of 18                                   SCENARIO #2                 NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Drafi
0
                                                                                        Post Validation Revision
3.8.1.1 AC Sources Operating
3.8.3.1 Onsite Power Distribution - Oeerating
Go to Section 3.1 for Loss of Emergency Bus 1.4-SA
Loss of power to Bus 1A-SA
EDG 1.4-SA fails to load
~
c a a n y open orifice isolation valves  
-  
I  
I_
____-
.--  
-I________  
3.0.3 (Due to loss of2/4 containment rad monitors and CVIS affect on CNMT  
vacuum reliefs)  
3.3.3.1 Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations (Due to inoperable Control  
Room Outside Air Intake Monitors)  
3.4.6.1 RCS IZdk Detection (Due to Kh4-3502A inup)  
___._I__--  
COMMENTS:  
Page 10 of 18  
SCENARIO #2  
NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Drafi  
Post Validation Revision  


                                    Required Operator Actions                               FORM ES-D-2
Required Operator Actions  
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2                 EVENTNUMBER:               6       FACILITY:     Harris
FORM ES-D-2  
EVEN? DESCRIPTION:             Loss of Power to an ESF Bus with Failure of EDG to Load
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2  
TIME
EVENTNUMBER:  
                    II*
6  
                      Check EDG A is running properly
FACILITY:  
                      e   Voltage
Harris  
                          Frequency
EVEN? DESCRIPTION:  
                BOP   Check Bus 1A-SA is NOT energized and pbdCC EMERGENCY STOP switch for
Loss of Power to an ESF Bus with Failure of EDG to Load  
                  KO I Start R Train CSP
TIME  
                      Adjust HC-186. I , RCI Seal IVTR IN3 Flow. to establish seal injection flow as
Check EDG A is running properly  
                      necessary to maintain the foilowing:
I
                          L,ess than 31 gppm total flow to all RCPs
e  
                                      and 13 gpm to all RCPs
Voltage  
                                                          .~                 -
I* Frequency  
                BOP                                   per OP-172, Reactor Auxiliary Building IIVAC
BOP  
                KO    Verify any CCW Pump - ninning
Check Bus 1A-SA is NOT energized and pbdCC EMERGENCY STOP switch for  
                RO  Verify Charging and Letdown flow per C)P-107, Chemical and Volume Control
KO  
                                                          --
I Start R Train CSP  
                                            Pressurrzcr level                                              I
Adjust HC-186. I, RCI Seal IVTR IN3 Flow. to establish seal injection flow as  
                BOP                                to maintain reactor power and S/G levels
necessary to maintain the foilowing:  
COMMENTS:
L,ess than 31 gppm total flow to all RCPs  
  Page 1 1 of 18                                 SCENARIO #2                   NUREG-I02I,Revision9, Draft
-
                                                                                        Post Validation Revision
and 13 gpm to all RCPs  
.~  
BOP  
KO
RO
BOP
per OP-172, Reactor Auxiliary Building IIVAC  
Verify any CCW Pump - ninning  
Verify Charging and Letdown flow per C)P-107, Chemical and Volume Control  
Pressurrzcr level --  
I  
to maintain reactor power and S/G levels  
COMMENTS:  
Page 11 of 18  
SCENARIO #2  
NUREG-I02I,  
Revision9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


Appendix D                       Required Operator Actions                             FORM E&sect;-D-2
Appendix D  
        ....             .....                             ....                           ......-
Required Operator Actions  
SCENARIO NLhlB3EK: 2           E\FNT NLIMHEK:           7       FACL LITY:   Harris
FORM E&sect;-D-2  
                            Second Dropped Control Rod K14 I Reactor Trip
....  
                    e   ALB-013-7-3, TWO OK MORE RODS AT BOTTOM, alarming
.....  
                    - DRPI indicates =d _ Rod    _ _K14~.___--                     ~        ~-
....  
                    Determines a second dropped rod has occurred and orders Reactor Trip
......-  
                    CRITICAL STEP TO TRIP REACTOR WHEN SECOND DROPPED
SCENARIO NLhlB3EK: 2  
                    ROD OCCURS.
E\\FNT NLIMHEK:  
                    I
7  
                    Enters and directs the action of PATH-I
FACL LITY:  
                                                    ____-.-._-                          ~-
Harris  
                    (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Reactor Trip:
COMMENTS:
                    e Trip breakers RTA and BYA - open
Second Dropped Control Rod K14 I Reactor Trip  
                    E Trip breakers RTB and BYE3 - open
e  
                    e Rod hottoni lights - not available due to loss of power
Determines a second dropped rod has occurred and orders Reactor Trip
                    _________~
ALB-013-7-3, TWO OK MORE RODS AT BOTTOM, alarming  
                    E  Neutron flux d e c r e m  _  I -   -
DRPI indicates =d  
                    (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Turbine Trip:
Rod K14
                    E  All turbine throttle valves - shut
~
                    e                        valves - shut
~-
                                          .~____I___.__I-..-
-
                      All turbine governor                                                          -
_ _ _ ~ . _ _ _ - -
                    (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Power To AC Emergency Buses:
CRITICAL STEP TO TRIP REACTOR WHEN SECOND DROPPED  
                      Check AC emergency bus IA-SA -. deenergized
I
                    e  Check AC emergency bus 1U-SB - energized
ROD OCCURS.  
                      Check bus voltages
Enters and directs the action of PATH-I  
                    D  Check 6.9 KV bus 1A-SA breakers -~ open
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Reactor Trip:  
                    D  Check 6.9 KV bus 1B-SI3 breakers -closed
e  
COMMENTS:
Trip breakers RTA and BYA - open  
  Page 12 of 18                               SCENARIO #2                   NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft
E Trip breakers RTB and BYE3 - open  
                                                                                  Post Vaiidation Revision
e  
Rod hottoni lights - not available due to loss of power  
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Turbine Trip:
E
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Power To AC Emergency Buses:
e
Check bus voltages
D
D
~-
____-.-._-
_________~  
Neutron flux d e c r e m   
_I-
-  
e
All turbine governor
.~____I___.__I-..-  
valves - shut
-
E
All turbine throttle valves - shut
Check AC emergency bus IA-SA -. deenergized  
Check AC emergency bus 1U-SB - energized  
Check 6.9 KV bus 1A-SA breakers -~ open  
Check 6.9 KV bus 1B-SI3 breakers -closed  
Page 12 of 18  
SCENARIO #2  
NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft  
Post Vaiidation Revision  


Amendix D                           Required Operator Actions                             FOSM ES-D-2
Amendix D  
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2                 EVENT NIJMBER:             7       FACILITY:     Harris
Required Operator Actions  
EVENT DESCRIPTION:             Secund Dropped C~ntrolRod K14 /Reactor Trip (CONTINUED)
FOSM ES-D-2  
  TIME       POSITIOP                 ...;tfPLICANTS
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2  
                                          .                       ..._OK BEIIAVIOK
EVENT NIJMBER:  
                                                            ACTIONS
7  
                                                                                                    ....-
FACILITY:  
                  RO  (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check NO SI Actuation and NOT required
Harris  
                      0   Check ail of the following dark:
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                                SI Actuated bypass permissive light
Secund Dropped C~ntrol Rod K14 /Reactor Trip (CONTINUED)  
                            * ALB-11-2-2
TIME  
                            0  AI,B-l1-5-l
POSITIOP  
                              ALB-11-5-3
RO
                          * ALB-12-1-4
I
                      0  CNMT pressure < 3.0 PSIG
SRO
                      e   PRZ pressure > 1850 PSIG
I
                          Steampressure > 601 PSHG
SRO
          I      SRO
I
                    I
BOP
                      Transition to and direct the actions of EOP-EPP-004. Rzactor T r b ResDonse
COMMENTS:
                SRO  Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required
....-
                      -  -
;tfPLICANTS ACTIONS OK BEIIAVIOK
                      Check WCS temperature and control AFW flow to stabilize temperature
....  
                      Check RCPs running
..._
          I    BOP    Check Feed System Status:
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check NO SI Actuation and NOT required  
                      * Verify feed reg valves - SHUT
0  
                      * Establish AFW flow to SGs using MDMW Pump B and TDAFW Pump as
Check ail of the following dark:  
                          necessary
0
                      Verify all control rods fully inserted
AI,B-l1-5-l  
                      Lheck PRZ Level > 17%
ALB-11-5-3  
COMMENTS:
0
    Page 13 of 68                                 SCENARIO ti2               NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft
CNMT pressure < 3.0 PSIG  
                                                                                        Post Validation Revision
e  
PRZ pressure > 1850 PSIG  
Steampressure > 601 PSHG  
Transition to and direct the actions of EOP-EPP-004. Rzactor Trb ResDonse  
SI Actuated bypass permissive light
* ALB-11-2-2
* ALB-12-1-4
Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required  
Check WCS temperature and control AFW flow to stabilize temperature  
--
Check RCPs running  
Check Feed System Status:  
*  
*
Verify all control rods fully inserted
Verify feed reg valves - SHUT  
Establish AFW flow to SGs using MDMW Pump B and TDAFW Pump as  
necessary  
Lheck PRZ Level > 17%  
Page 13 of 68  
SCENARIO ti2  
NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


Amendix D                       Required Operator Actions                               FORM ES-D-2
Amendix D  
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2             EVENT NUMBER:           8         FACILITY:       Harris
Required Operator Actions  
EVEKT DESCRIPTION:         Pressurizer Steam Space Break / Single Train SI
FORM ES-D-2  
                                    APPLICANI"S AC'I'IONS OR REIIAVIOR           ....
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2  
                  e   RCS pressure decreasing
EVENT NUMBER:  
                      PRZ lwei increasing
8  
                  e   Containment temperature increasing
FACILITY:  
                ~. Containment pressure increasing
Harris  
                  Directs SI Actuation due to loss of subcooling and transitions and directs the
EVEKT DESCRIPTION:  
                  actions ofPATH-I, Entry Point A                                               --
Pressurizer Steam Space Break / Single Train SI  
                  Manually initiates Safety lniection or verifies automatic Safety hiection
APPLICANI"S AC'I'IONS OR REIIAVIOR  
                  Ibldout A applies
....  
                -      -
e  
                  h p s RCPs when RCS pressure decreases below 1400 psig after venfylng SH flow
RCS pressure decreasing  
                greater_- than 200 gpm         -.____
PRZ lwei increasing  
                I
e  
                  CRITICAL STEP TO TRIP RCPs WHE-V TRIP CRITERIA MET.
Containment temperature increasing  
                      _      -                _l______li
Containment pressure increasing  
                Verify C S P B and RHR Pump B operating
Directs SI Actuation due to loss of subcooling and transitions and directs the  
                Venfy SI flow > 200 gpm
Manually initiates Safety lniection or verifies automatic Safety hiection
                                                        ~ _ _ _ _ _
~.
                Verify KCS pressure > 230 psig
actions ofPATH-I, Entry Point A  
                Check MS Line Actuation occurs when Containment pressure exceeds 3 psig
--  
                Verifv Containment Pressure has remained below 10 Dsie
Ibldout A applies  
                Verify at least 210 KF'PH AFW flow
h p s RCPs when RCS pressure decreases below 1400 psig after venfylng SH flow  
                Verify alignment of components from actuation of ESFAS s i p & using PATH-1
greater than 200 gpm  
                E___-
CRITICAL STEP TO TRIP RCPs WHE-V TRIP CRITERIA MET.  
                    ide, Attachment 6                                                          ___-
Verify C S P B and RHR Pump B operating  
                Control feed flow and steam dumo to stabilize RCS temoerature at 557 O F
Venfy SI flow > 200 gpm  
                Energize AC Bus 1B 1
Verify KCS pressure > 230 psig
                -.
--
                Check PRZ PORVs closed
-.____
COMMENTS:
-_
  Page 14 of18                             SCENARIO 82                     NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft
I_-
                                                                                      Post Validation Revision
_l______li
~ _ _ _ _ _
Check MS Line Actuation occurs when Containment pressure exceeds 3 psig  
Verifv Containment Pressure has remained below 10 Dsie  
Verify at least 210 KF'PH AFW flow  
Verify alignment of components from actuation of ESFAS sip& using PATH-1  
Control feed flow and steam dumo to stabilize RCS temoerature at 557 O F
E___-
ide, Attachment 6
___-
Energize AC Bus 1 B 1  
Check PRZ PORVs closed  
-.
COMMENTS:  
Page 14 of18  
SCENARIO 82  
NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


Amendix D                          Required Operator Actions                          FORM ES-D-2
FORM ES-D-2  
SCENARIO N U M B E R 2           EVENT NUMBER:           8       FACILITY:     Harris
Amendix D
EVENT DESCRIPTION:           Pressurizer Steam Space Break / Single Train SI (CONTIFUED)
Required Operator Actions
                                        APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
SCENARIO NUMBER 2  
                    -...                                     ..
EVENT NUMBER:  
                      Verify at least one PORV Block Valve own                                           I
8  
                      Chesk PW, surav valves closed                                                     I
FACILITY:  
                      Check NO SGs depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner or completely
Harris  
                      depressurized
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                      Check secondarv radiation norma6
Pressurizer Steam Space Break / Single Train SI (CONTIFUED)  
                      Check containment pressure NOT normal
APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
                    -
-...  
                    -Foldouts A and B apply
..  
                      Maintain KCS seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm
Verify at least one PORV Block Valve own  
                    Maintain at least 210 W P B AFW flow to SGs until at least one SG is above 25%
I  
                    1409/.]                                      _I____
Chesk PW, surav valves closed  
                    Control feed flow to maintain proper SG levels
I  
                    __
Check NO SGs depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner or completely  
                    Verify Bus IB1 is energized
depressurized  
                    Verifv Pw% PORVs closed                                                             I
Check secondarv radiation norma6  
                    Verify at least one PORV Block Valve open
Check containment pressure NOT normal  
COMMENl'S:
Foldouts A and B apply  
  Page 15 of 18                               SCENARIO #2                 NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
Maintain KCS seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm  
                                                                                    Post Validation Revision
-
-
Maintain at least 210 WPB AFW flow to SGs until at least one SG is above 25%  
Control feed flow to maintain proper SG levels  
Verify Bus IB1 is energized  
_I____
1409/.]
__
Verifv Pw% PORVs closed  
I  
Verify at least one PORV Block Valve open  
COMMENl'S:  
Page 15 of 18  
SCENARIO #2  
NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


Anpendix D                           Required Operator Actions                           FORM ES-D-2
Anpendix D  
  ~~
Required Operator Actions  
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2                 EVENT NUMBER:             8/ 9   FACILITY       Harris
FORM ES-D-2  
EVENT DESCRIPTION:               Pressurizer Steam Space Break / Single Train SI (CONTINUED)
~~  
                                              ...
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2  
                                91s Intrrrnediete    Hangr Compensating \'oltsgc ].ow Failure
EVENT NUMBER:  
-,-pi--                                    APPI ICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
8 / 9  
                        Check NO Containment Splay Pumps operating
FACILITY  
                        Determines NIS Interniediate Range Compensating Voltage is failed low and
Harris  
                        manualiy energizes both Source Range channels
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                        Checks RCS Dressure > 230 Dsie
Pressurizer Steam Space Break / Single Train SI (CONTINUED)  
                                                                                                    .-
91s Intrrrnediete
                        Checks KCS pressure stable
...  
                        Stops KHR Pump B
Hangr Compensating \\'oltsgc ].ow Failure  
          I     BOP I Checks SG pressures stable or increasing
APPI ICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
I    _      _                                                            __                           -
Check NO Containment Splay Pumps operating  
                                                          HX Valve, ICC-167
Determines NIS Interniediate Range Compensating Voltage is failed low and  
                                      energized by offsite power
Checks RCS Dressure > 230 Dsie
          I     BOP I Verif7iBus IBI energized
manualiy energizes both Source Range channels  
                            Train B CKDM fans
.-
                            Turbine Xormal Bearing Oil Pump
-,-pi---  
                        Stoa the DC b a r i n g Oil Pump
Checks KCS pressure stable  
          I     BOP   Continue attempts to restore offsite power to Emergency Bus LA-SA
Stops KHR Pump B  
COMMENTS:
I  
    Page 16 of 18                                   SCENARIO ff2               NUREG-1021, Revision 9. Draft
BOP  
                                                                                      Post Validation Revision
I Checks SG pressures stable or increasing  
__  
-  
I__
HX Valve, ICC-167  
energized by offsite power  
I  
BOP  
I Verif7iBus IBI energized  
Train B CKDM fans  
Turbine Xormal Bearing Oil Pump  
Stoa the DC baring Oil Pump  
I  
BOP  
Continue attempts to restore offsite power to Emergency Bus LA-SA  
COMMENTS:  
Page 16 of 18  
SCENARIO ff2  
NUREG-1021, Revision 9. Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


Appendix D                         Required Operator Actions                           FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
  SCENARIO NUMBER: 2             EVENT NUMBER:           8       FACILITY:       Harris
Required Operator Actions  
  EVENT DESCRIPTION:         Pressurizer Steam SDace Break / Single Train SI (CONTINUED1
FORM ES-D-2  
1 TIME   I POSITION                 APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2  
                      Verifv EDG B nimine unloaded
EVENT NUMBER:  
                      Reset SI
8  
                                                    -~
FACILITY:  
                      Shutdown EDG B per OP-155,Section 4.0
Harris  
                      Determine RHR Train B carable of Cold Leg Recirculation
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                      Verifv Auxiliarv and Radwaste Processing Building Radiation normal
Pressurizer Steam SDace Break / Single Train SI (CONTINUED1  
                      Check KCS uressure meater than 230 osie
1 TIME I POSITION  
                        TERMINATE THE SCENARIO AFTER THE TRANSITION TO
APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
                                              EPP-009 IS ANNOUNCED.
COMMENTS:
COMMENTS:
Verifv EDG B nimine unloaded -~
    Page l7of I8                               SCENAKIO #2                 NUREG-102I , Revision 9, Draft
Reset SI  
                                                                                    Post Validation Revision
Shutdown EDG B per OP-155, Section 4.0  
Determine RHR Train B carable of Cold Leg Recirculation  
Verifv Auxiliarv and Radwaste Processing Building Radiation normal  
Check KCS uressure meater than 230 osie  
TERMINATE THE SCENARIO AFTER THE TRANSITION TO  
EPP-009 IS ANNOUNCED.  
Page l7of I8  
SCENAKIO #2  
NUREG-102
I , Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


Appendix D                         Required Operator Actions                     FORM ESD-2
Appendix D  
  SCENARIO NUhIRER: 2             EVENT KUMBEK:           j 0   FACILITY:  Harris
Required Operator Actions  
                                                                    I                            ...
FORM ESD-2  
EVENT DESCRIPTION:           Classifies the Event
...
I TIME   IPOSITION I                 APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR                           I
FACILITY:
                      Classifies the event as an Site Area Emergency
Harris
                      NOTE: SAE BASED ONBREACH OFRCS B A M f E R AND
I
l---t-+----           CQNTAIRMENT PRESSlIRE IN EXCESS OF 3 PSIG.
SCENARIO NUhIRER: 2  
                                                SCENARIO #2             NUREG-l02t,Revision 9, Draft
EVENT KUMBEK:  
                                                                              Post Validation Revision
j 0  
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
Classifies the Event  
I TIME I POSITION I
APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
I  
Classifies the event as an Site Area Emergency  
NOTE: SAE BASED ONBREACH OFRCS B A M f E R AND  
CQNTA IRMENT PRESSlIRE IN EXCESS OF 3 PSIG.
l---t-+----  
SCENARIO #2  
NUREG-l02t,  
Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


    Harris
Harris  
    Draft
Draft  
  Scenario 3
Scenario 3  
Operating Exam
Operating Exam  
    2004
2004  


  Anuendix D                                   Simulator Scenario Outline                         FORM l?S-D-I
Anuendix D  
  Facility:     HAWS                Scenario Number:           3           Op-Test Number:
Simulator Scenario Outline  
        Examiners                                         Operators
FORM l?S-D-I  
  Initial Conditions: IC-18; 100% power BOL; AFW Pump A-&sect;A OOS (CFW026 RACK-OUT); HDP
Facility:  
                      0 0 s (CND065RACK-OUT); JXSEHT EVENTS 6 and 7 DURING SIMUIATOR
H A W S 
                      SETUP. Lower power by 25 MWe and increase boron concentration by 2 ppm; Allow
Scenario Number:  
                      plant to stabilize.
3  
  Turnover:           The unit is at 100% power at BOL, with equilibnum xenon conditions.
Op-Test Number:  
                      Boron concentration is 1238 ppm. Hank D rods are at 218 steps.
Examiners  
                      AFW Pump 'A'was taken out of service 2 hours ago for oil replacement due to
Operators  
                      contaniinants and is expected to be retiuned to service within the next 2 hours. Technical
Initial Conditions: IC-18; 100% power BOL; AFW Pump A-&sect;A OOS (CFW026 RACK-OUT); HDP  
                      Specification 3.7.1.2 has been entered. Risk level is YELLOW.
0 0 s (CND065 RACK-OUT); JXSEHT EVENTS 6 and 7 DURING SIMUIATOR  
                      HDP 'A' is tagged out of service for hearing replacement and is not expected back for the
SETUP. Lower power by 25 MWe and increase boron concentration by 2 ppm; Allow  
                      next several days.
plant to stabilize.  
                      Shift orders are to maintain power at 100% and restore AFW Pump 'A' to service when it
Turnover:  
                      becomes available. GP-005 has been completed and the plant has been stable for 3 weeks
The unit is at 100% power at BOL, with equilibnum xenon conditions.  
                                                                      Event Description
Boron concentration is 1238 ppm. Hank D rods are at 218 steps.  
                                              Operating CCW Pump Trip with failure of standby pump to
AFW Pump 'A' was taken out of service 2 hours ago for oil replacement due to  
                                              automatically start
contaniinants and is expected to be retiuned to service within the next 2 hours. Technical  
                                              Feed Water Flow Low Failure
Specification 3.7.1.2 has been entered. Risk level is YELLOW.  
              I              I
HDP 'A' is tagged out of service for hearing replacement and is not expected back for the  
        3      I CFW-12B      I C(B0P)        Heater Drain Pump Trip with Failure of Turbine to Automatically
next several days.  
                                              Runback
Shift orders are to maintain power at 100% and restore AFW Pump 'A' to service when it  
                                              Pressurizer Pressure High Failure
becomes available. GP-005 has been completed and the plant has been stable for 3 weeks  
Page I of 18                                     SCENARIO #3                     NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
I
                                                                                          Post Validation Revision
I
3
I CFW-12B I C(B0P)
Event Description  
Operating CCW Pump Trip with failure of standby pump to  
automatically start  
Feed Water Flow Low Failure  
Heater Drain Pump Trip with Failure of Turbine to Automatically  
Runback  
Pressurizer Pressure High Failure  
Page I of 18  
SCENARIO #3  
NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


    Event     h4aifunction     Event                            Event Description
Event  
    Number        Number         Type*
Number
        5      SGN-5C 42(       M (ALL)    SG Tube Rupture
5
                    600
8
                MSS-5C 2       C (RO)     Failure of MSlV on Ruptured &sect;G to close - can be closed locally
h4aifunction  
                                C (SRO)
Number  
                                            NOTE: INSERT MALFUiWT1Ohr DUIUNG INITIAL SETUP
SGN-5C 42(  
                                            OF SIWULA TOR.
600  
                                C (BOP)    Partial failure of Automatic Phase A Lwlation signal (Train B
MSS-5C 2  
                                            Phase A Slave Relay for select CNMT Phase A valves fails to
NA
                                            energize when required). iSI-287, ICs-11 & 1SW-242
Event
                                            NOTE: INSERT MALFffNCTIO-WDUZLVC IA7TIAL SETUP
Type*
                                            OF SIMULA TOR.
M (ALL)
      8            NA                      Classifies the Event
C (RO)  
* (N)omial, (Rleactivity, (I)nstmment, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
C (SRO)
Page 2 of I 8                                SCENARIO #3                       NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
C (BOP)
                                                                                      Post Validation Revision
Event Description
SG Tube Rupture
Failure of MSlV on Ruptured &sect;G to close - can be closed locally  
NOTE: INSERT MALFUiWT1Ohr DUIUNG INITIAL SETUP  
OF SIWULA TOR.  
Partial failure of Automatic Phase A Lwlation signal (Train B  
Phase A Slave Relay for select CNMT Phase A valves fails to  
energize when required). iSI-287, ICs-11 & 1SW-242  
NOTE: INSERT MALFffNCTIO-W DUZLVC IA7TIAL SETUP  
OF SIMULA TOR.  
Classifies the Event  
* (N)omial, (Rleactivity, (I)nstmment, (C)omponent, (M)ajor  
Page 2 of I8
SCENARIO #3  
NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


  Amendix D                         Reeauired Ouerator Actions                             FORM ES-D-2
Amendix D  
    SCENARIO NUiLIBER:              EVENT..NUhlBER:           I         FAClL ITl;
Reeauired Ouerator Actions  
              ..         3                  ..                                 .-. llnrris
FORM ES-D-2  
  EVENT DESCRIPTIO hI:         Operating CCW Pump Trip with failure of standby pump to
FAClL ITl;
                                automatically start
llnrris
                                        APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVfOR
.-.  
                        Diagnose trip of CCW Pump 1A-SA and failure of CCW Pump 1B-SB to
EVENT NUhlBER:  
                        automatic stalt
I  
                        e   Numerous alarms on ALB-005 due to no CCW flow
....  
                            Breaker indication on CCW Pump 1A-SA
SCENARIO NUiLIBER: 3
                      ~~
..  
                                                  1B-SB to start
EVENT DESCRIPTIO h I:  
                            Failure of C C W B_-___--
Operating CCW Pump Trip with failure of standby pump to  
                      Enters and directs the actions of AOP-014. Loss of ConiDonent Cooling Water
automatically start  
                                                          ter than 52 psig
APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVfOR  
                                        heck condition of the breaker and the pump
Diagnose trip of CCW Pump 1 A-SA and failure of CCW Pump 1B-SB to  
I           I RO   IVerifv adeauate ESW cooling water flow to the associated CCW heat exchnnaer
automatic stalt  
                                                                                  __                       -
e  
                                                                              ._
Enters and directs the actions of AOP-014. Loss of ConiDonent Cooling Water
                                                                        the CCW pump failure,
Numerous alarms on ALB-005 due to no CCW flow  
                                                                                  I                       -
Breaker indication on CCW Pump 1A-SA  
  COMMENTS:
Failure of C C W B  1B-SB to start  
Page 3 of 18                             SCENARIO #3                       NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
~~
                                                                                  Post Validation Revision
_-___--  
ter than 52 psig  
heck condition of the breaker and the pump  
I  
I  
RO  
I Verifv adeauate ESW cooling water flow to the associated CCW heat exchnnaer  
__  
-  
._  
the CCW pump failure,  
I  
-  
COMMENTS:  
Page 3 of 18  
SCENARIO #3  
NUREG-1021,  
Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


Appendix D                         Required Operator Actions                             FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
  SCENARIO NUMBER: 3               EVENT NUMBER: 2                 FACILITY:       Harris
Required Operator Actions  
  EVEN?' DESCRIPTION:         Peed Water FIQWI,OWFailure
FORM ES-D-2  
                                        APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3  
                    Diagnose low failure of controrling SG 'A' feed flow channel
EVENT NUMBER:  
                    e    S G A STM > FW FLOW MISMATCH (ALB-014-4-IA and IB) alarming
2  
                    * F1-477 indicating 0
FACILITY:  
                          SG 'A' feed reg valve opening
Harris  
                    0    SG 'A' level increasing
EVEN?' DESCRIPTION:  
                    - SG 'A' actual feed flow > steam flow
Peed Water FIQW I,OW Failure
                    0                                                                             -
COMMENTS:
                    Enter arid direct the actions of AOP-010, Feedwater I2lalfunctions
APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
                    (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check NO Main Feedwater Pump tripped
S G A STM > FW FLOW MISMATCH (ALB-014-4-IA and IB) alarming  
                    rakes MANLTAI. control of FK-478 prior to direction in AOP-010 to preveflt
SG 'A' feed reg valve opening  
                    - .
SG 'A' actual feed flow > steam flow
                    overfc-r          OMM-00 1 instructions
Diagnose low failure of controrling SG 'A' feed flow channel
                                                  -.                                                   ~
e
                    :heck DEH controlling Turbine Valves properiy
*
                    Maintain all of the following:
F1-477 indicating 0
                    * At Ieast one Main Feedwater Pump running
0
                          Main Feedwater flow to all Steam Generators
SG 'A' level increasing
                    v- AIL    ~ Steam
0 -  
                                _ _ Generator
Enter arid direct the actions of AOP-010, Feedwater I2lalfunctions  
                                        _ - levels greater than 30%
-
                    Check Feedwater Keylator Valves NOT operating properly in AUTO and perform
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check NO Main Feedwater Pump tripped  
                    the following:
rakes MANLTAI. control of FK-478 prior to direction in AOP-010 to preveflt  
                    P   Place applicable Feedwater Keplator Valve (FK-478) in MANUAL
overfc-r
                    P    Maintain Steam Generator levels between
-.  
                    ____I_                                _-______52 and 62% (REDUCE FW FLOW)
OMM-00 1 instructions  
                    CRITICAL STEP TO PREVENT PLAA'T TRIP AS A RESULT OF HIGH-
-.  
                    mmr SG LE VEL.~ _ _ -                                             -                   ~
~  
                    Jheck Main Control Room annunciators available
:heck DEH controlling Turbine Valves properiy  
                    -_______~-_I___..                                                      -__p-
Maintain all of the following:  
                    Jheck the following Pump status:
*  
                    P   NO Feedwater Train Pumps tnpped
At Ieast one Main Feedwater Pump running  
                    B   Only one HDP operating
Main Feedwater flow to all Steam Generators  
COMMENTS:
v -
Page 4 of 18                             SCENARIO #3                   NUREG- I02 I, Revision 9, Draft
~ _ _ _ -
                                                                                Post Validation Revision
AIL Steam Generator levels greater than 30%  
Check Feedwater Keylator Valves NOT operating properly in AUTO and perform  
the following:  
P  
P
Place applicable Feedwater Keplator Valve (FK-478) in MANUAL  
Maintain Steam Generator levels between 52 and 62% (REDUCE FW FLOW)  
____I_
_-______
CRITICAL STEP TO PREVENT PLAA'T TRIP AS A RESULT OF HIGH-  
~
_
_ -
-
~
mmr SG LE VEL.  
-__p-  
Jheck Main Control Room annunciators available  
Jheck the following Pump status:  
P  
B  
Only one HDP operating  
-_______~-_I___..
NO Feedwater Train Pumps tnpped
Page 4 of 18  
SCENARIO #3  
NUREG- I02 I, Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


  Appendix D                       Required Operator Actions                               FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
    SCENARIONUMBER:       3         EVENT NUMBER: 2                   FACILITY:       Harris
Required Operator Actions  
    EVENT 1 ;SCRIPTION:         Feed Water Flow Low FaiIure (CONTINUED)
FORM ES-D-2  
              POSITION 1                APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3  
                                                                                    TIiNG9T I E CREW
EVENT NUMBER:  
                                          SECTION 3.P FOR THE FAIL CRE OF THE FEED FLOW
2  
                                                              alfunctions (other than pump trips) Section
FACILITY:  
                                                                Valves operating properly in MODU:
Harris  
                            Main Feedwater Pumps
EVENT 1  
                            Condensate Booster Pumps
_-
                            Condensate Pumps
;SCRIPTION:  
                                            nsate Dump To CS? Isolation-Valve                 ~-
POSITION 1
                        Check pumps for normal operation
Feed Water Flow Low FaiIure (CONTINUED)  
                        Notify Load Ilispatcher of any load limitations
APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
                                                                                                      .-
TIiNG9 T I E CREW  
                        Check Reactor thermal power changed by less than 15% in any one hour period
SECTION 3. P FOR THE FAIL CRE OF THE FEED FLOW  
                SRO   IExit AOP-010
alfunctions (other than pump trips) Section  
                        Selests Channel 476 for control in accordance with OW-RP
Valves operating properly in MODU:  
    _-                                                                                       -      -
Main Feedwater Pumps  
                        estores Feed Keg Valve controller to AUTO when level stable at program with
Condensate Pumps  
                              w and steam flow matched
Condensate Booster Pumps  
  COMMENTS:
~-
~~
nsate Dump To CS? Isolation - Valve  
Page 5 of 18                             SCENARIO it3                     hWRF.0-1021,Revision9, Draft
Check pumps for normal operation  
                                                                                    Post Validation Revision
Notify Load Ilispatcher of any load limitations  
Check Reactor thermal power changed by less than 15% in any one hour period .-
SRO  
I Exit AOP-010  
Selests Channel 476 for control in accordance with OW-RP  
--  
estores Feed Keg Valve controller to AUTO when level stable at program with  
w and steam flow matched  
COMMENTS:  
~~  
Page 5 of 18  
SCENARIO it3  
hWRF.0-1021,  
Revision9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


  Appendix D                         Required Operator Actions                             FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
    SCENARIO NUMBER: 3               EVENT NUMBER:           3       FACILITY: Harris
Required Operator Actions  
~~
FORM ES-D-2  
    EVENT DESCRIPTION:           Heater Drain Pump Trip with Failure of Turbine to Aotolnatifdly
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3  
                                Runback
EVENT NUMBER:  
    TIME   I POSITION                   APPLICAKTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
3  
                        Diagnoses trip of Heater Drain Pump B
FACILITY:  
                            HTK DRN PUMP B O/C TRIP-GND (ALB-019-4-IA) alarming
Harris  
                        e   HTR DFW PUMP B LO UP-LO FLOW (ALB-019-3-1A) alamiing
~~  
                        e  SG levels decreasing
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                        _-  Reactor   Power
Heater Drain Pump Trip with Failure of Turbine to Aotolnatifdly  
                                        .. increasing
TIME I POSITION  
                        Enters arid directs the actions of AOP-010, Feedwater Malfunctions
Runback
                        (IMAIkDLZTE ACTION) Check NO Main Feedwater Pump tripped
APPLICAKTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
                                                                                                          -
Diagnoses trip of Heater Drain Pump B  
                        Check DEH controlling Turbine Valves properly
e
                        Maintain all ofthe following:
e  
                        e   At least one Main Feedwater Pump running
SG levels decreasing  
                            Main Feedwater flow to ali Steam Generators
Reactor Power increasing  
                            ALL Steam Generator levers greater than 30%
Enters arid directs the actions of AOP-010, Feedwater Malfunctions  
                        Check Main Control Room annunciators available
(IMAIkDLZTE ACTION) Check NO Main Feedwater Pump tripped  
                        Check the following Pump status:
Check DEH controlling Turbine Valves properly  
                        e   NO Feedwater Train Pumps tripped
Maintain all ofthe following:  
                        e   Both HDPs tripped                                                         --
e  
                        Go to the applicable section:
At least one Main Feedwater Pump running  
                        - Loss of Running P=(including
Main Feedwater flow to ali Steam Generators  
                        D                      ~
ALL Steam Generator levers greater than 30%  
                                                                -BO?H
Check Main Control Room annunciators available  
                                                                -      Heater Drain Pumps) Section 3.a
Check the following Pump status:  
                        Maintain all of the following:
e  
                        * At least one Main Feedwater Pump running
Go to the applicable section:
                            Main Feedwater flow to all Stearn Generators
D
                        m A I L Steam Generator le\& greater than 30%
Maintain all of the following:
    COMMENTS:
*
Page6of1.3                                   SCENARIO #3                   NUREG-1021, Kevision 9, Draft
m
                                                                                    Post Validation Revision
HTK DRN PUMP B O/C TRIP-GND (ALB-019-4-IA) alarming
HTR DFW PUMP B LO UP-LO FLOW (ALB-019-3-1A) alamiing
_-
..
-
NO Feedwater Train Pumps tripped  
e  
Both HDPs tripped  
--  
Loss of Running  
~ P=(including  
BO?H Heater Drain Pumps) Section 3.a  
At least one Main Feedwater Pump running  
Main Feedwater flow to all Stearn Generators  
AIL Steam Generator le\\& greater than 30%  
-
--
COMMENTS:  
Page6of1.3  
SCENARIO #3  
NUREG-1021, Kevision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


Appendix D                     Required Operator Actions                             FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
  SCERAKIO NURIBER: 3           EVENT NlJhIRER: 3                   FACILITY: Harris
Required Operator Actions  
            ..
FORM ES-D-2  
  EVENT DESCRIPTION:       Heater Drain Pump Triu with Failure of Turbine to Automsticallv
SCERAKIO NURIBER: 3  
              RO   Check control rods inserting to reduce Tavg - Tref mismatch
EVENT NlJhIRER:  
              BOP  I Check Main Steam pressure less than PoRV controller setpcint
3  
              KO ICheck PZR Level trending to reference level
FACILITY:  
              BOP ICheck load NOT less than or eaual to 900?
Harris  
COMMENTS:
..  
Page 7 of 18                         SCENAIUO #3                       MUREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                                                                              Post Validation Revision
Heater Drain Pump Triu with Failure of Turbine to Automsticallv  
RO  
BOP
Check control rods inserting to reduce Tavg - Tref mismatch  
I Check Main Steam pressure less than PoRV controller setpcint  
KO  
I Check PZR Level trending to reference level  
BOP  
I Check load NOT less than or eaual to 900?  
COMMENTS:  
Page 7 of 18  
SCENAIUO #3  
MUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


Aonendix D                       Rewired Oaerator Actions                                 FORM ES-D-2
Aonendix D  
  SCENARIO NUMBER 3               EVENT NUMBER:           3       FACILJTY         Harris
Rewired Oaerator Actions  
  EVENT DESCRIPTION:         Heater Drain Pump Trip with Failure of Turbine to Automatically
FORM ES-D-2  
  TIME
SCENARIO NUMBER 3  
                            Load Dispatcher that the Unit is reducing load
EVENT NUMBER:  
                                                        wer evolution by adjusting rods and/or boron
3  
                                                        iny per OP-107, Chemical and Volume Control
FACILJTY  
                    e   Determines number of gallons required per Reactivity Plan
Harris  
                        Sets FIS-113,Boric Acid Batch Counter, for corrcct number of gallons
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                    e  Sets ICs-283, FK-I 13 Boric Acid Flow, for desired value (typically
Heater Drain Pump Trip with Failure of Turbine to Automatically  
                        approximately 5 gpm)
TIME  
                    e  Places RMW CONTROL to S'I'OP
Load Dispatcher that the Unit is reducing load  
                    e  Places W t W MODE SELECTOR to BOR
wer evolution by adjusting rods and/or boron  
                    e  Piaces RMW CONTROL to START
iny per OP-107, Chemical and Volume Control  
                        When desired boric   acid added, a m s t e m for AUTO
e  
                                        -____...                                              I
e
                                                  om to be prepared for the increased water processing
e
                                                                                                    .-
e
                                                      n will NOT take the Unit to Turbine shutdown
e
                        fy Chemistry that Reactor power change will exceed 15% in a one hour period.
Determines number of gallons required per Reactivity Plan  
                                                                          __                            -
Sets FIS-113, Boric Acid Batch Counter, for corrcct number of gallons  
                        ck Rod Control in AUTO.
Sets ICs-283, FK-I 13 Boric Acid Flow, for desired value (typically  
                    Energize all available PRZ Backup heaters
approximately 5 gpm)  
            BOP   I Check the DEM System in AUTO
Places RMW CONTROL to S'I'OP  
                    Perform the following at the D M panel:
Places WtW MODE SELECTOR to BOR  
                    0   Depress the Load Rate MWh4IN pushbutton
Piaces RMW CONTROL to START  
                    * Enter desired rate (NOT to exceed 45 MWMIN) in DEMAND display
When desired boric  
                    * Depress ENTER pushbutton
-____...
                        Depress REF pushbutton
acid added, a m s t e m for AUTO  
                    e   Enter desired load in DEMAND display
I  
                    e   Depress ENTER pushbutton
om to be prepared for the increased water processing  
                        Check EIOLD pushbutton lit
n will NOT take the Unit to Turbine shutdown  
COMMENTS:
.-
Page8of18                             SCENARIO #3                       NUREG-1021, Revision 9. Draft
fy Chemistry that Reactor power change will exceed 15% in a one hour period.  
                                                                                Post Validation Revision
ck Rod Control in AUTO.  
__
-
Energize all available PRZ Backup heaters  
BOP  
I Check the DEM System in AUTO  
COMMENTS:
Perform the following at the D M panel:  
0  
*  
*  
Depress ENTER pushbutton  
Depress REF pushbutton  
e  
Enter desired load in DEMAND display  
e Depress ENTER pushbutton  
Check EIOLD pushbutton lit  
Depress the Load Rate MWh4IN pushbutton
Enter desired rate (NOT to exceed 45 MWMIN) in DEMAND display
Page8of18  
SCENARIO #3  
NUREG-1021, Revision 9. Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


  Appendix D                     Required Operator Actions                             FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
  SCENARIO NUMBER 3           EVENT NUMBER:             3       FACILITY:       Harris
Required Operator Actions  
  EVENT DESCRIPTION:       Heater Drain Pump Trip with Failure of Turbine to Automatically
FORM ES-D-2  
                              lute as necessary to
SCENARIO NUMBER 3  
                      rns to AOP-010
EVENT NUMBER:  
                              cpt'ntor to check the following seated, observing tailpipes:
3  
                    eck IIotweli level trending to between 71oiO and 46%.
FACILITY:  
                            -       -_ __ I
Harris  
COMMENTS:
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
Page 9 of 18                         SCENARIO li3                     NUREG-1021,Revision9, Draft
Heater Drain Pump Trip with Failure of Turbine to Automatically  
                                                                              Post Validation Revision
lute as necessary to  
rns to AOP-010  
cpt'ntor to check the following seated, observing tailpipes:  
eck IIotweli level trending to between 71oiO and 46%.  
-
-___I
COMMENTS:  
Page 9 of 18  
SCENARIO li3  
NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


  Aooendix D                     Required Operator Actions                             B.oRMES-D-2
Aooendix D  
~
Required Operator Actions  
    SCENARIO XUMBER: 3           EVENT NUMBER:           4       FACILITY:       Harris
B.oRM ES-D-2  
  EVENT DESCRIPTION:       Pressurizer Pressure High Failure
~  
                            ......   .VPI.iCANTS ACTIONS O K BEHAVIOR  ....
SCENARIO XUMBER: 3  
                    Diagnoses high failure of Pressurizer Pressure channel P-444
EVENT NUMBER:  
                    0 PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVKATION CONTROL (ItkB-O09-3-1),
4  
                        alarming
FACILITY:  
                        IRESSUKIZER RELIEF DISCHARGE HIGH TEMP (A123-009-8-2),
Harris  
                        alarming
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                    0  PRESSURIZER HIGH-LOW PRESS (ALB-009-5-I), alarming
Pressurizer Pressure High Failure  
                        PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK HIGH-LOW LEVEL PRESS OR TEh4P
COM.MENTS:
                        (ALB-009-8-1), alarming
.VPI.iCANTS ACTIONS OK BEHAVIOR
                    * PRZ heaters off
......  
                    * PIG! sprays open
....  
                    * PRZ PORV 4443 momentarily open
Diagnoses high failure of Pressurizer Pressure channel P-444  
                    __ PR2 pressure lowering on ..other channels                      -
0  
                    Enters and directs the actions of AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control
PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVKATION CONTROL (ItkB-O09-3-1),  
                    (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check that a bubble exists in the PRZ
alarming  
                    (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verifies proper operation of PRZ PORVs AND
alarming  
                    associated block valves
PRESSURIZER HIGH-LOW PRESS (ALB-009-5-I), alarming  
                    I
PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK HIGH-LOW LEVEL PRESS OR TEh4P  
                    (MIMEDIATE ACTION) Takes manual control of pressurizer pressure by either:
(ALB-009-8-1), alarming  
                    * Placing master controller PK-444A in manual, or
IRESSUKIZER RELIEF DISCHARGE HIGH TEMP (A123-009-8-2),
                        Placing heaters and spray valves in manual
0
                    Go TO Section 3.1, Pressure Control Malfunctions While Operating With a
* PRZ heaters off  
                    -
* PIG! sprays open  
                    Pressurizer Bubhle
*  
                    Monitor PRZ pressure by (henling other reliable indication
Enters and directs the actions of AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control  
                    Check plant in MODE 1 OR 2
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check that a bubble exists in the PRZ  
                    -heck PRZ pressure controlled
PRZ PORV 4443 momentarily open
                    Check PRZ pressure 2335 PSICi OR LESS
PR2 pressure lowering on other channels
  COM.MENTS:
-
Page 10 of 18                         SCENARIO #3                     NUREG-6021,Revision9, Draft
__
                                                                              Post Validation Revision
..
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verifies proper operation of PRZ PORVs AND  
I
associated block valves  
(MIMEDIATE ACTION) Takes manual control of pressurizer pressure by either:  
*  
Go TO Section 3.1, Pressure Control Malfunctions While Operating With a  
Pressurizer
-  
Bubhle  
Monitor PRZ pressure by (henling other reliable indication  
Placing master controller PK-444A in manual, or
Placing heaters and spray valves in manual
Check plant in MODE 1 OR 2  
-heck PRZ pressure controlled  
Check PRZ pressure 2335 PSICi OR LESS  
Page 10 of 18  
SCENARIO #3  
NUREG-6021, Revision9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


Appendix D                           Required Operator Actions                             FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
  SCENPIRiO NIIMBEK: 3
Required Operator Actions  
                    ..              EVENT N:JF..IUER:
FORM ES-D-2  
                                                        ... 4          FACILITY:       Harris
.I-__
                                                                                                    .I-__
EVENT N:JF..IUER:  
  WENT 1     SCRIPTION:       Pressurizer Pressure High Failure (CONTIN'UED)
4
    TIME                                  APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
FACILITY:
                  RO   ICheck ail of the PFZ PORV block valves onen
Harris
                  RO   Check that a malfunction of PT-444 has occurred
...  
                                                                                                          -
SCENPIRiO NIIMBEK: 3
                  RO    Verify PK-444A in MANUAL
..
                  RO   Control P W ,pressure as follows:
WENT 1  
                        0   Adjust PK-444A output as necessary, to attempt to restore and maintain PRZ
TIME
                            pressure
--
                        0  Check both PRZ spray valve controllers in AUTO and both spray valves
I_-
                            operating as desired
___
                            Check all PFZ heaters operating as desired                   -           -~
-
                RO    Check hoth of the following conditions present:
SCRIPTION:  
                        e   PRZ pressure is controlled
Pressurizer Pressure High Failure (CONTIN'UED)  
                        0             normal
APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
                            Status of a--      spray valve or a PRZ heater hank is controlled
RO  
                SRO
I Check ail of the PFZ PORV block valves onen  
                        Refer to Attachment 3, Pressure Control Malfunction Symptoms-Bubble in
RO  
                                                    -
RO
                        Direct Maintenance to investigate and repair the PRZ Pressure Control System
Check that a malfunction of PT-444 has occurred  
  --
Verify PK-444A in MANUAL  
  I  _  -
-
  ___
RO  
  -
RO
COMMENTS:
Control PW,  
Page I I of 18                           SCENARIO #3                     NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
pressure as follows:  
                                                                                  Post Validation Revision
0  
0
Adjust PK-444A output as necessary, to attempt to restore and maintain PRZ  
pressure  
Check both PRZ spray valve controllers in AUTO and both spray valves  
operating as desired  
Check all PFZ heaters operating as desired  
-  
-~  
Check hoth of the following conditions present:  
e  
PRZ pressure is controlled  
0  
Status of a normal spray valve or a PRZ heater hank is controlled  
--
SRO  
Refer to Attachment 3, Pressure Control Malfunction Symptoms-Bubble in  
Direct Maintenance to investigate and repair the PRZ Pressure Control System  
-  
COMMENTS:  
Page I I of 18  
SCENARIO #3  
NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


Appendix D                                     Required Operator Actions                                                   FORM E$-D-2
Appendix D  
                      ...                                                   ......                                                 _....-
Required Operator Actions  
  SCENARIO NLJR4REK: 3                           EVENT NUMBER.                     5           FACILITY:               Harris
FORM E$-D-2  
  EVENT DESCRIPTION:                       SG Tube Rupture
...  
  TIME      POSITION         1                     APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
......  
                  CUE           Diagnoses SGTR by multiple radiation monitor alarms, including:
_....-  
                                      CEV high alarm
SCENARIO NLJR4REK: 3  
                                      Steamline 'C' alert
EVENT NUMBER.  
                                                  'C' high alarm
5  
                  SRO          Determines SG tube rupture has occurred, orders a Reactor Trip and Safety
FACILITY:  
                                Injection, and enters .-and directs the actions ofPATN-1                           --
Harris  
                                ,VOTE: M A I'.WAh'.E ATTE.4fPTS 10 PERFORMACFIOAS OF AOP-016,
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                                E.X(.'ES.Yl).%PRI.)fAK I'P1.rl.W LEAKA GE, BEFORE DETERMI.VI.VG
SG Tube Rupture  
                                THAT LE.4KAGE IS 1,VLXCESS OF C'AT.4EILITIES TO PERFORM A
POSITION 1  
  ~-          ..-.   -.         CONl'KOLLED
APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
                          .....-.....     ~
TIME
                                                      P L . 4 . V T S H ( ' T D O l ~ ~ . ~ . ......
~-
                                                  .....                               ~            ~
CUE  
                    RO           :IMMEI)lATE ACI'ION) Verity Reactor Trip
SRO
                                    Trip breakers RYA and BYA - open
Diagnoses SGTR by multiple radiation monitor alarms, including:  
                                0  Trip breakers RI'B and BYB - open
CEV high alarm  
                                    Rod bottom lights - lit
Steamline 'C' alert  
                                    Neutron flux .....
'C' high alarm  
                                            ~       decreasink ..
Determines SG tube rupture has occurred, orders a Reactor Trip and Safety  
                                                          ~                         ~        ......         ..... ~.          .
Injection, and enters .- and directs the actions ofPATN-1  
                  f3OP         (IMMEDKl'E ACTION) Verify Turbine Trip
--  
                                    All turbine throttle d v r s -.. shut
,VOTE: MA I'.WAh'.E ATTE.4fPTS 10 PERFORMACFIOAS OF AOP-016,  
                        _ - . All turbi:=rnor...        ...... vzjvcs
E.X(.'ES.Yl).% PRI.)fAK I' P1.rl.W LEAKA GE, BEFORE DETERMI.VI.VG  
                                                                ~
THAT LE.4KAGE IS 1,VLXCESS OF C'AT.4EILITIES TO PERFORM A  
                                                                          - sliu:
CONl'KOLLED PL.4.VTSH('TDOl~~.~.
                                                                      ...... ~                                    .......  ~
~
                  BOP          (I~lhlED!KlF      ACTION)        Verify    Power    '1'0 AC    Emzrgewy      Buses
...... ~
                                    Check A(' enirrgcncy buses IA-SA w d In-SB -energized by oftX:e pov\er or
:IMMEI)lATE ACI'ION) Verity Reactor Trip
                                    EDGs
0
                                    Check bus vol!ages
Neutron
                                    Check 6.9 KV biis IA-SA breaker brenke: 195 (OFFSITE) - closed
~
                                    C!ieck 6.9 KV.....1:us IR. SR hrrakcr hreaker I25 (OFFSITE.)         ...           closed
flux .....  
  COMMENTS:
decreasink
Page 12 of 18                                           SCENARIO #3                                   hZTREG-1021,Revision 9, DraA
.....  
                                                                                                              Post Validation Revision
.  
(IMMEDKl'E ACTION) Verify Turbine Trip
(I~lhlED!KlF ACTION) Verify Power '1'0 AC Emzrgewy Buses
Check bus vol!ages
.. -.  
-.  
..... -
.....  
~  
.....
RO  
Trip breakers RYA and BYA - open  
Trip breakers RI'B and BYB - open  
Rod bottom lights - lit  
~.  
~  
..  
~  
......  
f3OP  
All turbine throttle d v r s -.. shut  
All turbi:=rnor ...... vzjvcs - sliu:  
Check A(' enirrgcncy buses IA-SA w d In-SB -energized by oftX:e pov\\er or  
EDGs  
Check 6.9 KV biis IA-SA breaker brenke: 195 (OFFSITE) - closed  
C!ieck 6.9 KV 1:us IR. SR hrrakcr hreaker I25 (OFFSITE.) closed
~
.
...
~
......
~
.......  
_ -  
BOP
.....
...
COMMENTS:  
Page 12 of 18  
SCENARIO #3  
hZTREG-1021,  
Revision 9, DraA  
Post Validation Revision  


Appendix D                       Required Operator Actions                           FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
  SCENARIO NUMBER: 3             EVENT NUMBER           5/ 7   FACILITY:       Harris
Required Operator Actions  
  EVENT DESCRIPTION:           SG Tnhe Rupture (CONTINUED)
FORM ES-D-2  
                      (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Actuates SI Actuation and determines SI has actuated
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3  
  I-
EVENT NUMBER  
              I RO I Verifv a11 CSPS and RIIR Pumos running
5 / 7  
                    Verify SI flow > 200 gpin
FACILITY:  
                                                                                                    I
Harris  
                    Verify RCS pressure > 230 psig
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                    Verify Main Steam Isolation NOT actuated, NOR required
SG Tnhe Rupture (CONTINUED)  
              I RO IVerify Containment pressure has remained < 10 psig
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Actuates SI Actuation and determines SI has actuated  
              I BOP IVeri& > 2 10 KPPW   AFW flow
I
                BOP                       omponents from actuation of ESFAS signals using PATH-I
-
                BOP                                            ed to close and manually closes them:
                                                              ORV N2 SUPPLY.
I  
                    e   ICs-I I, LTDN ISOL VLV
RO  
                    e              _. CNMT FAN CLRS OUTLET ISOL
I Verifv a11 CSPS and RIIR Pumos running  
                        I SW-242, NNS
I
                    CRITICAL TO COMPLETE PHASE A ISOLATIOIV WHICH FAILED TO
Verify SI flow > 200 gpin  
                                TICALLY ACTUA TE.
Verify RCS pressure > 230 psig  
                                                  ._
Verify Main Steam Isolation NOT actuated, NOR required  
                                  YISOLATE AFW TO SG C AXYTIME IMINMUM LE VEL OF
I  
COMMENTS:
RO  
Page 13 of iR                         SCENARIO #3                     NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft
I Verify Containment pressure has remained < 10 psig  
                                                                              Post Validation Revision
I  
BOP  
I Veri& > 2 10 KPPW AFW flow  
BOP  
BOP
omponents from actuation of ESFAS signals using PATH-I  
ed to close and manually closes them:  
ORV N2 SUPPLY.  
e  
e
I SW-242, NNS
_. CNMT FAN CLRS OUTLET ISOL  
CRITICAL TO COMPLETE PHASE A ISOLATIOIV WHICH FAILED TO  
ICs-I I, LTDN ISOL VLV
TICALL Y ACTUA TE.  
._  
YISOLATE AFW TO SG C AXYTIME IMINMUM LE VEL OF  
COMMENTS:  
Page 13 of iR  
SCENARIO #3  
NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


  Appendix 11                     Required Operator Actions                               FORM ESD-2
Appendix 11  
~
Required Operator Actions  
  SCENARIO NUMBER: 3             EVENT NUMBER:             5I6      FACILITY:       Harris
FORM ESD-2  
  EVENT DESCRIPTION:         SG Tube Rupture (CONTINUED)
~  
                              Failure of MSIV on Ruptured SG to Close
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3  
                            proper PFZ PORV and spray valve response
EVENT NUMBER:  
              I BOP IDetermines NO SGs are faulted
5 I 6 
    --bF=nnines                  SG C is ruptured
FACILITY:  
              I     1   Abnonnal secondary radiation levels
Harris  
    -4         BOP -1   Uncontrolled level increase
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                      When S G C level is > 25%, isolates M W flow to SG C
SG Tube Rupture (CONTINUED)  
                                                      ons of PATH-2 at Entry Point J
Failure of MSIV on Ruptured SG to Close  
                                                                                            -         -
proper PFZ PORV and spray valve response  
                                                          rocedures as required
I  
                      e Shut faulted SG C steam supply vaive, MS-72, to TDAFW pump (may have
BOP  
                        been performed earlier for RCS temperature control)
I Determines NO SGs are faulted  
                      e  Verify SG blowdown isolation wlves shut
- - b F = n n i n e s 
                      e  Veri@ SG C Main Steam Drain isolation valves shut
SG C is ruptured  
                      o  Verify SG C Main Steam Isolation Bypass valve shut
I  
  COMMENTS:
1  
Page 14 of 18                           SCENARIO 63                       NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Drafi
Abnonnal secondary radiation levels  
                                                                                Post Validation Revision
Uncontrolled level increase
-4  
BOP -1  
When S G C level is > 25%, isolates M W flow to SG C  
ons of PATH-2 at Entry Point J  
-  
-  
rocedures as required  
e  
e
e
o
Shut faulted SG C steam supply vaive, MS-72, to TDAFW pump (may have  
been performed earlier for RCS temperature control)  
Verify SG blowdown isolation wlves shut  
Veri@ SG C Main Steam Drain isolation valves shut  
Verify SG C Main Steam Isolation Bypass valve shut  
COMMENTS:  
Page 14 of 18  
SCENARIO 63  
NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Drafi  
Post Validation Revision  


  Annendix D                           Reauired Ooerator Actions                           FORM ES-D-2
Annendix D  
  SCENARIO NIJMHER. 3                  EVENT NUMBER:           5 6     FACILITY:     Harris
Reauired Ooerator Actions  
  I   .   .              I ..
FORM ES-D-2  
  EVENT DESCRIPTION:           SG Tuhe Rupture (CONTINUED)
EVENT NUMBER:  
                                Failure of MkIV o n Ruptured SG to Close
5 6  
                                            APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
FACILITY:  
                      Detennines SG C Main Steam Isolation valve failed to shut
Harris  
                      o   Shut all remaining Main Steam Isolation valves and bypasses
I..  
                      e   Place both Steam Dump interlock switches to OFF / RESET
SCENARIO NIJMHER. 3
                          Use intact SG PORVs for a11 further steam dumping
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                          Direct operator to locally isolate SG C using PATH-2 Guide, Attachment 1
I..
                      -o - Verify     SG A and B MSIV and bypass valves shut       I
SG Tuhe Rupture (CONTINUED)  
                      CRITICAL TO CLOSE SG AAhrD EMSIVs AND PLACE STEAMDUMP
Failure of MkIV on Ruptured SG to Close  
                      LVTERLOCK SWITCHES IN O F F / R E S E l TO PREVENT STEAMING
APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
                      RUPTLRED SG.                                            _.
Detennines SG C Main Steam Isolation valve failed to shut  
                      Isolate feed flow to SG C when level > 25%
o  
                      CRITICAL TO ISQLA TE FEED FLOW TO SG C TO PREVENT
Shut all remaining Main Steam Isolation valves and bypasses  
                                            RUPTURED SG.
e  
                      Check ruptured SG C pressure > 260 psig
Place both Steam Dump interlock switches to OFF / RESET  
i           I     I When PRZ Dressure decreases below 2000 D S ~ Rblock low stcam pressure SI simal
Use intact SG PORVs for a11 further steam dumping  
                    -~~
Direct operator to locally isolate SG C using PATH-2 Guide, Attachment 1  
              RO
o  
                    1 Check SG A and Rboth available for RCS cooldown
Verify SG A and B MSIV and bypass valves shut  
                      Dc.ttnt;ii;e required Core hi:Temperature based on SG C prcssure
CRITICAL TO CLOSE SG AAhrD EMSIVs AND PLACE STEAMDUMP  
                                  ~~~~~
LVTERLOCK SWITCHES IN OFF/RESEl TO PREVENT STEAMING  
                                                  ~                ~                        ~
Isolate feed flow to SG C when level > 25%  
                      Check condenser NOT available and dump steam from SG A and 3 at
I
                      rnaximuni rate using SG PORVs
-
                      When Core Exit Temperatures are less than target temperature
-
                      o   Stop the RCS cooldown
RUPTLRED SG.
                      o   Maintain CETs less than t a r i r m p..
_.
                                                                erature                    ~      _      _ _
CRITICAL TO ISQLA TE FEED FLOW TO SG C TO PREVENT  
                      Continue recovery actions during cooldown
Check ruptured SG C pressure > 260 psig  
                                                                              I        I
RUPTURED SG.
                      Maintain RCP seal iniection between 8 and 13 gpm
i  
  COMMENTS:
I  
Page 15 of18                                 SCENARIO #3                   NUREG-1021,Revision9, Draft
RO
                                                                                  Poet Validation Revision
I When PRZ Dressure decreases below 2000 DS~R block low stcam pressure SI simal  
1 Check SG A and R
both available for RCS cooldown  
-~~
~~~~~
Dc.ttnt;ii;e required Core hi:  
Temperature based on SG C prcssure  
Check condenser NOT available and dump steam from SG A and 3 at  
~
~
~
rnaximuni rate using SG PORVs  
When Core Exit Temperatures are less than target temperature  
o  
Stop the RCS cooldown  
o  
Maintain CETs less than tarirmperature
..  
Continue recovery actions during cooldown  
Maintain RCP seal iniection between 8 and 13 gpm  
~
_
_
_
I
I
COMMENTS:  
Page 15 of18  
SCENARIO #3  
NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft  
Poet Validation Revision  


~~
~~  
  Appendix L3                       Required Operator Actions                             FORM ES-D-2
Appendix L3  
    SCENARIO NUMBER: 3             EVENT NUMBER:             5       FACILITY:       Harris
Required Operator Actions  
    EVENT DESCRIPTIO
FORM ES-D-2  
                                        APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3  
                      Verify at least 210 KPPH AFW flow available
EVENT NUMBER:  
                      Verify power available to PRZ PORV Block valves
5  
                    I                                                                                  -
FACILITY:  
                      Check PIPZ FORVs closed
Harris  
    =+:
EVENT DESCRIPTIO  
                    Verifv at least one PRZ PORV Block valve open
=+:
                    If PRZ FORV actuates. verifv nrouer operation
SRO
                    Reset SI
RO
    -e~-
RO
              SRO  If offsite power lost, manually realign safeguards equipment
-- -e~-
                    _.
_--
                RO  Reset Phase A and Phase B
BOP
                RO  Establish L4 and N2 to Containment
COMMENTS:
    --
APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR  
                    Check RCS pressure > 230 psig
Verify at least 210 KPPH AFW flow available  
                    -
Verify power available to PRZ PORV Block valves  
              _--    Stop both RIIR pumps
Check PIPZ FORVs closed  
                                .l~____l__
-
                    When Core Exit Temperatures are less than target temperature
I
                    o   Stop the RCS cooldown
Verifv at least one PRZ PORV Block valve open  
                    - Maintain CETs less than target temperature
If PRZ FORV actuates. verifv nrouer operation  
                                I
Reset SI  
                    DO NOT continue until cooldown comulete
If offsite power lost, manually realign safeguards equipment  
              BOP  Check SG C pressure stable or increasing
Reset Phase A and Phase B  
                    Check RCS subcooiing greater than 30 OF using the computer
_.
                                  _______
Establish L4 and N2 to Containment  
  COMMENTS:
Check RCS pressure > 230 psig  
Page 16 of 18                           SCENARIO #3                     NUREG-I02i,Revision 9, Draft
Stop both RIIR pumps  
                                                                                Post Validation Revision
When Core Exit Temperatures are less than target temperature  
o  
Stop the RCS cooldown  
DO NOT continue until cooldown comulete
-  
. l ~ _ _ _ _ l _ _ 
Maintain CETs less than target temperature  
-
I  
Check SG C pressure stable or increasing  
Check RCS subcooiing greater than 30 OF using the computer  
_______  
Page 16 of 18  
SCENARIO #3  
NUREG-I02i,  
Revision 9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


-
_ -  
    Appendix D                 Required Operator Actions                   FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
    SCENARIO NUMBER: 3         EVENT NUMBER:         5 FACILITY:   Harris
Required Operator Actions  
    EVENT DESCRIPTION:   SG Tube Rupture (CONTINUED)
FORM ES-D-2  
                      0 PRZ level >_ 75%
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3  
                      * RCS suhcooling 5 10 "F
EVENT NUMBER:  
                              RY LEAKAGE.
5  
  COMMENTS:
FACILITY:  
  Page 17 of 18                       SCENARIO #3           h'uRuG-IO2 1 Revision 9, Diafi
Harris  
                                                                        ~
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
                                                                  Post Validation Revision
SG Tube Rupture (CONTINUED)  
0  
PRZ level >_ 75%  
* RCS suhcooling 5 10 "F  
RY LEAKAGE.  
COMMENTS:  
Page 17 of 18  
SCENARIO #3  
h'uRuG- IO2 1  
~ Revision 9, Diafi  
Post Validation Revision  


  Appendix D             Required Operator Actions                   FORM ES-D-2
Appendix D  
  SCENARIO NUMBER: 3   EVENT NUMBER:           8 FACILITY:   Harris
Required Operator Actions  
  EVENT DESCRIPTION: Clnssifies the Event
FORM ES-D-2  
  COMMENTS:
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3  
Page 18 of IR                 SCENARIO #3           NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft
EVENT NUMBER:  
                                                            Post Validation Revision
8  
FACILITY:  
Harris  
EVENT DESCRIPTION:  
Clnssifies the Event  
COMMENTS:  
Page 18 of IR  
SCENARIO #3  
NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft  
Post Validation Revision  


    Harris
Harris  
    Draft
Draft  
  Scenario 4
Scenario 4  
    Spare
Spare  
Operating Exam
Operating Exam  
    2004
2004
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 03:23, 16 January 2025

Feb-March 2004 Exam 50-400/2004-301DRAFT Scenarios & Outlines
ML041170065
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/30/2003
From: Ernstes M
Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch
To: Scarola J
Carolina Power & Light Co
References
50-400/04-301 50-400/04-301
Download: ML041170065 (67)


See also: IR 05000400/2004301

Text

INITIAL SUBMITTAL

HARRIS EXAM

50-400/2004-301

FEBRUARY 23 - 27,2004

& MARCH 4,2004 (WRITTEN)

Harris

Draft

Operating Exam

2004

Harris

Draft

Scenario 1

Operating Exam

2004

Appendix D

Simulator Scenario Outline

FORM ES-D-I

-

Facility:

HARRIS

Scenario Number:

t

Op-Test Numher:

Examiners

Operators

Initial Conditions: IC-32: 26% power MOL; AFW Pump A-SA OOS (CPKr026 RACK OUT); INSERT

EVENTS 7,8, and 9 DURING SIMULATOR SETUP. Ensure DFH HOLD button is

illuminated. Ensure both Condensate Pumps and one Condensate Booster Pump is in

service. Ensure a Reactivity Plan is provided (NOTE - NEW REACTIVITY PLAN

REQUIRED FOR SCENARIO - DELETE TIIIS NOTE WON COMPLETION

OF REACTIVITY PLAN).

The unit is at 26% power at MOL, 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> following a reactor startup. The plant tripped

approximately 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> ago (I2 hours before startup).

Boron concentration is 1166 ppm. Bark D rods are at 108 steps.

AFW Pump 'A' was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago for oil replacement due to

contaminants and is expected to be returned to service within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. 'Technical

Specification 3.7.1.2 has been entered. Risk level is YELLOW.

Shift orders are to place the second Condensate Booster Pump in service and continue the

power ramp to 90% power and restore MW Pump 'A' to service when it hecomes

available. GP-005 is being performed per Step 5.0.1 16.

An Auxiliary Operator is standing by to start the Condensate Booster Pump. All prestart

Turnover:

check

I

I

Page 1 of 25

SCENARIO #I

NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft

Pout Validation Revision

Event

T)'pe*

C (BOP)

R (RO) -

c (SRO)

M (ALL)

M (ALL)

C (BOP)

C (SRO)

c (RO)

C (SRO)

al Loss of Condenser Vacuum

NOTE: INITIATE THIS EVENT Oh'SAME THGGER AS

EVENT4 DUE TO TIME' UNTIL THISEVENTISNOTED BY

AVAILABLE CUES. THIS EWMT WIL

SIMULATOR OPERATOR TO ADJUST

NOTE: AVSERT MALFUNCTION DURING IhTTIAL SETUP

AFW Pump 'B' trip

  • (N)orinal, (R)eactivity, (Qnstmment, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Page 2 of 25

SCENARIO # 1

h W G - I 0 2 I , Revision 9, Draf?

Post Validation Revision

Auuendix Il

Rewired Ooerator Actions

FORM E§-I)-2

SCEKARIO NIJMBEK: I

EVENT NITvlREK:

1

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT 1 ISCRIPTION:

Place Second Condensate Rooster Pump in service

CUE

I shw orders directplacing a second Condensate Booster Pump in service

BOP

Verify Initial Conditions of OP-134, Section 5.6.1

1. One Condcnsate Booster Pump is in service per Section 5.5 of OP-134

2. Condensate Booster Pump E I,ock-Out Relay reset

Reviews CAUTION: To prevent damaging the CBP recirc valves, do not operate

the second Condensate Booster Pump for more than 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> wit11 MFP suction

flow less than 4500 kpph.

3. Total feedwater flow is greater than 4500 kpph

4. CPD Ooerator and Cbemistrv have been notified of potential flow and pressure

BOP

I

-

1 changes in the C o n d e n s a k m .

Direct AO to perform prestart checks on Condensate Booster Pump B per

Attachment 6

'Verify CONDENSATE BOOSTbR PUMP B RECIRC, ICE-261 in MODU and

___

I

BOP

I Reviews CAUTION: There are no Condensate Booster h n ~ p

trips to protect the

+-

BOP

Reviews NOTE: Computer points listed in Section 6.0 of this procedure may be

monitored for information.

Reviews NOTE: When the Condensate Booster Pump controi switch is placed to

the START position, the Aux Lube Oil Pump will start and supply the VSF

Coupling with oil until oil pressure is greater than or equal to 20 psig, at which

time the Condensate Booster Pump starts.

COMMENTS:

Page 3 of 25

SCENARIO # 1

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Dnft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

~~

SCENARIO NUMBER 1

EVENT NUMBER:

1

FACILITY:

Harris

?SCRIPTION:

POSKION

Plsce Second Condensate Train in service (CQNTINUJ3D)

BOP

BOP

BOP

BOP

BOP

BOP

BOP

BOP

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

I

- I

Reviews CAUTION: The amount of time the associated tecirc valve, 1 CE-261 is

open, should be minimized due to lack of lubrication without Condensate I3ooster

Pump running.

Place the control switch CONDEXSATE BOOSTER PlJMP 5 RECIRC, 1CE-261

___-

in the OPEN position immediately prior __

to starting Condensate Booster Pump B

Reviews NOTE: Starting the second Condensate Booster Pump may cause the

previously running pump controller to reject to Manual. This is due to the speed

sensor on the pump being started initially providing a speed input signal that is

based on ekctrical noise. If the running CBP controller rejects to manual, it is

permissible to return the controller to Auto once the CBP being started reaches the

no-load speed. If the controller again rejects to manual, then further investigation

would be required.

Stalt B Condensate Booster Pump

Directs AO to locally verify Condensate Booster Pump A Aux Lube Oil Punip has

stopped

Directs A 0 to check differential pressure across the Pall Replaceable Duplex

Filter, as indicated between PI-OILO-2304Bl and PJ-OlLO-2304B2 is less than 15

PSI. IF differential pressure across the Pall Replaceable Duplex Filter is greater

than or equal to 15 PSI, then direct A 0 to swap to the idlehut of service filter per

Slowly increase the demand signal on PK-2308, CNDST B U R PUMP B SPEED

ONTKOI,LER

to match the demand simal on the areviouslv running Condensate

__

.-

_________

__I

x__ ___

~.

-

-I_

Section

_-

8 . l n h e r w i s e

I_-_

this StQ -

is NIA)

.-

-

Booster Pump Speed Controller

_I

$ice PK-2308, CNDST BSTR PCMP B SPEED CONI'ROLLER to AUTO when

--

he demand signals are matched

Place the control switch for CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP

!61 in the MODIJ-on

I

-

l_l___

____I_

COMMENTS:

Page 4 of 25

SCENARIO # 1

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, DraA

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER:

2

FACILITY: Harris

3SCRIPTION:

Pressurizer Level high failure

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

I

Diagnose high failure of controlling PRZ level control channel, I.T-459

EVENT

TIME

I_-

-

I_-

__-

_._I

POSITION

SRO

RO

SRO

RO

SKO

-

.-

RO

SRO

RO

SKO

SRO

-

__I-

-

-

o

1~1-4~9inciicating

100%

e

PEL? backup heaters all energized

Charging flow decreasing on FI-122A. 1

1) alarming

e

PRESSURIZER HIGH LEVEL (ALE-009-4-1) alarming

e

PKESSURIZER HIGH LEVEI, ALERT (ALB-009-4-2)

_.

ahrming

Directs taking manual control of charging and increasing flow

Takes manual control of charging (CS-23 1, FK-122.1 CHARGING FLOW) and

increases flow to maintain PRZ level

Enters and directs the performance of OW-Kp

Selects channels 460/461 on PRZ Level Control Selector (may select per ALB-

009-4-1 or -

4

L

Directs tripping appropriate bistable~

Restores charging (CS-231, FK-122.1 CHARGING FL.OiV) and places in

automatic, if desired

Kefers to TS 3.3.1 (6 hr), 3.3.3.5.a (7 day) and 3.3.3.6 ( 7 day) for PRZ level

channel failure

Initiates repairs

PRZ CONT HIGH LEVEL i?EVIATION AND HEATERS ON (ALB-009-2-

_.

I_

_-.--I_

__--

_

.

I

I

__

I_______

__-

.-

.-

--

--

l______l___l_

___I_.-

_-

__

-

_-

I

_

-

COMMENTS:

Page 5 of25

SCENARIO #1

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NCJMRER: 1

EVENT NUMBER:

3

FACILITY:

Harris

~~~

~

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

SG Level Low Failure

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEFIAVIOR

..

I 7'1R4E 1 POSITION

.

I

SRO

I Diagiose low failure of controlling SG 'B' level channel

~ *

SG B NR LVWSP NL'EO DE\\* (ALE-14-2-1B) aiming

STEAM GEN B LOU' LVI, (ALB-14-54A) alarming

1:

STEAM GEN B LOW-LOW LEVEL (ALB-14-54B) alarming

0

SG 'B' level, LI-486 SB, indicating 0%

I *

S(i I3 PW > SI'M FLOW MISMATCH (AL,B-I4-5-1A) alarming

SG 'I%'

feed flow > steam flow

SG '5' feed reg vdve opening

SG 'B' level rising on operable SG level channels

Enter and direct the actions of .4OP-O10, Feedwater Malfunctions

(IkIMEDIATE ACTION) Check any Main Feedwater Pump tripped

I

__

--__-

-

l___l

____

l t + % % + i M M E D I A T E

ACTION) Check initial Reactor power less than 90%.

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check initial Reactor power less than 80%.

-

I_-

-_____--

-

At least one Main Feedwater Pump running

___I

ALL Steam Generator levels greater than 3W/0

-

heck Feedwater Regulator Valves NOT operating properly in AUTO and perfon

I

.~

~

the following:

Place applicable Feedwater Regulator Valve (FK-488) in MANUAL

Maintain Steam Generator levels between 52 and 62% (REDUCE EW

CRITICAL STEP TO PREVENT PLANT TRIP AS A RESULT OF HIGH-

COMMENTS:

Page 6 of25

SCENARIO #l

h"%-

102 1. Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Aumndix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

-

SCENARIO MJMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER:

3

FACILITY

Harris

~

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

SG Level Low Failure (CONTINUED)

I TIME

POSIIION [

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR DEtIAVIOR

__

Check the following Pump status:

0

NOTE: OXLII FWPUMP IS OPERATING AT THIS TIME

Go to the applicable section:

If any Feedwater Train Piinips tripped, go to Step I 1

All CondensateiFeedwater flow malfunctions (other than pump trips) Section

Check the following Recirc and Dump Valves operating properly in blOD1J:

e

Main Feedwater Pumps

Condensate Pumps

e

1 CE-293, Condensate Recirc

0

Check the Condensate and Feedwater System intact

Reviews NOTE: Pumps should be stopped in the order of higher to lower

pressure. (To stop a Condensate Pump, stop a Main Feedwater Pump followed by a

Condensate Booster Pump and then the Condensate Iuq.)

Check pumps for noma1 opemt~on.

Notify Load Dispatcher of any load limitations.

Condensate Booster Pumps

-~

ICE-142, Condensate 1 h 1 T o CST Isolation Valve

-

---

_I_

--

____

_-

I

I

SRO

I Check Reactor thermal power changed by less than 15% in any one hour period

._l___l_l

______I

__

Refers to TS 3.3.1 (Items 13 and 14) ~ 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> requirement to trip bistables

Initiate repairs

COMMENTS:

Page 7 of 25

SCENARIO $1

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Kequired Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT KUMBER:

4

FACILITY.

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTIC

TIME -

'OSITION

SRO

KO

I__

I

SRO

RO

I-

COMMENTS:

Median Tavg high failure

APPI.ICA"T'S ACTIONS OK BEHAVIOR

.

Rods irrserting

I

I

D

I

I FK-122 *ut

increasing

Enter and direct the actions of AOP-001, Malfunction of Kod Control and

TR-408 Ked Pen at max output

RCS I.OOPNBIC TAVG HVLO DEV (AL14-010-6-3A/7-3A/8-3A)

all

RCS 1WFITAVG HIGH-LOW (AI.B-0 10-6-4B) alarming

PRESSURIZER CONTROL LOW LEVEL DEVIATION (ALB-009-2-2)

alarming

Charging flow FI-122A. 1 increasing

aiarmiug

_ _ -

~ -

___ I_

_____I

1ndication.stem

-

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check that < 2 control rods are dropped

__-

'IMMEDIATE ACTION) Position Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN

'IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check Control Bank motion stopped

So to the appropriate section:

Manually operate affected control bank to restore the following:

B

B

@

Section 3.2, Continuous Spurious Control Bank Motion

-

Equilibrium power and temperature conditions

Rods above the insertion limits ofTech Spec 3.1.3.6 and PIP-106, Technical

Specification Equipment List Program and Core Operating Limits Report.

Page 8 of25

SCENARIO #I

NUREG-IO21,

Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

~~

~

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER:

4

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT

-

iSCRIPTION:

POSITION

Median Tavg high failure (CONrINUED)

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OK BEHAVIOR

SRO

KO

SRO

KO

SRO

SRO

RO

SRO

RO

I KO -

§KO

I

Check that instrument channel failure has not occurred by observing the following:

RCS Tavg

RCSTref

0

Power Range NH channels

Turbine first stage pressure

Verify proper operation of the folIowing:

C X T S demineralizers

BTRS

e

Reactor Makeup Control System

Check that this section was not cntered due to control banks moving out and go to

_I

Check that ncither of the following occurred:

Unexplained RClS bontion

tJn lanned RCS dilution

-P-

___

Check that an automatic Rod Control malfiinction occurred

Maintain inanual rod contml unlil appropriate corrective action is complete

Exit this orocedure

COMMENTS:

Page 9 of 25

SCENARIO #I

NWG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FC)RM ES-D-2

~~~~

~

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT NUMRER

5

FACILITY:

Harris

POSITION

-

SRO

BOP

BOP

l_l_

SKO

BOP

I30P

Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

Diagnoses lowering main condenser vacuum

e

e

Enters and directs the actions of AOP-012, Partial Iass of Condenser Vacuum

Check Turbine in operation

Check Condenser pressure in both Zones less than:

0

Decreasing Condenser vacuum indication on MCB

CPdnSR PRE TRP LOWJ VACLJUM alarm (A1.B-020-2-4A) alarming

COMPUTER ALARM MS/TURBINE SYSTEMS (AIB-020-5-5) alanning

___

_I___

I

_I

_-

7.5 inches Kg absolute and Turbine first stage pressure is greater than 60%

turbine load

-0K-

5 inches IIg absolute and Turbine first stage pressure is less than 6OYo turbine

0

Reduce Turbine ioad as necessary to niaintain Condenser vacuum using one of the

follo.rving:

D

GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown from Power Operation to Hot Standby

Continue Turbine load reduction until directed otherwise by Unit SCO based on

the following:

a

Vacuum stable or increasing

B

m

AOP-038, Rapid Down-

-

I

Cause of vacuum loss identified and corrected

Plant conditions require Reactor or Turbine trip

NOTE TO SIMULATOR OPERA TOR:

ASSOONAS TURBINE LOAD HAS BEENLOWERED INRESPONSE TO

LOWERING VACUUM, REDUCE MALFhTNCTION SEVERITY

II_---

TO 5.

_~~I-_

VOTE: SE VER4L MIhThTES AFTER RILWO VING AfALFUNCTIO.V,

REPORT AS A 0 THAT AIR INLEAKAGE WAS APPARENT CAUSE AND

I CE-4 75, COhDEhSER VA Chi7.W BREz4KER, HAS BEEN FULLY CL OSED.

VOISE LEVEL IN AREA HAS DECREASED SUBSTANTPALL X

COMMENTS:

Page 10 of 2.5

SCENNAKIO #I

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NIJMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER:

5

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum (CONTINUED)

1 TIME

I POSITION

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

BOP

s of Attachment 1

BOP

SRO

SRB

SRO

ed and go to Step 11

0 failure of a Circulating Water System

-

solabie leak in Circulating Water System exists and go to Step

-

SRO

SKQ

_-.__

I ,

Check NO isolable leak between Condenser Waterbox isolation valves exists and

Check Circulating Water temperatures using the following EWFIS Computer

Points stable or decreasing:

0

Check plant shutdown initiated

go to Step 20

'TCVJ1930, Cooling Tower Basin Temp

TCW194OA, Condenser A Circ Water Met Temp

TCW1940B, Condenser B Circ Water Inlet Temp

__ps

.~

__I

Notify Load Dispatcher of reduced load capability

Monitor Turbine vibration leveis normal

Reviews Note: Exhaust IIood Spray may not be effective in reducing Exhaust

Hood temxrature above 15% Turbine load

Check Exhaust Hood temnerature less than 145'F

-

-

_I -

-

_____--

_I_-

-

r -

I

SRO

1 Check Keactor thermal power changed by less than 15% in any one hour period

COMMENTS:

Page 1 I of25

SCENARIO # I

NLTKEG-1021, Revision9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER:

5

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuom (CONTINUED)

__l__l____l_

~ - - _ _ _

COMMENTS:

Page 12 of 25

SCENARIO #I

NUREG-102 1, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Amendis D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER:

6 / 7

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip

POSITIOr

SKO

RO

BOP

SRO

-

-

RO

RO

RO

RO

SRO

RO

___

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

Diagnoses Main Steam break inside containment

e

Reactor power increasing

Steam flow increasing

Feed flow increasing

0

Steam pressure decreasing

RCS temperature decreasing

Containment pressure increasing

Containment radiation levels unchanged

Orders a reactor trip and safety injection and enters PATH-I

NOTE: DUE 10 THE FAILURE OF THE AUTOMATIC AND MAATAL

REACTOR T f f I e A SAFETYINJECTIQNIS LIKELY TO OCCUR BEFORE

Determines reactor failed to automatically trip

e

Reactor trip breakers closed

Rod bottom lights off

e

Neutron flus NOT decreasing

Attempts manual trip of reactor

Determines manual trip NOT successful

Reactor trip breakers closed

e

Rod bottom lights off

e

Neutron flus NOT decreasing

Informs SRO of' failure of reactor io trip automatically or manually

SG levels decreasing after initial swell

-

---

___

I_

THE REACTOR CANBE _l_l_

TRIPPED LOCALLY. -

--

__

-

__-

__--__I_

_-

__I-

-

Transitions to and directs the actions of FRP-S. 1, Response to Nuclear Power

(IMMEIXATIi ACTION) Verifies rods inserting automatically or manually inserts

_-___

-

Generation / ATWS

-I_

control rods -

-

I_

I_.-____

-

COMMENTS:

Page I3 of 25

SCENAFUO #I

?KJREG-I021,

Revision9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM E§-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVEN?' NUMBER: 6 / 7 / 8

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip

All turbine throttle valves shut

All turbine governor valves

- shut

ACTION) Determines neither Motor-Driven AFW pump running

___

and verifies Turhine-Driven M W Pump operating

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Determines reactor is not tripped and directs operator to

contact or report to Control Room

CRITICAL STEP TO DIRECT A LOCAL KEACTOR TRKP TO ADD

NEGATIVE REACTIVITY TO CORE.

I

,

R'OTE: AFTER API'ROXIWATEL Y 15 SECOIVD DELAK CONTACT

COXTROL ROOM AS THE OPERATOR DIRECTED TO CONTACT/

REPORT.

Directs operator to locally tnp the reactor by (order of preference):

Locally opening the reactor trip breakers

0

Locally trip both rod drive MG set generator output breakers.

Locally triEboth rod drive MG set motor breakers

,VOTE: APPROXIMATELY 30 SECONDS AFTER BEING DIRECTED TO

LOCALLY TRIP THE REACTOR, OPEN THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERA

Initiate monitoring of CSFSTs

_-I_--

- - ~

__I

I___-____

COMMENTS:

Page 14 of 25

SCENARIO #I

NUREG-1021, Revision 9: Draft

Post Validation Reviision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER: 6 / 7 I 9

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCXIPTION:

Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to TI'&?

e

Start a boric acid pump

Open ICs-278, Emergency Boric Acid Addition \\,ahre

Verify > 30 gpm emergency bontion flow

Verify > 30 gpm CSIP flow to RCS

Ver&RC§Lressure

2: 2335 psig

_-

NTTZ

SI ACTUATED

L I G E A N D SEVERAL OTIIER GVEXPECTED

IiVDICATtOAS WILL BE RECEIVED DUE TO A FAILrJm OF SLAVE

RELA Y K602B WHICH IS INCL drDED AS THE INITIATING FAILURE FOR

THIS EVENT. THE FOLLO WIA'G COMPONEATS ARE AFFECTED:

I(

SI Actuaied light - blinks &e to difference in Train SA & SS - hght

operated by contaet on K40.2 via multiprexer

SI Reset Auto-SI Blocked - blinks when atienapting to reset SI due to Train

SA resei with Trnin SB not able to reset - timer started by contact on K402

LCV-II5D does not auto open

LCV-II5E does not auto close

CC-415 does not auto close

e

__-

305 noes not auto close

__-

_-I__

eniify failure of RWST suction to CSPs to open

ttempis to open ICs-291 and reports failure to SKI

__-

_I-

-

1CS-291 red light off, green light an

COMMENTS:

Page 15 of25

SCENARIO #1

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

-~

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT MJMRER:

6 / 4

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to 'kip

(CONTINUED)

entilation valves and dampers shut

RO

I ~ e r i f v

reactor tri~oeci

__

BOP

1 Verifies turbine trinued

__I__

I j

_I

Begin monitoring of foldout for FKP-S. I

Controls AFW flow to intact SGs to maintain between 40% and 50%

--

SRO

BOP

__ -

.-

Y 'C' BY THIS

TIME, PA4RTICULARL Y IF iWS ISOLATIOXHAS OCCC'RRED, AND

CHOOSE TO ISOLATE

_l___ll__

AFW TO SG %'.

-_-

Verify All Dilution Paths Isolated

e

Checks for positive reactivity addition due to cooldown

a

Reactor tripped

Reactor Makeup Water punips OFF

FCV-I14B,

Reactor Makeup Water valve SHUT

ICS-98, BTRS Bypass valve OPEN

Direct A 0 to locdliy verify ICs-510, Boric Acid Batch Tank Outlet valve

__

I_-

_I__

htemediate range startup rate positive

--

eteimines a SG is depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner and go to Step 18

___I

___

ss valves closed

-

mines SG 'C' faulted due to SG pressure decreasing in an uncontrolled

manner or comnlctelv denressurized

COMMENTS:

Page 16 of 25

SCENARIO #I

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER:

6 / 7

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip

TIME

___-

I_-

I_-

POSITION

SRO

__-

BOP

RO

RO

SRO

._I

-

--

COMMENTS:

(CONTINUED)

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

Detemiines SG 'A' and SG 'B' NOT faulted

Isolates SG 'G'

Verifies PORV closed

0

Verifies FW Isolation closed

Verifies AFW isolated to SG

Closes steam supply to 'B'DAFW Pump

E

Verifies before seat drain isolation closed

0

Verifies SG blowdown isolation closed

Verifies steam analyzer isolation closed

E

Verifies cheniical addition isolations closed

S.1 TO MINIMIZE PRESSURE RISE INSIDE CONTAINMENT.

Verifies core exit thermocouples < 1200 "F

___.._.__-

--

CRITICAL STEP TO ISOLATE SG 'C' PRIOR TO EXITING FRP-

-.

_

I

~

.

Verify reactor subcritical

Power ranges < 5%

Intermediate startup rate negative

Implements FWs, a5 required

_I___

.__-

.___

Page 17 of25

SCENARIO W1

NIJREG-1021, Revisinn9, Draft

Post Validation Kevision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER:

6 / 7

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip

(CONTINUED)

BOP

BOP

RO

SRO

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

Transitions to and directs the actions of FRP-J.1 based on MAGENTA path on

Containment CSFST

Verifies Phase A isolation valves closed

Verifies Containment Vent isolation valves closed

Verifies Containment Spray operation due to pressure

Venfy Spray Pumps running

e

Verify-r

-

valve alignment

Verifies Phase B isoiation

Stop all KCPs due to loss of cooling flow

Venfies prowr operation of containment fan coolers

I

-

10 psig

__

I_

___

I__

1 Verifies MSNs and bvuasscs closed

1

, Determines SG C is onlv faulted SG and verifies isolated

Check both Spray Pumps running

Check both ESW Booster Pumps running and orifice bpitss isolation

P-

-. valves closed

I__

I_-

COMMENTS:

Page 18 of25

SCENARIO #I

NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FOKM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER

6 / 7

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip

(CONTINUED)

TIhlEIPOS1.r ION

I

SRO

I

BOP

RO

-+I--

-

Transitions to and directs the actions of EOP PATH-l

Verifies reactor tnmed

I_

Verifies turbine tripped

Verifies power to AC safeguards buses

I

-

Verifies SI actuated

_I___--

Begins monitoring of CSFSTs

Begins monitoring of Foldout A

__II

__I___

Verifies proper operation of emergency safeguards equipment

Main steam line isolation

D

b

CSIP and RHR pumps running

SI flow z 200 gpm

Containment pressure above 10 psig, with actions taken

AFW flow at least 2 10 KPIB available

-

I_

l___ll

COMMEhTS:

Page 19 of25

SCENARIO #1

NUREG-1021, Kevision9: Dnf?

Post Validation Revision

-

-

~

__

..

...

,

~ ..._ _.-

.........

-

Aonendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

~~

~

~~

SCENARIO NUMBER: I

EVENT NUMBER:

6 / 7

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip

(CONTINUED)

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

ESFAS proper alignment using Attachment 6

2 RHR Pumps running

2 CCW Pumps running

-

SI Valves properly aligned

0

2CsPsrunning

N1 ESW and ESW Booster Pumps running

NOTE: R WST SUCTIO".'S TO CSIPS FAILED TO OPEN ON SI

ACTLbtTION. ,WAYHAVE BEEA'RECOGMZEI) BY THIS POINTAND

OPERABLE F7AL VE: OPEAED. I F ? V O ~

IT IS CRITICAL AT TMIS POI"

TO OPEV THE VAL YE TO ESTABLISH FLQW.

Phase A proper alignment

Blowdown and SCi sample valves shut

Main steam lines isolated

Containment Spray operation

RCPs stopped

Both FW I'umps tripped

FW Isolation valves closed

XEITIIER MDAFW Pump operating

T D A W Pump operating

AFW alignment (FLOW ISOLATED TO SG 'C')

Both EDGs running

Containment Fan Coolers - 1 per unit operating in slow speed

Control Room Ventilation in Emergency Recirc

AC Ruses 1Al and lB 1 energized

Air compressors 1A and 1B in Local Control Mode

Page 20 of 25

SCENARIO #1

NURE:C-102 1, Revision 9, I h f i

Post Validation Revision

Appendix H)

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: I

EVEKT NUMBER:

6 I 7

FACILITY

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trir,

I'OSITIOI\\

RO

-

RO

SRO

I

-

.-

_I_-

-

I___.-

____-

COMMENTS:

(CONTIhWED)

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR DEIIAVIOR

Attempts to stablize RCS temperature using WR Tcold due to no RCPs

NOTE: DUE TO FAULTED sc, ncs TEMPEM TURE IS EXPECTED TO

-

BELOW.

Verifies proper operation of PRZ PORVs

NOTE:

I___

SPRAY VALVES N O T R F m R E D

__

DUE TO NO RCPSRKVNING.

Detemiines SG 'C' faulted and transitions to and directs the actions of EPP-014.

Faulted Steam Generator Isolation

NOTE: SG SHOULD AILREADYHAVE BEENISOLATED PER

DIRECTIQh'S OF F'RP-S.1, BUT TRANSITIQN TO EPP-014 IS STILL

______

RXLTRED..

-

Page21 of25

NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

~

~.~-I__

I.

.~

___

. .... .......___.

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER:

6 / 7

FACILITY: Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip

I

l__l_

Check MSIVs and bypass valves shut

Determines SGs A and R are NOT faulted

_I--

-_I_ _------

etemiines SI Termination Critena are met

Subcooling (> 40%)

0

e

Heat Sink (SG level > 40%)

RCS Pressure (stable / incrcasing)

__I-

O PREVENT

RCS OVERFILL AND PRESSURIZATION RESULTING IN

ND OR SAFETIES.

COMMENTS:

Page 22 of 25

SCENARIO #1

NIREG-1021,

Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Annendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

~~

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER:

6 / 4

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Steam Bresk Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip

I

RO

COMMENTS:

---

I

Reset SI

Manually reali&n safeguards equipment, if required, following a loss of offsite

nower

___I

Stons all but I CSIP

I

Determines KCS nressure stable or increasina

I

Check CSIP suction aligned to RWST

Opens normal miniflow isolation valves

e

1CS-182

ICs-196

0

ICs-210

e

ICs-214

Isolates BIT outkt valves

1 s - 3

e

ISH-4

Verify cold and hot leg injection valves closed

1SI-52

lSI-86

1SI-104

Establishes charging lineup

Closes FK-122.1

__-.

__--

_ _ _- - -

~- -

I

.-

-

_-.I____-

__

Opens ICs-235

Opens ICs-238

____

___

Controls charging to maintain pressurizer level using FK-122.1 and maintain flow

__

150am

Verify PR% level can be maintained stable or increasing

Reset Phase A and Phase B Isolation signals

__-

_--I_-

-

I

__

I _ _ _ _ _

Page 23 of25

SCENARIO # 1

NUREG-I02 I ~ Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

~~

~

~

SCENARIO NIJMBER I

EVEN?' NUMBER:

6 / 7

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip

SI-287

ansition to EPP-008, SI Termination

-_

____

-

____ __

TERMINATE nm

SCENARIO AFTER TRE TRANSITION TO

EPP-008

___x_I

IS ANNOUNCED.

I_

COMMENTS:

Page 24 of25

SCENARIO #I

MJREG-1021,

Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

I # Ol?iVNTJS

-~

. . . . . . .

Harris

Draft

Scenario 2

Operating Exam

2004

Appendix D

Simulator Scenario Outline

FORM ES-D-I

Op-Test Numher:

Facility:

HARRlS

Scenario Number:

2

Examiners

(&3?dtOrS

Initial Conditions: IC-18; 100% power DOL; AFW Pump A-SA OOS (CFW026 RACK-OUT); HDP A

OOS (CN11065 RACK-OUT); Lower power by 25 MWe and increase boron

concentration by 2 ppm: Allow plant to stabilize.

The unit is at 100% power at BOL, with equilibrium xenon conditions.

Boron concentration is 1238 ppm. Bank D rods are at 218 steps.

AFW Pump A was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago for oil replacement due to

contaminants and is expected to be returned to service within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 has been entered. Risk level is YELLOW.

IIDP A is tagged out of service for hearing replacement and is not expected back for

the next several days.

Shift orders are to maintain power at 100% and restore AFW Pump A to service when

it becomes available. GP-005 has been completed and the plant has been stable for 3

weeks.

Turnover:

Eamp 90

XB 100070

OFF with I

NOTE: MVL TIPLE E VERTS Oh

SAME TRIGGER.

Page 1 of 18

SCENAIUO R2

M W G - I O Z I , Revision 9, Draft

Post Validaticn Revision

NOTE: MUL TIPL

NOTE: THIS E VENT SHOULD BE SET ON SAME

TRIGGER AS E VENT 7.

  • (X)orrnai, (K)eactivity, (Onstrurnent, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Page2of18

SCENARIO #2

NUREG-1021, Kevision 9, DnA

Post Validation Kevision

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

Appendix D

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

EVENTNUMRER:

1

FACILITY:

Harris

~

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

SIG A PORV Pressure Transmitter PT-308 fails high with failure of

e

e

RCS temperature lowering

SG A PORV open (open indication failed)

Directs operator to take manuai control of SG A PORV and close per

requirements of OMM-OOI

e

SRO provides control limits

e

Condition / cause communicated to SRO

SKC3 p v i d e s concurrence to take manual control

Appropnatc procedure implemented when plant stabilized

COMMENTS:

SCENARIO #2

NIJREG-1021, Revision 9, DnR

Post Validation Revision

Page 3 of 18

Auoendix D

Requircd Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

~~~

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

EVENT NUMBER:

2

FACILITY:

Harris

EVEKT DESCRIPTION:

LT-112, VCT Level, High Pailure

ALB-007-5-5. COMPUTER ALARM CIIEM & VOL SYSTEMS

Enters and direets the actions of AOP-003. Malfunction of Reactor Makeup

Control

Check 1.4 available

Tank, aligns to HUT

I

SKO

I Determines LK-I 12 output has failed and noes to Section 3.1, LT-I 12 or LT-115

-

Malfiinction

- - + s K ( 1 - k % O U S

ACTION, Assesses effects of LT-I 12 failure (Attachment 1)

I

RO

1 Determines failure is NOT due to LT-I 15 and EO to Step 8

Determines failure caused by LT-112

Monitor VCT level using either:

~l__l

__-

I

'ntain VCT level above 20% using auto makeup

intain VCT level below 7oo/o by manually diverting

COMMENTS:

Page 4 of 18

SCENARIO #2

WUTPEG-102

I ~ Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actioi~s

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

EVENT NUMBER:

2

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION

1.T-112, VCT Level, High Failure (CONTINUED)

n LCV-I i5A III VC'T position

_I_

_--

COMMENTS:

Page 5 of 18

SCENARIO #2

NUREG-1021, Revision9: Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-I)-2

EVENT XWBER:

3

FACILITY:

Harris

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

SCRIPTION:

Dropped Control Rod FZ

I

EVENT -

TIME

POSITION

CUE

SRO

RO

RO

RO

...

SRO

SKO

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

ALB-013-4-2, POUER RANGE HIGH NEUTRON FLUX RATE ALERT,

e

alarming

ALB-O 13-4-5, POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVLATHON, alarming

ALH-013-7-4, ONE ROD AT BOTTOM, alarming

ALE-013-8-1, BANK D FULL ROD WITHDRAWAL, alarming

AI,B-013-8-S, COMPUTER ALARM ROD DEVISEQ NIS PWR RANGE

TILTS, alarming

Control rods stepping out until C-11 interlock

e

RCS temperature decreasing

e

Enters and directs the actions of AOP-001, Malfunction of Rod Conwol and

Indication System

(1MMEI)IATE ACTION) Check that LESS THAN TWO control rods are dropped

[IMMEDIATE ACTION) Position Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN

e

IXWI indicates Rod F2 b o x e d

_I

-

-

-

-

IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check Control Bank motion STOPPED

-__

I

Go To Section 3.1, Dropped Control Rod

Record the time at which the rod dropped

Adjust one of the following to equalize Tavg with Tref

e

Turbine load

Boron concentration

Direct an operator to check ALL Rod Control Power and Logic Cabinets for

normal operation, as follows

____I__

-

_--I_

s_---

_I

Direct Maintenance to perform corrective action on ALL affected Rod Control

Power and I

LoAc Cabinets

lheck that ALB-13-7-1, ROD CONTROL URGENT ALARM, is ALARMING,

iut do not reset until Maintenance has completed repairs

__-___I___

COMMENTS:

SCENARIO #2

huREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Page 6 of 18

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

EVENT NUMBER:

3

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTIO

TIME

_-

I

-

POSITION

SRO

SRO

RO

KO

SRO

__--

COMMENTS:

Dropped Control Hod F2 (CONTINUED)

....

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

-....

..

Kcview the fbllowing l:cckfi;ca! Specifications:

3.1.3.1, hlovablr Control Aswmblies Group Ileiglit

0

3.1.1, Axial Flux IXI'ferencr

Notify the following:

Manager - C?pentions

.~ Reackv EngineerinL

....

CIieck Reactor Power AT OR AROVE P-i0 (IO'%).

3.1. I.!, Horation Control - Shutdown Margin. Modes I & 2

3.I.33, Shi~tdown Rod Insertion Limit

3.1.3.6, Contrcil Rod Insrrtion Limits

3.2.4, Quadrant P o w r Tilt Ratio

~

. . . -.

. . -.

. .-

. . . -.

. .-

. . -.

. . -

Reset any negative rate trip alarm at the NIS cabinets

Lower turbine load as recommended by Reactor Engineering

-

Page 7 of 18

SCENARIO #2

NURIG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

~

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENAKIO NIJMBER: 2

EVENT NIJMBEK:

4

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTIC

POSITION

CUE

SKO

SRO

SRO

SRO

SKO -

RO

RO

BOP

BOP

Power Reduction

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

Power reduction to less than 90% within the next 20 minutes has been directed

Direct the actions of AOP-038, Rapid Downpower after discussing Reactor Trip

Notify Load Dispatcher that the Unit is reducing load

Determine required horic acid addiiion for desired power reduction, as follows:

Notify Radwastc Control Room to be prepared for the increased water processing

Check that a planned load reduction will NOT take the Unit to Turbine shutdown

to dhwfirr droeped

.. Pod P e C l l X

-

Critena using Attachment I

--

Obtain values from the latest completed OPT-1525, Reactivity Plan

Generation Weekly

~.

Interval MOIIE

-~

1 at Full Power

-

requirements due to

I boration

-.

._

Determine rcactor power change will NOT exceed 15% in a one hour period

Check Rod Control in AUTO

Energize all available PRZ Backup heaters

heck the IIEH System in AUTO

.~

I

Perfonn the following at the DEK panel:

B

D

D

Depress EXTEK pushbutton

D

Depress REF pushhutton

D

1

Depress ENTER pushbutton

t

Check IIOLD pushbutton LIT

B

Depress GO pushbutton

I

Depress the h a d Rate MW/MN pushbutton

Enter desired rate in DEMAND display

Enter desired load in DEMAhD display

Verify the d u e in the REFERENCE display Lowers

COMMENTS:

Page 8 of 18

SCENARIO #2

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revinion

Appendix D

Kequired OpenltoF Actions

P O W ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

EVENT NUMBER:

4 / 5

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Power Reduction (Continued) /Boric Acid Pump Trip


*


*---

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

Commence RCS boration as required to maititam Control Rods above the Kod

Insertion Limit

e

Directs KO to stat? standby boric acid pump to allow continuing boration

NOTE: IF OPERA TOR SENT TO INICIESTIGATE, REPORT

BREAKER FOR PUMP CLOSED, BUT MOTOR IS EXTREMELY HOT

TO TOUCH.

ALE-006-8-4, BORIC ACID FI.OB' DEVIATION, alarming

Boric Acid Pump A-SA tripped

_____

I

Starts standby Boric Acid Pump

Restarts boration flow

Initiates repairs to pump

Verifv Generator load and Reactor Dower lowering

Maintain Generator reactive load (VARs) within guidelines

When Turbine load is less than YS%, then dispatch an operator to open 3A and 3B.-

_ _ _I _ _ . . ~ -

Feedwatet Heater vents per OP-136, Shntdowzn of Feedwater Heatem

_. 3A and -.__

3B

Check Tavg within 5°F of T,,.

Check Power level at the target value

______

COMMENTS:

NUREG-I02 1, Revision 9, Drafi

Page 9 of 18

SCENARIO #2

-

Post Validation Revision

~~

Appendix 13

Required Operator Actions

FORM E§-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER 2

EVEKT NUMBER:

6

FACILITY:

IIarris

EVENT DESCRIPTIC

TIME

_I-

POSITION

SRO

RO

SRO

I_--

SRO

I swo

1,oss of Power to an ESF Bus with Failure of EDG to Load

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

I.

S[.VI!L?\\TOH OPERATOR INSTRCCTIONS: INSERT NEXT

MALFUNCTJON FOR LOSS OF PONEH AFTER CHEW HAS

REDUCED PO\\VER

____._...._...I

e Multiple system alarms

e

e

Enters and directs the actions of AOP-025. Loss of One Emergency AC Bus

( 6 1 or one Emergency DC Bus (I 25V)

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Determines no CSP running and isolates letdown by

VERIFY at least one Emergency AC Bus is FNERGIZED

REFER TO the following Tech Specs:

e

e

s

0

3.6.5 Vacuum Relief System

0

3.8.1.1 AC Sources Operating

3.8.3.1 Onsite Power Distribution - Oeerating

Go to Section 3.1 for Loss of Emergency Bus 1.4-SA

Loss of power to Bus 1A-SA

EDG 1.4-SA fails to load

~

c a a n y open orifice isolation valves

-

I

I_

____-

.--

-I________

3.0.3 (Due to loss of2/4 containment rad monitors and CVIS affect on CNMT

vacuum reliefs)

3.3.3.1 Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations (Due to inoperable Control

Room Outside Air Intake Monitors)

3.4.6.1 RCS IZdk Detection (Due to Kh4-3502A inup)

___._I__--

COMMENTS:

Page 10 of 18

SCENARIO #2

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Drafi

Post Validation Revision

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

EVENTNUMBER:

6

FACILITY:

Harris

EVEN? DESCRIPTION:

Loss of Power to an ESF Bus with Failure of EDG to Load

TIME

Check EDG A is running properly

I

e

Voltage

I* Frequency

BOP

Check Bus 1A-SA is NOT energized and pbdCC EMERGENCY STOP switch for

KO

I Start R Train CSP

Adjust HC-186. I, RCI Seal IVTR IN3 Flow. to establish seal injection flow as

necessary to maintain the foilowing:

L,ess than 31 gppm total flow to all RCPs

-

and 13 gpm to all RCPs

.~

BOP

KO

RO

BOP

per OP-172, Reactor Auxiliary Building IIVAC

Verify any CCW Pump - ninning

Verify Charging and Letdown flow per C)P-107, Chemical and Volume Control

Pressurrzcr level --

I

to maintain reactor power and S/G levels

COMMENTS:

Page 11 of 18

SCENARIO #2

NUREG-I02I,

Revision9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM E§-D-2

....

.....

....

......-

SCENARIO NLhlB3EK: 2

E\\FNT NLIMHEK:

7

FACL LITY:

Harris

COMMENTS:

Second Dropped Control Rod K14 I Reactor Trip

e

Determines a second dropped rod has occurred and orders Reactor Trip

ALB-013-7-3, TWO OK MORE RODS AT BOTTOM, alarming

DRPI indicates =d

Rod K14

~

~-

-

_ _ _ ~ . _ _ _ - -

CRITICAL STEP TO TRIP REACTOR WHEN SECOND DROPPED

I

ROD OCCURS.

Enters and directs the action of PATH-I

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Reactor Trip:

e

Trip breakers RTA and BYA - open

E Trip breakers RTB and BYE3 - open

e

Rod hottoni lights - not available due to loss of power

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Turbine Trip:

E

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Power To AC Emergency Buses:

e

Check bus voltages

D

D

~-

____-.-._-

_________~

Neutron flux d e c r e m

_I-

-

e

All turbine governor

.~____I___.__I-..-

valves - shut

-

E

All turbine throttle valves - shut

Check AC emergency bus IA-SA -. deenergized

Check AC emergency bus 1U-SB - energized

Check 6.9 KV bus 1A-SA breakers -~ open

Check 6.9 KV bus 1B-SI3 breakers -closed

Page 12 of 18

SCENARIO #2

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Vaiidation Revision

Amendix D

Required Operator Actions

FOSM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

EVENT NIJMBER:

7

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Secund Dropped C~ntrol Rod K14 /Reactor Trip (CONTINUED)

TIME

POSITIOP

RO

I

SRO

I

SRO

I

BOP

COMMENTS:

....-

tfPLICANTS ACTIONS OK BEIIAVIOK

....

..._

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check NO SI Actuation and NOT required

0

Check ail of the following dark:

0

AI,B-l1-5-l

ALB-11-5-3

0

CNMT pressure < 3.0 PSIG

e

PRZ pressure > 1850 PSIG

Steampressure > 601 PSHG

Transition to and direct the actions of EOP-EPP-004. Rzactor Trb ResDonse

SI Actuated bypass permissive light

  • ALB-11-2-2
  • ALB-12-1-4

Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required

Check WCS temperature and control AFW flow to stabilize temperature

--

Check RCPs running

Check Feed System Status:

Verify all control rods fully inserted

Verify feed reg valves - SHUT

Establish AFW flow to SGs using MDMW Pump B and TDAFW Pump as

necessary

Lheck PRZ Level > 17%

Page 13 of 68

SCENARIO ti2

NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Amendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

EVENT NUMBER:

8

FACILITY:

Harris

EVEKT DESCRIPTION:

Pressurizer Steam Space Break / Single Train SI

APPLICANI"S AC'I'IONS OR REIIAVIOR

....

e

RCS pressure decreasing

PRZ lwei increasing

e

Containment temperature increasing

Containment pressure increasing

Directs SI Actuation due to loss of subcooling and transitions and directs the

Manually initiates Safety lniection or verifies automatic Safety hiection

~.

actions ofPATH-I, Entry Point A

--

Ibldout A applies

h p s RCPs when RCS pressure decreases below 1400 psig after venfylng SH flow

greater than 200 gpm

CRITICAL STEP TO TRIP RCPs WHE-V TRIP CRITERIA MET.

Verify C S P B and RHR Pump B operating

Venfy SI flow > 200 gpm

Verify KCS pressure > 230 psig

--

-.____

-_

I_-

_l______li

~ _ _ _ _ _

Check MS Line Actuation occurs when Containment pressure exceeds 3 psig

Verifv Containment Pressure has remained below 10 Dsie

Verify at least 210 KF'PH AFW flow

Verify alignment of components from actuation of ESFAS sip& using PATH-1

Control feed flow and steam dumo to stabilize RCS temoerature at 557 O F

E___-

ide, Attachment 6

___-

Energize AC Bus 1 B 1

Check PRZ PORVs closed

-.

COMMENTS:

Page 14 of18

SCENARIO 82

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

FORM ES-D-2

Amendix D

Required Operator Actions

SCENARIO NUMBER 2

EVENT NUMBER:

8

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Pressurizer Steam Space Break / Single Train SI (CONTIFUED)

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

-...

..

Verify at least one PORV Block Valve own

I

Chesk PW, surav valves closed

I

Check NO SGs depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner or completely

depressurized

Check secondarv radiation norma6

Check containment pressure NOT normal

Foldouts A and B apply

Maintain KCS seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm

-

-

Maintain at least 210 WPB AFW flow to SGs until at least one SG is above 25%

Control feed flow to maintain proper SG levels

Verify Bus IB1 is energized

_I____

1409/.]

__

Verifv Pw% PORVs closed

I

Verify at least one PORV Block Valve open

COMMENl'S:

Page 15 of 18

SCENARIO #2

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Anpendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

~~

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

EVENT NUMBER:

8 / 9

FACILITY

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Pressurizer Steam Space Break / Single Train SI (CONTINUED)

91s Intrrrnediete

...

Hangr Compensating \\'oltsgc ].ow Failure

APPI ICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

Check NO Containment Splay Pumps operating

Determines NIS Interniediate Range Compensating Voltage is failed low and

Checks RCS Dressure > 230 Dsie

manualiy energizes both Source Range channels

.-

-,-pi---

Checks KCS pressure stable

Stops KHR Pump B

I

BOP

I Checks SG pressures stable or increasing

__

-

I__

HX Valve, ICC-167

energized by offsite power

I

BOP

I Verif7iBus IBI energized

Train B CKDM fans

Turbine Xormal Bearing Oil Pump

Stoa the DC baring Oil Pump

I

BOP

Continue attempts to restore offsite power to Emergency Bus LA-SA

COMMENTS:

Page 16 of 18

SCENARIO ff2

NUREG-1021, Revision 9. Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

EVENT NUMBER:

8

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Pressurizer Steam SDace Break / Single Train SI (CONTINUED1

1 TIME I POSITION

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

COMMENTS:

Verifv EDG B nimine unloaded -~

Reset SI

Shutdown EDG B per OP-155, Section 4.0

Determine RHR Train B carable of Cold Leg Recirculation

Verifv Auxiliarv and Radwaste Processing Building Radiation normal

Check KCS uressure meater than 230 osie

TERMINATE THE SCENARIO AFTER THE TRANSITION TO

EPP-009 IS ANNOUNCED.

Page l7of I8

SCENAKIO #2

NUREG-102

I , Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ESD-2

...

FACILITY:

Harris

I

SCENARIO NUhIRER: 2

EVENT KUMBEK:

j 0

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Classifies the Event

I TIME I POSITION I

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

I

Classifies the event as an Site Area Emergency

NOTE: SAE BASED ONBREACH OFRCS B A M f E R AND

CQNTA IRMENT PRESSlIRE IN EXCESS OF 3 PSIG.

l---t-+----

SCENARIO #2

NUREG-l02t,

Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Harris

Draft

Scenario 3

Operating Exam

2004

Anuendix D

Simulator Scenario Outline

FORM l?S-D-I

Facility:

H A W S

Scenario Number:

3

Op-Test Number:

Examiners

Operators

Initial Conditions: IC-18; 100% power BOL; AFW Pump A-§A OOS (CFW026 RACK-OUT); HDP

0 0 s (CND065 RACK-OUT); JXSEHT EVENTS 6 and 7 DURING SIMUIATOR

SETUP. Lower power by 25 MWe and increase boron concentration by 2 ppm; Allow

plant to stabilize.

Turnover:

The unit is at 100% power at BOL, with equilibnum xenon conditions.

Boron concentration is 1238 ppm. Hank D rods are at 218 steps.

AFW Pump 'A' was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago for oil replacement due to

contaniinants and is expected to be retiuned to service within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Technical

Specification 3.7.1.2 has been entered. Risk level is YELLOW.

HDP 'A' is tagged out of service for hearing replacement and is not expected back for the

next several days.

Shift orders are to maintain power at 100% and restore AFW Pump 'A' to service when it

becomes available. GP-005 has been completed and the plant has been stable for 3 weeks

I

I

3

I CFW-12B I C(B0P)

Event Description

Operating CCW Pump Trip with failure of standby pump to

automatically start

Feed Water Flow Low Failure

Heater Drain Pump Trip with Failure of Turbine to Automatically

Runback

Pressurizer Pressure High Failure

Page I of 18

SCENARIO #3

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Event

Number

5

8

h4aifunction

Number

SGN-5C 42(

600

MSS-5C 2

NA

Event

Type*

M (ALL)

C (RO)

C (SRO)

C (BOP)

Event Description

SG Tube Rupture

Failure of MSlV on Ruptured §G to close - can be closed locally

NOTE: INSERT MALFUiWT1Ohr DUIUNG INITIAL SETUP

OF SIWULA TOR.

Partial failure of Automatic Phase A Lwlation signal (Train B

Phase A Slave Relay for select CNMT Phase A valves fails to

energize when required). iSI-287, ICs-11 & 1SW-242

NOTE: INSERT MALFffNCTIO-W DUZLVC IA7TIAL SETUP

OF SIMULA TOR.

Classifies the Event

  • (N)omial, (Rleactivity, (I)nstmment, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Page 2 of I8

SCENARIO #3

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Amendix D

Reeauired Ouerator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

FAClL ITl;

llnrris

.-.

EVENT NUhlBER:

I

....

SCENARIO NUiLIBER: 3

..

EVENT DESCRIPTIO h I:

Operating CCW Pump Trip with failure of standby pump to

automatically start

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVfOR

Diagnose trip of CCW Pump 1 A-SA and failure of CCW Pump 1B-SB to

automatic stalt

e

Enters and directs the actions of AOP-014. Loss of ConiDonent Cooling Water

Numerous alarms on ALB-005 due to no CCW flow

Breaker indication on CCW Pump 1A-SA

Failure of C C W B 1B-SB to start

~~

_-___--

ter than 52 psig

heck condition of the breaker and the pump

I

I

RO

I Verifv adeauate ESW cooling water flow to the associated CCW heat exchnnaer

__

-

._

the CCW pump failure,

I

-

COMMENTS:

Page 3 of 18

SCENARIO #3

NUREG-1021,

Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3

EVENT NUMBER:

2

FACILITY:

Harris

EVEN?' DESCRIPTION:

Peed Water FIQW I,OW Failure

COMMENTS:

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

S G A STM > FW FLOW MISMATCH (ALB-014-4-IA and IB) alarming

SG 'A' feed reg valve opening

SG 'A' actual feed flow > steam flow

Diagnose low failure of controrling SG 'A' feed flow channel

e

F1-477 indicating 0

0

SG 'A' level increasing

0 -

Enter arid direct the actions of AOP-010, Feedwater I2lalfunctions

-

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check NO Main Feedwater Pump tripped

rakes MANLTAI. control of FK-478 prior to direction in AOP-010 to preveflt

overfc-r

-.

OMM-00 1 instructions

-.

~

heck DEH controlling Turbine Valves properiy

Maintain all of the following:

At Ieast one Main Feedwater Pump running

Main Feedwater flow to all Steam Generators

v -

~ _ _ _ -

AIL Steam Generator levels greater than 30%

Check Feedwater Keylator Valves NOT operating properly in AUTO and perform

the following:

P

P

Place applicable Feedwater Keplator Valve (FK-478) in MANUAL

Maintain Steam Generator levels between 52 and 62% (REDUCE FW FLOW)

____I_

_-______

CRITICAL STEP TO PREVENT PLAA'T TRIP AS A RESULT OF HIGH-

~

_

_ -

-

~

mmr SG LE VEL.

-__p-

Jheck Main Control Room annunciators available

Jheck the following Pump status:

P

B

Only one HDP operating

-_______~-_I___..

NO Feedwater Train Pumps tnpped

Page 4 of 18

SCENARIO #3

NUREG- I02 I, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3

EVENT NUMBER:

2

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT 1

_-

SCRIPTION

POSITION 1

Feed Water Flow Low FaiIure (CONTINUED)

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

TIiNG9 T I E CREW

SECTION 3. P FOR THE FAIL CRE OF THE FEED FLOW

alfunctions (other than pump trips) Section

Valves operating properly in MODU:

Main Feedwater Pumps

Condensate Pumps

Condensate Booster Pumps

~-

nsate Dump To CS? Isolation - Valve

Check pumps for normal operation

Notify Load Ilispatcher of any load limitations

Check Reactor thermal power changed by less than 15% in any one hour period .-

SRO

I Exit AOP-010

Selests Channel 476 for control in accordance with OW-RP

--

estores Feed Keg Valve controller to AUTO when level stable at program with

w and steam flow matched

COMMENTS:

~~

Page 5 of 18

SCENARIO it3

hWRF.0-1021,

Revision9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3

EVENT NUMBER:

3

FACILITY:

Harris

~~

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Heater Drain Pump Trip with Failure of Turbine to Aotolnatifdly

TIME I POSITION

Runback

APPLICAKTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

Diagnoses trip of Heater Drain Pump B

e

e

SG levels decreasing

Reactor Power increasing

Enters arid directs the actions of AOP-010, Feedwater Malfunctions

(IMAIkDLZTE ACTION) Check NO Main Feedwater Pump tripped

Check DEH controlling Turbine Valves properly

Maintain all ofthe following:

e

At least one Main Feedwater Pump running

Main Feedwater flow to ali Steam Generators

ALL Steam Generator levers greater than 30%

Check Main Control Room annunciators available

Check the following Pump status:

e

Go to the applicable section:

D

Maintain all of the following:

m

HTK DRN PUMP B O/C TRIP-GND (ALB-019-4-IA) alarming

HTR DFW PUMP B LO UP-LO FLOW (ALB-019-3-1A) alamiing

_-

..

-

NO Feedwater Train Pumps tripped

e

Both HDPs tripped

--

Loss of Running

~ P=(including

BO?H Heater Drain Pumps) Section 3.a

At least one Main Feedwater Pump running

Main Feedwater flow to all Stearn Generators

AIL Steam Generator le\\& greater than 30%

-

--

COMMENTS:

Page6of1.3

SCENARIO #3

NUREG-1021, Kevision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCERAKIO NURIBER: 3

EVENT NlJhIRER:

3

FACILITY:

Harris

..

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Heater Drain Pump Triu with Failure of Turbine to Automsticallv

RO

BOP

Check control rods inserting to reduce Tavg - Tref mismatch

I Check Main Steam pressure less than PoRV controller setpcint

KO

I Check PZR Level trending to reference level

BOP

I Check load NOT less than or eaual to 900?

COMMENTS:

Page 7 of 18

SCENAIUO #3

MUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Aonendix D

Rewired Oaerator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER 3

EVENT NUMBER:

3

FACILJTY

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Heater Drain Pump Trip with Failure of Turbine to Automatically

TIME

Load Dispatcher that the Unit is reducing load

wer evolution by adjusting rods and/or boron

iny per OP-107, Chemical and Volume Control

e

e

e

e

e

Determines number of gallons required per Reactivity Plan

Sets FIS-113, Boric Acid Batch Counter, for corrcct number of gallons

Sets ICs-283, FK-I 13 Boric Acid Flow, for desired value (typically

approximately 5 gpm)

Places RMW CONTROL to S'I'OP

Places WtW MODE SELECTOR to BOR

Piaces RMW CONTROL to START

When desired boric

-____...

acid added, a m s t e m for AUTO

I

om to be prepared for the increased water processing

n will NOT take the Unit to Turbine shutdown

.-

fy Chemistry that Reactor power change will exceed 15% in a one hour period.

ck Rod Control in AUTO.

__

-

Energize all available PRZ Backup heaters

BOP

I Check the DEM System in AUTO

COMMENTS:

Perform the following at the D M panel:

0

Depress ENTER pushbutton

Depress REF pushbutton

e

Enter desired load in DEMAND display

e Depress ENTER pushbutton

Check EIOLD pushbutton lit

Depress the Load Rate MWh4IN pushbutton

Enter desired rate (NOT to exceed 45 MWMIN) in DEMAND display

Page8of18

SCENARIO #3

NUREG-1021, Revision 9. Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER 3

EVENT NUMBER:

3

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Heater Drain Pump Trip with Failure of Turbine to Automatically

lute as necessary to

rns to AOP-010

cpt'ntor to check the following seated, observing tailpipes:

eck IIotweli level trending to between 71oiO and 46%.

-

-___I

COMMENTS:

Page 9 of 18

SCENARIO li3

NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Aooendix D

Required Operator Actions

B.oRM ES-D-2

~

SCENARIO XUMBER: 3

EVENT NUMBER:

4

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Pressurizer Pressure High Failure

COM.MENTS:

.VPI.iCANTS ACTIONS OK BEHAVIOR

......

....

Diagnoses high failure of Pressurizer Pressure channel P-444

0

PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVKATION CONTROL (ItkB-O09-3-1),

alarming

alarming

PRESSURIZER HIGH-LOW PRESS (ALB-009-5-I), alarming

PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK HIGH-LOW LEVEL PRESS OR TEh4P

(ALB-009-8-1), alarming

IRESSUKIZER RELIEF DISCHARGE HIGH TEMP (A123-009-8-2),

0

  • PRZ heaters off
  • PIG! sprays open

Enters and directs the actions of AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check that a bubble exists in the PRZ

PRZ PORV 4443 momentarily open

PR2 pressure lowering on other channels

-

__

..

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verifies proper operation of PRZ PORVs AND

I

associated block valves

(MIMEDIATE ACTION) Takes manual control of pressurizer pressure by either:

Go TO Section 3.1, Pressure Control Malfunctions While Operating With a

Pressurizer

-

Bubhle

Monitor PRZ pressure by (henling other reliable indication

Placing master controller PK-444A in manual, or

Placing heaters and spray valves in manual

Check plant in MODE 1 OR 2

-heck PRZ pressure controlled

Check PRZ pressure 2335 PSICi OR LESS

Page 10 of 18

SCENARIO #3

NUREG-6021, Revision9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

.I-__

EVENT N:JF..IUER:

4

FACILITY:

Harris

...

SCENPIRiO NIIMBEK: 3

..

WENT 1

TIME

--

I_-

___

-

SCRIPTION:

Pressurizer Pressure High Failure (CONTIN'UED)

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

RO

I Check ail of the PFZ PORV block valves onen

RO

RO

Check that a malfunction of PT-444 has occurred

Verify PK-444A in MANUAL

-

RO

RO

Control PW,

pressure as follows:

0

0

Adjust PK-444A output as necessary, to attempt to restore and maintain PRZ

pressure

Check both PRZ spray valve controllers in AUTO and both spray valves

operating as desired

Check all PFZ heaters operating as desired

-

-~

Check hoth of the following conditions present:

e

PRZ pressure is controlled

0

Status of a normal spray valve or a PRZ heater hank is controlled

--

SRO

Refer to Attachment 3, Pressure Control Malfunction Symptoms-Bubble in

Direct Maintenance to investigate and repair the PRZ Pressure Control System

-

COMMENTS:

Page I I of 18

SCENARIO #3

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM E$-D-2

...

......

_....-

SCENARIO NLJR4REK: 3

EVENT NUMBER.

5

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

SG Tube Rupture

POSITION 1

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

TIME

~-

CUE

SRO

Diagnoses SGTR by multiple radiation monitor alarms, including:

CEV high alarm

Steamline 'C' alert

'C' high alarm

Determines SG tube rupture has occurred, orders a Reactor Trip and Safety

Injection, and enters .- and directs the actions ofPATN-1

--

,VOTE: MA I'.WAh'.E ATTE.4fPTS 10 PERFORMACFIOAS OF AOP-016,

E.X(.'ES.Yl).% PRI.)fAK I' P1.rl.W LEAKA GE, BEFORE DETERMI.VI.VG

THAT LE.4KAGE IS 1,VLXCESS OF C'AT.4EILITIES TO PERFORM A

CONl'KOLLED PL.4.VTSH('TDOl~~.~.

~

...... ~

IMMEI)lATE ACI'ION) Verity Reactor Trip

0

Neutron

~

flux .....

decreasink

.....

.

(IMMEDKl'E ACTION) Verify Turbine Trip

(I~lhlED!KlF ACTION) Verify Power '1'0 AC Emzrgewy Buses

Check bus vol!ages

.. -.

-.

..... -

.....

~

.....

RO

Trip breakers RYA and BYA - open

Trip breakers RI'B and BYB - open

Rod bottom lights - lit

~.

~

..

~

......

f3OP

All turbine throttle d v r s -.. shut

All turbi:=rnor ...... vzjvcs - sliu:

Check A(' enirrgcncy buses IA-SA w d In-SB -energized by oftX:e pov\\er or

EDGs

Check 6.9 KV biis IA-SA breaker brenke: 195 (OFFSITE) - closed

C!ieck 6.9 KV 1:us IR. SR hrrakcr hreaker I25 (OFFSITE.) closed

~

.

...

~

......

~

.......

_ -

BOP

.....

...

COMMENTS:

Page 12 of 18

SCENARIO #3

hZTREG-1021,

Revision 9, DraA

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3

EVENT NUMBER

5 / 7

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

SG Tnhe Rupture (CONTINUED)

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Actuates SI Actuation and determines SI has actuated

I

-

I

RO

I Verifv a11 CSPS and RIIR Pumos running

I

Verify SI flow > 200 gpin

Verify RCS pressure > 230 psig

Verify Main Steam Isolation NOT actuated, NOR required

I

RO

I Verify Containment pressure has remained < 10 psig

I

BOP

I Veri& > 2 10 KPPW AFW flow

BOP

BOP

omponents from actuation of ESFAS signals using PATH-I

ed to close and manually closes them:

ORV N2 SUPPLY.

e

e

I SW-242, NNS

_. CNMT FAN CLRS OUTLET ISOL

CRITICAL TO COMPLETE PHASE A ISOLATIOIV WHICH FAILED TO

ICs-I I, LTDN ISOL VLV

TICALL Y ACTUA TE.

._

YISOLATE AFW TO SG C AXYTIME IMINMUM LE VEL OF

COMMENTS:

Page 13 of iR

SCENARIO #3

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix 11

Required Operator Actions

FORM ESD-2

~

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3

EVENT NUMBER:

5 I 6

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

SG Tube Rupture (CONTINUED)

Failure of MSIV on Ruptured SG to Close

proper PFZ PORV and spray valve response

I

BOP

I Determines NO SGs are faulted

- - b F = n n i n e s

SG C is ruptured

I

1

Abnonnal secondary radiation levels

Uncontrolled level increase

-4

BOP -1

When S G C level is > 25%, isolates M W flow to SG C

ons of PATH-2 at Entry Point J

-

-

rocedures as required

e

e

e

o

Shut faulted SG C steam supply vaive, MS-72, to TDAFW pump (may have

been performed earlier for RCS temperature control)

Verify SG blowdown isolation wlves shut

Veri@ SG C Main Steam Drain isolation valves shut

Verify SG C Main Steam Isolation Bypass valve shut

COMMENTS:

Page 14 of 18

SCENARIO 63

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Drafi

Post Validation Revision

Annendix D

Reauired Ooerator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

EVENT NUMBER:

5 6

FACILITY:

Harris

I..

SCENARIO NIJMHER. 3

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

I..

SG Tuhe Rupture (CONTINUED)

Failure of MkIV on Ruptured SG to Close

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

Detennines SG C Main Steam Isolation valve failed to shut

o

Shut all remaining Main Steam Isolation valves and bypasses

e

Place both Steam Dump interlock switches to OFF / RESET

Use intact SG PORVs for a11 further steam dumping

Direct operator to locally isolate SG C using PATH-2 Guide, Attachment 1

o

Verify SG A and B MSIV and bypass valves shut

CRITICAL TO CLOSE SG AAhrD EMSIVs AND PLACE STEAMDUMP

LVTERLOCK SWITCHES IN OFF/RESEl TO PREVENT STEAMING

Isolate feed flow to SG C when level > 25%

I

-

-

RUPTLRED SG.

_.

CRITICAL TO ISQLA TE FEED FLOW TO SG C TO PREVENT

Check ruptured SG C pressure > 260 psig

RUPTURED SG.

i

I

RO

I When PRZ Dressure decreases below 2000 DS~R block low stcam pressure SI simal

1 Check SG A and R

both available for RCS cooldown

-~~

~~~~~

Dc.ttnt;ii;e required Core hi:

Temperature based on SG C prcssure

Check condenser NOT available and dump steam from SG A and 3 at

~

~

~

rnaximuni rate using SG PORVs

When Core Exit Temperatures are less than target temperature

o

Stop the RCS cooldown

o

Maintain CETs less than tarirmperature

..

Continue recovery actions during cooldown

Maintain RCP seal iniection between 8 and 13 gpm

~

_

_

_

I

I

COMMENTS:

Page 15 of18

SCENARIO #3

NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft

Poet Validation Revision

~~

Appendix L3

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3

EVENT NUMBER:

5

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTIO

=+:

SRO

RO

RO

-- -e~-

_--

BOP

COMMENTS:

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

Verify at least 210 KPPH AFW flow available

Verify power available to PRZ PORV Block valves

Check PIPZ FORVs closed

-

I

Verifv at least one PRZ PORV Block valve open

If PRZ FORV actuates. verifv nrouer operation

Reset SI

If offsite power lost, manually realign safeguards equipment

Reset Phase A and Phase B

_.

Establish L4 and N2 to Containment

Check RCS pressure > 230 psig

Stop both RIIR pumps

When Core Exit Temperatures are less than target temperature

o

Stop the RCS cooldown

DO NOT continue until cooldown comulete

-

. l ~ _ _ _ _ l _ _

Maintain CETs less than target temperature

-

I

Check SG C pressure stable or increasing

Check RCS subcooiing greater than 30 OF using the computer

_______

Page 16 of 18

SCENARIO #3

NUREG-I02i,

Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

_ -

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3

EVENT NUMBER:

5

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

SG Tube Rupture (CONTINUED)

0

PRZ level >_ 75%

  • RCS suhcooling 5 10 "F

RY LEAKAGE.

COMMENTS:

Page 17 of 18

SCENARIO #3

h'uRuG- IO2 1

~ Revision 9, Diafi

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3

EVENT NUMBER:

8

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Clnssifies the Event

COMMENTS:

Page 18 of IR

SCENARIO #3

NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Harris

Draft

Scenario 4

Spare

Operating Exam

2004