ML041170065
| ML041170065 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 10/30/2003 |
| From: | Ernstes M Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch |
| To: | Scarola J Carolina Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| 50-400/04-301 50-400/04-301 | |
| Download: ML041170065 (67) | |
See also: IR 05000400/2004301
Text
INITIAL SUBMITTAL
HARRIS EXAM
50-400/2004-301
-
FEBRUARY 23 27,2004
& MARCH 4,2004 (WRITTEN)
Harris
Draft
Operating Exam
2004
Harris
Draft
Scenario 1
Operating Exam
2004
Appendix D Simulator Scenario Outline FORM ES-D-I
-Facility: HARRIS Scenario Number: t Op-Test Numher:
Examiners Operators
Initial Conditions: IC-32: 26% power MOL; AFW Pump A-SA OOS (CPKr026 RACK OUT); INSERT
EVENTS 7,8, and 9 DURING SIMULATOR SETUP. Ensure DFH HOLD button is
illuminated. Ensure both Condensate Pumps and one Condensate Booster Pump is in
service. Ensure a Reactivity Plan is provided (NOTE - NEW REACTIVITY PLAN
REQUIRED FOR SCENARIO - DELETE TIIIS NOTE W O N COMPLETION
OF REACTIVITY PLAN).
Turnover: The unit is at 26% power at MOL, 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> following a reactor startup. The plant tripped
approximately 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> ago (I2 hours before startup).
Boron concentration is 1166 ppm. Bark D rods are at 108 steps.
AFW Pump 'A' was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago for oil replacement due to
contaminants and is expected to be returned to service within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. 'Technical
Specification 3.7.1.2 has been entered. Risk level is YELLOW.
Shift orders are to place the second Condensate Booster Pump in service and continue the
power ramp to 90% power and restore MW Pump 'A' to service when it hecomes
available. GP-005 is being performed per Step 5.0.1 16.
An Auxiliary Operator is standing by to start the Condensate Booster Pump. All prestart
check
I
I
Page 1 of 25 SCENARIO # I NUREG-1021,Revision9, Draft
Pout Validation Revision
Event
-T)'pe*
C (BOP) al Loss of Condenser Vacuum
c (SRO)
R (RO) NOTE: INITIATE THIS EVENT Oh'SAME THGGER AS
EVENT4 DUE TO TIME' UNTIL THISEVENTISNOTED BY
AVAILABLE CUES. THIS E W M T WIL
SIMULATOR OPERATOR TO ADJUST
M (ALL)
M (ALL)
NOTE: AVSERT MALFUNCTION DURING IhTTIAL SETUP
C (SRO)
c (RO)
C (SRO)
- (N)orinal, (R)eactivity, (Qnstmment, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Page 2 of 25 SCENARIO # 1 h W G - I 0 2 I , Revision 9, Draf?
Post Validation Revision
Auuendix Il Rewired Ooerator Actions FORM E§-I)-2
SCEKARIO NIJMBEK: I EVENT NITvlREK: 1 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT 1 ISCRIPTION: Place Second Condensate Rooster Pump in service
CUE Ishw orders directplacing a second Condensate Booster Pump in service
BOP Verify Initial Conditions of OP-134, Section 5.6.1
1. One Condcnsate Booster Pump is in service per Section 5.5 of OP-134
2. Condensate Booster Pump E I,ock-Out Relay reset
Reviews CAUTION: To prevent damaging the CBP recirc valves, do not operate
the second Condensate Booster Pump for more than 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> wit11 MFP suction
flow less than 4500 kpph.
3. Total feedwater flow is greater than 4500 kpph
4. CPD Ooerator and Cbemistrv have been notified of potential flow and pressure
-
1 changes in the C o n d e n s a k m .
Direct AO to perform prestart checks on Condensate Booster Pump B per
I BOP
Attachment 6 ___
'Verify CONDENSATE BOOSTbR PUMP B RECIRC, ICE-261 in MODU and
+- I BOP
IReviews CAUTION: There are no Condensate Booster h n ~ tripsp to protect the
Reviews NOTE: Computer points listed in Section 6.0 of this procedure may be
monitored for information.
Reviews NOTE: When the Condensate Booster Pump controi switch is placed to
the START position, the Aux Lube Oil Pump will start and supply the VSF
Coupling with oil until oil pressure is greater than or equal to 20 psig, at which
time the Condensate Booster Pump starts.
COMMENTS:
Page 3 of 25 SCENARIO # 1 NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Dnft
Post Validation Revision
Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
~~
SCENARIO NUMBER 1 EVENT NUMBER: 1 FACILITY: Harris
?SCRIPTION: Plsce Second Condensate Train in service (CQNTINUJ3D)
POSKION APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR I
Reviews CAUTION: The amount of time the associated tecirc valve, 1CE-261 is
open, should be minimized due to lack of lubrication without Condensate I3ooster
Pump running. __
Place the control switch CONDEXSATE BOOSTER PlJMP 5 RECIRC, 1CE-261
in the OPEN position immediately prior __
___- to starting Condensate Booster Pump B
Reviews NOTE: Starting the second Condensate Booster Pump may cause the
previously running pump controller to reject to Manual. This is due to the speed
-
I
sensor on the pump being started initially providing a speed input signal that is
based on ekctrical noise. If the running CBP controller rejects to manual, it is
permissible to return the controller to Auto once the CBP being started reaches the
no-load speed. If the controller again rejects to manual, then further investigation
would be required.
_ _ I .- _________
BOP Stalt B Condensate Booster
x__ ___ Pump ~. -
BOP Directs AO to locally verify Condensate Booster Pump A Aux Lube Oil Punip has
stopped - I _
BOP Directs A 0 to check differential pressure across the Pall Replaceable Duplex
Filter, as indicated between PI-OILO-2304Bl and PJ-OlLO-2304B2 is less than 15
PSI. IF differential pressure across the Pall Replaceable Duplex Filter is greater
than or equal to 15 PSI, then direct A 0 to swap to the idlehut of service filter per
_-
Section 8 . l n h e r w i s e this StQ -
I _ - _ is NIA) .-
BOP Slowly increase the demand signal on PK-2308, CNDST B U R PUMP B SPEED
Booster Pump Speed Controller _ I
-
- ONTKOI,LER to match the demand simal on the areviouslv running Condensate
$ice PK-2308, CNDST BSTR PCMP B SPEED CONI'ROLLER to AUTO when
I
he demand signals are matched
- --
Place the control switch for CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP
!61 in the MODIJ-on
l_l___ _ _ _ _ I _
COMMENTS:
Page 4 of 25 SCENARIO # 1 NUREG-1021,Revision 9, DraA
Post Validation Revision
Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 2 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT 3SCRIPTION: Pressurizer Level high failure
TIME POSITION APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR I
SRO - high failure of controlling- PRZ level control channel, I.T-459
Diagnose
RO o 1~1-4~9inciicating 100%
e PEL? backup heaters all energized
Charging flow decreasing on FI-122A. 1
PRZ CONT HIGH LEVEL i?EVIATIONAND HEATERS ON (ALB-009-2-
1) alarming
e PRESSURIZER HIGH LEVEL (ALE-009-4-1) alarming
I _-
e PKESSURIZER HIGH LEVEI, ALERT (ALB-009-4-2) _. ahrming
SRO Directs taking manual control of charging and increasing flow
- I _ _.
RO Takes manual control of charging (CS-23 1, FK-122.1 CHARGING FLOW) and
- .- increases
__- -to maintain PRZ level _I--.-_
flow
SKO Enters and directs the performance of O W - K p
I I ._
RO Selects channels 460/461 on PRZ Level Control Selector (may select per ALB-
009-4-1 or - 4 L I_______ __- __
SRO Directs tripping appropriate bistable~
-- .- .-
RO Restores charging (CS-231, FK-122.1 CHARGING FL.OiV) and places in
-- if desired
automatic,
SKO Kefers to TS 3.3.1 (6 hr), 3.3.3.5.a (7 day) and 3.3.3.6 ( 7 day) for PRZ level
channel failure
l______l___l_
SRO Initiates repairs
I _ - - _- _ _ _ I _ . -
__- _ _ I -
__ - _ -_ I -
_._ I
COMMENTS:
Page 5 of25 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft
Post Validation Revision
Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NCJMRER: 1
~~~ ~ EVENT NUMBER: 3 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: SG Level Low Failure
I 7'1R4E 1 POSITION . APPLICANT'S ACTIONS..OR BEFIAVIOR
I SRO IDiagiose low failure of controlling SG 'B' level channel
SG B NR LVWSP NL'EO DE\* (ALE-14-2-1B) a i m i n g
1:
~
0
STEAM GEN B LOU' LVI, (ALB-14-54A) alarming
STEAM GEN B LOW-LOW LEVEL (ALB-14-54B) alarming
SG 'B' level, LI-486 SB, indicating 0%
I * S(i I3 PW > SI'M FLOW MISMATCH (AL,B-I4-5-1A) alarming
- SG 'I% ' > steam flow
feed flow
SG '5'feed reg vdve opening
I
SG 'B' level rising on operable
__ - level channels
SG - __-
Enter and direct the actions of .4OP-O10, Feedwater Malfunctions -
l _ _ _ l
(IkIMEDIATE ACTION) Check any Main Feedwater Pump tripped
____
lt+%%+iMMEDIATE ACTION) Check initial Reactor power less than 90%.
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check initial Reactor power less than 80%.
-
I _ - -_____--
-
- At least one Main Feedwater Pump running
ALL Steam Generator levels greater than 3W/0
___I
-
heck Feedwater Regulator Valves NOT operating
I .~properly
~
in AUTO and p e r f o n
the following:
Place applicable Feedwater Regulator Valve (FK-488) in MANUAL
Maintain Steam Generator levels between 52 and 62% (REDUCE EW
CRITICAL STEP TO PREVENT PLANT TRIP AS A RESULT OF HIGH-
COMMENTS:
Page 6 of25 SCENARIO #l h
"%
- 1021. Revision 9, Draft
Post Validation Revision
Aumndix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
-
SCENARIO MJMBER: 1
~
EVENT NUMBER: 3 FACILITY Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: SG Level Low Failure (CONTINUED)
I TIME POSIIION [
__ APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR DEtIAVIOR
Check the following Pump status:
0 If any Feedwater Train Piinips tripped, go to Step I 1
NOTE: OXLII FWPUMP IS OPERATING AT THIS TIME
Go to the applicable section:
All CondensateiFeedwater flow malfunctions (other than pump trips) Section
Check the following Recirc and Dump Valves operating properly in blOD1J:
e Main Feedwater Pumps
Condensate Booster Pumps
Condensate Pumps
e 1CE-293, Condensate Recirc
0 ICE-142, Condensate 1 h 1 T o CST Isolation Valve -~
Check the Condensate and Feedwater System intact
--- _I_ -
Reviews NOTE: Pumps should be stopped in the order of higher to lower
pressure. (To stop a Condensate Pump, stop a Main Feedwater Pump followed by a
Condensate Booster Pump and then the Condensate Iuq.)
Check pumps for noma1 opemt~on.
____ _- --
Notify Load Dispatcher of any load limitations.
I I SRO I Check Reactor thermal power changed by less than 15% in any one hour period
_.
l__l ______I
Refers to TS 3.3.1 (Items 13 and 14) 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> requirement to trip bistables
~
__
Initiate repairs
COMMENTS:
Page 7 of 25 SCENARIO $1 NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
Post Validation Revision
Appendix D Kequired Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT KUMBER: 4 FACILITY. Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTIC Median Tavg high failure
-
TIME 'OSITION
SRO .
APPI.ICA"T'S ACTIONS OK BEHAVIOR
KO Rods irrserting
I TR-408 Ked Pen at max output
I RCS I.OOPNBIC TAVG HVLO DEV (AL14-010-6-3A/7-3A/8-3A) all
aiarmiug
RCS 1WFITAVG HIGH-LOW (AI.B-0 10-6-4B) alarming
D PRESSURIZER CONTROL LOW LEVEL DEVIATION (ALB-009-2-2)
alarming
I Charging flow FI-122A. 1 increasing
___
I FK-122 *ut increasing _ _ - ~ -
I
I _ _ I _
SRO Enter and direct the actions of AOP-001, Malfunction of Kod Control and
1ndication.stem - _____I
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check that < 2 control rods are dropped
__-
'IMMEDIATE ACTION) Position Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN
RO 'IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check Control Bank motion stopped
I @
-
So to the appropriate section:
Section 3.2, Continuous Spurious Control Bank Motion -
Manually operate affected control bank to restore the following:
B Equilibrium power and temperature conditions
B Rods above the insertion limits ofTech Spec 3.1.3.6 and PIP-106, Technical
Specification Equipment List Program and Core Operating Limits Report.
COMMENTS:
Page 8 of25 SCENARIO #I NUREG-IO21,Revision 9, Draft
Post Validation Revision
Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
~~ ~
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 4 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT iSCRIPTION: Median Tavg high failure (CONrINUED)
POSITION APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OK BEHAVIOR
SRO Check that instrument channel failure has not occurred by observing the following:
KO RCS Tavg
RCSTref
0 Power Range NH channels
Turbine first stage pressure
SRO Verify proper operation of the folIowing:
KO C X T S demineralizers
BTRS
e
_
Reactor Makeup Control System
I
SRO Check that this section was not cntered due to control banks moving out and go to
SRO Check that ncither of the following occurred:
RO Unexplained RClS bontion
- PtJn -lanned RCS dilution
___
SRO Check that an automatic Rod Control malfiinction occurred
I KO -
RO Maintain inanual rod contml unlil appropriate corrective action is complete
§KO Exit this orocedure
I
-
COMMENTS:
Page 9 of 25 SCENARIO #I N W G - 1 0 2 1 , Revision 9, Draft
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions FC)RM ES-D-2
~~~~ ~
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMRER 5 FACILITY: Harris
Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum
POSITION APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
Diagnoses lowering main condenser vacuum
e Decreasing Condenser vacuum indication on MCB
e CPdnSR PRE TRP LOWJVACLJUMalarm (A1.B-020-2-4A) alarming
- ___ COMPUTER ALARM MS/TURBINE SYSTEMS (AIB-020-5-5) alanning
_ I _ _ _
SRO Enters and directs the actions of AOP-012, Partial Iass of Condenser Vacuum
I _ I
l_l_
BOP _-
Check Turbine in operation
BOP Check Condenser pressure in both Zones less than:
0 7.5 inches Kg absolute and Turbine first stage pressure is greater than 60%
turbine load
-0K-
0 5 inches IIg absolute and Turbine first stage pressure is less than 6OYo turbine
SKO Reduce Turbine ioad as necessary to niaintain Condenser vacuum using one of the
BOP follo.rving:
D GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown from Power Operation to Hot Standby
m AOP-038, Rapid Down- - I
I30P Continue Turbine load reduction until directed otherwise by Unit SCO based on
the following:
a Cause of vacuum loss identified and corrected
- Vacuum stable or increasing
B Plant conditions require Reactor or Turbine trip
NOTE TO SIMULATOR OPERA TOR:
ASSOONAS TURBINE LOAD HAS BEENLOWERED INRESPONSE TO
_ ~
LOWERING VACUUM, REDUCE MALFhTNCTION SEVERITY TO 5.
~ I - _
I I _ - --
VOTE: SE VER4L MIhThTESAFTER RILWO VING AfALFUNCTIO.V,
REPORT AS A 0 THAT AIR INLEAKAGE WAS APPARENT CAUSE AND
I CE-4 75, COhDEhSER VAChi7.W BREz4KER, HAS BEEN FULLY CL OSED.
VOISE LEVEL IN AREA HAS DECREASED SUBSTANTPALLX
COMMENTS:
Page 10 of 2.5 SCENNAKIO # I NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NIJMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 5 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum (CONTINUED)
1 TIME I POSITION APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
BOP s of Attachment 1
SRO ed and go to Step 11
SRB 0 failure of a Circulating Water System
-
SRO solabie leak in Circulating Water System exists and go to Step
- I ,
_-.__
SRO Check NO isolable leak between Condenser Waterbox isolation valves exists and
go to Step 20
Check Circulating Water temperatures using the following EWFIS Computer
Points stable or decreasing:
'TCVJ1930,Cooling Tower Basin Temp
0 TCW194OA, Condenser A Circ Water Met Temp
_
TCW1940B, Condenser B Circ .~
_ I
Water Inlet Temp __ps
SKQ Check plant shutdown initiated
Notify Load Dispatcher of reduced load capability
-Monitor Turbine vibration leveis
_ I - - normal -
Reviews Note: Exhaust IIood Spray may not be effective in reducing Exhaust
Hood temxrature above 15% Turbine load
_ I_ - - _____--
Check Exhaust Hood temnerature less than 145'F
r- I SRO 1 Check Keactor thermal power changed by less than 15% in any one hour period
COMMENTS:
Page 1 I of25 SCENARIO # I NLTKEG-1021, Revision9, Draft
Post Validation Revision
Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 5 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuom (CONTINUED)
__l__l____l_
~--___
COMMENTS:
Page 12 of 25 SCENARIO #I NUREG-102 1, Revision 9,Draft
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Amendis D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 6/ 7 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip
POSITIOr APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
SKO Diagnoses Main Steam break inside containment
RO e Reactor power increasing
BOP Steam flow increasing
Feed flow increasing
- SG levels decreasing after initial swell
0 Steam pressure decreasing
RCS temperature decreasing
Containment pressure increasing
- Containment radiation levels ---unchanged
SRO Orders a reactor trip and safety injection and enters PATH-I
- ___
NOTE: DUE 10 THE FAILURE OF THE AUTOMATIC AND MAATAL
REACTOR T f f I eA SAFETYINJECTIQNIS LIKELY TO OCCUR BEFORE
- THE REACTOR CANBE TRIPPED LOCALLY. -
I _ _ l _ l _
RO Determines reactor failed to automatically trip
e Reactor trip breakers closed
- Rod bottom lights off
__ Neutron flus NOT decreasing --
e
RO Attempts manual trip of reactor
_ _ - - _ _ I _
- __-
RO Determines manual trip NOT successful
Reactor trip breakers closed
e Rod bottom lights off
e
- Neutron flus NOT decreasing _- _ _ I -
RO Informs SRO of' failure of reactor io trip automatically or manually
SRO Transitions to and directs the actions of FRP-S. 1, Response to Nuclear Power
-
Generation / ATWS - I _ _-___
RO (IMMEIXATIi ACTION) Verifies rods inserting automatically or manually inserts
___-control rods- I_.-____ - I _
COMMENTS:
Page I 3 of 25 SCENAFUO #I ?KJREG-I021,Revision9, Draft
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM E§-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVEN?' NUMBER: 6 / 7 / 8 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip
All turbine throttle valves shut
- shut
All turbine governor valves
ACTION) Determines neither Motor-Driven AFW pump running
and verifies Turhine-Driven M W Pump operating___
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Determines reactor is not tripped and directs operator to
contact or report to Control Room
CRITICAL STEP TO DIRECT A LOCAL KEACTOR TRKP TO ADD
I, NEGATIVE REACTIVITY TO CORE.
R'OTE: AFTER API'ROXIWATEL Y 15 SECOIVDDELAK CONTACT
COXTROL ROOM A S THE OPERATOR DIRECTED TO CONTACT/
REPORT. __I _ - I _ - - - - ~
Directs operator to locally tnp the reactor by (order of preference):
Locally opening the reactor trip breakers
0 Locally trip both rod drive MG set generator output breakers.
Locally triEboth rod drive MG set motor breakers
I___-____
,VOTE: APPROXIMATELY 30 SECONDS AFTER BEING DIRECTED TO
LOCALLY TRIP THE REACTOR, OPEN THE REACTOR TRIP B R E A K E R A
Initiate monitoring o f CSFSTs
COMMENTS:
Page 14 of 25 SCENARIO #I NUREG-1021,Revision 9: Draft
Post Validation Reviision
Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 6 / 7 I 9 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCXIPTION: Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to TI'&?
Start a boric acid pump
e Open ICs-278, Emergency Boric Acid Addition \,ahre
Verify > 30 gpm emergency bontion flow
Verify > 30 gpm CSIP flow to RCS
Ver&RC§Lressure 2: 2335 psig _-
I(
NTTZSI ACTUATED L I G E A N D SEVERAL OTIIER GVEXPECTED
IiVDICATtOAS WILL BE RECEIVED DUE TO A FAILrJm OF SLAVE
RELA Y K602B WHICH IS INCL drDEDAS THE INITIATING FAILURE FOR
THIS EVENT. THE FOLLO WIA'G COMPONEATSARE AFFECTED:
SI Actuaied light - blinks &e to difference in Train SA & SS - hght
operated by contaet on K40.2 via multiprexer
SI Reset Auto-SI Blocked - blinks when atienapting to reset SI due to Train
SA resei with Trnin SB not able to reset - timer started by contact on K402
e LCV-II5D does not auto open
- LCV-II5E does not auto close
CC-415 does not auto close
_-I__
__-
305 noes not auto close __-
eniify failure of RWST suction to CSPs to open
1CS-291 red light off, green light an __- _ I - -
ttempis to open ICs-291 and reports failure to SKI
COMMENTS:
Page 15 of25 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft
Post Validation Revision
-~
Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT MJMRER: 6/4 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to 'kip
(CONTINUED)
entilation valves and dampers shut
__
RO I ~ e r i f reactor
v tri~oeci
BOP 1 Verifies turbine trinued
_ I
I j
_ _ I _ _
SRO Begin monitoring of foldout for FKP-S. I
--
BOP Controls AFW flow to intact S G s to maintain between 40% and 50%
_ _- .-
Y 'C'BY THIS
TIME, PA4RTICULARLY IF iWS ISOLATIOXHAS OCCC'RRED, AND
CHOOSE _ l _ _ _ l l__
Verify All Dilution Paths Isolated
- Reactor Makeup Water punips OFF
FCV-I14B,Reactor Makeup Water valve SHUT
e ICS-98, BTRS Bypass valve OPEN
- Direct A 0 to locdliy verify ICs-510, Boric Acid Batch Tank Outlet valve
__ I _ -
Checks for positive reactivity addition due to cooldown
a Reactor tripped
_ htemediate range startup rate positive
I _ _
--
eteimines a SG is depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner and go to Step
___I ___ 18
ss valves closed
-
mines S G 'C' faulted due to SG pressure decreasing in an uncontrolled
manner or comnlctelv denressurized
COMMENTS:
Page 16 of 25 SCENARIO # I NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 6/7 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip
(CONTINUED)
TIME POSITION APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
SRO Detemiines SG 'A' and SG 'B' NOT faulted
__-
Verifies PORV closed
0 Verifies FW Isolation closed
Closes steam supply to 'B'DAFW Pump
E Verifies before seat drain isolation closed
0 Verifies SG blowdown isolation closed
Verifies steam analyzer isolation closed
___- E Verifies
___.._.__- cheniical addition isolations
- closed
CRITICAL STEP TO ISOLATE SG 'C' PRIOR TO EXITING FRP-
I _ -
S.1
- . TO MINIMIZE PRESSURE _ I
RISE INSIDE
~ . CONTAINMENT.
RO Verifies core exit thermocouples < 1200 "F
I _ -
RO Verify reactor subcritical
Power ranges < 5%
Intermediate startup rate negative _ I ___ .__-
SRO Implements FWs, a5 required
.___
._I - --
COMMENTS:
Page 17 of25 SCENARIO W1 NIJREG-1021,Revisinn9, Draft
Post Validation Kevision
Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 6/7 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip
(CONTINUED)
APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
Transitions to and directs the actions of FRP-J.1 based on MAGENTA path on
Containment CSFST
Verifies Phase A isolation valves closed
Verifies Containment Vent isolation valves closed
I -
BOP Verifies Containment Spray operation due to pressure 10 psig
- Venfy Spray Pumps running
e Verify-r -valve alignment
BOP Verifies Phase B isoiation
__
RO Stop all KCPs due to loss of cooling flow
___ I _ _ I_
SRO Venfies prowr operation of containment fan coolers
1 Verifies MSNs and bvuasscs closed
, Determines SG Cis onlv faulted SG and verifies isolated
1
Check both Spray Pumps running
P -
Check both ESW Booster Pumps running and orifice bpitss isolation
-.valves closed I _ _
I _ -
COMMENTS:
Page 18 of25 SCENARIO # I NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions FOKM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER 6/7 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip
(CONTINUED)
TIhlEIPOS1.rION
I SRO Transitions to and directs the actions of EOP PATH-l
Verifies reactor tnmed
Verifies turbine tripped
I - I_
I BOP Verifies power to AC safeguards buses
Verifies SI actuated
Begins monitoring of CSFSTs
_ _ I I _ I _ _ _ - -
Begins monitoring of Foldout A
__I___
RO Verifies proper operation of emergency safeguards equipment
- CSIP and RHR pumps running
- SI flow z 200 gpm
Main steam line isolation
D Containment pressure above 10 psig, with actions taken
b AFW flow at least 2 10 KPIB available -
-+ I --
I _ l _ _ _ l l
-
COMMEhTS:
Page 19 of25 SCENARIO #1 NUREG-1021, Kevision9: Dnf?
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- ... , ~ ...__.-......... .. - - __ ~
Aonendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
~~ ~ ~~
SCENARIO NUMBER: I EVENT NUMBER: 6/ 7 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip
(CONTINUED)
APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
ESFAS proper alignment using Attachment 6
0 2CsPsrunning
-
2 RHR Pumps running
- 2 CCW Pumps running
N1 ESW and ESW Booster Pumps running
SI Valves properly aligned
NOTE: R WST SUCTIO".'S TO CSIPSFAILED TO OPEN ON SI
ACTLbtTION. ,WAYHAVE BEEA'RECOGMZEI) BY THIS POINTAND
OPERABLE F7AL VE: OPEAED. I F ? V O ~IT IS CRITICAL AT TMIS POI"
TO OPEV THE VAL YE TO ESTABLISH FLQW.
Phase A proper alignment
Blowdown and SCi sample valves shut
Main steam lines isolated
Containment Spray operation
RCPs stopped
Both FW I'umps tripped
FW Isolation valves closed
XEITIIER MDAFW Pump operating
T D A W Pump operating
AFW alignment (FLOW ISOLATED TO SG 'C')
Both EDGs running
Containment Fan Coolers - 1 per unit operating in slow speed
Control Room Ventilation in Emergency Recirc
AC Ruses 1Al and l B 1 energized
Air compressors 1A and 1B in Local Control Mode
Page 20 of 25 SCENARIO # 1 NURE:C-102 1, Revision 9, I h f i
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Appendix H) Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: I EVEKT NUMBER: 6I7 FACILITY Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trir,
(CONTIhWED)
I'OSITIOI\ APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR DEIIAVIOR
RO Attempts to stablize RCS temperature using WR Tcold due to no RCPs
NOTE: DUE TO FAULTED sc, ncs TEMPEM TURE IS EXPECTED TO
- -BELOW.
RO Verifies proper operation of PRZ PORVs
NOTE: SPRAY VALVES N O T__
I _ _ _ R F m R E D DUE TO NO RCPSRKVNING.
SRO Detemiines SG 'C' faulted and transitions to and directs the actions of EPP-014.
Faulted Steam Generator Isolation
NOTE: SG SHOULD AILREADYHAVE BEENISOLATED PER
DIRECTIQh'S OF F'RP-S.1,BUT TRANSITIQN TO EPP-014 IS STILL
-
I.
-
-
RXLTRED.. ______
_I _ -
-
I ___.-
____-
COMMENTS:
Page21 of25 NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft
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.~___ . .... .......___.
I .
~ ~ . ~ - I _ _
Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 6/ 7 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip
I
Check MSIVs and bypass valves shut
l _ _ l _
Determines SGs A and R are NOT faulted
- _ I _ _- - - ---
etemiines SI Termination Critena are met
- Subcooling (> 40%)
0 Heat Sink (SG level > 40%)
e RCS Pressure (stable / incrcasing)
_ I - -
_ _ I-
O PREVENT
RCS OVERFILL AND PRESSURIZATION RESULTING IN
ND OR SAFETIES.
COMMENTS:
Page 22 of 25 SCENARIO #1 NIREG-1021,Revision 9,Draft
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Annendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
~~
SCENARIO NUMBER: 1 EVENT NUMBER: 6/ 4 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Steam Bresk Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip
Reset SI
___I --- I
Manually reali&n safeguards equipment, if required, following a loss of offsite
nower
Stons all but I CSIP I
Determines KCS nressure stable or increasina I
Check CSIP suction aligned to RWST
__-. __--
Opens normal miniflow isolation valves
e 1CS-182
- ICs-196
0 ICs-210
e ICs-214 ___- - - ~- -
Isolates BIT outkt valves
e ISH-4 I .- -
Verify cold and hot leg injection valves closed
lSI-86
- 1SI-104 I
_-. ____- __
Establishes charging lineup
Closes FK-122.1
Opens ICs-235
Opens ICs-238 ____ ___
Controls charging to maintain pressurizer level using FK-122.1 and maintain flow
__150am __- _ - - I _ - -
Verify PR% level can be maintained stable or increasing
I _ _ _ _ _ __ I
I RO Reset Phase A and Phase B Isolation signals
COMMENTS:
Page 23 of25 SCENARIO # 1 NUREG-I02 I Revision 9, Draft
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
~~ ~ ~
SCENARIO NIJMBER I EVEN?' NUMBER: 6/7 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip
SI-287
-_
ansition to EPP-008, SI Termination
- ____ __
TERMINATE n m SCENARIO AFTER TRE TRANSITION TO
EPP-008 IS ANNOUNCED.
___x_I I _
____
COMMENTS:
Page 24 of25 SCENARIO #I MJREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
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I # Ol?iVNTJS
-~ . ......
Harris
Draft
Scenario 2
Operating Exam
2004
Appendix D Simulator Scenario Outline FORM ES-D-I
Facility: HARRlS Scenario Number: 2 Op-Test Numher:
Examiners (&3?dtOrS
Initial Conditions: IC-18; 100% power DOL; AFW Pump A-SA OOS (CFW026 RACK-OUT); HDP A
OOS (CN11065 RACK-OUT); Lower power by 25 MWe and increase boron
concentration by 2 ppm: Allow plant to stabilize.
Turnover: The unit is at 100% power at BOL, with equilibrium xenon conditions.
Boron concentration is 1238 ppm. Bank D rods are at 218 steps.
AFW Pump Awas taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago for oil replacement due to
contaminants and is expected to be returned to service within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 has been entered. Risk level is YELLOW.
IIDP A is tagged out of service for hearing replacement and is not expected back for
the next several days.
Shift orders are to maintain power at 100% and restore AFW Pump Ato service when
it becomes available. GP-005 has been completed and the plant has been stable for 3
weeks.
Eamp 90 NOTE: MVL TIPLE E VERTS OhSAME TRIGGER.
XB 100070
OFF with I
Page 1 of 18 SCENAIUO R2 M W G - I O Z I , Revision 9, Draft
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NOTE: MUL TIPL
NOTE: THIS E VENT SHOULD BE SET ON SAME
TRIGGER AS E VENT 7.
- (X)orrnai, (K)eactivity, (Onstrurnent, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Page2of18 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Kevision 9, DnA
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENTNUMRER: 1 FACILITY: Harris
~
EVENT DESCRIPTION: SIG A PORV Pressure Transmitter PT-308 fails high with failure of
e SG A PORV open (open indication failed)
e RCS temperature lowering
Directs operator to take manuai control of SG A PORV and close per
requirements of OMM-OOI
e Condition / cause communicated to SRO
SKC3 p v i d e s concurrence to take manual control
SRO provides control limits
e Appropnatc procedure implemented when plant stabilized
COMMENTS:
Page 3 of 18 SCENARIO #2 NIJREG-1021, Revision 9, DnR
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Auoendix D Requircd Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
~~~
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 2 FACILITY: Harris
EVEKT DESCRIPTION: LT-112, VCT Level, High Pailure
ALB-007-5-5. COMPUTER ALARM CIIEM & VOL SYSTEMS
Tank, aligns to HUT
Enters and direets the actions of AOP-003. Malfunction of Reactor Makeup
Control
Check 1.4 available
I SKO I Determines LK-I 12 output has failed and noes
- to Section 3.1, LT-I 12 or LT-115
Malfiinction
--+sK(1-k%OUS ACTION, Assesses effects of LT-I 12 failure (Attachment 1)
I RO 1 Determines failure is NOT due to LT-I 15 and EO to Step 8
Determines failure caused by LT-112
__- ~ l _ _ l
Monitor VCT level using either:
I
'ntain VCT level above 20% using auto makeup
intain VCT level below 7oo/o by manually diverting
COMMENTS:
Page 4 of 18 SCENARIO #2 WUTPEG-102I Revision 9, Draft
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Appendix D Required Operator Actioi~s FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 2 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION 1.T-112, VCT Level, High Failure (CONTINUED)
n LCV-I i5A III VC'T position
_ I_
_- -
COMMENTS:
Page 5 of 18 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021,Revision9: Draft
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-I)-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT X W B E R : 3 FACILITY: Harris
-
EVENT :SCRIPTION:
TIME POSITION
Dropped Control Rod FZ
APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR I
e ALB-013-4-2, POUER RANGE HIGH NEUTRON FLUX RATE ALERT,
CUE alarming
- ALB-O 13-4-5, POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVLATHON, alarming
ALH-013-7-4, ONE ROD AT BOTTOM, alarming
e ALE-013-8-1, BANK D FULL ROD WITHDRAWAL, alarming
- AI,B-013-8-S, COMPUTER ALARM ROD DEVISEQ NIS PWR RANGE
TILTS, alarming
RCS temperature decreasing
e Control rods stepping out until C-11 interlock
e IXWI indicates Rod F2 b o x e d_ I -
SRO Enters and directs the actions of AOP-001, Malfunction of Rod Conwol and
Indication
- System
-
RO (1MMEI)IATE ACTION) Check that LESS THAN TWO control rods are dropped
-
RO [IMMEDIATEACTION) Position Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN
... IMMEDIATEACTION) Check Control Bank motion STOPPED
SRO Go To Section 3.1, Dropped Control Rod -__ I
____I__
SKO Record the time at which the rod dropped
_ -- I _ -
Adjust one of the following to equalize Tavg with Tref
e Turbine load
Boron concentrations_---
Direct an operator to check ALL Rod Control Power and Logic Cabinets for
normal operation, as follows
_ I
Direct Maintenance to perform corrective action on ALL affected Rod Control
Power and LoAc Cabinets
I
__-___I___
lheck that ALB-13-7-1, ROD CONTROL URGENT ALARM, is ALARMING,
iut do not reset until Maintenance has completed repairs
COMMENTS:
Page 6 of 18 SCENARIO #2 huREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 3 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTIO Dropped Control Hod F2 (CONTINUED)
TIME POSITION -.... APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
.. ....
SRO Kcview the fbllowing l:cckfi;ca! Specifications:
3.1. I.!, Horation Control - Shutdown Margin. Modes I & 2
3.1.3.1, hlovablr Control Aswmblies Group Ileiglit
3 . I . 3 3 , Shi~tdownRod Insertion Limit
3.1.3.6, Contrcil Rod Insrrtion Limits
0 3.1.1, Axial Flux IXI'ferencr
3.2.4, Quadrant P o w r Tilt Ratio ~
SRO Notify the following:
Manager - C?pentions
.~ Reackv E n g i n e e r i n L ...-.
.... .. -. ..- .. .-. ..- ..-. ..-
RO CIieck Reactor Power AT OR AROVE P-i0 (IO'%).
KO Reset any negative rate trip alarm at the NIS cabinets
_- __-- -
SRO Lower turbine load as recommended by Reactor Engineering
I -
COMMENTS:
Page 7 of 18 SCENARIO #2 NURIG-1021, Revision 9, Draft
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~
Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENAKIO NIJMBER: 2 EVENT NIJMBEK: 4 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTIC Power Reduction
POSITION APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
CUE Power reduction to less than 90% within the next 20 minutes has been directed
to dhwfirr- droeped.. Pod P e C l l X
SKO Direct the actions of AOP-038, Rapid Downpower after discussing Reactor Trip
Critena using Attachment I --
SRO Notify Load Dispatcher that the Unit is reducing load
SRO Determine required horic acid addiiion for desired power reduction, as follows:
- Obtain values from the latest completed OPT-1525, Reactivity Plan
Generation Weekly
~. -~ 1 at Full Power
Interval MOIIE -
SRO Notify Radwastc Control Room to be prepared for the increased water processing
- requirements due to boration
I -. ._
SKO Check that a planned load reduction will NOT take the Unit to Turbine shutdown
Determine rcactor power change will NOT exceed 15% in a one hour period
RO Check Rod Control in AUTO
RO Energize all available PRZ Backup heaters
I .~
BOP heck the IIEH System in AUTO
BOP Perfonn the following at the DEK panel:
B Depress the h a d Rate MW/MN pushbutton
D Enter desired rate in DEMAND display
D Depress EXTEK pushbutton
D Depress REF pushhutton
D Enter desired load in DEMAhD display
1 Depress ENTER pushbutton
t Check IIOLD pushbutton LIT
B Depress GO pushbutton
I Verify the d u e in the REFERENCE display Lowers
COMMENTS:
Page 8 of 18 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
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Appendix D Kequired OpenltoF Actions P O W ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 4/ 5 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Power Reduction (Continued) /Boric Acid Pump Trip
APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
Commence RCS boration as required to maititam Control Rods above the Kod
Insertion Limit
e ALE-006-8-4, BORIC ACID FI.OB' DEVIATION, alarming
Boric Acid Pump A-SA tripped
Directs KO to stat? standby boric acid pump to allow continuing boration
_____
NOTE: IF OPERA TOR SENT TO INICIESTIGATE, REPORT
BREAKER FOR PUMP CLOSED, BUT MOTOR IS EXTREMELY HOT
* TO TOUCH.
Starts standby Boric Acid Pump
Restarts boration flow
I
Initiates repairs to pump
Verifv Generator load and Reactor Dower lowering
Maintain Generator reactive load (VARs) within guidelines
_ _ _I _ _ . . ~ -
When Turbine load is less than YS%, then dispatch an operator to open 3A and 3B.-
Feedwatet Heater vents per OP-136, Shntdowzn of Feedwater Heatem_. 3A and 3B
-.__
Check Tavgwithin 5°F of T,,. ______
Check Power level at the target value
---*---
COMMENTS:
- 9 of 18
Page SCENARIO #2 NUREG-I02 1, Revision 9, Drafi
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~~
Appendix 13 Required Operator Actions FORM E§-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER 2 EVEKT NUMBER: 6 FACILITY: IIarris
EVENT DESCRIPTIC 1,oss of Power to an ESF Bus with Failure of EDG to Load
TIME POSITION I. APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
S[.VI!L?\TOH OPERATOR INSTRCCTIONS: INSERT NEXT
MALFUNCTJON FOR LOSS OF PONEH AFTER CHEW H A S
REDUCED PO\VER
____._...._...I
e Multiple system alarms
e Loss of power to Bus 1A-SA
e EDG 1.4-SA fails to load
SRO Enters and directs the actions of AOP-025. Loss of One Emergency AC Bus
_ I -
( 6 1 or o n e Emergency DC Bus ( I 25V)
~
RO (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Determines no C S P running and isolates letdown by
I _ --
c a a n y open orifice isolation valves - I
SRO VERIFY at least one Emergency AC Bus is FNERGIZED ____- .- -
-I________ I _
SRO REFER TO the following Tech Specs:
e 3.0.3 (Due to loss of2/4 containment rad monitors and CVIS affect on CNMT
vacuum reliefs)
e 3.3.3.1 Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations (Due to inoperable Control
Room Outside Air Intake Monitors)
s 3.4.6.1 RCS IZdk Detection (Due to Kh4-3502A inup)
0 3.6.5 Vacuum Relief System
0 3.8.1.1 AC Sources Operating
_ _
3.8.3.1
_ . _
Onsite
I _ _
Power
- -
Distribution - Oeerating
I swo Go to Section 3.1 for Loss of Emergency Bus 1.4-SA
COMMENTS:
Page 10 of 18 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Drafi
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Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENTNUMBER: 6 FACILITY: Harris
EVEN? DESCRIPTION: Loss of Power to an ESF Bus with Failure of EDG to Load
TIME
II*
Check EDG A is running properly
e Voltage
Frequency
BOP Check Bus 1A-SA is NOT energized and pbdCC EMERGENCY STOP switch for
KO I Start R Train CSP
Adjust HC-186. I , RCI Seal IVTR IN3 Flow. to establish seal injection flow as
necessary to maintain the foilowing:
L,ess than 31 gppm total flow to all RCPs
and 13 gpm to all RCPs
.~ -
BOP per OP-172, Reactor Auxiliary Building IIVAC
KO Verify any CCW Pump - ninning
RO Verify Charging and Letdown flow per C)P-107, Chemical and Volume Control
--
Pressurrzcr level I
BOP to maintain reactor power and S/G levels
COMMENTS:
Page 1 1 of 18 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-I02I,Revision9, Draft
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM E§-D-2
.... ..... .... ......-
SCENARIO NLhlB3EK: 2 E\FNT NLIMHEK: 7 FACL LITY: Harris
Second Dropped Control Rod K14 I Reactor Trip
e ALB-013-7-3, TWO OK MORE RODS AT BOTTOM, alarming
- DRPI indicates =d _ Rod _ _K14~.___-- ~ ~-
Determines a second dropped rod has occurred and orders Reactor Trip
CRITICAL STEP TO TRIP REACTOR WHEN SECOND DROPPED
ROD OCCURS.
I
Enters and directs the action of PATH-I
____-.-._- ~-
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Reactor Trip:
e Trip breakers RTA and BYA - open
E Trip breakers RTB and BYE3 - open
e Rod hottoni lights - not available due to loss of power
_________~
E Neutron flux d e c r e m _ I - -
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Turbine Trip:
E All turbine throttle valves - shut
e valves - shut
.~____I___.__I-..-
All turbine governor -
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Power To AC Emergency Buses:
Check AC emergency bus IA-SA -. deenergized
e Check AC emergency bus 1U-SB - energized
Check bus voltages
D Check 6.9 KV bus 1A-SA breakers -~ open
D Check 6.9 KV bus 1B-SI3 breakers -closed
COMMENTS:
Page 12 of 18 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft
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Amendix D Required Operator Actions FOSM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NIJMBER: 7 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Secund Dropped C~ntrolRod K14 /Reactor Trip (CONTINUED)
TIME POSITIOP ...;tfPLICANTS
. ..._OK BEIIAVIOK
ACTIONS
....-
RO (IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check NO SI Actuation and NOT required
0 Check ail of the following dark:
SI Actuated bypass permissive light
- ALB-11-2-2
0 AI,B-l1-5-l
ALB-11-5-3
- ALB-12-1-4
e PRZ pressure > 1850 PSIG
Steampressure > 601 PSHG
I SRO
I
Transition to and direct the actions of EOP-EPP-004. Rzactor T r b ResDonse
SRO Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required
- -
Check WCS temperature and control AFW flow to stabilize temperature
Check RCPs running
I BOP Check Feed System Status:
- Verify feed reg valves - SHUT
necessary
Verify all control rods fully inserted
Lheck PRZ Level > 17%
COMMENTS:
Page 13 of 68 SCENARIO ti2 NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft
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Amendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 8 FACILITY: Harris
EVEKT DESCRIPTION: Pressurizer Steam Space Break / Single Train SI
APPLICANI"S AC'I'IONS OR REIIAVIOR ....
e RCS pressure decreasing
PRZ lwei increasing
e Containment temperature increasing
~. Containment pressure increasing
Directs SI Actuation due to loss of subcooling and transitions and directs the
actions ofPATH-I, Entry Point A --
Manually initiates Safety lniection or verifies automatic Safety hiection
Ibldout A applies
- -
h p s RCPs when RCS pressure decreases below 1400 psig after venfylng SH flow
greater_- than 200 gpm -.____
I
CRITICAL STEP TO TRIP RCPs WHE-V TRIP CRITERIA MET.
_ - _l______li
Verify C S P B and RHR Pump B operating
Venfy SI flow > 200 gpm
~ _ _ _ _ _
Verify KCS pressure > 230 psig
Check MS Line Actuation occurs when Containment pressure exceeds 3 psig
Verifv Containment Pressure has remained below 10 Dsie
Verify at least 210 KF'PH AFW flow
Verify alignment of components from actuation of ESFAS s i p & using PATH-1
E___-
ide, Attachment 6 ___-
Control feed flow and steam dumo to stabilize RCS temoerature at 557 O F
Energize AC Bus 1B 1
-.
Check PRZ PORVs closed
COMMENTS:
Page 14 of18 SCENARIO 82 NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft
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Amendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO N U M B E R 2 EVENT NUMBER: 8 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Pressurizer Steam Space Break / Single Train SI (CONTIFUED)
APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
-... ..
Verify at least one PORV Block Valve own I
Chesk PW, surav valves closed I
Check NO SGs depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner or completely
depressurized
Check secondarv radiation norma6
Check containment pressure NOT normal
-
-Foldouts A and B apply
Maintain KCS seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm
Maintain at least 210 W P B AFW flow to SGs until at least one SG is above 25%
1409/.] _I____
Control feed flow to maintain proper SG levels
__
Verify Bus IB1 is energized
Verifv Pw% PORVs closed I
Verify at least one PORV Block Valve open
COMMENl'S:
Page 15 of 18 SCENARIO #2 NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
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Anpendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
~~
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 8/ 9 FACILITY Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Pressurizer Steam Space Break / Single Train SI (CONTINUED)
...
91s Intrrrnediete Hangr Compensating \'oltsgc ].ow Failure
-,-pi-- APPI ICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
Check NO Containment Splay Pumps operating
Determines NIS Interniediate Range Compensating Voltage is failed low and
manualiy energizes both Source Range channels
Checks RCS Dressure > 230 Dsie
.-
Checks KCS pressure stable
Stops KHR Pump B
I BOP I Checks SG pressures stable or increasing
I _ _ __ -
HX Valve, ICC-167
energized by offsite power
I BOP I Verif7iBus IBI energized
Train B CKDM fans
Turbine Xormal Bearing Oil Pump
Stoa the DC b a r i n g Oil Pump
I BOP Continue attempts to restore offsite power to Emergency Bus LA-SA
COMMENTS:
Page 16 of 18 SCENARIO ff2 NUREG-1021, Revision 9. Draft
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 2 EVENT NUMBER: 8 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Pressurizer Steam SDace Break / Single Train SI (CONTINUED1
1 TIME I POSITION APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
Verifv EDG B nimine unloaded
Reset SI
-~
Shutdown EDG B per OP-155,Section 4.0
Determine RHR Train B carable of Cold Leg Recirculation
Verifv Auxiliarv and Radwaste Processing Building Radiation normal
Check KCS uressure meater than 230 osie
TERMINATE THE SCENARIO AFTER THE TRANSITION TO
EPP-009 IS ANNOUNCED.
COMMENTS:
Page l7of I8 SCENAKIO #2 NUREG-102I , Revision 9, Draft
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ESD-2
SCENARIO NUhIRER: 2 EVENT KUMBEK: j 0 FACILITY: Harris
I ...
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Classifies the Event
I TIME IPOSITION I APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR I
Classifies the event as an Site Area Emergency
NOTE: SAE BASED ONBREACH OFRCS B A M f E R AND
l---t-+---- CQNTAIRMENT PRESSlIRE IN EXCESS OF 3 PSIG.
SCENARIO #2 NUREG-l02t,Revision 9, Draft
Post Validation Revision
Harris
Draft
Scenario 3
Operating Exam
2004
Anuendix D Simulator Scenario Outline FORM l?S-D-I
Facility: HAWS Scenario Number: 3 Op-Test Number:
Examiners Operators
Initial Conditions: IC-18; 100% power BOL; AFW Pump A-§A OOS (CFW026 RACK-OUT); HDP
0 0 s (CND065RACK-OUT); JXSEHT EVENTS 6 and 7 DURING SIMUIATOR
SETUP. Lower power by 25 MWe and increase boron concentration by 2 ppm; Allow
plant to stabilize.
Turnover: The unit is at 100% power at BOL, with equilibnum xenon conditions.
Boron concentration is 1238 ppm. Hank D rods are at 218 steps.
AFW Pump 'A'was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago for oil replacement due to
contaniinants and is expected to be retiuned to service within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Technical
Specification 3.7.1.2 has been entered. Risk level is YELLOW.
HDP 'A' is tagged out of service for hearing replacement and is not expected back for the
next several days.
Shift orders are to maintain power at 100% and restore AFW Pump 'A' to service when it
becomes available. GP-005 has been completed and the plant has been stable for 3 weeks
Event Description
Operating CCW Pump Trip with failure of standby pump to
automatically start
Feed Water Flow Low Failure
I I
3 I CFW-12B I C(B0P) Heater Drain Pump Trip with Failure of Turbine to Automatically
Runback
Pressurizer Pressure High Failure
Page I of 18 SCENARIO #3 NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
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Event h4aifunction Event Event Description
Number Number Type*
5 SGN-5C 42( M (ALL) SG Tube Rupture
600
MSS-5C 2 C (RO) Failure of MSlV on Ruptured §G to close - can be closed locally
C (SRO)
NOTE: INSERT MALFUiWT1Ohr DUIUNG INITIAL SETUP
OF SIWULA TOR.
C (BOP) Partial failure of Automatic Phase A Lwlation signal (Train B
Phase A Slave Relay for select CNMT Phase A valves fails to
energize when required). iSI-287, ICs-11 & 1SW-242
NOTE: INSERT MALFffNCTIO-WDUZLVC IA7TIAL SETUP
OF SIMULA TOR.
8 NA Classifies the Event
- (N)omial, (Rleactivity, (I)nstmment, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Page 2 of I 8 SCENARIO #3 NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
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Amendix D Reeauired Ouerator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUiLIBER: EVENT..NUhlBER: I FAClL ITl;
.. 3 .. .-. llnrris
EVENT DESCRIPTIO hI: Operating CCW Pump Trip with failure of standby pump to
automatically start
APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVfOR
Diagnose trip of CCW Pump 1A-SA and failure of CCW Pump 1B-SB to
automatic stalt
e Numerous alarms on ALB-005 due to no CCW flow
Breaker indication on CCW Pump 1A-SA
~~
1B-SB to start
Failure of C C W B_-___--
Enters and directs the actions of AOP-014. Loss of ConiDonent Cooling Water
ter than 52 psig
heck condition of the breaker and the pump
I I RO IVerifv adeauate ESW cooling water flow to the associated CCW heat exchnnaer
__ -
._
the CCW pump failure,
I -
COMMENTS:
Page 3 of 18 SCENARIO #3 NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 2 FACILITY: Harris
EVEN?' DESCRIPTION: Peed Water FIQWI,OWFailure
APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
Diagnose low failure of controrling SG 'A' feed flow channel
e S G A STM > FW FLOW MISMATCH (ALB-014-4-IA and IB) alarming
- F1-477 indicating 0
SG 'A' feed reg valve opening
0 SG 'A' level increasing
- SG 'A' actual feed flow > steam flow
0 -
Enter arid direct the actions of AOP-010, Feedwater I2lalfunctions
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check NO Main Feedwater Pump tripped
rakes MANLTAI. control of FK-478 prior to direction in AOP-010 to preveflt
- .
overfc-r OMM-00 1 instructions
-. ~
- heck DEH controlling Turbine Valves properiy
Maintain all of the following:
- At Ieast one Main Feedwater Pump running
Main Feedwater flow to all Steam Generators
v- AIL ~ Steam
_ _ Generator
_ - levels greater than 30%
Check Feedwater Keylator Valves NOT operating properly in AUTO and perform
the following:
P Place applicable Feedwater Keplator Valve (FK-478) in MANUAL
P Maintain Steam Generator levels between
____I_ _-______52 and 62% (REDUCE FW FLOW)
CRITICAL STEP TO PREVENT PLAA'T TRIP AS A RESULT OF HIGH-
mmr SG LE VEL.~ _ _ - - ~
Jheck Main Control Room annunciators available
-_______~-_I___.. -__p-
Jheck the following Pump status:
P NO Feedwater Train Pumps tnpped
B Only one HDP operating
COMMENTS:
Page 4 of 18 SCENARIO #3 NUREG- I02 I, Revision 9, Draft
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIONUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 2 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT 1 ;SCRIPTION: Feed Water Flow Low FaiIure (CONTINUED)
POSITION 1 APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
TIiNG9T I E CREW
SECTION 3.P FOR THE FAIL CRE OF THE FEED FLOW
alfunctions (other than pump trips) Section
Valves operating properly in MODU:
Main Feedwater Pumps
Condensate Booster Pumps
Condensate Pumps
nsate Dump To CS? Isolation-Valve ~-
Check pumps for normal operation
Notify Load Ilispatcher of any load limitations
.-
Check Reactor thermal power changed by less than 15% in any one hour period
Selests Channel 476 for control in accordance with OW-RP
_- - -
estores Feed Keg Valve controller to AUTO when level stable at program with
w and steam flow matched
COMMENTS:
~~
Page 5 of 18 SCENARIO it3 hWRF.0-1021,Revision9, Draft
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 3 FACILITY: Harris
~~
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Heater Drain Pump Trip with Failure of Turbine to Aotolnatifdly
Runback
TIME I POSITION APPLICAKTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
Diagnoses trip of Heater Drain Pump B
HTK DRN PUMP B O/C TRIP-GND (ALB-019-4-IA) alarming
e HTR DFW PUMP B LO UP-LO FLOW (ALB-019-3-1A) alamiing
e SG levels decreasing
_- Reactor Power
.. increasing
Enters arid directs the actions of AOP-010, Feedwater Malfunctions
(IMAIkDLZTE ACTION) Check NO Main Feedwater Pump tripped
-
Check DEH controlling Turbine Valves properly
Maintain all ofthe following:
e At least one Main Feedwater Pump running
Main Feedwater flow to ali Steam Generators
ALL Steam Generator levers greater than 30%
Check Main Control Room annunciators available
Check the following Pump status:
e NO Feedwater Train Pumps tripped
e Both HDPs tripped --
Go to the applicable section:
- Loss of Running P=(including
D ~
-BO?H
- Heater Drain Pumps) Section 3.a
Maintain all of the following:
- At least one Main Feedwater Pump running
Main Feedwater flow to all Stearn Generators
m A I L Steam Generator le\& greater than 30%
COMMENTS:
Page6of1.3 SCENARIO #3 NUREG-1021, Kevision 9, Draft
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCERAKIO NURIBER: 3 EVENT NlJhIRER: 3 FACILITY: Harris
..
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Heater Drain Pump Triu with Failure of Turbine to Automsticallv
RO Check control rods inserting to reduce Tavg - Tref mismatch
BOP I Check Main Steam pressure less than PoRV controller setpcint
KO ICheck PZR Level trending to reference level
BOP ICheck load NOT less than or eaual to 900?
COMMENTS:
Page 7 of 18 SCENAIUO #3 MUREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
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Aonendix D Rewired Oaerator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER 3 EVENT NUMBER: 3 FACILJTY Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Heater Drain Pump Trip with Failure of Turbine to Automatically
TIME
Load Dispatcher that the Unit is reducing load
wer evolution by adjusting rods and/or boron
iny per OP-107, Chemical and Volume Control
e Determines number of gallons required per Reactivity Plan
Sets FIS-113,Boric Acid Batch Counter, for corrcct number of gallons
e Sets ICs-283, FK-I 13 Boric Acid Flow, for desired value (typically
approximately 5 gpm)
e Places RMW CONTROL to S'I'OP
e Places W t W MODE SELECTOR to BOR
e Piaces RMW CONTROL to START
When desired boric acid added, a m s t e m for AUTO
-____... I
om to be prepared for the increased water processing
.-
n will NOT take the Unit to Turbine shutdown
fy Chemistry that Reactor power change will exceed 15% in a one hour period.
__ -
ck Rod Control in AUTO.
Energize all available PRZ Backup heaters
BOP I Check the DEM System in AUTO
Perform the following at the D M panel:
0 Depress the Load Rate MWh4IN pushbutton
- Enter desired rate (NOT to exceed 45 MWMIN) in DEMAND display
- Depress ENTER pushbutton
Depress REF pushbutton
e Enter desired load in DEMAND display
e Depress ENTER pushbutton
Check EIOLD pushbutton lit
COMMENTS:
Page8of18 SCENARIO #3 NUREG-1021, Revision 9. Draft
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER 3 EVENT NUMBER: 3 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Heater Drain Pump Trip with Failure of Turbine to Automatically
lute as necessary to
rns to AOP-010
cpt'ntor to check the following seated, observing tailpipes:
eck IIotweli level trending to between 71oiO and 46%.
- -_ __ I
COMMENTS:
Page 9 of 18 SCENARIO li3 NUREG-1021,Revision9, Draft
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Aooendix D Required Operator Actions B.oRMES-D-2
~
SCENARIO XUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 4 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Pressurizer Pressure High Failure
...... .VPI.iCANTS ACTIONS O K BEHAVIOR ....
Diagnoses high failure of Pressurizer Pressure channel P-444
0 PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVKATION CONTROL (ItkB-O09-3-1),
alarming
IRESSUKIZER RELIEF DISCHARGE HIGH TEMP (A123-009-8-2),
alarming
0 PRESSURIZER HIGH-LOW PRESS (ALB-009-5-I), alarming
PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK HIGH-LOW LEVEL PRESS OR TEh4P
(ALB-009-8-1), alarming
- PRZ heaters off
- PIG! sprays open
- PRZ PORV 4443 momentarily open
__ PR2 pressure lowering on ..other channels -
Enters and directs the actions of AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check that a bubble exists in the PRZ
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verifies proper operation of PRZ PORVs AND
associated block valves
I
(MIMEDIATE ACTION) Takes manual control of pressurizer pressure by either:
- Placing master controller PK-444A in manual, or
Placing heaters and spray valves in manual
Go TO Section 3.1, Pressure Control Malfunctions While Operating With a
-
Pressurizer Bubhle
Monitor PRZ pressure by (henling other reliable indication
Check plant in MODE 1 OR 2
-heck PRZ pressure controlled
Check PRZ pressure 2335 PSICi OR LESS
COM.MENTS:
Page 10 of 18 SCENARIO #3 NUREG-6021,Revision9, Draft
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENPIRiO NIIMBEK: 3
.. EVENT N:JF..IUER:
... 4 FACILITY: Harris
.I-__
WENT 1 SCRIPTION: Pressurizer Pressure High Failure (CONTIN'UED)
TIME APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
RO ICheck ail of the PFZ PORV block valves onen
RO Check that a malfunction of PT-444 has occurred
-
RO Verify PK-444A in MANUAL
RO Control P W ,pressure as follows:
0 Adjust PK-444A output as necessary, to attempt to restore and maintain PRZ
pressure
0 Check both PRZ spray valve controllers in AUTO and both spray valves
operating as desired
Check all PFZ heaters operating as desired - -~
RO Check hoth of the following conditions present:
e PRZ pressure is controlled
0 normal
Status of a-- spray valve or a PRZ heater hank is controlled
Refer to Attachment 3, Pressure Control Malfunction Symptoms-Bubble in
-
Direct Maintenance to investigate and repair the PRZ Pressure Control System
--
I _ -
___
-
COMMENTS:
Page I I of 18 SCENARIO #3 NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Draft
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM E$-D-2
... ...... _....-
SCENARIO NLJR4REK: 3 EVENT NUMBER. 5 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: SG Tube Rupture
TIME POSITION 1 APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
CUE Diagnoses SGTR by multiple radiation monitor alarms, including:
CEV high alarm
Steamline 'C' alert
'C' high alarm
SRO Determines SG tube rupture has occurred, orders a Reactor Trip and Safety
Injection, and enters .-and directs the actions ofPATN-1 --
,VOTE: M A I'.WAh'.E ATTE.4fPTS 10 PERFORMACFIOAS OF AOP-016,
E.X(.'ES.Yl).%PRI.)fAK I'P1.rl.W LEAKA GE, BEFORE DETERMI.VI.VG
THAT LE.4KAGE IS 1,VLXCESS OF C'AT.4EILITIES TO PERFORM A
~- ..-. -. CONl'KOLLED
.....-..... ~
P L . 4 . V T S H ( ' T D O l ~ ~ . ~ . ......
..... ~ ~
RO :IMMEI)lATE ACI'ION) Verity Reactor Trip
Trip breakers RYA and BYA - open
0 Trip breakers RI'B and BYB - open
Rod bottom lights - lit
Neutron flux .....
~ decreasink ..
~ ~ ...... ..... ~. .
f3OP (IMMEDKl'E ACTION) Verify Turbine Trip
All turbine throttle d v r s -.. shut
_ - . All turbi:=rnor... ...... vzjvcs
~
- sliu:
...... ~ ....... ~
BOP (I~lhlED!KlF ACTION) Verify Power '1'0 AC Emzrgewy Buses
Check A(' enirrgcncy buses IA-SA w d In-SB -energized by oftX:e pov\er or
Check bus vol!ages
Check 6.9 KV biis IA-SA breaker brenke: 195 (OFFSITE) - closed
C!ieck 6.9 KV.....1:us IR. SR hrrakcr hreaker I25 (OFFSITE.) ... closed
COMMENTS:
Page 12 of 18 SCENARIO #3 hZTREG-1021,Revision 9, DraA
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER 5/ 7 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: SG Tnhe Rupture (CONTINUED)
(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Actuates SI Actuation and determines SI has actuated
I-
I RO I Verifv a11 CSPS and RIIR Pumos running
Verify SI flow > 200 gpin
I
Verify RCS pressure > 230 psig
Verify Main Steam Isolation NOT actuated, NOR required
I RO IVerify Containment pressure has remained < 10 psig
I BOP IVeri& > 2 10 KPPW AFW flow
BOP omponents from actuation of ESFAS signals using PATH-I
BOP ed to close and manually closes them:
ORV N2 SUPPLY.
e _. CNMT FAN CLRS OUTLET ISOL
I SW-242, NNS
CRITICAL TO COMPLETE PHASE A ISOLATIOIV WHICH FAILED TO
TICALLY ACTUA TE.
._
YISOLATE AFW TO SG C AXYTIME IMINMUM LE VEL OF
COMMENTS:
Page 13 of iR SCENARIO #3 NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft
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Appendix 11 Required Operator Actions FORM ESD-2
~
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 5I6 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: SG Tube Rupture (CONTINUED)
Failure of MSIV on Ruptured SG to Close
proper PFZ PORV and spray valve response
I BOP IDetermines NO SGs are faulted
--bF=nnines SG C is ruptured
I 1 Abnonnal secondary radiation levels
-4 BOP -1 Uncontrolled level increase
When S G C level is > 25%, isolates M W flow to SG C
ons of PATH-2 at Entry Point J
- -
rocedures as required
e Shut faulted SG C steam supply vaive, MS-72, to TDAFW pump (may have
been performed earlier for RCS temperature control)
e Verify SG blowdown isolation wlves shut
e Veri@ SG C Main Steam Drain isolation valves shut
o Verify SG C Main Steam Isolation Bypass valve shut
COMMENTS:
Page 14 of 18 SCENARIO 63 NUREG-1021,Revision 9, Drafi
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Annendix D Reauired Ooerator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NIJMHER. 3 EVENT NUMBER: 5 6 FACILITY: Harris
I . . I ..
EVENT DESCRIPTION: SG Tuhe Rupture (CONTINUED)
Failure of MkIV o n Ruptured SG to Close
APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
Detennines SG C Main Steam Isolation valve failed to shut
o Shut all remaining Main Steam Isolation valves and bypasses
e Place both Steam Dump interlock switches to OFF / RESET
Use intact SG PORVs for a11 further steam dumping
Direct operator to locally isolate SG C using PATH-2 Guide, Attachment 1
-o - Verify SG A and B MSIV and bypass valves shut I
CRITICAL TO CLOSE SG AAhrD EMSIVs AND PLACE STEAMDUMP
LVTERLOCK SWITCHES IN O F F / R E S E l TO PREVENT STEAMING
RUPTLRED SG. _.
Isolate feed flow to SG C when level > 25%
CRITICAL TO ISQLA TE FEED FLOW TO SG C TO PREVENT
RUPTURED SG.
Check ruptured SG C pressure > 260 psig
i I I When PRZ Dressure decreases below 2000 D S ~ Rblock low stcam pressure SI simal
-~~
1 Check SG A and Rboth available for RCS cooldown
Dc.ttnt;ii;e required Core hi:Temperature based on SG C prcssure
~~~~~
~ ~ ~
Check condenser NOT available and dump steam from SG A and 3 at
When Core Exit Temperatures are less than target temperature
o Stop the RCS cooldown
o Maintain CETs less than t a r i r m p..
erature ~ _ _ _
Continue recovery actions during cooldown
I I
Maintain RCP seal iniection between 8 and 13 gpm
COMMENTS:
Page 15 of18 SCENARIO #3 NUREG-1021,Revision9, Draft
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~~
Appendix L3 Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 5 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTIO
APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR
Verify at least 210 KPPH AFW flow available
Verify power available to PRZ PORV Block valves
I -
Check PIPZ FORVs closed
=+:
Verifv at least one PRZ PORV Block valve open
If PRZ FORV actuates. verifv nrouer operation
Reset SI
-e~-
SRO If offsite power lost, manually realign safeguards equipment
_.
RO Reset Phase A and Phase B
RO Establish L4 and N2 to Containment
--
Check RCS pressure > 230 psig
-
_-- Stop both RIIR pumps
.l~____l__
When Core Exit Temperatures are less than target temperature
o Stop the RCS cooldown
- Maintain CETs less than target temperature
I
DO NOT continue until cooldown comulete
BOP Check SG C pressure stable or increasing
Check RCS subcooiing greater than 30 OF using the computer
_______
COMMENTS:
Page 16 of 18 SCENARIO #3 NUREG-I02i,Revision 9, Draft
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-
Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 5 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: SG Tube Rupture (CONTINUED)
0 PRZ level >_ 75%
- RCS suhcooling 5 10 "F
RY LEAKAGE.
COMMENTS:
Page 17 of 18 SCENARIO #3 h'uRuG-IO2 1 Revision 9, Diafi
~
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions FORM ES-D-2
SCENARIO NUMBER: 3 EVENT NUMBER: 8 FACILITY: Harris
EVENT DESCRIPTION: Clnssifies the Event
COMMENTS:
Page 18 of IR SCENARIO #3 NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft
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Harris
Draft
Scenario 4
Spare
Operating Exam
2004