Text

Feb-March 2004 Exam 50-400/2004-301DRAFT Scenarios & Outlines
	ML041170065
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	10/30/2003
From:	Ernstes M; Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch
To:	Scarola J; Carolina Power & Light Co
References
	50-400/04-301 50-400/04-301
	Download: ML041170065 (67)
	v • d • e

INITIAL SUBMITTAL

HARRIS EXAM

50-400/2004-301

FEBRUARY 23 - 27,2004

& MARCH 4,2004 (WRITTEN)

Harris

Draft

Operating Exam

2004

Harris

Draft

Scenario 1

Operating Exam

2004

Appendix D

Simulator Scenario Outline

FORM ES-D-I

-

Facility:

HARRIS

Scenario Number:

t

Op-Test Numher:

Examiners

Operators

Initial Conditions: IC-32: 26% power MOL; AFW Pump A-SA OOS (CPKr026 RACK OUT); INSERT

EVENTS 7,8, and 9 DURING SIMULATOR SETUP. Ensure DFH HOLD button is

illuminated. Ensure both Condensate Pumps and one Condensate Booster Pump is in

service. Ensure a Reactivity Plan is provided (NOTE - NEW REACTIVITY PLAN

REQUIRED FOR SCENARIO - DELETE TIIIS NOTE WON COMPLETION

OF REACTIVITY PLAN).

The unit is at 26% power at MOL, 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months following a reactor startup. The plant tripped

approximately 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months ago (I2 hours before startup).

Boron concentration is 1166 ppm. Bark D rods are at 108 steps.

AFW Pump 'A' was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ago for oil replacement due to

contaminants and is expected to be returned to service within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . 'Technical

Specification 3.7.1.2 has been entered. Risk level is YELLOW.

Shift orders are to place the second Condensate Booster Pump in service and continue the

power ramp to 90% power and restore MW Pump 'A' to service when it hecomes

available. GP-005 is being performed per Step 5.0.1 16.

An Auxiliary Operator is standing by to start the Condensate Booster Pump. All prestart

Turnover:

check

I

Page 1 of 25

SCENARIO #I

NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft

Pout Validation Revision

Event

T)'pe*

C (BOP)

R (RO) -

c (SRO)

M (ALL)

C (BOP)

C (SRO)

c (RO)

C (SRO)

al Loss of Condenser Vacuum

NOTE: INITIATE THIS EVENT Oh'SAME THGGER AS

EVENT4 DUE TO TIME' UNTIL THISEVENTISNOTED BY

AVAILABLE CUES. THIS EWMT WIL

SIMULATOR OPERATOR TO ADJUST

NOTE: AVSERT MALFUNCTION DURING IhTTIAL SETUP

AFW Pump 'B' trip

(N)orinal, (R)eactivity, (Qnstmment, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Page 2 of 25

SCENARIO # 1

h W G - I 0 2 I , Revision 9, Draf?

Post Validation Revision

Auuendix Il

Rewired Ooerator Actions

FORM E§-I)-2

SCEKARIO NIJMBEK: I

EVENT NITvlREK:

1

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT 1 ISCRIPTION:

Place Second Condensate Rooster Pump in service

CUE

I shw orders directplacing a second Condensate Booster Pump in service

BOP

Verify Initial Conditions of OP-134, Section 5.6.1

1. One Condcnsate Booster Pump is in service per Section 5.5 of OP-134

2. Condensate Booster Pump E I,ock-Out Relay reset

Reviews CAUTION: To prevent damaging the CBP recirc valves, do not operate

the second Condensate Booster Pump for more than 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months wit11 MFP suction

flow less than 4500 kpph.

3. Total feedwater flow is greater than 4500 kpph

4. CPD Ooerator and Cbemistrv have been notified of potential flow and pressure

BOP

I

-

1 changes in the C o n d e n s a k m .

Direct AO to perform prestart checks on Condensate Booster Pump B per

Attachment 6

'Verify CONDENSATE BOOSTbR PUMP B RECIRC, ICE-261 in MODU and

___

I

BOP

I Reviews CAUTION: There are no Condensate Booster h n ~ p

trips to protect the

+-

BOP

Reviews NOTE: Computer points listed in Section 6.0 of this procedure may be

monitored for information.

Reviews NOTE: When the Condensate Booster Pump controi switch is placed to

the START position, the Aux Lube Oil Pump will start and supply the VSF

Coupling with oil until oil pressure is greater than or equal to 20 psig, at which

time the Condensate Booster Pump starts.

COMMENTS:

Page 3 of 25

SCENARIO # 1

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Dnft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

~~

SCENARIO NUMBER 1

EVENT NUMBER:

1

FACILITY:

Harris

?SCRIPTION:

POSKION

Plsce Second Condensate Train in service (CQNTINUJ3D)

BOP

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

I

- I

Reviews CAUTION: The amount of time the associated tecirc valve, 1 CE-261 is

open, should be minimized due to lack of lubrication without Condensate I3ooster

Pump running.

Place the control switch CONDEXSATE BOOSTER PlJMP 5 RECIRC, 1CE-261

___-

in the OPEN position immediately prior __

to starting Condensate Booster Pump B

Reviews NOTE: Starting the second Condensate Booster Pump may cause the

previously running pump controller to reject to Manual. This is due to the speed

sensor on the pump being started initially providing a speed input signal that is

based on ekctrical noise. If the running CBP controller rejects to manual, it is

permissible to return the controller to Auto once the CBP being started reaches the

no-load speed. If the controller again rejects to manual, then further investigation

would be required.

Stalt B Condensate Booster Pump

Directs AO to locally verify Condensate Booster Pump A Aux Lube Oil Punip has

stopped

Directs A 0 to check differential pressure across the Pall Replaceable Duplex

Filter, as indicated between PI-OILO-2304Bl and PJ-OlLO-2304B2 is less than 15

PSI. IF differential pressure across the Pall Replaceable Duplex Filter is greater

than or equal to 15 PSI, then direct A 0 to swap to the idlehut of service filter per

Slowly increase the demand signal on PK-2308, CNDST B U R PUMP B SPEED

ONTKOI,LER

to match the demand simal on the areviouslv running Condensate

__

.-

_________

__I

x__ ___

~.

-

-I_

Section

_-

8 . l n h e r w i s e

I_-_

this StQ -

is NIA)

.-

-

Booster Pump Speed Controller

_I

$ice PK-2308, CNDST BSTR PCMP B SPEED CONI'ROLLER to AUTO when

--

he demand signals are matched

Place the control switch for CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP

!61 in the MODIJ-on

I

-

l_l___

____I_

COMMENTS:

Page 4 of 25

SCENARIO # 1

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, DraA

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER:

2

FACILITY: Harris

3SCRIPTION:

Pressurizer Level high failure

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

I

Diagnose high failure of controlling PRZ level control channel, I.T-459

EVENT

TIME

I_-

-

I_-

__-

_._I

POSITION

SKO

-

.-

SKO

-

__I-

-

o

1~1-4~9inciicating

100%

e

PEL? backup heaters all energized

Charging flow decreasing on FI-122A. 1

1) alarming

e

PRESSURIZER HIGH LEVEL (ALE-009-4-1) alarming

e

PKESSURIZER HIGH LEVEI, ALERT (ALB-009-4-2)

_.

ahrming

Directs taking manual control of charging and increasing flow

Takes manual control of charging (CS-23 1, FK-122.1 CHARGING FLOW) and

increases flow to maintain PRZ level

Enters and directs the performance of OW-Kp

Selects channels 460/461 on PRZ Level Control Selector (may select per ALB-

009-4-1 or -

4

L

Directs tripping appropriate bistable~

Restores charging (CS-231, FK-122.1 CHARGING FL.OiV) and places in

automatic, if desired

Kefers to TS 3.3.1 (6 hr), 3.3.3.5.a (7 day) and 3.3.3.6 ( 7 day) for PRZ level

channel failure

Initiates repairs

PRZ CONT HIGH LEVEL i?EVIATION AND HEATERS ON (ALB-009-2-

_.

I_

_-.--I_

__--

_

.

I

__

I_______

__-

.-

--

l______l___l_

___I_.-

_-

__

-

_-

I

_

-

COMMENTS:

Page 5 of25

SCENARIO #1

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NCJMRER: 1

EVENT NUMBER:

3

FACILITY:

Harris

~~~

~

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

SG Level Low Failure

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEFIAVIOR

..

I 7'1R4E 1 POSITION

.

I

SRO

I Diagiose low failure of controlling SG 'B' level channel

~ *

SG B NR LVWSP NL'EO DE\\* (ALE-14-2-1B) aiming

STEAM GEN B LOU' LVI, (ALB-14-54A) alarming

1:

STEAM GEN B LOW-LOW LEVEL (ALB-14-54B) alarming

0

SG 'B' level, LI-486 SB, indicating 0%

I *

S(i I3 PW > SI'M FLOW MISMATCH (AL,B-I4-5-1A) alarming

SG 'I%'

feed flow > steam flow

SG '5' feed reg vdve opening

SG 'B' level rising on operable SG level channels

Enter and direct the actions of .4OP-O10, Feedwater Malfunctions

(IkIMEDIATE ACTION) Check any Main Feedwater Pump tripped

I

__

--__-

-

l___l

____

l t + % % + i M M E D I A T E

ACTION) Check initial Reactor power less than 90%.

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check initial Reactor power less than 80%.

-

I_-

-_____--

-

At least one Main Feedwater Pump running

___I

ALL Steam Generator levels greater than 3W/0

-

heck Feedwater Regulator Valves NOT operating properly in AUTO and perfon

I

.~

~

the following:

Place applicable Feedwater Regulator Valve (FK-488) in MANUAL

Maintain Steam Generator levels between 52 and 62% (REDUCE EW

CRITICAL STEP TO PREVENT PLANT TRIP AS A RESULT OF HIGH-

COMMENTS:

Page 6 of25

SCENARIO #l

h"%-

102 1. Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Aumndix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

-

SCENARIO MJMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER:

3

FACILITY

Harris

~

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

SG Level Low Failure (CONTINUED)

I TIME

POSIIION [

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR DEtIAVIOR

__

Check the following Pump status:

0

NOTE: OXLII FWPUMP IS OPERATING AT THIS TIME

Go to the applicable section:

If any Feedwater Train Piinips tripped, go to Step I 1

All CondensateiFeedwater flow malfunctions (other than pump trips) Section

Check the following Recirc and Dump Valves operating properly in blOD1J:

e

Main Feedwater Pumps

Condensate Pumps

e

1 CE-293, Condensate Recirc

0

Check the Condensate and Feedwater System intact

Reviews NOTE: Pumps should be stopped in the order of higher to lower

pressure. (To stop a Condensate Pump, stop a Main Feedwater Pump followed by a

Condensate Booster Pump and then the Condensate Iuq.)

Check pumps for noma1 opemt~on.

Notify Load Dispatcher of any load limitations.

Condensate Booster Pumps

-~

ICE-142, Condensate 1 h 1 T o CST Isolation Valve

-

---

_I_

--

____

_-

I

SRO

I Check Reactor thermal power changed by less than 15% in any one hour period

._l___l_l

______I

__

Refers to TS 3.3.1 (Items 13 and 14) ~ 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months requirement to trip bistables

Initiate repairs

COMMENTS:

Page 7 of 25

SCENARIO $1

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Kequired Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT KUMBER:

4

FACILITY.

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTIC

TIME -

'OSITION

SRO

KO

I__

I

SRO

RO

I-

COMMENTS:

Median Tavg high failure

APPI.ICA"T'S ACTIONS OK BEHAVIOR

.

Rods irrserting

I

D

I

I FK-122 *ut

increasing

Enter and direct the actions of AOP-001, Malfunction of Kod Control and

TR-408 Ked Pen at max output

RCS I.OOPNBIC TAVG HVLO DEV (AL14-010-6-3A/7-3A/8-3A)

all

RCS 1WFITAVG HIGH-LOW (AI.B-0 10-6-4B) alarming

PRESSURIZER CONTROL LOW LEVEL DEVIATION (ALB-009-2-2)

alarming

Charging flow FI-122A. 1 increasing

aiarmiug

_ _ -

~ -

___ I_

_____I

1ndication.stem

-

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check that < 2 control rods are dropped

__-

'IMMEDIATE ACTION) Position Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN

'IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check Control Bank motion stopped

So to the appropriate section:

Manually operate affected control bank to restore the following:

B

@

Section 3.2, Continuous Spurious Control Bank Motion

-

Equilibrium power and temperature conditions

Rods above the insertion limits ofTech Spec 3.1.3.6 and PIP-106, Technical

Specification Equipment List Program and Core Operating Limits Report.

Page 8 of25

SCENARIO #I

NUREG-IO21,

Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

~~

~

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER:

4

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT

-

iSCRIPTION:

POSITION

Median Tavg high failure (CONrINUED)

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OK BEHAVIOR

KO

KO

I KO -

§KO

I

Check that instrument channel failure has not occurred by observing the following:

RCS Tavg

RCSTref

0

Power Range NH channels

Turbine first stage pressure

Verify proper operation of the folIowing:

C X T S demineralizers

BTRS

e

Reactor Makeup Control System

Check that this section was not cntered due to control banks moving out and go to

_I

Check that ncither of the following occurred:

Unexplained RClS bontion

tJn lanned RCS dilution

-P-

___

Check that an automatic Rod Control malfiinction occurred

Maintain inanual rod contml unlil appropriate corrective action is complete

Exit this orocedure

COMMENTS:

Page 9 of 25

SCENARIO #I

NWG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FC)RM ES-D-2

~~~~

~

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT NUMRER

5

FACILITY:

Harris

POSITION

-

SRO

BOP

l_l_

SKO

BOP

I30P

Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

Diagnoses lowering main condenser vacuum

e

Enters and directs the actions of AOP-012, Partial Iass of Condenser Vacuum

Check Turbine in operation

Check Condenser pressure in both Zones less than:

0

Decreasing Condenser vacuum indication on MCB

CPdnSR PRE TRP LOWJ VACLJUM alarm (A1.B-020-2-4A) alarming

COMPUTER ALARM MS/TURBINE SYSTEMS (AIB-020-5-5) alanning

___

_I___

I

_I

_-

7.5 inches Kg absolute and Turbine first stage pressure is greater than 60%

turbine load

-0K-

5 inches IIg absolute and Turbine first stage pressure is less than 6OYo turbine

0

Reduce Turbine ioad as necessary to niaintain Condenser vacuum using one of the

follo.rving:

D

GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown from Power Operation to Hot Standby

Continue Turbine load reduction until directed otherwise by Unit SCO based on

the following:

a

Vacuum stable or increasing

B

m

AOP-038, Rapid Down-

-

I

Cause of vacuum loss identified and corrected

Plant conditions require Reactor or Turbine trip

NOTE TO SIMULATOR OPERA TOR:

ASSOONAS TURBINE LOAD HAS BEENLOWERED INRESPONSE TO

LOWERING VACUUM, REDUCE MALFhTNCTION SEVERITY

II_---

TO 5.

_~~I-_

VOTE: SE VER4L MIhThTES AFTER RILWO VING AfALFUNCTIO.V,

REPORT AS A 0 THAT AIR INLEAKAGE WAS APPARENT CAUSE AND

I CE-4 75, COhDEhSER VA Chi7.W BREz4KER, HAS BEEN FULLY CL OSED.

VOISE LEVEL IN AREA HAS DECREASED SUBSTANTPALL X

COMMENTS:

Page 10 of 2.5

SCENNAKIO #I

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NIJMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER:

5

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum (CONTINUED)

1 TIME

I POSITION

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

s of Attachment 1

SRB

ed and go to Step 11

0 failure of a Circulating Water System

-

solabie leak in Circulating Water System exists and go to Step

-

SRO

SKQ

_-.__

I ,

Check NO isolable leak between Condenser Waterbox isolation valves exists and

Check Circulating Water temperatures using the following EWFIS Computer

Points stable or decreasing:

0

Check plant shutdown initiated

go to Step 20

'TCVJ1930, Cooling Tower Basin Temp

TCW194OA, Condenser A Circ Water Met Temp

TCW1940B, Condenser B Circ Water Inlet Temp

__ps

.~

__I

Notify Load Dispatcher of reduced load capability

Monitor Turbine vibration leveis normal

Reviews Note: Exhaust IIood Spray may not be effective in reducing Exhaust

Hood temxrature above 15% Turbine load

Check Exhaust Hood temnerature less than 145'F

-

_I -

-

_____--

_I_-

-

r -

I

SRO

1 Check Keactor thermal power changed by less than 15% in any one hour period

COMMENTS:

Page 1 I of25

SCENARIO # I

NLTKEG-1021, Revision9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER:

5

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuom (CONTINUED)

__l__l____l_

~ - - _ _ _

COMMENTS:

Page 12 of 25

SCENARIO #I

NUREG-102 1, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Amendis D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER:

6 / 7

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip

POSITIOr

SKO

-

___

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

Diagnoses Main Steam break inside containment

e

Reactor power increasing

Steam flow increasing

Feed flow increasing

0

Steam pressure decreasing

RCS temperature decreasing

Containment pressure increasing

Containment radiation levels unchanged

Orders a reactor trip and safety injection and enters PATH-I

NOTE: DUE 10 THE FAILURE OF THE AUTOMATIC AND MAATAL

REACTOR T f f I e A SAFETYINJECTIQNIS LIKELY TO OCCUR BEFORE

Determines reactor failed to automatically trip

e

Reactor trip breakers closed

Rod bottom lights off

e

Neutron flus NOT decreasing

Attempts manual trip of reactor

Determines manual trip NOT successful

Reactor trip breakers closed

e

Rod bottom lights off

e

Neutron flus NOT decreasing

Informs SRO of' failure of reactor io trip automatically or manually

SG levels decreasing after initial swell

-

---

___

I_

THE REACTOR CANBE _l_l_

TRIPPED LOCALLY. -

--

__

-

__-

__--__I_

_-

__I-

-

Transitions to and directs the actions of FRP-S. 1, Response to Nuclear Power

(IMMEIXATIi ACTION) Verifies rods inserting automatically or manually inserts

_-___

-

Generation / ATWS

-I_

control rods -

-

I_

I_.-____

-

COMMENTS:

Page I3 of 25

SCENAFUO #I

?KJREG-I021,

Revision9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM E§-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVEN?' NUMBER: 6 / 7 / 8

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip

All turbine throttle valves shut

All turbine governor valves

- shut

ACTION) Determines neither Motor-Driven AFW pump running

___

and verifies Turhine-Driven M W Pump operating

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Determines reactor is not tripped and directs operator to

contact or report to Control Room

CRITICAL STEP TO DIRECT A LOCAL KEACTOR TRKP TO ADD

NEGATIVE REACTIVITY TO CORE.

I

,

R'OTE: AFTER API'ROXIWATEL Y 15 SECOIVD DELAK CONTACT

COXTROL ROOM AS THE OPERATOR DIRECTED TO CONTACT/

REPORT.

Directs operator to locally tnp the reactor by (order of preference):

Locally opening the reactor trip breakers

0

Locally trip both rod drive MG set generator output breakers.

Locally triEboth rod drive MG set motor breakers

,VOTE: APPROXIMATELY 30 SECONDS AFTER BEING DIRECTED TO

LOCALLY TRIP THE REACTOR, OPEN THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERA

Initiate monitoring of CSFSTs

_-I_--

- - ~

__I

I___-____

COMMENTS:

Page 14 of 25

SCENARIO #I

NUREG-1021, Revision 9: Draft

Post Validation Reviision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER: 6 / 7 I 9

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCXIPTION:

Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to TI'&?

e

Start a boric acid pump

Open ICs-278, Emergency Boric Acid Addition \\,ahre

Verify > 30 gpm emergency bontion flow

Verify > 30 gpm CSIP flow to RCS

Ver&RC§Lressure

2: 2335 psig

_-

NTTZ

SI ACTUATED

L I G E A N D SEVERAL OTIIER GVEXPECTED

IiVDICATtOAS WILL BE RECEIVED DUE TO A FAILrJm OF SLAVE

RELA Y K602B WHICH IS INCL drDED AS THE INITIATING FAILURE FOR

THIS EVENT. THE FOLLO WIA'G COMPONEATS ARE AFFECTED:

I(

SI Actuaied light - blinks &e to difference in Train SA & SS - hght

operated by contaet on K40.2 via multiprexer

SI Reset Auto-SI Blocked - blinks when atienapting to reset SI due to Train

SA resei with Trnin SB not able to reset - timer started by contact on K402

LCV-II5D does not auto open

LCV-II5E does not auto close

CC-415 does not auto close

e

__-

305 noes not auto close

__-

_-I__

eniify failure of RWST suction to CSPs to open

ttempis to open ICs-291 and reports failure to SKI

__-

_I-

-

1CS-291 red light off, green light an

COMMENTS:

Page 15 of25

SCENARIO #1

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

-~

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT MJMRER:

6 / 4

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to 'kip

(CONTINUED)

entilation valves and dampers shut

RO

I ~ e r i f v

reactor tri~oeci

__

BOP

1 Verifies turbine trinued

__I__

I j

_I

Begin monitoring of foldout for FKP-S. I

Controls AFW flow to intact SGs to maintain between 40% and 50%

--

SRO

BOP

__ -

.-

Y 'C' BY THIS

TIME, PA4RTICULARL Y IF iWS ISOLATIOXHAS OCCC'RRED, AND

CHOOSE TO ISOLATE

_l___ll__

AFW TO SG %'.

-_-

Verify All Dilution Paths Isolated

e

Checks for positive reactivity addition due to cooldown

a

Reactor tripped

Reactor Makeup Water punips OFF

FCV-I14B,

Reactor Makeup Water valve SHUT

ICS-98, BTRS Bypass valve OPEN

Direct A 0 to locdliy verify ICs-510, Boric Acid Batch Tank Outlet valve

__

I_-

_I__

htemediate range startup rate positive

--

eteimines a SG is depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner and go to Step 18

___I

___

ss valves closed

-

mines SG 'C' faulted due to SG pressure decreasing in an uncontrolled

manner or comnlctelv denressurized

COMMENTS:

Page 16 of 25

SCENARIO #I

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER:

6 / 7

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip

TIME

___-

I_-

POSITION

__-

._I

-

--

COMMENTS:

(CONTINUED)

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

Detemiines SG 'A' and SG 'B' NOT faulted

Isolates SG 'G'

Verifies PORV closed

0

Verifies FW Isolation closed

Verifies AFW isolated to SG

Closes steam supply to 'B'DAFW Pump

E

Verifies before seat drain isolation closed

0

Verifies SG blowdown isolation closed

Verifies steam analyzer isolation closed

E

Verifies cheniical addition isolations closed

S.1 TO MINIMIZE PRESSURE RISE INSIDE CONTAINMENT.

Verifies core exit thermocouples < 1200 "F

___.._.__-

--

CRITICAL STEP TO ISOLATE SG 'C' PRIOR TO EXITING FRP-

-.

_

I

~

.

Verify reactor subcritical

Power ranges < 5%

Intermediate startup rate negative

Implements FWs, a5 required

_I___

.__-

.___

Page 17 of25

SCENARIO W1

NIJREG-1021, Revisinn9, Draft

Post Validation Kevision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER:

6 / 7

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip

(CONTINUED)

BOP

RO

SRO

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

Transitions to and directs the actions of FRP-J.1 based on MAGENTA path on

Containment CSFST

Verifies Phase A isolation valves closed

Verifies Containment Vent isolation valves closed

Verifies Containment Spray operation due to pressure

Venfy Spray Pumps running

e

Verify-r

-

valve alignment

Verifies Phase B isoiation

Stop all KCPs due to loss of cooling flow

Venfies prowr operation of containment fan coolers

I

-

10 psig

__

I_

___

I__

1 Verifies MSNs and bvuasscs closed

1

, Determines SG C is onlv faulted SG and verifies isolated

Check both Spray Pumps running

Check both ESW Booster Pumps running and orifice bpitss isolation

P-

-. valves closed

I__

I_-

COMMENTS:

Page 18 of25

SCENARIO #I

NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FOKM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER

6 / 7

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip

(CONTINUED)

TIhlEIPOS1.r ION

I

SRO

I

BOP

RO

-+I--

-

Transitions to and directs the actions of EOP PATH-l

Verifies reactor tnmed

I_

Verifies turbine tripped

Verifies power to AC safeguards buses

I

-

Verifies SI actuated

_I___--

Begins monitoring of CSFSTs

Begins monitoring of Foldout A

__II

__I___

Verifies proper operation of emergency safeguards equipment

Main steam line isolation

D

b

CSIP and RHR pumps running

SI flow z 200 gpm

Containment pressure above 10 psig, with actions taken

AFW flow at least 2 10 KPIB available

-

I_

l___ll

COMMEhTS:

Page 19 of25

SCENARIO #1

NUREG-1021, Kevision9: Dnf?

Post Validation Revision

-

~

__

..

...

,

~ ..._ _.-

.........

-

Aonendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

~~

~

~~

SCENARIO NUMBER: I

EVENT NUMBER:

6 / 7

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip

(CONTINUED)

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

ESFAS proper alignment using Attachment 6

2 RHR Pumps running

2 CCW Pumps running

-

SI Valves properly aligned

0

2CsPsrunning

N1 ESW and ESW Booster Pumps running

NOTE: R WST SUCTIO".'S TO CSIPS FAILED TO OPEN ON SI

ACTLbtTION. ,WAYHAVE BEEA'RECOGMZEI) BY THIS POINTAND

OPERABLE F7AL VE: OPEAED. I F ? V O ~

IT IS CRITICAL AT TMIS POI"

TO OPEV THE VAL YE TO ESTABLISH FLQW.

Phase A proper alignment

Blowdown and SCi sample valves shut

Main steam lines isolated

Containment Spray operation

RCPs stopped

Both FW I'umps tripped

FW Isolation valves closed

XEITIIER MDAFW Pump operating

T D A W Pump operating

AFW alignment (FLOW ISOLATED TO SG 'C')

Both EDGs running

Containment Fan Coolers - 1 per unit operating in slow speed

Control Room Ventilation in Emergency Recirc

AC Ruses 1Al and lB 1 energized

Air compressors 1A and 1B in Local Control Mode

Page 20 of 25

SCENARIO #1

NURE:C-102 1, Revision 9, I h f i

Post Validation Revision

Appendix H)

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: I

EVEKT NUMBER:

6 I 7

FACILITY

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trir,

I'OSITIOI\\

RO

-

RO

SRO

I

-

.-

_I_-

-

I___.-

____-

COMMENTS:

(CONTIhWED)

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR DEIIAVIOR

Attempts to stablize RCS temperature using WR Tcold due to no RCPs

NOTE: DUE TO FAULTED sc, ncs TEMPEM TURE IS EXPECTED TO

-

BELOW.

Verifies proper operation of PRZ PORVs

NOTE:

I___

SPRAY VALVES N O T R F m R E D

__

DUE TO NO RCPSRKVNING.

Detemiines SG 'C' faulted and transitions to and directs the actions of EPP-014.

Faulted Steam Generator Isolation

NOTE: SG SHOULD AILREADYHAVE BEENISOLATED PER

DIRECTIQh'S OF F'RP-S.1, BUT TRANSITIQN TO EPP-014 IS STILL

______

RXLTRED..

-

Page21 of25

NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

~

~.~-I__

I.

.~

___

. .... .......___.

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER:

6 / 7

FACILITY: Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip

I

l__l_

Check MSIVs and bypass valves shut

Determines SGs A and R are NOT faulted

_I--

-_I_ _------

etemiines SI Termination Critena are met

Subcooling (> 40%)

0

e

Heat Sink (SG level > 40%)

RCS Pressure (stable / incrcasing)

__I-

O PREVENT

RCS OVERFILL AND PRESSURIZATION RESULTING IN

ND OR SAFETIES.

COMMENTS:

Page 22 of 25

SCENARIO #1

NIREG-1021,

Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Annendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

~~

SCENARIO NUMBER: 1

EVENT NUMBER:

6 / 4

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Steam Bresk Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip

I

RO

COMMENTS:

---

I

Reset SI

Manually reali&n safeguards equipment, if required, following a loss of offsite

nower

___I

Stons all but I CSIP

I

Determines KCS nressure stable or increasina

I

Check CSIP suction aligned to RWST

Opens normal miniflow isolation valves

e

1CS-182

ICs-196

0

ICs-210

e

ICs-214

Isolates BIT outkt valves

1 s - 3

e

ISH-4

Verify cold and hot leg injection valves closed

1SI-52

lSI-86

1SI-104

Establishes charging lineup

Closes FK-122.1

__-.

__--

_ _ _- - -

~- -

I

.-

-

_-.I____-

__

Opens ICs-235

Opens ICs-238

____

___

Controls charging to maintain pressurizer level using FK-122.1 and maintain flow

__

150am

Verify PR% level can be maintained stable or increasing

Reset Phase A and Phase B Isolation signals

__-

_--I_-

-

I

__

I _ _ _ _ _

Page 23 of25

SCENARIO # 1

NUREG-I02 I ~ Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

~~

~

SCENARIO NIJMBER I

EVEN?' NUMBER:

6 / 7

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Steam Break Inside Containment with Failure of Reactor to Trip

SI-287

ansition to EPP-008, SI Termination

-_

____

-

____ __

TERMINATE nm

SCENARIO AFTER TRE TRANSITION TO

EPP-008

___x_I

IS ANNOUNCED.

I_

COMMENTS:

Page 24 of25

SCENARIO #I

MJREG-1021,

Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

I # Ol?iVNTJS

-~

. . . . . . .

Harris

Draft

Scenario 2

Operating Exam

2004

Appendix D

Simulator Scenario Outline

FORM ES-D-I

Op-Test Numher:

Facility:

HARRlS

Scenario Number:

2

Examiners

(&3?dtOrS

Initial Conditions: IC-18; 100% power DOL; AFW Pump A-SA OOS (CFW026 RACK-OUT); HDP A

OOS (CN11065 RACK-OUT); Lower power by 25 MWe and increase boron

concentration by 2 ppm: Allow plant to stabilize.

The unit is at 100% power at BOL, with equilibrium xenon conditions.

Boron concentration is 1238 ppm. Bank D rods are at 218 steps.

AFW Pump A was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ago for oil replacement due to

contaminants and is expected to be returned to service within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 has been entered. Risk level is YELLOW.

IIDP A is tagged out of service for hearing replacement and is not expected back for

the next several days.

Shift orders are to maintain power at 100% and restore AFW Pump A to service when

it becomes available. GP-005 has been completed and the plant has been stable for 3

weeks.

Turnover:

Eamp 90

XB 100070

OFF with I

NOTE: MVL TIPLE E VERTS Oh

SAME TRIGGER.

Page 1 of 18

SCENAIUO R2

M W G - I O Z I , Revision 9, Draft

Post Validaticn Revision

NOTE: MUL TIPL

NOTE: THIS E VENT SHOULD BE SET ON SAME

TRIGGER AS E VENT 7.

(X)orrnai, (K)eactivity, (Onstrurnent, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Page2of18

SCENARIO #2

NUREG-1021, Kevision 9, DnA

Post Validation Kevision

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

Appendix D

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

EVENTNUMRER:

1

FACILITY:

Harris

~

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

SIG A PORV Pressure Transmitter PT-308 fails high with failure of

e

RCS temperature lowering

SG A PORV open (open indication failed)

Directs operator to take manuai control of SG A PORV and close per

requirements of OMM-OOI

e

SRO provides control limits

e

Condition / cause communicated to SRO

SKC3 p v i d e s concurrence to take manual control

Appropnatc procedure implemented when plant stabilized

COMMENTS:

SCENARIO #2

NIJREG-1021, Revision 9, DnR

Post Validation Revision

Page 3 of 18

Auoendix D

Requircd Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

~~~

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

EVENT NUMBER:

2

FACILITY:

Harris

EVEKT DESCRIPTION:

LT-112, VCT Level, High Pailure

ALB-007-5-5. COMPUTER ALARM CIIEM & VOL SYSTEMS

Enters and direets the actions of AOP-003. Malfunction of Reactor Makeup

Control

Check 1.4 available

Tank, aligns to HUT

I

SKO

I Determines LK-I 12 output has failed and noes to Section 3.1, LT-I 12 or LT-115

-

Malfiinction

- - + s K ( 1 - k % O U S

ACTION, Assesses effects of LT-I 12 failure (Attachment 1)

I

RO

1 Determines failure is NOT due to LT-I 15 and EO to Step 8

Determines failure caused by LT-112

Monitor VCT level using either:

~l__l

__-

I

'ntain VCT level above 20% using auto makeup

intain VCT level below 7oo/o by manually diverting

COMMENTS:

Page 4 of 18

SCENARIO #2

WUTPEG-102

I ~ Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actioi~s

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

EVENT NUMBER:

2

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION

1.T-112, VCT Level, High Failure (CONTINUED)

n LCV-I i5A III VC'T position

_I_

_--

COMMENTS:

Page 5 of 18

SCENARIO #2

NUREG-1021, Revision9: Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-I)-2

EVENT XWBER:

3

FACILITY:

Harris

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

SCRIPTION:

Dropped Control Rod FZ

I

EVENT -

TIME

POSITION

CUE

SRO

RO

...

SRO

SKO

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

ALB-013-4-2, POUER RANGE HIGH NEUTRON FLUX RATE ALERT,

e

alarming

ALB-O 13-4-5, POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVLATHON, alarming

ALH-013-7-4, ONE ROD AT BOTTOM, alarming

ALE-013-8-1, BANK D FULL ROD WITHDRAWAL, alarming

AI,B-013-8-S, COMPUTER ALARM ROD DEVISEQ NIS PWR RANGE

TILTS, alarming

Control rods stepping out until C-11 interlock

e

RCS temperature decreasing

e

Enters and directs the actions of AOP-001, Malfunction of Rod Conwol and

Indication System

(1MMEI)IATE ACTION) Check that LESS THAN TWO control rods are dropped

[IMMEDIATE ACTION) Position Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN

e

IXWI indicates Rod F2 b o x e d

_I

-

IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check Control Bank motion STOPPED

-__

I

Go To Section 3.1, Dropped Control Rod

Record the time at which the rod dropped

Adjust one of the following to equalize Tavg with Tref

e

Turbine load

Boron concentration

Direct an operator to check ALL Rod Control Power and Logic Cabinets for

normal operation, as follows

____I__

-

_--I_

s_---

_I

Direct Maintenance to perform corrective action on ALL affected Rod Control

Power and I

LoAc Cabinets

lheck that ALB-13-7-1, ROD CONTROL URGENT ALARM, is ALARMING,

iut do not reset until Maintenance has completed repairs

__-___I___

COMMENTS:

SCENARIO #2

huREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Page 6 of 18

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

EVENT NUMBER:

3

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTIO

TIME

_-

I

-

POSITION

SRO

RO

KO

SRO

__--

COMMENTS:

Dropped Control Hod F2 (CONTINUED)

....

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

-....

..

Kcview the fbllowing l:cckfi;ca! Specifications:

3.1.3.1, hlovablr Control Aswmblies Group Ileiglit

0

3.1.1, Axial Flux IXI'ferencr

Notify the following:

Manager - C?pentions

.~ Reackv EngineerinL

....

CIieck Reactor Power AT OR AROVE P-i0 (IO'%).

3.1. I.!, Horation Control - Shutdown Margin. Modes I & 2

3.I.33, Shi~tdown Rod Insertion Limit

3.1.3.6, Contrcil Rod Insrrtion Limits

3.2.4, Quadrant P o w r Tilt Ratio

~

. . . -.

. . -.

. .-

. . . -.

. .-

. . -.

. . -

Reset any negative rate trip alarm at the NIS cabinets

Lower turbine load as recommended by Reactor Engineering

-

Page 7 of 18

SCENARIO #2

NURIG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

~

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENAKIO NIJMBER: 2

EVENT NIJMBEK:

4

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTIC

POSITION

CUE

SKO

SRO

SKO -

RO

BOP

Power Reduction

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

Power reduction to less than 90% within the next 20 minutes has been directed

Direct the actions of AOP-038, Rapid Downpower after discussing Reactor Trip

Notify Load Dispatcher that the Unit is reducing load

Determine required horic acid addiiion for desired power reduction, as follows:

Notify Radwastc Control Room to be prepared for the increased water processing

Check that a planned load reduction will NOT take the Unit to Turbine shutdown

to dhwfirr droeped

.. Pod P e C l l X

-

Critena using Attachment I

--

Obtain values from the latest completed OPT-1525, Reactivity Plan

Generation Weekly

~.

Interval MOIIE

-~

1 at Full Power

-

requirements due to

I boration

-.

._

Determine rcactor power change will NOT exceed 15% in a one hour period

Check Rod Control in AUTO

Energize all available PRZ Backup heaters

heck the IIEH System in AUTO

.~

I

Perfonn the following at the DEK panel:

B

D

Depress EXTEK pushbutton

D

Depress REF pushhutton

D

1

Depress ENTER pushbutton

t

Check IIOLD pushbutton LIT

B

Depress GO pushbutton

I

Depress the h a d Rate MW/MN pushbutton

Enter desired rate in DEMAND display

Enter desired load in DEMAhD display

Verify the d u e in the REFERENCE display Lowers

COMMENTS:

Page 8 of 18

SCENARIO #2

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revinion

Appendix D

Kequired OpenltoF Actions

P O W ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

EVENT NUMBER:

4 / 5

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Power Reduction (Continued) /Boric Acid Pump Trip

*

*---

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

Commence RCS boration as required to maititam Control Rods above the Kod

Insertion Limit

e

Directs KO to stat? standby boric acid pump to allow continuing boration

NOTE: IF OPERA TOR SENT TO INICIESTIGATE, REPORT

BREAKER FOR PUMP CLOSED, BUT MOTOR IS EXTREMELY HOT

TO TOUCH.

ALE-006-8-4, BORIC ACID FI.OB' DEVIATION, alarming

Boric Acid Pump A-SA tripped

_____

I

Starts standby Boric Acid Pump

Restarts boration flow

Initiates repairs to pump

Verifv Generator load and Reactor Dower lowering

Maintain Generator reactive load (VARs) within guidelines

When Turbine load is less than YS%, then dispatch an operator to open 3A and 3B.-

_ _ _I _ _ . . ~ -

Feedwatet Heater vents per OP-136, Shntdowzn of Feedwater Heatem

_. 3A and -.__

3B

Check Tavg within 5°F of T,,.

Check Power level at the target value

______

COMMENTS:

NUREG-I02 1, Revision 9, Drafi

Page 9 of 18

SCENARIO #2

-

Post Validation Revision

~~

Appendix 13

Required Operator Actions

FORM E§-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER 2

EVEKT NUMBER:

6

FACILITY:

IIarris

EVENT DESCRIPTIC

TIME

_I-

POSITION

I_--

I swo

1,oss of Power to an ESF Bus with Failure of EDG to Load

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

I.

S[.VI!L?\\TOH OPERATOR INSTRCCTIONS: INSERT NEXT

MALFUNCTJON FOR LOSS OF PONEH AFTER CHEW HAS

REDUCED PO\\VER

____._...._...I

e Multiple system alarms

e

Enters and directs the actions of AOP-025. Loss of One Emergency AC Bus

( 6 1 or one Emergency DC Bus (I 25V)

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Determines no CSP running and isolates letdown by

VERIFY at least one Emergency AC Bus is FNERGIZED

REFER TO the following Tech Specs:

e

s

0

3.6.5 Vacuum Relief System

0

3.8.1.1 AC Sources Operating

3.8.3.1 Onsite Power Distribution - Oeerating

Go to Section 3.1 for Loss of Emergency Bus 1.4-SA

Loss of power to Bus 1A-SA

EDG 1.4-SA fails to load

~

c a a n y open orifice isolation valves

-

I

I_

____-

.--

-I________

3.0.3 (Due to loss of2/4 containment rad monitors and CVIS affect on CNMT

vacuum reliefs)

3.3.3.1 Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations (Due to inoperable Control

Room Outside Air Intake Monitors)

3.4.6.1 RCS IZdk Detection (Due to Kh4-3502A inup)

___._I__--

COMMENTS:

Page 10 of 18

SCENARIO #2

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Drafi

Post Validation Revision

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

EVENTNUMBER:

6

FACILITY:

Harris

EVEN? DESCRIPTION:

Loss of Power to an ESF Bus with Failure of EDG to Load

TIME

Check EDG A is running properly

I

e

Voltage

I* Frequency

BOP

Check Bus 1A-SA is NOT energized and pbdCC EMERGENCY STOP switch for

KO

I Start R Train CSP

Adjust HC-186. I, RCI Seal IVTR IN3 Flow. to establish seal injection flow as

necessary to maintain the foilowing:

L,ess than 31 gppm total flow to all RCPs

-

and 13 gpm to all RCPs

.~

BOP

KO

RO

BOP

per OP-172, Reactor Auxiliary Building IIVAC

Verify any CCW Pump - ninning

Verify Charging and Letdown flow per C)P-107, Chemical and Volume Control

Pressurrzcr level --

I

to maintain reactor power and S/G levels

COMMENTS:

Page 11 of 18

SCENARIO #2

NUREG-I02I,

Revision9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM E§-D-2

....

.....

....

......-

SCENARIO NLhlB3EK: 2

E\\FNT NLIMHEK:

7

FACL LITY:

Harris

COMMENTS:

Second Dropped Control Rod K14 I Reactor Trip

e

Determines a second dropped rod has occurred and orders Reactor Trip

ALB-013-7-3, TWO OK MORE RODS AT BOTTOM, alarming

DRPI indicates =d

Rod K14

~

~-

-

_ _ _ ~ . _ _ _ - -

CRITICAL STEP TO TRIP REACTOR WHEN SECOND DROPPED

I

ROD OCCURS.

Enters and directs the action of PATH-I

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Reactor Trip:

e

Trip breakers RTA and BYA - open

E Trip breakers RTB and BYE3 - open

e

Rod hottoni lights - not available due to loss of power

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Turbine Trip:

E

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verify Power To AC Emergency Buses:

e

Check bus voltages

D

~-

____-.-._-

_________~

Neutron flux d e c r e m

_I-

-

e

All turbine governor

.~____I___.__I-..-

valves - shut

-

E

All turbine throttle valves - shut

Check AC emergency bus IA-SA -. deenergized

Check AC emergency bus 1U-SB - energized

Check 6.9 KV bus 1A-SA breakers -~ open

Check 6.9 KV bus 1B-SI3 breakers -closed

Page 12 of 18

SCENARIO #2

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Vaiidation Revision

Amendix D

Required Operator Actions

FOSM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

EVENT NIJMBER:

7

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Secund Dropped C~ntrol Rod K14 /Reactor Trip (CONTINUED)

TIME

POSITIOP

I

I

I

COMMENTS:

....-

tfPLICANTS ACTIONS OK BEIIAVIOK

....

..._

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check NO SI Actuation and NOT required

0

Check ail of the following dark:

0

AI,B-l1-5-l

ALB-11-5-3

0

CNMT pressure < 3.0 PSIG

e

PRZ pressure > 1850 PSIG

Steampressure > 601 PSHG

Transition to and direct the actions of EOP-EPP-004. Rzactor Trb ResDonse

SI Actuated bypass permissive light

ALB-11-2-2

ALB-12-1-4

Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required

Check WCS temperature and control AFW flow to stabilize temperature

--

Check RCPs running

Check Feed System Status:

Verify all control rods fully inserted

Verify feed reg valves - SHUT

Establish AFW flow to SGs using MDMW Pump B and TDAFW Pump as

necessary

Lheck PRZ Level > 17%

Page 13 of 68

SCENARIO ti2

NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Amendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

EVENT NUMBER:

8

FACILITY:

Harris

EVEKT DESCRIPTION:

Pressurizer Steam Space Break / Single Train SI

APPLICANI"S AC'I'IONS OR REIIAVIOR

....

e

RCS pressure decreasing

PRZ lwei increasing

e

Containment temperature increasing

Containment pressure increasing

Directs SI Actuation due to loss of subcooling and transitions and directs the

Manually initiates Safety lniection or verifies automatic Safety hiection

~.

actions ofPATH-I, Entry Point A

--

Ibldout A applies

h p s RCPs when RCS pressure decreases below 1400 psig after venfylng SH flow

greater than 200 gpm

CRITICAL STEP TO TRIP RCPs WHE-V TRIP CRITERIA MET.

Verify C S P B and RHR Pump B operating

Venfy SI flow > 200 gpm

Verify KCS pressure > 230 psig

--

-.____

-_

I_-

_l______li

~ _ _ _ _ _

Check MS Line Actuation occurs when Containment pressure exceeds 3 psig

Verifv Containment Pressure has remained below 10 Dsie

Verify at least 210 KF'PH AFW flow

Verify alignment of components from actuation of ESFAS sip& using PATH-1

Control feed flow and steam dumo to stabilize RCS temoerature at 557 O F

E___-

ide, Attachment 6

___-

Energize AC Bus 1 B 1

Check PRZ PORVs closed

-.

COMMENTS:

Page 14 of18

SCENARIO 82

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

FORM ES-D-2

Amendix D

Required Operator Actions

SCENARIO NUMBER 2

EVENT NUMBER:

8

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Pressurizer Steam Space Break / Single Train SI (CONTIFUED)

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

-...

..

Verify at least one PORV Block Valve own

I

Chesk PW, surav valves closed

I

Check NO SGs depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner or completely

depressurized

Check secondarv radiation norma6

Check containment pressure NOT normal

Foldouts A and B apply

Maintain KCS seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm

-

Maintain at least 210 WPB AFW flow to SGs until at least one SG is above 25%

Control feed flow to maintain proper SG levels

Verify Bus IB1 is energized

_I____

1409/.]

__

Verifv Pw% PORVs closed

I

Verify at least one PORV Block Valve open

COMMENl'S:

Page 15 of 18

SCENARIO #2

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Anpendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

~~

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

EVENT NUMBER:

8 / 9

FACILITY

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Pressurizer Steam Space Break / Single Train SI (CONTINUED)

91s Intrrrnediete

...

Hangr Compensating \\'oltsgc ].ow Failure

APPI ICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

Check NO Containment Splay Pumps operating

Determines NIS Interniediate Range Compensating Voltage is failed low and

Checks RCS Dressure > 230 Dsie

manualiy energizes both Source Range channels

.-

-,-pi---

Checks KCS pressure stable

Stops KHR Pump B

I

BOP

I Checks SG pressures stable or increasing

__

-

I__

HX Valve, ICC-167

energized by offsite power

I

BOP

I Verif7iBus IBI energized

Train B CKDM fans

Turbine Xormal Bearing Oil Pump

Stoa the DC baring Oil Pump

I

BOP

Continue attempts to restore offsite power to Emergency Bus LA-SA

COMMENTS:

Page 16 of 18

SCENARIO ff2

NUREG-1021, Revision 9. Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

EVENT NUMBER:

8

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Pressurizer Steam SDace Break / Single Train SI (CONTINUED1

1 TIME I POSITION

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

COMMENTS:

Verifv EDG B nimine unloaded -~

Reset SI

Shutdown EDG B per OP-155, Section 4.0

Determine RHR Train B carable of Cold Leg Recirculation

Verifv Auxiliarv and Radwaste Processing Building Radiation normal

Check KCS uressure meater than 230 osie

TERMINATE THE SCENARIO AFTER THE TRANSITION TO

EPP-009 IS ANNOUNCED.

Page l7of I8

SCENAKIO #2

NUREG-102

I , Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ESD-2

...

FACILITY:

Harris

I

SCENARIO NUhIRER: 2

EVENT KUMBEK:

j 0

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Classifies the Event

I TIME I POSITION I

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

I

Classifies the event as an Site Area Emergency

NOTE: SAE BASED ONBREACH OFRCS B A M f E R AND

CQNTA IRMENT PRESSlIRE IN EXCESS OF 3 PSIG.

l---t-+----

SCENARIO #2

NUREG-l02t,

Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Harris

Draft

Scenario 3

Operating Exam

2004

Anuendix D

Simulator Scenario Outline

FORM l?S-D-I

Facility:

H A W S

Scenario Number:

3

Op-Test Number:

Examiners

Operators

Initial Conditions: IC-18; 100% power BOL; AFW Pump A-§A OOS (CFW026 RACK-OUT); HDP

0 0 s (CND065 RACK-OUT); JXSEHT EVENTS 6 and 7 DURING SIMUIATOR

SETUP. Lower power by 25 MWe and increase boron concentration by 2 ppm; Allow

plant to stabilize.

Turnover:

The unit is at 100% power at BOL, with equilibnum xenon conditions.

Boron concentration is 1238 ppm. Hank D rods are at 218 steps.

AFW Pump 'A' was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ago for oil replacement due to

contaniinants and is expected to be retiuned to service within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . Technical

Specification 3.7.1.2 has been entered. Risk level is YELLOW.

HDP 'A' is tagged out of service for hearing replacement and is not expected back for the

next several days.

Shift orders are to maintain power at 100% and restore AFW Pump 'A' to service when it

becomes available. GP-005 has been completed and the plant has been stable for 3 weeks

I

3

I CFW-12B I C(B0P)

Event Description

Operating CCW Pump Trip with failure of standby pump to

automatically start

Feed Water Flow Low Failure

Heater Drain Pump Trip with Failure of Turbine to Automatically

Runback

Pressurizer Pressure High Failure

Page I of 18

SCENARIO #3

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Event

Number

5

8

h4aifunction

Number

SGN-5C 42(

600

MSS-5C 2

NA

Event

Type*

M (ALL)

C (RO)

C (SRO)

C (BOP)

Event Description

SG Tube Rupture

Failure of MSlV on Ruptured §G to close - can be closed locally

NOTE: INSERT MALFUiWT1Ohr DUIUNG INITIAL SETUP

OF SIWULA TOR.

Partial failure of Automatic Phase A Lwlation signal (Train B

Phase A Slave Relay for select CNMT Phase A valves fails to

energize when required). iSI-287, ICs-11 & 1SW-242

NOTE: INSERT MALFffNCTIO-W DUZLVC IA7TIAL SETUP

OF SIMULA TOR.

Classifies the Event

(N)omial, (Rleactivity, (I)nstmment, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Page 2 of I8

SCENARIO #3

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Amendix D

Reeauired Ouerator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

FAClL ITl;

llnrris

.-.

EVENT NUhlBER:

I

....

SCENARIO NUiLIBER: 3

..

EVENT DESCRIPTIO h I:

Operating CCW Pump Trip with failure of standby pump to

automatically start

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVfOR

Diagnose trip of CCW Pump 1 A-SA and failure of CCW Pump 1B-SB to

automatic stalt

e

Enters and directs the actions of AOP-014. Loss of ConiDonent Cooling Water

Numerous alarms on ALB-005 due to no CCW flow

Breaker indication on CCW Pump 1A-SA

Failure of C C W B 1B-SB to start

~~

_-___--

ter than 52 psig

heck condition of the breaker and the pump

I

RO

I Verifv adeauate ESW cooling water flow to the associated CCW heat exchnnaer

__

-

._

the CCW pump failure,

I

-

COMMENTS:

Page 3 of 18

SCENARIO #3

NUREG-1021,

Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3

EVENT NUMBER:

2

FACILITY:

Harris

EVEN?' DESCRIPTION:

Peed Water FIQW I,OW Failure

COMMENTS:

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

S G A STM > FW FLOW MISMATCH (ALB-014-4-IA and IB) alarming

SG 'A' feed reg valve opening

SG 'A' actual feed flow > steam flow

Diagnose low failure of controrling SG 'A' feed flow channel

e

F1-477 indicating 0

0

SG 'A' level increasing

0 -

Enter arid direct the actions of AOP-010, Feedwater I2lalfunctions

-

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check NO Main Feedwater Pump tripped

rakes MANLTAI. control of FK-478 prior to direction in AOP-010 to preveflt

overfc-r

-.

OMM-00 1 instructions

-.

~

heck DEH controlling Turbine Valves properiy

Maintain all of the following:

At Ieast one Main Feedwater Pump running

Main Feedwater flow to all Steam Generators

v -

~ _ _ _ -

AIL Steam Generator levels greater than 30%

Check Feedwater Keylator Valves NOT operating properly in AUTO and perform

the following:

P

Place applicable Feedwater Keplator Valve (FK-478) in MANUAL

Maintain Steam Generator levels between 52 and 62% (REDUCE FW FLOW)

____I_

_-______

CRITICAL STEP TO PREVENT PLAA'T TRIP AS A RESULT OF HIGH-

~

_

_ -

-

~

mmr SG LE VEL.

-__p-

Jheck Main Control Room annunciators available

Jheck the following Pump status:

P

B

Only one HDP operating

-_______~-_I___..

NO Feedwater Train Pumps tnpped

Page 4 of 18

SCENARIO #3

NUREG- I02 I, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3

EVENT NUMBER:

2

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT 1

_-

SCRIPTION

POSITION 1

Feed Water Flow Low FaiIure (CONTINUED)

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

TIiNG9 T I E CREW

SECTION 3. P FOR THE FAIL CRE OF THE FEED FLOW

alfunctions (other than pump trips) Section

Valves operating properly in MODU:

Main Feedwater Pumps

Condensate Pumps

Condensate Booster Pumps

~-

nsate Dump To CS? Isolation - Valve

Check pumps for normal operation

Notify Load Ilispatcher of any load limitations

Check Reactor thermal power changed by less than 15% in any one hour period .-

SRO

I Exit AOP-010

Selests Channel 476 for control in accordance with OW-RP

--

estores Feed Keg Valve controller to AUTO when level stable at program with

w and steam flow matched

COMMENTS:

~~

Page 5 of 18

SCENARIO it3

hWRF.0-1021,

Revision9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3

EVENT NUMBER:

3

FACILITY:

Harris

~~

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Heater Drain Pump Trip with Failure of Turbine to Aotolnatifdly

TIME I POSITION

Runback

APPLICAKTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

Diagnoses trip of Heater Drain Pump B

e

SG levels decreasing

Reactor Power increasing

Enters arid directs the actions of AOP-010, Feedwater Malfunctions

(IMAIkDLZTE ACTION) Check NO Main Feedwater Pump tripped

Check DEH controlling Turbine Valves properly

Maintain all ofthe following:

e

At least one Main Feedwater Pump running

Main Feedwater flow to ali Steam Generators

ALL Steam Generator levers greater than 30%

Check Main Control Room annunciators available

Check the following Pump status:

e

Go to the applicable section:

D

Maintain all of the following:

m

HTK DRN PUMP B O/C TRIP-GND (ALB-019-4-IA) alarming

HTR DFW PUMP B LO UP-LO FLOW (ALB-019-3-1A) alamiing

_-

..

-

NO Feedwater Train Pumps tripped

e

Both HDPs tripped

--

Loss of Running

~ P=(including

BO?H Heater Drain Pumps) Section 3.a

At least one Main Feedwater Pump running

Main Feedwater flow to all Stearn Generators

AIL Steam Generator le\\& greater than 30%

-

--

COMMENTS:

Page6of1.3

SCENARIO #3

NUREG-1021, Kevision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCERAKIO NURIBER: 3

EVENT NlJhIRER:

3

FACILITY:

Harris

..

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Heater Drain Pump Triu with Failure of Turbine to Automsticallv

RO

BOP

Check control rods inserting to reduce Tavg - Tref mismatch

I Check Main Steam pressure less than PoRV controller setpcint

KO

I Check PZR Level trending to reference level

BOP

I Check load NOT less than or eaual to 900?

COMMENTS:

Page 7 of 18

SCENAIUO #3

MUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Aonendix D

Rewired Oaerator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER 3

EVENT NUMBER:

3

FACILJTY

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Heater Drain Pump Trip with Failure of Turbine to Automatically

TIME

Load Dispatcher that the Unit is reducing load

wer evolution by adjusting rods and/or boron

iny per OP-107, Chemical and Volume Control

e

Determines number of gallons required per Reactivity Plan

Sets FIS-113, Boric Acid Batch Counter, for corrcct number of gallons

Sets ICs-283, FK-I 13 Boric Acid Flow, for desired value (typically

approximately 5 gpm)

Places RMW CONTROL to S'I'OP

Places WtW MODE SELECTOR to BOR

Piaces RMW CONTROL to START

When desired boric

-____...

acid added, a m s t e m for AUTO

I

om to be prepared for the increased water processing

n will NOT take the Unit to Turbine shutdown

.-

fy Chemistry that Reactor power change will exceed 15% in a one hour period.

ck Rod Control in AUTO.

__

-

Energize all available PRZ Backup heaters

BOP

I Check the DEM System in AUTO

COMMENTS:

Perform the following at the D M panel:

0

Depress ENTER pushbutton

Depress REF pushbutton

e

Enter desired load in DEMAND display

e Depress ENTER pushbutton

Check EIOLD pushbutton lit

Depress the Load Rate MWh4IN pushbutton

Enter desired rate (NOT to exceed 45 MWMIN) in DEMAND display

Page8of18

SCENARIO #3

NUREG-1021, Revision 9. Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER 3

EVENT NUMBER:

3

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Heater Drain Pump Trip with Failure of Turbine to Automatically

lute as necessary to

rns to AOP-010

cpt'ntor to check the following seated, observing tailpipes:

eck IIotweli level trending to between 71oiO and 46%.

-

-___I

COMMENTS:

Page 9 of 18

SCENARIO li3

NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Aooendix D

Required Operator Actions

B.oRM ES-D-2

~

SCENARIO XUMBER: 3

EVENT NUMBER:

4

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Pressurizer Pressure High Failure

COM.MENTS:

.VPI.iCANTS ACTIONS OK BEHAVIOR

......

....

Diagnoses high failure of Pressurizer Pressure channel P-444

0

PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVKATION CONTROL (ItkB-O09-3-1),

alarming

PRESSURIZER HIGH-LOW PRESS (ALB-009-5-I), alarming

PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK HIGH-LOW LEVEL PRESS OR TEh4P

(ALB-009-8-1), alarming

IRESSUKIZER RELIEF DISCHARGE HIGH TEMP (A123-009-8-2),

0

PRZ heaters off

PIG! sprays open

Enters and directs the actions of AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Check that a bubble exists in the PRZ

PRZ PORV 4443 momentarily open

PR2 pressure lowering on other channels

-

__

..

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Verifies proper operation of PRZ PORVs AND

I

associated block valves

(MIMEDIATE ACTION) Takes manual control of pressurizer pressure by either:

Go TO Section 3.1, Pressure Control Malfunctions While Operating With a

Pressurizer

-

Bubhle

Monitor PRZ pressure by (henling other reliable indication

Placing master controller PK-444A in manual, or

Placing heaters and spray valves in manual

Check plant in MODE 1 OR 2

-heck PRZ pressure controlled

Check PRZ pressure 2335 PSICi OR LESS

Page 10 of 18

SCENARIO #3

NUREG-6021, Revision9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

.I-__

EVENT N:JF..IUER:

4

FACILITY:

Harris

...

SCENPIRiO NIIMBEK: 3

..

WENT 1

TIME

--

I_-

___

-

SCRIPTION:

Pressurizer Pressure High Failure (CONTIN'UED)

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

RO

I Check ail of the PFZ PORV block valves onen

RO

Check that a malfunction of PT-444 has occurred

Verify PK-444A in MANUAL

-

RO

Control PW,

pressure as follows:

0

Adjust PK-444A output as necessary, to attempt to restore and maintain PRZ

pressure

Check both PRZ spray valve controllers in AUTO and both spray valves

operating as desired

Check all PFZ heaters operating as desired

-

-~

Check hoth of the following conditions present:

e

PRZ pressure is controlled

0

Status of a normal spray valve or a PRZ heater hank is controlled

--

SRO

Refer to Attachment 3, Pressure Control Malfunction Symptoms-Bubble in

Direct Maintenance to investigate and repair the PRZ Pressure Control System

-

COMMENTS:

Page I I of 18

SCENARIO #3

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM E$-D-2

...

......

_....-

SCENARIO NLJR4REK: 3

EVENT NUMBER.

5

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

SG Tube Rupture

POSITION 1

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

TIME

~-

CUE

SRO

Diagnoses SGTR by multiple radiation monitor alarms, including:

CEV high alarm

Steamline 'C' alert

'C' high alarm

Determines SG tube rupture has occurred, orders a Reactor Trip and Safety

Injection, and enters .- and directs the actions ofPATN-1

--

,VOTE: MA I'.WAh'.E ATTE.4fPTS 10 PERFORMACFIOAS OF AOP-016,

E.X(.'ES.Yl).% PRI.)fAK I' P1.rl.W LEAKA GE, BEFORE DETERMI.VI.VG

THAT LE.4KAGE IS 1,VLXCESS OF C'AT.4EILITIES TO PERFORM A

CONl'KOLLED PL.4.VTSH('TDOl~~.~.

~

...... ~

IMMEI)lATE ACI'ION) Verity Reactor Trip

0

Neutron

~

flux .....

decreasink

.....

.

(IMMEDKl'E ACTION) Verify Turbine Trip

(I~lhlED!KlF ACTION) Verify Power '1'0 AC Emzrgewy Buses

Check bus vol!ages

.. -.

-.

..... -

.....

~

.....

RO

Trip breakers RYA and BYA - open

Trip breakers RI'B and BYB - open

Rod bottom lights - lit

~.

~

..

~

......

f3OP

All turbine throttle d v r s -.. shut

All turbi:=rnor ...... vzjvcs - sliu:

Check A(' enirrgcncy buses IA-SA w d In-SB -energized by oftX:e pov\\er or

EDGs

Check 6.9 KV biis IA-SA breaker brenke: 195 (OFFSITE) - closed

C!ieck 6.9 KV 1:us IR. SR hrrakcr hreaker I25 (OFFSITE.) closed

~

.

...

~

......

~

.......

_ -

BOP

.....

...

COMMENTS:

Page 12 of 18

SCENARIO #3

hZTREG-1021,

Revision 9, DraA

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3

EVENT NUMBER

5 / 7

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

SG Tnhe Rupture (CONTINUED)

(IMMEDIATE ACTION) Actuates SI Actuation and determines SI has actuated

I

-

I

RO

I Verifv a11 CSPS and RIIR Pumos running

I

Verify SI flow > 200 gpin

Verify RCS pressure > 230 psig

Verify Main Steam Isolation NOT actuated, NOR required

I

RO

I Verify Containment pressure has remained < 10 psig

I

BOP

I Veri& > 2 10 KPPW AFW flow

BOP

omponents from actuation of ESFAS signals using PATH-I

ed to close and manually closes them:

ORV N2 SUPPLY.

e

I SW-242, NNS

_. CNMT FAN CLRS OUTLET ISOL

CRITICAL TO COMPLETE PHASE A ISOLATIOIV WHICH FAILED TO

ICs-I I, LTDN ISOL VLV

TICALL Y ACTUA TE.

._

YISOLATE AFW TO SG C AXYTIME IMINMUM LE VEL OF

COMMENTS:

Page 13 of iR

SCENARIO #3

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Appendix 11

Required Operator Actions

FORM ESD-2

~

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3

EVENT NUMBER:

5 I 6

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

SG Tube Rupture (CONTINUED)

Failure of MSIV on Ruptured SG to Close

proper PFZ PORV and spray valve response

I

BOP

I Determines NO SGs are faulted

- - b F = n n i n e s

SG C is ruptured

I

1

Abnonnal secondary radiation levels

Uncontrolled level increase

-4

BOP -1

When S G C level is > 25%, isolates M W flow to SG C

ons of PATH-2 at Entry Point J

-

rocedures as required

e

o

Shut faulted SG C steam supply vaive, MS-72, to TDAFW pump (may have

been performed earlier for RCS temperature control)

Verify SG blowdown isolation wlves shut

Veri@ SG C Main Steam Drain isolation valves shut

Verify SG C Main Steam Isolation Bypass valve shut

COMMENTS:

Page 14 of 18

SCENARIO 63

NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Drafi

Post Validation Revision

Annendix D

Reauired Ooerator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

EVENT NUMBER:

5 6

FACILITY:

Harris

I..

SCENARIO NIJMHER. 3

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

I..

SG Tuhe Rupture (CONTINUED)

Failure of MkIV on Ruptured SG to Close

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

Detennines SG C Main Steam Isolation valve failed to shut

o

Shut all remaining Main Steam Isolation valves and bypasses

e

Place both Steam Dump interlock switches to OFF / RESET

Use intact SG PORVs for a11 further steam dumping

Direct operator to locally isolate SG C using PATH-2 Guide, Attachment 1

o

Verify SG A and B MSIV and bypass valves shut

CRITICAL TO CLOSE SG AAhrD EMSIVs AND PLACE STEAMDUMP

LVTERLOCK SWITCHES IN OFF/RESEl TO PREVENT STEAMING

Isolate feed flow to SG C when level > 25%

I

-

RUPTLRED SG.

_.

CRITICAL TO ISQLA TE FEED FLOW TO SG C TO PREVENT

Check ruptured SG C pressure > 260 psig

RUPTURED SG.

i

I

RO

I When PRZ Dressure decreases below 2000 DS~R block low stcam pressure SI simal

1 Check SG A and R

both available for RCS cooldown

-~~

~~~~~

Dc.ttnt;ii;e required Core hi:

Temperature based on SG C prcssure

Check condenser NOT available and dump steam from SG A and 3 at

~

rnaximuni rate using SG PORVs

When Core Exit Temperatures are less than target temperature

o

Stop the RCS cooldown

o

Maintain CETs less than tarirmperature

..

Continue recovery actions during cooldown

Maintain RCP seal iniection between 8 and 13 gpm

~

_

I

COMMENTS:

Page 15 of18

SCENARIO #3

NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft

Poet Validation Revision

~~

Appendix L3

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3

EVENT NUMBER:

5

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTIO

=+:

SRO

RO

-- -e~-

_--

BOP

COMMENTS:

APPLICANTS ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR

Verify at least 210 KPPH AFW flow available

Verify power available to PRZ PORV Block valves

Check PIPZ FORVs closed

-

I

Verifv at least one PRZ PORV Block valve open

If PRZ FORV actuates. verifv nrouer operation

Reset SI

If offsite power lost, manually realign safeguards equipment

Reset Phase A and Phase B

_.

Establish L4 and N2 to Containment

Check RCS pressure > 230 psig

Stop both RIIR pumps

When Core Exit Temperatures are less than target temperature

o

Stop the RCS cooldown

DO NOT continue until cooldown comulete

-

. l ~ _ _ _ _ l _ _

Maintain CETs less than target temperature

-

I

Check SG C pressure stable or increasing

Check RCS subcooiing greater than 30 OF using the computer

_______

Page 16 of 18

SCENARIO #3

NUREG-I02i,

Revision 9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

_ -

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3

EVENT NUMBER:

5

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

SG Tube Rupture (CONTINUED)

0

PRZ level >_ 75%

RCS suhcooling 5 10 "F

RY LEAKAGE.

COMMENTS:

Page 17 of 18

SCENARIO #3

h'uRuG- IO2 1

~ Revision 9, Diafi

Post Validation Revision

Appendix D

Required Operator Actions

FORM ES-D-2

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3

EVENT NUMBER:

8

FACILITY:

Harris

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Clnssifies the Event

COMMENTS:

Page 18 of IR

SCENARIO #3

NUREG-1021, Revision9, Draft

Post Validation Revision

Harris

Draft

Scenario 4

Spare

Operating Exam

2004

ML041170065

Text

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