ML063180546

Technical Specification Pages - Issuance of Amendment 247 Change of Containment Building Sump Buffering Agent from Trisodium Phosphate to Sodium Tetraborate

ML063180546
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	11/13/2006
From:	Wang A NRC/NRR/ADRO/DORL/LPLIV
To:
Wang A, NRR/DORL/LP4, 415-1445
Shared Package
ML063120239	List: ML063120248 ML063180546
References
TAC MD2864
Download: ML063180546 (9)

Text

() Pursuant to the Act End 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use Inamounts as required any byproduct, source, or special nuclear material without restriction to chemnical or physical form for sample analysis or Instrument calibration or when associated with radioactive apparatus or.

comipboentd; (5) Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by operation of the facility.

3. This renewed license shall be deemed to contain and Issubject to the. conditions specified Inthe following Commission regulations In10 CFR Chapter 1: Part 20, Section 30.34 of part 30, Section 40.41 of Part 40. Section 50.54 and 50.59 of Part 50, and Section 70.32 of Part 70; and Is,subject to.all applicable Provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter Ineffect; and Is subject f6 the additional conditions specified or Incorporated below:

A. Maximum Power Level Omaha Public Power District Isauthorized to operate the Fart Calhoun Station, Unit 1, -

-- tsteady-state-'re .actor-core po~~'r-levels- not-in-excess-of-I 5Q0-rnegawatts thermal- -

(rated, power).

B. Technical Specifications The Teghnicai Specificatilons contained InAppendix A,as revised through Amendment No. 247 are hereby !ncorporated Inthe lcense. Omaha Public Power District shallj opefiti the facility In-accordance with the technical Specifications.

C.security end Safeguards Continciencv Plans The Omaha Public PoWer District shiall fully Implement and maintain Ineffect all

• provisions of the C.QmrplssiorI-ppov~cl physical q=trly ftialnl and qdualfication.,

and isfeguards contIngericy plans Including .amendment Made pursuant to provisions or the Miscellaneous Aniendments. 4nd-8earch Requirements revisionst1110 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and.-27822) arid to the, autIhoridty of 1001M 50.90 bnd 10 .CFR 60.64(p). The plIans; Which contalin Safeduards lnorm .atlorpro-..t1cted under..10 CFR1 73.21, are entitled: 'Fort Calhoun SiAtion Security Plan, Training And Qualifcation Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan' submitted by letter dated October,1M, 2004.'

Renwed Operating License No. DPR-40 -

I.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS - FIGURES TABLE OF CONTENTS FIGURE DESCgRIPTION SECTION 1-1 TMLP Safety Limits 4 Pump Operations Section 1.0 2-3 NaTB Volume Required for RCS Critical Boron Concentration (ARO. HZP. No Xenon)Section 2.3 2-8 Flux Peaking Augmentation Factors Section 2.10 2-10 Spent Fuel Pool Region 2 Storage Criteria Section 2.8 2-11 Limiting Bum up Criteria for Acceptable S1torge In Spent Fuel Cask Section 2.8 2-12 Boric Acid Solubility in Water Section 2.2 TOC -Page 8 Amendment No 146,426,431,141,161,470 17-2,188,192,107-.207,221,232,239 ,247

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3 Emergiency Core Cooling System (Continued)

()Protection Against Low Temperature Overpressurization The following limiting conditions shall be applied during scheduled heatups and cooldowns. Disabling of the HPSI pumps need not be required if the RCS is vented through at least a 0.94 square inch or larger vent.

Whenever the reactor coolant system cold leg temperature is below 350*F, at least one (1 ) HPSI pump shall be disabled.

Whenever the reactor coolant system cold leg temperature is below 320*F, at least two (2) HPSI pumps shall be disabled.

Whenever the reactor coolant system cold leg temperature is below 270 0F, all three (3) HPSI pumps shall be disabled.

In the event that no charging pumps are operable when the reactor coolant system cold leg temperature Is below 270 0F, a single HPSI pump may be made operable and utilized for boric acid Injection to the core, with flow rate restricted to no greater than 120Ogpm.

(4) Containment Sump Buffering Aaent Specification and Volume Requirement' During operating Modes 1 and 2, the containment sump buffering agent baskets shall contain a volume of active hydrated sodium tetraborate (NaTB) that iswithin the area of acceptable operation shown in Figure 2-3.

a. With the above buffering agent requirements not within limits, the buffering agent shall be restored within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

b. With Specification 2.3(4)a required action and completion time not met, the plant shall be In hot shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and cold shutdown within the following 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

Basis The normal procedure for starting the reactor Is to first heat the reactor coolant to near operating temperature by running the reactor coolant pumps. The reactor Is then made critical. The energy stored in the reactor coolant during the approach to criticality is substantially equal to that during power operation and therefore all engineered safety features and auxiliary cooling systems are required to be fully operable.

2.3 - Page 4 Amendment No. 17,20,43,417,64,74,77, 10010,13,11,5716I17,21,21,32 247 ThcQ i-W~fit a~

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3 Emergency Core Cooling System (Continuedl)

With respect to3 the 4

core cooling function, there is functional redundancy over most of the range of break sizes. ( )( )

The LOCA analysis confirms adequate core cooling for the break spectrum up to and incl uding the 32 inch double-ended break assuming the safety injection capability which most adversely affects accident consequences and are defined as follows. The entire contents of all four safety Injection tanks are assumed to be available for emergency core cooling, but the contents of one of the tanks is assumed to be lost through the reactor coolant system. In addition, of the three high-pressure safety injection pumps and the two low-pressure safety injection pumps, for both large break analysis and small break analysis it is assumed that one high pressure pump and one low pressure pump operate(5); and also that 25% of their combined discharge rate is lost from the reactor coolant system out of the break. The transient hot spot fuel clad temperatures for the break sizes considered are shown in USAR Section 14.

The restriction on HPSI pump operability at low temperatures, in combination with the PORV setpoints ensure that the reactor vessel pressure-temperature limits would not be exceeded in the case of an inadvertent actuation of the operable HPSI and charging pumps.

Removal of the reactor vessel head, one pressurizer safety valve, or one PORV provides sufficient expansion volume to limit any of the design basis pressure transients. Thus, no additional relief capacity is required.

Technical Specification 2.2(1) specifies that, when fuel is Inthe reactor, at least one flow path shall be provided for boric acid injection to the core. Should boric acid injection become necessary, and no charging pumps are operable, operation of a single HPSI pump would provide the required flow path. The HPSJ pump flow rate must be restricted to that of three charging pumps in order to minimize the consequences of a mass addition transient while at low temperatures.

Hydrated Sodium Tetraborate (NaTB) is required to adjust the pH of the recirculation water to 2:7.0 after a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). This pH varue is necessary to prevent significant amounts of Iodine, released from fuel failures and dissolved in the recirculation water, from converting to a volatile form and evolving Into the containment atmosphere. Higher levels of airborne Iodine In containment may Increase the releases of radionuclides and the consequences of the accident. A pH of a 7.0. Is also necessary to prevent stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of austeniltic stainless steel components in containment. SCC increases the probability of failure of components.

NaTB Is used because of the high humidity in the containment building during normal operation. Since the NaTB Is hydrated, it is less likely to absorb large amounts of water from the humid atmosphere and will undergo less physical and chemical change.

Radiation levels in containment following a LOCA may cause the generation of hydrochloric and nitric acids from radiolysis of cable insulation and sump water. NaTB will neutralize these acids.

The required amount of NaTB Is represented in a volume quantity converted from the Reference 7 mass quantity using the manufactured density. Verification of this amount during surveillance testing utilizes the measured volume.

2.3 - Page 6 Amendment No. 39,47,64,74,77.100261

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3 Emergiency Core Cooling System (Continued)

Figure 2!-3 NaTB Volume Required for RCS Critical Boron Concentration (ARO. HZP, No Xenon) 2.3 - Page 8 No. 232, 247 2.3-Pge 8Amendment

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.6 Safety Injection and Containment Cooling Systems Tests Applicabilit Applies to the safety injection system, the containment spray system, the containment cooling system and air filtration system inside the containment.

Objective To verify that the subject systems will respond promptly and perform their intended functions, if required.

Specifications (1) Safety Injection System System tests shall be performed on a refueling frequency. A test safety feature actuation signal will be applied to initiate operation of the system. The safety injection and shutdown cooling system pump motors may be de-energized for this portion of the test.

A second overlapping test will be considered satisfactory if control board indication and visual observations Indicate all components have received the safety feature actuation signal in the proper sequence and timing (i.e., the appropriate pump breakers shall have opened and closed, and all valves shall have completed their travel).

(2) Containment Spray System

a. System tests shall be performed on a refueling frequency. The test shall be performed with the Isolation valves Inthe spray supply lines at the containment blocked closed. Operation of the system is initiated by tripping the normal actuation Instrumentation.

b. At least every ten years the spray nozzles shall be verified to be open.

C. The test will be considered satisfactory if-(i) Visual observations indicate that at least 264 nozzles per spray

---head~er-have-operated satisfactorily__-.-.---

(ii) No more than one nozzle per spray header Is missing.

d.6 Representative samples of Hydrated Sodium Tetraborate (NaTB) that have been exposed to the same environmental conditions as that in the mesh baskets shall be tested on a refueling frequency by:

.3.6 -Pagel1 Amendment No. 7,44,421,15:7,171,2O1 , 247

.This Specification Isapplicable only for Fuel Cycle 24. I

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.6 Safety Iniection and Containment Cooling Systems Tests (continued)

(i) Verifying that the containment sump buffering agent baskets contain a volume of granular NaTB that is within the area of acceptable operation of Figure 2-3.

(ii) Verifying that a sample from the buffering agent baskets provides adequate pH upward adjustment of the recirculation water.

3.6 - Page 2 . 3.6-Pge 2Amendment No. 44,470,201,232, 247

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.6 Safety Iniection and Containment Cooling Systems Tests (Continued)

Operation of the system for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> every month will demonstrate operability of the filters and adsorbers system and remove excessive moisture build-up on the adsorbers.

Demonstration of the automatic initiation capability will assure system availability.

Determination of the volume of buffering agent in containment must be performed due to the possibility of leaking valves and components inthe containment building that could cause dissolution of the buffering agent during normal operation.

A refueling frequency shall be utilized to visually determine that the volume of buffering agent contained inthe buffering agent baskets iswithin the area of acceptable operation based on the buffering agent volume required by Figure 2-3. A measured value or the Technical Data Book (TDB) 11,"Reactivity Curves" may be used to obtain a hot zero power (HZP) critical boron concentration (CBC). The was found" volume of buffering agent must be within the area of acceptable operation of Figure 2-3 using this HZP CBC value. Prior to exiting the refueling outage, visual buffering agent volume determination is performed3 to ensure that the nas-left' volume of buffering agent contained Inthe baskets is k72.5 ft .

This requirement ensures that there is in adequate quantity of buffering agent to adjust the pH of the post-LOCA sump solution to a value 2:7.0 for HZP CBC up to 1800 ppm.

Testing must be performed to ensure the solubility and buffering ability of the NaTB after exposure to the containment environment. A representative sample of 1.24 to 1.27 grams of NaTB from one of the baskets Incontainment Is submerged in 0.99 -1.01 liters of water at a boron concentration of 2436 - 2456 ppm (equivalent to a RCS boron concentration of*

1800 ppm - Figure 2-3) using boric acid. At a standard temperature of 115 - 1250F,without agitation, the solution must be left to stand for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The liquid Isthen decanted and mixed, the temperature is adjusted to 75 - 79OF and the pH measured. At this point, the pH must be 2:7.0. The representative sample weight is based on the minimum required NaTB3 weight of 4301 pounds, less the quantity required to account for acidic radiolysis products (758 pounds), and maximum possible post-LOCA sump volume of 398,445 gallons, normalized to a 1.0 liter sample. At a manufactured density of 59.3 lbM/ft 3 4301 pounds corresponds to the minimum volume of 72.5 ft3.-

For dissolution testing, the boron concentration of the test water Is representative of the maximum possible boron concentration corresponding to the maximum possible post-LOCA sump volume. The post-LOCA sump volume originates from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), the Safety Injection Refueling Water Tank (SIRWVT), the Safety Injection Tanks (SITs) and the Boric Acid Storage Tanks (BASTs). The maximum post-LOCA sump boron concentration Isbased on a cumulative boron concentration Inthe RCS, SIRWT, SITs and BASTs of 2446 ppm. The cumulative boron concentration is based on a maximum RCS HZP CBC with no Xenon at Beginning of Cycle conditions, SIRWT and SIT boron-concentrations at maximum-allowe-d values-of 2,35-0pprn an-d-maximum-B-AST -

concentration of 4.5 % wt. Agitation of the test solution Isprohibited since an adequate standard for the agitatilon Intensity cannot be specified. The test time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is necessary to allow time for the dissolved NaTB to naturally diffuse through the sample solution. Inthe post-LOCA containment sump, rapid mixing would occur, significantly decreasing the actual amount of time before the required pH Is achieved. This would ensure achieving a pH 2:7.0 by the onset of recirculation after a LOCA.

3.6 - Page 6 Amendment No. 121,17-0,201,232 247

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.6 Safety injectilon and Containment Cooling Systems Tests (Continued)

References (1) USAR, Section 6.2 (2) USAR, Section 6.3 (3) USAR, Section 14.16 (4) USAR, Section 6.4 3.6 - Page 7 3.6 age 7Amendment

- No. M3, 24 7