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{{#Wiki_filter:t'C CEIZRATED DI RJBUTION DEMONSTR TJON SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:8807070064 DOC.DATE: 88/06/27 NOTARIZED:
{{#Wiki_filter:t
NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ARBUCKLE,J.D.
'C CEIZRATED           DI   RJBUTION     DEMONSTR TJON                     SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
Washington Public Power Supply System POWERS,C.M.
ACCESSION NBR:8807070064       DOC.DATE: 88/06/27   NOTARIZED: NO                   DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS   Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public             Powe   05000397 AUTH. NAME         AUTHOR AFFILIATION ARBUCKLE,J.D.     Washington Public Power Supply System POWERS,C.M.       Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME         RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
LER sys DISTRIBUTION TITLE: 50.73 NOTES: 88-019-00:on 880527,control room emergency filtration actuation during testing due to inadequate procedure.
LER 88-019-00:on 880527,control room emergency filtration sys actuation during testing   due to inadequate procedure.
W/8 ltr.CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR j ENCL L SIZE: Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpl, etc.~i t"i't)~;v~~RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 LA SAMWORTH, R INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON AEOD/DOA AEOD/DSP/ROAB ARM/DCTS/DAB NRR/DEST/ADS 7E NRR/DEST/ESB 8D NRR/DEST/MEB 9H NRR/DEST/PSB 8D NRR/DEST/SGB 8D NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 NRR DREP/RAB 10~N DR'S/IB 9A~REG F 02 RES/DE/EIB RGN5-: FILE'1 EXTERNAL: EG&G WILLIAMS, S H ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MAYS,G COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 PD ACRS MOELLER AEOD/DSP/NAS AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DEST/CEB 8H NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H NRR/DEST/RSB 8E NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RES TELFORD,Z RES/DRPS DEPY FORD BLDG HOY,A LPDR NSIC HARRIS,J COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 A j A TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 45 ENCL 44 NRC Form 368 (0 83)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)V.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO.3150410(EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME HI Washin ton Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER l21 PAGE 3i 0 5 0 0 0 397 1 OFO 4""'"'Control Room Emergency F>tr at>on ystem ctuation ur>ng est>ng ue to Inadequate Procedure-Personnel Error EVENT DATE (5)LER NUMBER (61 REPORT DATE (71 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED IBI MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR o c'r ssar/BNTIAL fr<2 RsvrsroN MONTH OAY C?P.NUMBER rynp Nr/MBSR YEAR FACI LIT Y NA M ES DOCKET NUMBER(3)0 5 0 0 0 052 0 88 88 01 9 0 00 627 8 8 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATING MODE (8)5 POWE R LEYEL 0 0 0 20.402(BI 20,405(sill l(0 20.405 (o)ll I)ii)20,405 (~Ill I (iii1 20.405(~I (1)I I v)20.405 I~I (1 l(v I 20.405(c)60.35(c)(ll 50.38(c)(21 50.7 3(~I (2 Hi)50,73(e)(2)(ii)50.73(o l(21(iiil LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)50.73(o l(21(iv)50.73(el(2)(v) 50.73(e l(2)(vii)50.73(~l(2)(viii)(Al 50.73(~l(21(viiil(81 50.73 (~I (2)(o I THIS REPORT Is sUBMITTED pURSUANT To THE REGUIREMENTs oF 10 cFR ()r Icntcsr ont or mort of rnt foriowinp/
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR NOTES:
Ill)73.7((B)73.7((cl OTHER ISptcify in Aosrrtcr INIOVV end in Ttvr, HRC FOrm 366AI NAME J.D.Arbuckle Com liance En ineer TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 50 937 7-21 15 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (131 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.TI/REA REPORTABLE TO NPADS Pnvvp()jxTBF@
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ENCL TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpl, etc.
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.TURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS.j+QPBTcvr~P+$
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                                                                  't
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (141 EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (151 MONTH DAY YEAR YES Irf ytL comprtrt EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE/NO ABSTRACT ILimrr ro/400 sotcts,/e., tpprovimtrtiy
                                                                      )
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/inn/(151 On May 27, 1988 it was determined that a Control Room Emergency Filtration System actuation which occurred on May 20, 1988 was reportable per 10CFR50.73.
                                                                        ~;
The inadvertent start of Control Room Emergency Filtration System Fan WN-FN-54B was the failure of Plant Instrument and Control (I 8 C)Technicians to reset the trip logic (due to an inadequate procedure) during the performance of a Reactor Building Exhaust Plenum Radiation Monitor (REA-RIS-609B and D)Response Time Test.The immediate cause of this event was the failure to reset the Balance of Plant Relay Cabinet (RC-2), Division II, trip circuitry due to an.'inadequate procedure.
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The root cause of the event is personnel error during the procedure revision and review process.A previously approved procedure deviation, which added steps to reset a subchannel half-trip condition prior to continuing with the procedure; was not incorporated during the two-year periodic review and revision process for the procedure.
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After verification that no actual initiating condition existed, the trip condition was reset and the system was returned to normal lineup.Further corrective actions include 1)adding the requirement to the procedure that the WN trip circuitry be reset, and 2)modifying the Periodic Procedure Revision Form to include verification that deviations have been incorporated.
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This event posed no threat to the health and safety of.either the public or Plant personnel.
RECIPIENT        COPIES          RECIPIENT                   COPIES ID CODE/NAME       LTTR ENCL    ID  CODE/NAME                LTTR ENCL PD5 LA               1    1    PD5 PD                          1    1              A SAMWORTH, R           1    1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON         1    1    ACRS MOELLER                    2    2 AEOD/DOA             1    1    AEOD/DSP/NAS                    1    1 AEOD/DSP/ROAB         2    2    AEOD/DSP/TPAB                  1    1 ARM/DCTS/DAB         1    1    DEDRO                          1    1 NRR/DEST/ADS 7E       1    0    NRR/DEST/CEB 8H                1    1 NRR/DEST/ESB 8D       1    1    NRR/DEST/ICSB 7                1    1 NRR/DEST/MEB 9H       1    1    NRR/DEST/MTB 9H                1    1 NRR/DEST/PSB 8D       1    1    NRR/DEST/RSB 8E                1    1 NRR/DEST/SGB 8D      1    1    NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10                1    1 NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10       1    1    NRR/DOEA/EAB 11                1    1 NRR DREP/RAB 10       1    1    NRR/DREP/RPB 10                2    2
8807070064 880627 I+~PDR ADOCK 05000397 8 PDC.((NRC Form 358 NRC Farm 35SA 15431 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILERI TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPAOVEO OMB NO, 3)50WIOA EXPIRES: S/31/dd FACILI'TY NAME 111 OOCKET NUMSER 12)LER NUMSER Id)yg':5 sEovENTIAL NUMaeo~..z>IIEvrsIoN.:)N N VM e II PAOE IS)Washington Nucl ear Pl ant-Uni t 2 p 5 p p p 3 9 7 8 8 TExT/5'ore<<ace ir rtpu/rerL u>>a/raoa'M/P//IC%%drm 3%A 5/I I 7)019 0 0 0 2 oF 0 4 Plant Conditions a)Power Level-0%b)Plant Mode-5 (Refueling)
        ~N   DR 'S/ IB 9A     1    1    NUDOCS-ABSTRACT                1    1
Event Descri tion On May 27, 1988 it was determined that a Control Room Emergency Filtration System actuation which occurred on May 20, 1988 was reportable per 10CFR50.73.
        ~REG F           02     1    1    RES TELFORD,Z                  1    1 RES/DE/EIB RGN5-: FILE   '1     1 1
The inadvertent start of Control Room Emergency Filtration System Fan WN-FN-54B was the result of a failure to reset the trip logic during the performance of Plant Procedure (PPh1)7.4.3.2.3.24,"Secondary Containment Isolation on Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation High (Channels B and D)-Response Time Test".The procedure provides instructions for performance of a Response Time Test of Reactor Building Exhaust Plenum Radiation Monitors REA-RIS-609B and REA-RIS-609D to demonstrate time response of the logic within the Secondary Containment Isolation System.Plant Instrument and Control (IEC)Technicians had completed the installation of test equipment=for REA-RIS-609B, which caused a half-trip in Balance of Plant Relay Cabinet (RC-2), Division II.However, the procedure did not require personnel to reset this half-trip prior to placing REA-RIS-609D in a test condition.
1 1
Because the circuitry was not reset, there was a half-trip condition in existence for subchannel B.(To clear the trip conditions for Control Room Ventilation, personnel must reset WN Reset Pushbuttons 3 BX and 3BY.)As a result, when the I8C Technicians disconnected the sensor input cable to REA-RIS-609D, a second half-trip condition was introduced in RC-2 (subchannel D)which caused a full trip of the WN Start Logic and, by design, WN-FN-54B automatically started.It should be noted that the I8C Technicians performed each step of the process as it was described in the procedure.
RES/DRPS DEPY                  1    .1 EXTERNAL: EG&G WILLIAMS,S       4    4    FORD BLDG HOY,A                1    1 H ST LOBBY WARD       1     1   LPDR                            1     1 NRC PDR              1     1   NSIC HARRIS,J                  1     1 NSIC MAYS,G          1     1 j
The immediate cause of this event was the failure to reset the RC-2 trip circuitry due to an inadequate procedure.
A TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR      45  ENCL        44
The root cause of this event is personnel error during the procedure revision and review process..A procedure deviation had previously been approved which added steps to reset the subchannel half-trip condition prior to proceeding to the opposite channel.However, this deviation was not incorporated into the current revision during the two-year periodic review and update process.Plant Instrument and Control and Plant Administration personnel collectively failed to ensure that the deviation was incorporated.
 
This event would not have occurred if the deviation had been included during the procedure revision process.Immediate Corrective Action After verification that no actual initiating condition existed, the trip condition was reset and the Control Room Emergency Filtration System was returned to normal lineup.Nrlc so/IM 3aaA 15431<<U.S.OPO:1055-0.524 535/Sd5 NRC form 3SSA (883)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION AffROVED OMB NO.3(50WIOS EXPIRES: 8/31/88 f ACILI'TY NAME (I)DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (5)~AQE (3)Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TEXT/4 more Recce IB RR)end, ore aSS(iane/HRC Form 3//SAY/(IT)o s o o o 3 9 7 YEAR 2'/8 8 SEQUENTIAL
NRC Form 368                                                                                                                                  V.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (0 83)
?Ar REVISION NUMSER'3+NUMBER 01 9-00 030F 0 4 Further Evaluation and Corrective Action A.Further Evaluation l.The event was not considered to be reportable at the time of occurrence because a planned full actuation would have occurred later in the procedure and, therefore, it was considered to be a preplanned sequence and no four-hour or 30 day reports were necessary.
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150410(
However, upon later review (May 27, 1988)it was determined that since the actuation occurred prior to the expected step.in the procedure, the event was subsequently determined to be reportable.
EXPIRES: 8/31/88 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
2.Since the time-frame that the deviation was written (1986), the procedure deviation process has been changed such that the affected pages are now removed from the procedure and the marked up pages are integrated in place of those pages.It is possible that the deviation would have been incorporated into the procedure had it been processed under the current program.B.Further Corrective Action 1.Plant Procedure 7.'4.3.2.3.24 has been deviated to require that the WMA trip circuitry be reset prior to continuing with the procedure.
FACILITY NAME HI                                                                                                                    DOCKET NUMBER l21                              PAGE 3i Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit                                        2                                                          0  5  0    0    0    397              1    OFO      4
2.The Periodic Procedure Revision Form will be modified toinclude verification that an outstanding.procedure deviation has been incorporated.
""'"'Control                Room    Emergency                F>    tr at>on ystem ctuation                    ur>ng              est>ng        ue    to Inadequate Procedure              Personnel                Error EVENT DATE (5)                      LER NUMBER (61                          REPORT DATE (71                        OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED IBI MONTH      DAY      YEAR      YEAR    o  c'r  ssar/BNTIAL fr<2 RsvrsroN MONTH              OAY  YEAR            FACI LITY NA M ES                  DOCKET NUMBER(3)
3.A letter will be issued to appropriate Plant personnel which explains the modification to the Periodic Procedure Revision, Form and the reason for the change.Safety Si nificance There is no safety significance associated with this event in that there was no actual initiating condition which would have caused the system to actuate, and all equipment operated correctly to place the Control Room Ventilation System in an isolation condition.
C?P.         NUMBER    rynp Nr/MBSR 0    5    0      0      0 052            0   88 88                        01        9      0    00 627                  8 8                                                 0    5    0    0      0 OPERATING THIS REPORT Is sUBMITTED pURSUANT To THE REGUIREMENTs oF 10 cFR ()r Icntcsr ont or mort of rnt foriowinp/            Ill)
Accordingly, this event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or Plant personnel.
MODE (8)                                                                                                                                              73.7((B) 5       20.402(BI                                  20.405(c)                        50.73(o l(21(iv)
Similar Events 84-017, 84-018, 85-027, 85-036 and 87-009 NRC SORM SSSA (883)RU 8 OPO 1888<HIES 538/455 NRC Form SEEA 1883)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT{LER)TEXT CONTINUATION US.NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMS NO.3150M)04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME Ill DOCKET NUMSER (21 YEAR LER NUMSER PEI SEQUENTIAL NUM ER IIEYIEIQN NUM E II~AOE)3)Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TEXT/I/moro E/woo/o/or/roko/Moo~H/IC%%dnn 3/ISA 3/(IT)0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 8 8 019 00 04'"0 EI IS Information Text Reference EIIS Reference System Component Control Room Emergency Filtration System WMA-FN-548 REA-RIS-609A REA-RIS-6098 VH VH VA VA Fan 45 45 NRC SQRM EEEA IS 43)o U.S/SPO:)8884428 838/Edd h.WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O.Box 968~3000 George Washington Way~Richland, Washington 99352 Docket No.50-397 June 27, 1988 Document Control Desk U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555  
POWE R                          20,405(sill l(0                             60.35(c)(ll                      50.73(el(2)(v)                              73.7((cl LEYEL 0 0       0       20.405 (o) ll I )ii)                       50.38(c)    (21                  50.73(e l(2) (vii)                           OTHER ISptcify in Aosrrtcr INIOVV end in Ttvr, HRC FOrm 20,405 (~ IllI (iii1                    50.7 3( ~ I (2 Hi)               50.73( ~ l(2)(viii)(Al                      366AI 20.405( ~ I (1) I I v)                      50,73(e) (2) (ii)               50.73( ~ l(21(viiil(81 20.405  I ~ I (1 l(vI                      50.73(o l(21(iiil                50.73 (~ I (2)(o I LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME                                                                                                                                                  TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE J.D. Arbuckle                Com          liance        En    ineer                                                            50 937                    7      -21             15 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (131 MANUFAC.          REPORTABLE                                                              MANUFAC.         REPORTABLE CAUSE    SYSTEM      COMPONENT                                                                    CAUSE SYSTEM  COMPONENT TI/REA          TO NPADS    Pnvvp()jxTBF@
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TURER          TO NPRDS
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (141                                                                          MONTH            DAY    YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (151 YES Irf ytL comprtrt EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE/                                          NO ABSTRACT ILimrr ro /400 sotcts, /e., tpprovimtrtiy /if/ten sinprt sotto ryptwrirrtn /inn/ (151 On      May      27,      1988        it          was    determined              that a Control Room Emergency Filtration System The inadvertent actuation which occurred                                  on May 20,            1988 was reportable per 10CFR50.73.
start of Control Room Emergency Filtration System Fan WN-FN-54B was the failure of Plant Instrument and Control ( I 8 C ) Technicians to reset the trip logic (due to an inadequate procedure) during the performance of a Reactor Building Exhaust Plenum Radiation Monitor (REA-RIS-609B and D) Response Time Test.
The immediate                  cause of this event was the failure to reset the Balance of Plant Relay Cabinet          (RC-2), Division II, trip circuitry due to an.'inadequate procedure.                                                                                   The root cause of the event is personnel error during the procedure revision and review process.
A previously approved                                    procedure deviation, which added steps to reset a subchannel half-trip condition prior to continuing with the procedure; was not incorporated during the two-year periodic review and revision process for the procedure.
After verification that                                  no  actual        initiating condition existed,                              the    trip condition                      was reset        and    the system was returned to normal lineup. Further corrective actions include
: 1) adding the requirement to the procedure that the WN trip circuitry be reset, and 2) modifying the Periodic Procedure Revision Form to include verification that deviations have been incorporated.
This event posed no threat to the health                                                          and   safety of .either the public or Plant personnel.
8807070064 880627                                                                                                                  I+~
PDR          ADOCK 05000397 8                                            PDC                                                                                              .((
NRC Form 358
 
NRC Farm 35SA                                                                                                              U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION 15431 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILERI TEXT CONTINUATION                                             APPAOVEO OMB NO, 3)50WIOA EXPIRES: S/31/dd FACILI'TY NAME 111                                                               OOCKET NUMSER 12)             LER NUMSER Id)                        PAOE IS) yg':5 sEovENTIAL ~..z>N IIEvrsIoN NUMaeo    .:) N VM e II Washington Nucl ear Pl ant                             -   Uni   t 2     p   5   p p   p 3 9 7 8 8       019                0 0      0 2 oF 0 4 TExT /5'ore <<ace ir rtpu/rerL u>> a/raoa'M/ P//IC %%drm 3%A 5/ II 7)
Plant Conditions a)           Power Level                 -   0%
b)           Plant         Mode           -   5     (Refueling)
Event Descri               tion On   May 27,             1988       it     was       determined         that     a Control   Room Emergency         Filtration             System actuation which occurred on May 20, 1988 was reportable per 10CFR50.73.                                                                                 The inadvertent start of Control Room Emergency Filtration System Fan WN-FN-54B was the result of a failure to reset the trip logic during the performance of Plant Procedure (PPh1)     7.4.3.2.3.24, "Secondary Containment Isolation on Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation High (Channels B and D) - Response Time Test". The procedure provides instructions for performance of a Response Time Test of Reactor Building Exhaust Plenum Radiation Monitors REA-RIS-609B and REA-RIS-609D to demonstrate time response of the logic within the Secondary Containment Isolation System.
Plant Instrument                     and Control                 ( IEC) Technicians had completed the installation of test equipment =for REA-RIS-609B,                                         which caused a half-trip in Balance of Plant Relay Cabinet (RC-2), Division                                   II.         However, the procedure did not require personnel to reset this               half-trip prior to placing REA-RIS-609D in a test condition. Because the circuitry was not reset, there was a half-trip condition in existence for subchannel B. (To clear the trip conditions for Control Room Ventilation, personnel must reset WN Reset Pushbuttons                             3 BX and           3BY.)
As     a     result,             when         the       I8C         Technicians       disconnected the sensor input cable to REA-RIS-609D,                 a     second           half-trip condition                 was introduced in RC-2 (subchannel                             D) which caused                   a       full         trip of the WN Start Logic and, by design, WN-FN-54B automatically started.                                 It should be noted that the I8C Technicians performed each step of the process as                               it   was described in the procedure.
The immediate cause                           of this event               was   the   failure to reset the         RC-2       trip circuitry due to an inadequate                               procedure.           The root cause of this event is personnel error during the procedure revision and review process.. A procedure deviation had previously been approved which added steps to reset the subchannel half-trip condition prior to proceeding to the opposite channel. However, this deviation was not incorporated into the current revision during the two-year periodic review and update process.                         Plant Instrument and Control and Plant Administration personnel collectively failed to                               ensure         that the deviation         was incorporated.           This event would not have occurred process.
if the           deviation         had   been   included during the procedure revision Immediate Corrective Action After verification that                                 no       actual   initiating condition existed,               the trip condition was     reset         and       the Control                   Room     Emergency     Filtration System was           returned to normal lineup.
Nrlc so/IM 3aaA                                                                                                                         <<U.S.OPO:1055-0.524 535/Sd5 15431
 
NRC   form 3SSA                                                                                                         U.S. NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION (883)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION                                         AffROVED OMB NO. 3(50WIOS EXPIRES: 8/31/88 fACILI'TYNAME (I)                                                             DOCKET NUMBER (2)               LER NUMBER (5)                     ~ AQE (3)
SEQUENTIAL ?Ar REVISION YEAR 2'/  NUMSER    '3+ NUMBER Washington Nuclear Plant                              - Unit       2     o  s  o  o  o  3 9  7 8 8      01    9    00 030F                    0 4 TEXT /4 more Recce IB RR)end, ore aSS(iane/ HRC Form 3//SAY/ ( IT)
Further Evaluation                        and     Corrective Action A.             Further Evaluation
: l.         The       event       was       not considered to be reportable at the time of occurrence because             a     planned full actuation would have occurred later in the procedure and, therefore,                           it   was considered to be a preplanned sequence and no four-hour or 30 day reports were necessary.                                       However, upon later review (May 27, 1988)                       it was determined that since the actuation occurred prior to the expected step. in the procedure, the event was subsequently determined to be reportable.
: 2.         Since the time-frame that the deviation was written (1986), the procedure deviation process has been changed such that the affected pages are now removed from the procedure and the marked up pages are integrated in place of those pages.                         It is possible that the deviation would have been incorporated into the procedure had                                 it been processed under the current program.
B.             Further Corrective Action
: 1.         Plant Procedure                       7.'4.3.2.3.24 has been deviated to require that the                                 WMA trip circuitry                   be   reset prior to continuing with the procedure.
: 2.         The         Periodic               Procedure       Revision Form will be modified to include verification                     that       an     outstanding .procedure             deviation has                   been incorporated.
: 3.         A   letter will be issued to appropriate Plant personnel which explains the modification to the Periodic Procedure Revision, Form and the reason for the change.
Safety Si nificance There         is     no       safety significance associated                             with this event in that there                       was       no actual         initiating condition                             which would have caused the system to actuate, and all equipment             operated correctly to place the Control Room Ventilation System in an isolation             condition. Accordingly, this event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or Plant personnel.
Similar Events 84-017, 84-018, 85-027, 85-036 and 87-009 NRC SORM SSSA                                                                                                                         RU 8 OPO 1888<HIES 538/455 (883)
 
NRC Form SEEA                                                                                                   US. NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION 1883)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) TEXT CONTINUATION                                   APPROVED OMS NO. 3150M)04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME Ill                                                     DOCKET NUMSER (21               LER NUMSER PEI                     ~ AOE )3)
YEAR  SEQUENTIAL       IIEYIEIQN NUM ER         NUM E II Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit TEXT /I/moro E/woo /o /or/roko/ Moo ~ H/IC %%dnn 3/ISA 3/ (IT) 2      0 5   0 0   0 3 9   7 8 8     019             00         04'"0 EI IS Information Text Reference                                                   EIIS Reference System     Component Control         Room         Emergency       Filtration       System                     VH WMA-FN-548                                                                                 VH            Fan REA-RIS-609A                                                                               VA              45 REA-RIS-6098                                                                               VA             45 NRC SQRM EEEA                                                                                                                 o U.S/SPO:)8884428 838/Edd IS 43)
 
h.
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99352 Docket No. 50-397 June 27, 1988 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
NUCLEAR PLANT NO.2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.88-019  
NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 88-019
 
==Dear  Sir:==


==Dear Sir:==
Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 88-019 for the WNP-2 Plant.
Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.88-019 for the WNP-2 Plant.This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence'.
This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence'.
Very truly yours, C.M.Powers (M/D 927M)WNP-2 Plant Manager CMP:lg  
Very truly yours, C.M. Powers   (M/D 927M)
WNP-2 Plant Manager CMP:lg


==Enclosure:==
==Enclosure:==


Licensee Event Report No.88-019 cc: Mr.John B.Martin, NRC-Region V Mr.C.J.Bosted, NRC Site (M/D 901A)INPO Records Center-Atlanta, GA Ms.Dottie Sherman, ANI Mr.D.L.Williams, BPA (M/D 399)}}
Licensee Event Report No. 88-019 cc:   Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V Mr. C.J . Bosted, NRC Site (M/D 901A)
INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA Ms. Dottie Sherman,   ANI Mr. D.L. Williams,   BPA (M/D   399)}}

Latest revision as of 14:57, 29 October 2019

LER 88-019-00:on 880527,control Room Emergency Filtration Sys Actuated on 880520.Caused by Failure to Reset balance- of-plant Relay Cabinet Due to Inadequate Procedure.Trip Condition reset.W/880627 Ltr
ML17284A413
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 06/27/1988
From: Arbuckle J, Powers C
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
LER-88-019, LER-88-19, NUDOCS 8807070064
Download: ML17284A413 (6)


Text

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'C CEIZRATED DI RJBUTION DEMONSTR TJON SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8807070064 DOC.DATE: 88/06/27 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ARBUCKLE,J.D. Washington Public Power Supply System POWERS,C.M. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 88-019-00:on 880527,control room emergency filtration sys actuation during testing due to inadequate procedure.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR NOTES:

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ENCL TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpl, etc.

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RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 A SAMWORTH, R 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/NAS 1 1 AEOD/DSP/ROAB 2 2 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 ARM/DCTS/DAB 1 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADS 7E 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 8H 1 1 NRR/DEST/ESB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 8E 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 1 1 NRR DREP/RAB 10 1 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 2 2

~N DR 'S/ IB 9A 1 1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1

~REG F 02 1 1 RES TELFORD,Z 1 1 RES/DE/EIB RGN5-: FILE '1 1 1

1 1

RES/DRPS DEPY 1 .1 EXTERNAL: EG&G WILLIAMS,S 4 4 FORD BLDG HOY,A 1 1 H ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC HARRIS,J 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 j

A TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 45 ENCL 44

NRC Form 368 V.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (0 83)

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150410(

EXPIRES: 8/31/88 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME HI DOCKET NUMBER l21 PAGE 3i Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 397 1 OFO 4

""'"'Control Room Emergency F> tr at>on ystem ctuation ur>ng est>ng ue to Inadequate Procedure Personnel Error EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (61 REPORT DATE (71 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED IBI MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR o c'r ssar/BNTIAL fr<2 RsvrsroN MONTH OAY YEAR FACI LITY NA M ES DOCKET NUMBER(3)

C?P. NUMBER rynp Nr/MBSR 0 5 0 0 0 052 0 88 88 01 9 0 00 627 8 8 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATING THIS REPORT Is sUBMITTED pURSUANT To THE REGUIREMENTs oF 10 cFR ()r Icntcsr ont or mort of rnt foriowinp/ Ill)

MODE (8) 73.7((B) 5 20.402(BI 20.405(c) 50.73(o l(21(iv)

POWE R 20,405(sill l(0 60.35(c)(ll 50.73(el(2)(v) 73.7((cl LEYEL 0 0 0 20.405 (o) ll I )ii) 50.38(c) (21 50.73(e l(2) (vii) OTHER ISptcify in Aosrrtcr INIOVV end in Ttvr, HRC FOrm 20,405 (~ IllI (iii1 50.7 3( ~ I (2 Hi) 50.73( ~ l(2)(viii)(Al 366AI 20.405( ~ I (1) I I v) 50,73(e) (2) (ii) 50.73( ~ l(21(viiil(81 20.405 I ~ I (1 l(vI 50.73(o l(21(iiil 50.73 (~ I (2)(o I LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE J.D. Arbuckle Com liance En ineer 50 937 7 -21 15 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (131 MANUFAC. REPORTABLE MANUFAC. REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TI/REA TO NPADS Pnvvp()jxTBF@

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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (141 MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (151 YES Irf ytL comprtrt EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE/ NO ABSTRACT ILimrr ro /400 sotcts, /e., tpprovimtrtiy /if/ten sinprt sotto ryptwrirrtn /inn/ (151 On May 27, 1988 it was determined that a Control Room Emergency Filtration System The inadvertent actuation which occurred on May 20, 1988 was reportable per 10CFR50.73.

start of Control Room Emergency Filtration System Fan WN-FN-54B was the failure of Plant Instrument and Control ( I 8 C ) Technicians to reset the trip logic (due to an inadequate procedure) during the performance of a Reactor Building Exhaust Plenum Radiation Monitor (REA-RIS-609B and D) Response Time Test.

The immediate cause of this event was the failure to reset the Balance of Plant Relay Cabinet (RC-2), Division II, trip circuitry due to an.'inadequate procedure. The root cause of the event is personnel error during the procedure revision and review process.

A previously approved procedure deviation, which added steps to reset a subchannel half-trip condition prior to continuing with the procedure; was not incorporated during the two-year periodic review and revision process for the procedure.

After verification that no actual initiating condition existed, the trip condition was reset and the system was returned to normal lineup. Further corrective actions include

1) adding the requirement to the procedure that the WN trip circuitry be reset, and 2) modifying the Periodic Procedure Revision Form to include verification that deviations have been incorporated.

This event posed no threat to the health and safety of .either the public or Plant personnel.

8807070064 880627 I+~

PDR ADOCK 05000397 8 PDC .((

NRC Form 358

NRC Farm 35SA U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION 15431 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILERI TEXT CONTINUATION APPAOVEO OMB NO, 3)50WIOA EXPIRES: S/31/dd FACILI'TY NAME 111 OOCKET NUMSER 12) LER NUMSER Id) PAOE IS) yg':5 sEovENTIAL ~..z>N IIEvrsIoN NUMaeo .:) N VM e II Washington Nucl ear Pl ant - Uni t 2 p 5 p p p 3 9 7 8 8 019 0 0 0 2 oF 0 4 TExT /5'ore <<ace ir rtpu/rerL u>> a/raoa'M/ P//IC %%drm 3%A 5/ II 7)

Plant Conditions a) Power Level - 0%

b) Plant Mode - 5 (Refueling)

Event Descri tion On May 27, 1988 it was determined that a Control Room Emergency Filtration System actuation which occurred on May 20, 1988 was reportable per 10CFR50.73. The inadvertent start of Control Room Emergency Filtration System Fan WN-FN-54B was the result of a failure to reset the trip logic during the performance of Plant Procedure (PPh1) 7.4.3.2.3.24, "Secondary Containment Isolation on Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation High (Channels B and D) - Response Time Test". The procedure provides instructions for performance of a Response Time Test of Reactor Building Exhaust Plenum Radiation Monitors REA-RIS-609B and REA-RIS-609D to demonstrate time response of the logic within the Secondary Containment Isolation System.

Plant Instrument and Control ( IEC) Technicians had completed the installation of test equipment =for REA-RIS-609B, which caused a half-trip in Balance of Plant Relay Cabinet (RC-2), Division II. However, the procedure did not require personnel to reset this half-trip prior to placing REA-RIS-609D in a test condition. Because the circuitry was not reset, there was a half-trip condition in existence for subchannel B. (To clear the trip conditions for Control Room Ventilation, personnel must reset WN Reset Pushbuttons 3 BX and 3BY.)

As a result, when the I8C Technicians disconnected the sensor input cable to REA-RIS-609D, a second half-trip condition was introduced in RC-2 (subchannel D) which caused a full trip of the WN Start Logic and, by design, WN-FN-54B automatically started. It should be noted that the I8C Technicians performed each step of the process as it was described in the procedure.

The immediate cause of this event was the failure to reset the RC-2 trip circuitry due to an inadequate procedure. The root cause of this event is personnel error during the procedure revision and review process.. A procedure deviation had previously been approved which added steps to reset the subchannel half-trip condition prior to proceeding to the opposite channel. However, this deviation was not incorporated into the current revision during the two-year periodic review and update process. Plant Instrument and Control and Plant Administration personnel collectively failed to ensure that the deviation was incorporated. This event would not have occurred process.

if the deviation had been included during the procedure revision Immediate Corrective Action After verification that no actual initiating condition existed, the trip condition was reset and the Control Room Emergency Filtration System was returned to normal lineup.

Nrlc so/IM 3aaA <<U.S.OPO:1055-0.524 535/Sd5 15431

NRC form 3SSA U.S. NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION (883)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION AffROVED OMB NO. 3(50WIOS EXPIRES: 8/31/88 fACILI'TYNAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (5) ~ AQE (3)

SEQUENTIAL ?Ar REVISION YEAR 2'/ NUMSER '3+ NUMBER Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 o s o o o 3 9 7 8 8 01 9 00 030F 0 4 TEXT /4 more Recce IB RR)end, ore aSS(iane/ HRC Form 3//SAY/ ( IT)

Further Evaluation and Corrective Action A. Further Evaluation

l. The event was not considered to be reportable at the time of occurrence because a planned full actuation would have occurred later in the procedure and, therefore, it was considered to be a preplanned sequence and no four-hour or 30 day reports were necessary. However, upon later review (May 27, 1988) it was determined that since the actuation occurred prior to the expected step. in the procedure, the event was subsequently determined to be reportable.
2. Since the time-frame that the deviation was written (1986), the procedure deviation process has been changed such that the affected pages are now removed from the procedure and the marked up pages are integrated in place of those pages. It is possible that the deviation would have been incorporated into the procedure had it been processed under the current program.

B. Further Corrective Action

1. Plant Procedure 7.'4.3.2.3.24 has been deviated to require that the WMA trip circuitry be reset prior to continuing with the procedure.
2. The Periodic Procedure Revision Form will be modified to include verification that an outstanding .procedure deviation has been incorporated.
3. A letter will be issued to appropriate Plant personnel which explains the modification to the Periodic Procedure Revision, Form and the reason for the change.

Safety Si nificance There is no safety significance associated with this event in that there was no actual initiating condition which would have caused the system to actuate, and all equipment operated correctly to place the Control Room Ventilation System in an isolation condition. Accordingly, this event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or Plant personnel.

Similar Events84-017, 84-018,85-027, 85-036 and 87-009 NRC SORM SSSA RU 8 OPO 1888<HIES 538/455 (883)

NRC Form SEEA US. NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION 1883)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMS NO. 3150M)04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME Ill DOCKET NUMSER (21 LER NUMSER PEI ~ AOE )3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL IIEYIEIQN NUM ER NUM E II Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit TEXT /I/moro E/woo /o /or/roko/ Moo ~ H/IC %%dnn 3/ISA 3/ (IT) 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 8 8 019 00 04'"0 EI IS Information Text Reference EIIS Reference System Component Control Room Emergency Filtration System VH WMA-FN-548 VH Fan REA-RIS-609A VA 45 REA-RIS-6098 VA 45 NRC SQRM EEEA o U.S/SPO:)8884428 838/Edd IS 43)

h.

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99352 Docket No. 50-397 June 27, 1988 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.88-019

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.88-019 for the WNP-2 Plant.

This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence'.

Very truly yours, C.M. Powers (M/D 927M)

WNP-2 Plant Manager CMP:lg

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report No.88-019 cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V Mr. C.J . Bosted, NRC Site (M/D 901A)

INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI Mr. D.L. Williams, BPA (M/D 399)