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{{#Wiki_filter:Ac CE1ZRA.TED D1SDGBUTI0 Qi, REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:8906260144 DOC.DATE: 89/06/16 NOTARIZED:
{{#Wiki_filter:Ac CE1ZRA.TED           D1SDGBUTI0 Qi, REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
NO DOCKET FACXL:50-397 WPPSS.Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ARBUCKLE,J.D.
ACCESSION NBR:8906260144           DOC.DATE: 89/06/16       NOTARIZED: NO             DOCKET FACXL:50-397     WPPSS. Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public             Powe   05000397 AUTH. NAME           AUTHOR AFFILIATION ARBUCKLE,J.D.         Washington Public Power Supply System POWERS,C.M.           Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME           RECIPIENT AFFILIATION                                                   R I
Washington Public Power Supply System POWERS,C.M.
Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
LER 89-019-00:on 890524,RHR sys shutdown cooling containment isolation valve (ESF)closure due to personnel error.W/8" ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Li'censee Event Report (LER),.Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES: R I D S.RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 LA SAMWORTH,R INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON ACRS WYLXE AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DEST/ADE 8H NRR/DEST/CEB 8H NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H~NRR/DEST/RSB 8E NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT
LER     89-019-00:on 890524,RHR sys shutdown cooling containment isolation valve (ESF) closure due to personnel error.
~RES/DSIR/EIB RGN5 FILE 01 EXTERNAL EG&G WILLIAMS g S L ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MURPHY,G.A COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1-1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1'1~1 1 1 1 4 4 1,1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5.PD ACRS MOELLER AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DSP IRM/DCTS/DAB NRR/DEST/ADS 7E NRR/DEST/ESB 8D NRR/DEST/MEB 9H NRR/DEST/PSB 8D NRR/DEST/SGB 8D NRR/DLPQ/PEB 10 NRR/M RPB 10 02 PRAB FORD BLDG HOY g A LPDR NSIC MAYS,G COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1~N<pg(y(gag rg DOZE K)ALL''RIDS" RECIPZEPXS:
W/8   "
PZZASE HELP US 10 REHKR RAPZE!CXRZACZ'IHE DOQIME&#xc3;2 CONTROL DESK, RXN P1-37 (EZZ.20079)m ELIMINATE YOUR KLME PKN DI81%GSOTXOW LISTS B3R DOCUMFNTS YOU DOHiT NEEDf D D 8 I'-S h D D 8 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 43 ENCL 42 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O.Box 968~3000 George Washington Way~Richland, Washington 99352 Docket No.50-397 June 16, 1989 Document Control Desk U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555  
ltr.       D S .
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T         COPIES RECEIVED:LTR           ENCL       SIZE:
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Li'censee Event Report (LER),. Incident Rpt, etc.
NOTES:
RECIPIENT            COPIES            RECIPIENT           COPIES ID  CODE/NAME        LTTR ENCL        ID CODE/NAME         LTTR ENCL            D PD5 LA                   1    1      PD5. PD                  1      1 SAMWORTH,R               1    1                                                    D INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON               1    1      ACRS MOELLER            2      2 ACRS WYLXE               1    1      AEOD/DOA                1      1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB             1    1      AEOD/ROAB/DSP            2      2 DEDRO                     1    1      IRM/DCTS/DAB            1      1 NRR/DEST/ADE 8H           1    1      NRR/DEST/ADS    7E      1      0 NRR/DEST/CEB 8H           1    1      NRR/DEST/ESB    8D      1      1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 7           1-    1      NRR/DEST/MEB    9H      1      1 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H           1    1      NRR/DEST/PSB    8D      1      1
          ~
NRR/DEST/RSB 8E           1    1      NRR/DEST/SGB    8D      1      1 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10           1    1      NRR/DLPQ/PEB    10      1      1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11           1    1      NRR/M      RPB 10      2      2 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT           1  '1                        02      1      1
        ~
RES/DSIR/EIB           ~
1    1                PRAB          1      1  I RGN5   FILE 01           1    1                                                    8 EXTERNAL     EG&G WILLIAMSg S L ST LOBBY   WARD       1,1 4     4     FORD BLDG HOY g A LPDR 1
1 1
1             I'-
NRC PDR                  1     1     NSIC MAYS,G              1     1
          ~ NSIC MURPHY,G.A N<   pg(y(gag rg 1    1 S
h D
D DOZE K) ALL ''RIDS" RECIPZEPXS:
8 PZZASE HELP US 10 REHKR RAPZE!     CXRZACZ 'IHE DOQIME&#xc3;2 CONTROL DESK, RXN P1-37 (EZZ. 20079)   m   ELIMINATE YOUR KLME PKN DI81%GSOTXOW LISTS B3R DOCUMFNTS YOU DOHiT NEEDf FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR             43   ENCL     42
 
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99352 Docket No. 50-397 June 16, 1989 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
NUCLEAR PLANT NO.2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.89-019  
NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 89-019


==Dear Sir:==
==Dear Sir:==
Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report'.No.89-019 for the WNP-2 Plant.This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.
 
Very truly yours, C.M.P rs (M/D 927M)WNP-2 ant Manager CMP:lg  
Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report '.No. 89-019 for the WNP-2 Plant.
This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.
Very truly yours, C.M. P   rs (M/D 927M)
WNP-2     ant Manager CMP:lg


==Enclosure:==
==Enclosure:==


Licensee Event Report No.89-019 cc: Mr.John B.Martin,.NRC
Licensee Event Report No. 89-019 cc:   Mr. John B. Martin,.NRC - Region V Mr. C.J. Bosted, NRC Site (M/D 901A)
-Region V Mr.C.J.Bosted, NRC Site (M/D 901A)INPO Records Center-Atlanta, GA Ms.Dottie Sherman, ANI Mr.D.L.Williams, BPA (M/D 399)8906260i44 890&i&PDR ADOCK 05000397 8 F'DC WpgP l)
INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI Mr. D.L. Williams,   BPA (M/D 399)
NAC Form 355 (94)3 I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATOAY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO.31504104 EXPIRES: 5/31/SS FACILITY NAME 0)Washin ton Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2)PAGE 3)0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 1 OFp 4>>TLE(4)Residua Heat Remova ystem S ut own Coo sng Containment Isolation Valve (En ineered Safety Feature)Closure Due to Personnel Error EVENT DATE (5)MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR LER NUMBER (5)SEGUSNTIAL NUMBER REPORT DATE (7)NUMBER MONTH OAY YEAR DOCKET NUMBERISI 0 5 0 0 0 FACILITY NAMES OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (SI 0 524 89 OPERATING MODE (SI 5 POWER LEVEL p p p 8 9 019 00 06 168 9 20.402(bl 20.405(~I (I I I i)20.405 (s l(l I (ii)20.405 (~I(I l(iii)20.405 (~I(l I(ivl 20.405(sl(l l(v)20.405(c)50.35(c)(1)50.35(cl(2) 50.73(x)(2)(il 50.73(s l(2)(ii)50.73(s))2)Bill LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)50,73(sl(2)(ivl 50.7 3(s I (2)(vl 50.73(s)(2)(vill 50,73(s I (2)(xiii)I A I 50.73(el(2)(v)iil(BI 50.73(~)(2)(x)THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE AEOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (I:/Checil one or more O/the/ollorvinPI (11 0 5 0 0 0 73.71(b)73.71(c)OTHER/Speci/y in Ahltrett oerovvenr/in Text, HRC Form 366AI NAME J.D.Arbuckle, Com liance En ineer TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 50 937 7-211 5 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE OESCRIBEO IN THIS REPORT (13l CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.TUREA REPORTABLE,'y'.>
WpgP 8906260i44 890&i&                                                           l PDR   ADOCK     05000397                                                     )
g.N.TO NPADS c: CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.TUAEA EPORTABLE TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPOAT EXPECTED (14)X NO YES II/yer, complete fXPfCTEO St/84/ISSIOH DATEI ABSTRACT/Limit to/400 rpscet, I.e..epproximetely A/teen Iinpleepece rypevvritren linn/(15)EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (I SI iWq@Eg%$&#xc3;vfst MONTH DAY YEAR On May 24, 1989 at 0642 hours, while in operational condition 5 with the reactor head removed, the reactor cavity flooded up and the fuel pool gates removed, the Inboard Residual Heat Removal (RHR)Shutdown Cooling Supply Valve (RHR-V-9)automatically isolated when a Contractor Maintenance Electrician lifted a wire de-energizing the valve control relay.Closure of RHR-V-9 is interlocked with the RHR Shutdown Cooling pumps so that RHR-P-2A tripped on valve closure.Valve RHR-V-9 is a Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (Containment Isolation)
8                     F'DC
Valve.By 0650 hours the wire had been reterminated, RHR-V-9 opened, RHR-P-2A restarted and shutdown cooling restored.The root cause of the event was personnel error in that a Contractor Maintenance Electrician exceeded the authorized work by lifting a lead not listed within the work package documents.
 
A properly reviewed and authorized change should have been obtained from the Field Engineer in charge of the work prior to proceeding.
NAC Form 355                                                                                                                                         U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATOAY COMMISSION (94)3 I APPROVED OMB NO. 31504104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)                                                          EXPIRES: 5/31/SS FACILITY NAME 0)                                                                                                                         DOCKET NUMBER (2)                           PAGE 3)
Corrective actions consisted of 1)counselling the individual involved, 2)training appropriate contractor personnel on applicable Plant procedures, and 3)performing an assessment of RHR Shutdown Cooling isolations which have occurred.There is no safety significance associated with this event.At the time of the isolation reactor water level was greater than 22 feet above the reactor vessel flange which provides a large heat sink for core cooling and adequate time to'estore RHR Shutdown Cooling, or initiate an alternate decay heat removal method.In this event, shutdown cooling was restor ed within eight minutes.NRC Form 355 (94)3)
Washin          ton Nuclear Plant - Unit                              2                                                                  0     5   0   0   0 3       9 7     1   OFp     4
NRRPorm 388A IB4LI(jM ILITY NAME (tl LICENSEE EV REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINUATI OOCKET NUMBER (31 U.S.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMB NO.3150-0(04 EXPIRES: 8/31/BS PACE (3)(.ER NUMBER (81 Washington Nuclear Plant-.Unit 2 TE/rr/7///mare EPeae/4 mrtu/red, uee edr//r/rme/NRC Pamr 38//AS/(17l 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 YEAR Pgg 8 9 SEOUENTIAL NUMSeR 0 1 9-REVISION NuMSER 000 2 OF 0 4 Plant Conditions a)Power Level-OX b)Plant Mode-5 (Refueling)
>>TLE(4)Residua                 Heat Remova                     ystem S ut own Coo sng Containment Isolation Valve (En ineered Safety Feature) Closure Due to Personnel Error EVENT DATE (5)                     LER NUMBER (5)                         REPORT DATE (7)                           OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (SI MONTH       OAY      YEAR    YEAR            SEGUSNTIAL                                OAY     YEAR           FACILITYNAMES                            DOCKET NUMBERISI NUMBER          NUMBER MONTH 0   5   0   0   0 0       524 89                 8   9             019               00 06 168                         9                                                     0  5    0    0    0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE AEOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (I: /Checil one or more O/ the /ollorvinPI (11 OPERATING MODE (SI            5      20.402(bl                                                                                                                      73.71(b) 20.405(c)                          50,73(sl(2)(ivl POWER                            20.405( ~ I (I I I i)                    50.35(c) (1)                        50.7 3(s I (2)(vl                                73.71(c)
Event Descri tion On May 24, 1989 at 0642 hours the Inboard Residual Meat Removal (RMR)Shutdown Cooling Supply Valve (RMR-V-9)automatically isolated when a Contractor Maintenance Electrician lifted a wire which de-energized the valve control relay.Valve RMR-V-9 closure is interlocked with Shutdown Cooling RHR pumps (RHR-P-2A and RHR-P-2B)so that closure of RHR-V-9 tripped RHR-P-2A.Valve RHR-V-9 is a Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff (Containment Isolation)
LEVEL p      p p          20.405 (s l(lI (ii)                       50.35(cl(2)                         50.73(s) (2)(vill                                OTHER /Speci/y in Ahltrett oerovvenr/in Text, HRC Form 20.405 ( ~ I( I l(iii)                   50.73(x ) (2) (il                  50,73(s  I (2) ( xiii)I A I                    366AI 20.405 (I(l I(ivl                      50.73(s l(2)(ii)                    50.73(el(2) (v)iil(BI 20.405(sl(l l(v)                         50.73(s) )2) Bill                  50.73( ~ )(2)(x)
Valve.At the time of the event the Plant was in a shutdown condition for the annual maintenance and refueling outage.Also, RHR Loop A was operating in the Shutdown Cooling Mode.At the time of the event a Contractor Maintenance Electrician was working on a Plant Modification Record (PMR)for improving the Leak Detection System by upgrading signal processing and diagnostic capabilities.
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
The electrician was attempting to land a wire on a terminal behind the terminals associated with relay LD-RLY-K04B.
NAME                                                                                                                                                          TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE J.D. Arbuckle,                Com          liance        En  ineer                                                                    50 937                 7- 211                 5 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE OESCRIBEO IN THIS REPORT (13l CAUSE     SYSTEM       COMPONENT           MANUFAC.           REPORTABLE,'y'.>         g. N .                                           MANUFAC.        EPORTABLE TUREA            TO NPADS                           CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT c:                                                                    TUAEA         TO NPRDS iWq@Eg%$&#xc3;vfst SUPPLEMENTAL REPOAT EXPECTED (14)                                                                                 MONTH      DAY    YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (I SI YES II/ yer, complete fXPfCTEO St/84/ISSIOH         DATEI                   X        NO ABSTRACT /Limit to /400 rpscet, I.e.. epproximetely A/teen Iinpleepece rypevvritren   linn/ (15)
In order to gain access he(.lifted a wire to relay LD-RLY-K04B.
On       May     24, 1989           at     0642 hours,                 while in operational condition 5 with the reactor head removed,               the reactor                   cavity flooded                 up and the fuel pool gates removed, the Inboard Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling Supply Valve (RHR-V-9) automatically isolated when a Contractor Maintenance Electrician lifted a wire de-energizing the valve control relay. Closure of RHR-V-9 is interlocked with the RHR Shutdown Cooling pumps so that RHR-P-2A tripped on valve closure. Valve RHR-V-9 is a Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (Containment Isolation) Valve.                                                     By 0650 hours the wire had been reterminated, RHR-V-9 opened, RHR-P-2A restarted and shutdown cooling restored.
Relay LD-RLY-K04B is designed to open on RHR Area High temperature which could indicate a leak of high temperature primary coolant in the RHR equipment room.Lifting the wire caused the same result as an area high temperature actuation; the valve control relay is deenergized and RHR-V-9 closes.Immediate Corrective Action The lifted wire was immediately re-terminated.
The         root cause               of the event was personnel error in that a Contractor Maintenance Electrician                   exceeded the authorized work by lifting a lead not listed within the work package documents.                           A properly reviewed and authorized change should have been obtained from the Field Engineer in charge of the work prior to proceeding.                                                                                         Corrective actions consisted of 1) counselling the individual involved, 2) training appropriate contractor personnel on applicable Plant procedures, and 3) performing an assessment of RHR Shutdown Cooling isolations which have occurred.
By 0650 hours (eight minutes after the initiating event), Plant Operators had opened RHR-V-9, started RHR-P-2A and restored shutdown cooling.Further Evaluation and Corrective Action J 1 I I I A.Fur ther Evaluation 1.This event is reportabl e under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)as,"an event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF).N 2.There were no structures, systems or components that were inoperable at the start of this event that contributed to the event.3.The root cause of the event was personnel error in that the Contractor Maintenance Electrician performed work outside that authorized in the work package, and not in accordance with Plant procedures.
There         is no safety significance associated with this event. At the time of the isolation reactor water level was greater than 22 feet above the reactor vessel flange which provides a large heat sink for core cooling and adequate time to'estore RHR Shutdown Cooling, or initiate an alternate decay heat removal method.                                                                                   In this event, shutdown cooling was restor ed within eight minutes.
Plant procedures were not the cause of this event.NRC SORM 388A (043)~0.8.CPOr 1988 S20-S89/00010 NRQ Corm 3$8A (9~LICENSEE EV REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATI U.S.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO.3)60-0)08 EXPIRES: B/31/BB PA ILITY NAME ll)OOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (8)gg 88OUENTIAL j@S 48VISION NVM88A PACE (3)Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TEXT//f moro 8/roco/8 I//rkrrrL Irso//'/oorr/HRC
NRC Form 355 (94)3)
%%drrrr 38843/(17) o s o o o 97 89-01 9 0 0 OF 0 4 4.As noted in the Similar Events Section of this LER, a similar event (which occurred on May 20, 1989)was reported in LER 89-017.Further corrective actions taken as a result of the event described in LER 89-017 were not fully implemented at the time this event occurred (May 24, 1989).B.Further Corrective Action 1.The Contractor Maintenance Electrician was counselled on the importance of remaining within the authorized bounds of plant work packages and in the specifics of rigorously following the"Determ/Reterm Data Sheet." This action was completed on May 24, 1989 at 1315 hours.2.Contractor personnel working on the Leak Detection Plant modification were retrained on the applicable Plant procedures and reminded of the proper methods for obtaining authorization prior to performing work outside the scope of that contained in the work package.This action was completed on May 30,.1989 at 1630 hours.3.Tool box meeting training sessions for all Contractor Maintenance Electricians were held emphasizing the necessity of remaining within the bounds of approved work packages.Emphasis was given to rigorously following"Determ/Reterm Data Sheets" and stopping work when it appeared necessary to disturb other equipment.
 
Changes to work packages utilizing the Field Engineer to intiate the appropriate documentation was also discussed.
NRRPorm 388A                                                                                                             U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION IB4LI(
This action was completed on May 30, 1989 at 1630 hour s.4.An overall assessment of the RHR Shutdown Cooling isolations which have occurred is currently being performed by the Plant Technical and Nuclear Safety Assurance Groups.Safety Si nificance There is no safety significance associated with this event.At the time of the event, the reactor vessel head was removed and reactor water level was greater than 22 feet above the reactor vessel flange.These conditions provide a large heat sink for core cooling with adequate time to restore RHR Shutdown Cooling or initiate an alternate methoa of decay heat removal.RHR Shutdown Cooling was restored within eight minutes, well within the time frame allowed by Technical Specifications.
LICENSEE EV                 REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINUATI                           APPROVEO OMB NO. 3150-0(04 jM                                                                                                                              EXPIRES: 8/31/BS ILITYNAME (tl                                                              OOCKET NUMBER (31                                                    PACE (3)
(.ER NUMBER (81 YEAR    SEOUENTIAL      REVISION Pgg  NUMSeR        NuMSER Washington Nuclear Plant                               -.Unit     2   0  5  0  0    0 3 9 7   8 9      0  1    9 000                  2 OF 0        4 TE/rr/7///mare EPeae /4 mrtu/red, uee edr//r/rme/NRC Pamr 38//AS/(17l Plant Conditions a)        Power Level                -  OX b)        Plant          Mode        -  5   (Refueling)
Event Descri                   tion On     May 24, 1989 at 0642 hours the Inboard Residual                                       Meat Removal (RMR) Shutdown Cooling Supply Valve (RMR-V-9) automatically isolated when a Contractor Maintenance Electrician lifted a wire which de-energized the valve control relay. Valve RMR-V-9 closure is interlocked with Shutdown Cooling RHR pumps (RHR-P-2A and RHR-P-2B) so that closure of RHR-V-9 tripped RHR-P-2A. Valve RHR-V-9 is a Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff (Containment Isolation) Valve. At the time of the event the Plant was in a shutdown condition for the annual maintenance and refueling outage.                                                 Also, RHR Loop A was operating in the Shutdown Cooling Mode.
At the time of the event a Contractor Maintenance Electrician was working on a Plant Modification Record (PMR) for improving the Leak Detection System by upgrading signal processing and diagnostic capabilities.                                         The electrician was attempting to land a wire on a terminal behind the terminals associated with relay LD-RLY-K04B.
In order to gain access he(.lifted a wire to relay LD-RLY-K04B. Relay LD-RLY-K04B is designed to open on RHR Area High temperature which could indicate a leak of high temperature primary coolant in the RHR equipment room. Lifting the wire caused the same result as an area                                   high temperature actuation; the valve control relay is deenergized and RHR-V-9 closes.
Immediate Corrective Action The       lifted wire was immediately re-terminated. By                                   0650 hours     (eight minutes after the       initiating event), Plant Operators had opened                                     RHR-V-9,     started RHR-P-2A and restored shutdown cooling.
Further Evaluation and Corrective Action J           A.         Fur     ther Evaluation 1
: 1.         This event is reportabl e under 10CFR50. 73(a) (2) (iv) as, "an event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF).N I
I                      2.         There were no structures,                       systems or components that were inoperable                           at the       start of this             event that contributed to the event.
I
: 3.         The root cause of the event was personnel error in that the Contractor Maintenance Electrician performed work outside that authorized in the work package, and not in accordance with Plant procedures.                                     Plant procedures were not the cause of this event.
NRC SORM 388A                                                                                                                         ~ 0.8. CPOr 1988 S20-S89/00010 (043)
 
NRQ Corm 3$ 8A                                                                                                               U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (9~
LICENSEE EV                   REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATI                             APPROVED OMB NO. 3)60-0)08 EXPIRES: B/31/BB PA ILITY NAME ll)                                                               OOCKET NUMBER (2)                                                       PACE (3)
LER NUMBER (8) 88OUENTIAL      48VISION gg             j@S NVM88A Washington Nuclear Plant                                 - Unit   2     o  s  o  o  o      97 89 01              9        0 0              OF  0    4 TEXT //f moro 8/roco/8 I//rkrrrL Irso //'/oorr/HRC %%drrrr 38843/(17)
: 4.           As   noted in the Similar Events Section of this LER, a similar event (which occurred on May 20, 1989) was reported in LER 89-017. Further corrective actions taken as a result of the event described in LER 89-017 were not fully implemented at the time this event occurred (May 24, 1989).
B.         Further Corrective Action
: 1.         The     Contractor Maintenance Electrician                       was   counselled   on   the importance of remaining within the authorized bounds                             of plant   work packages and                 in the specifics of rigorously following the                               "Determ/Reterm Data Sheet."                       This action was completed on May 24, 1989 at                           1315 hours.
: 2.         Contractor personnel working on the                             Leak Detection Plant modification were retrained on the applicable Plant                             procedures   and reminded of the proper methods for obtaining authorization                             prior to performing work outside the scope of that contained in the work                             package. This action       was   completed on May     30, .1989           at   1630 hours.
: 3.           Tool         box meeting training sessions                           for all Contractor Maintenance Electricians were held emphasizing the necessity of remaining within the bounds of approved work packages.                                 Emphasis was given to rigorously following "Determ/Reterm Data Sheets" and stopping work when it appeared necessary to disturb other equipment.                               Changes to work packages utilizing the Field Engineer to intiate the appropriate documentation was also discussed.               This action was completed on May 30, 1989 at 1630 hour s.
: 4.           An overall assessment                     of the RHR Shutdown Cooling isolations which have occurred is currently being performed by the Plant Technical and Nuclear Safety Assurance Groups.
Safety Si nificance There           is no safety significance associated with this event. At the time of the event, the reactor vessel head was removed and reactor water level was greater than 22 feet above the reactor vessel flange.                                       These conditions provide a large heat sink for core cooling with adequate time to restore RHR Shutdown Cooling or initiate an alternate methoa of decay heat removal. RHR Shutdown Cooling was restored within eight minutes, well within the time frame allowed by Technical Specifications.
Accordingly, this event caused no threat to the safety of either the public or Plant personnel.
Accordingly, this event caused no threat to the safety of either the public or Plant personnel.
Similar Events LERs 87-005, 87-008 and 89-017 NAC SOAM 388A (943)~V.s.CPor (988-520-589r00090 f
Similar Events LERs       87-005, 87-008 and 89-017 NAC SOAM 388A                                                                                                                         ~ V.s. CPor   (988-520-589r00090 (943)
NR'O Form 368A (SM)r, LICENSEE EV REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTIN UATI U.S.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMS NO.3160M)04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (I)DOCKET NUMBER (2)YEAR LER NUMBER (8)SSQVSNTIAL NVMSSR REVISION NVMSSR PACE (3)Washin ton Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TEXT///more space/s nor/rad, use addr'0)roa/NRC Form 388A's/(17)0 5 0 0 0 9 7 Q 9 0 1 9 0 0 4 oF0 EIIS Information Text Reference EIIS Reference System Component Residual Heat Removal (RHR)Shutdown Cooling Supply Valve (RHR-V-9)Pump RHR-P-2A Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System Pump RHR-P-2B Leak Detection System Residual Heat Removal Shutdown Cooling Supply Valve Relay (LD-RLY-K04B)
 
BO BO BD BO IJ BO I SV P 94 NRO FORM 088A (983)rV.S.CPOr (988 520 589r00070}}
f NR'O Form 368A                                                                                                 U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (SM) r,                               LICENSEE EV               REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTIN UATI                     APPROVED OMS NO. 3160M)04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (I )                                                       DOCKET NUMBER (2)         LER NUMBER (8)                       PACE (3)
YEAR  SSQVSNTIAL        REVISION NVMSSR          NVMSSR Washin ton Nuclear                       Plant - Unit       2   0  5  0  0    0 9 7 Q  9    0  1    9        0 0          4  oF0 TEXT ///more space /s nor/rad, use addr'0)roa/NRC Form 388A's/ (17)
EIIS Information Text Reference                                                                               EIIS Reference System             Component Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling Supply Valve (RHR-V-9)                                                                                             BO                    I SV Pump RHR-P-2A                                                                                         BO                        P Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System                                                                   BD Pump RHR-P-2B                                                                                         BO Leak Detection System                                                                                 IJ Residual Heat Removal Shutdown Cooling Supply Valve Relay (LD-RLY-K04B)                                                                                         BO                     94 NRO FORM 088A                                                                                                             rV.S. CPOr (988 520 589r00070 (983)}}

Latest revision as of 14:35, 29 October 2019

LER 89-019-00:on 890524,inboard RHR Shutdown Cooling Supply Valve Automatically Isolated When Electrician Lifted Wire Deenergizing Valve Control Relay.Personnel Counseled & Training in Plant Procedures initiated.W/890616 Ltr
ML17285A567
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 06/16/1989
From: Arbuckle J, Powers C
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-019, NUDOCS 8906260144
Download: ML17285A567 (7)


Text

Ac CE1ZRA.TED D1SDGBUTI0 Qi, REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8906260144 DOC.DATE: 89/06/16 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACXL:50-397 WPPSS. Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ARBUCKLE,J.D. Washington Public Power Supply System POWERS,C.M. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION R I

SUBJECT:

LER 89-019-00:on 890524,RHR sys shutdown cooling containment isolation valve (ESF) closure due to personnel error.

W/8 "

ltr. D S .

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Li'censee Event Report (LER),. Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL D PD5 LA 1 1 PD5. PD 1 1 SAMWORTH,R 1 1 D INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 ACRS WYLXE 1 1 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 DEDRO 1 1 IRM/DCTS/DAB 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADE 8H 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADS 7E 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 8H 1 1 NRR/DEST/ESB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 1- 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 8D 1 1

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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99352 Docket No. 50-397 June 16, 1989 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.89-019

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report '.No.89-019 for the WNP-2 Plant.

This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Very truly yours, C.M. P rs (M/D 927M)

WNP-2 ant Manager CMP:lg

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report No.89-019 cc: Mr. John B. Martin,.NRC - Region V Mr. C.J. Bosted, NRC Site (M/D 901A)

INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI Mr. D.L. Williams, BPA (M/D 399)

WpgP 8906260i44 890&i& l PDR ADOCK 05000397 )

8 F'DC

NAC Form 355 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATOAY COMMISSION (94)3 I APPROVED OMB NO. 31504104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) EXPIRES: 5/31/SS FACILITY NAME 0) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE 3)

Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 1 OFp 4

>>TLE(4)Residua Heat Remova ystem S ut own Coo sng Containment Isolation Valve (En ineered Safety Feature) Closure Due to Personnel Error EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (5) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (SI MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR SEGUSNTIAL OAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBERISI NUMBER NUMBER MONTH 0 5 0 0 0 0 524 89 8 9 019 00 06 168 9 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE AEOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (I: /Checil one or more O/ the /ollorvinPI (11 OPERATING MODE (SI 5 20.402(bl 73.71(b) 20.405(c) 50,73(sl(2)(ivl POWER 20.405( ~ I (I I I i) 50.35(c) (1) 50.7 3(s I (2)(vl 73.71(c)

LEVEL p p p 20.405 (s l(lI (ii) 50.35(cl(2) 50.73(s) (2)(vill OTHER /Speci/y in Ahltrett oerovvenr/in Text, HRC Form 20.405 ( ~ I( I l(iii) 50.73(x ) (2) (il 50,73(s I (2) ( xiii)I A I 366AI 20.405 (~ I(l I(ivl 50.73(s l(2)(ii) 50.73(el(2) (v)iil(BI 20.405(sl(l l(v) 50.73(s) )2) Bill 50.73( ~ )(2)(x)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE J.D. Arbuckle, Com liance En ineer 50 937 7- 211 5 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE OESCRIBEO IN THIS REPORT (13l CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC. REPORTABLE,'y'.> g. N . MANUFAC. EPORTABLE TUREA TO NPADS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT c: TUAEA TO NPRDS iWq@Eg%$Ãvfst SUPPLEMENTAL REPOAT EXPECTED (14) MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (I SI YES II/ yer, complete fXPfCTEO St/84/ISSIOH DATEI X NO ABSTRACT /Limit to /400 rpscet, I.e.. epproximetely A/teen Iinpleepece rypevvritren linn/ (15)

On May 24, 1989 at 0642 hours0.00743 days <br />0.178 hours <br />0.00106 weeks <br />2.44281e-4 months <br />, while in operational condition 5 with the reactor head removed, the reactor cavity flooded up and the fuel pool gates removed, the Inboard Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling Supply Valve (RHR-V-9) automatically isolated when a Contractor Maintenance Electrician lifted a wire de-energizing the valve control relay. Closure of RHR-V-9 is interlocked with the RHR Shutdown Cooling pumps so that RHR-P-2A tripped on valve closure. Valve RHR-V-9 is a Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (Containment Isolation) Valve. By 0650 hours0.00752 days <br />0.181 hours <br />0.00107 weeks <br />2.47325e-4 months <br /> the wire had been reterminated, RHR-V-9 opened, RHR-P-2A restarted and shutdown cooling restored.

The root cause of the event was personnel error in that a Contractor Maintenance Electrician exceeded the authorized work by lifting a lead not listed within the work package documents. A properly reviewed and authorized change should have been obtained from the Field Engineer in charge of the work prior to proceeding. Corrective actions consisted of 1) counselling the individual involved, 2) training appropriate contractor personnel on applicable Plant procedures, and 3) performing an assessment of RHR Shutdown Cooling isolations which have occurred.

There is no safety significance associated with this event. At the time of the isolation reactor water level was greater than 22 feet above the reactor vessel flange which provides a large heat sink for core cooling and adequate time to'estore RHR Shutdown Cooling, or initiate an alternate decay heat removal method. In this event, shutdown cooling was restor ed within eight minutes.

NRC Form 355 (94)3)

NRRPorm 388A U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION IB4LI(

LICENSEE EV REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINUATI APPROVEO OMB NO. 3150-0(04 jM EXPIRES: 8/31/BS ILITYNAME (tl OOCKET NUMBER (31 PACE (3)

(.ER NUMBER (81 YEAR SEOUENTIAL REVISION Pgg NUMSeR NuMSER Washington Nuclear Plant -.Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 8 9 0 1 9 000 2 OF 0 4 TE/rr/7///mare EPeae /4 mrtu/red, uee edr//r/rme/NRC Pamr 38//AS/(17l Plant Conditions a) Power Level - OX b) Plant Mode - 5 (Refueling)

Event Descri tion On May 24, 1989 at 0642 hours0.00743 days <br />0.178 hours <br />0.00106 weeks <br />2.44281e-4 months <br /> the Inboard Residual Meat Removal (RMR) Shutdown Cooling Supply Valve (RMR-V-9) automatically isolated when a Contractor Maintenance Electrician lifted a wire which de-energized the valve control relay. Valve RMR-V-9 closure is interlocked with Shutdown Cooling RHR pumps (RHR-P-2A and RHR-P-2B) so that closure of RHR-V-9 tripped RHR-P-2A. Valve RHR-V-9 is a Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff (Containment Isolation) Valve. At the time of the event the Plant was in a shutdown condition for the annual maintenance and refueling outage. Also, RHR Loop A was operating in the Shutdown Cooling Mode.

At the time of the event a Contractor Maintenance Electrician was working on a Plant Modification Record (PMR) for improving the Leak Detection System by upgrading signal processing and diagnostic capabilities. The electrician was attempting to land a wire on a terminal behind the terminals associated with relay LD-RLY-K04B.

In order to gain access he(.lifted a wire to relay LD-RLY-K04B. Relay LD-RLY-K04B is designed to open on RHR Area High temperature which could indicate a leak of high temperature primary coolant in the RHR equipment room. Lifting the wire caused the same result as an area high temperature actuation; the valve control relay is deenergized and RHR-V-9 closes.

Immediate Corrective Action The lifted wire was immediately re-terminated. By 0650 hours0.00752 days <br />0.181 hours <br />0.00107 weeks <br />2.47325e-4 months <br /> (eight minutes after the initiating event), Plant Operators had opened RHR-V-9, started RHR-P-2A and restored shutdown cooling.

Further Evaluation and Corrective Action J A. Fur ther Evaluation 1

1. This event is reportabl e under 10CFR50. 73(a) (2) (iv) as, "an event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF).N I

I 2. There were no structures, systems or components that were inoperable at the start of this event that contributed to the event.

I

3. The root cause of the event was personnel error in that the Contractor Maintenance Electrician performed work outside that authorized in the work package, and not in accordance with Plant procedures. Plant procedures were not the cause of this event.

NRC SORM 388A ~ 0.8. CPOr 1988 S20-S89/00010 (043)

NRQ Corm 3$ 8A U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (9~

LICENSEE EV REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATI APPROVED OMB NO. 3)60-0)08 EXPIRES: B/31/BB PA ILITY NAME ll) OOCKET NUMBER (2) PACE (3)

LER NUMBER (8) 88OUENTIAL 48VISION gg j@S NVM88A Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 o s o o o 97 89 01 9 0 0 OF 0 4 TEXT //f moro 8/roco/8 I//rkrrrL Irso //'/oorr/HRC %%drrrr 38843/(17)

4. As noted in the Similar Events Section of this LER, a similar event (which occurred on May 20, 1989) was reported in LER 89-017. Further corrective actions taken as a result of the event described in LER 89-017 were not fully implemented at the time this event occurred (May 24, 1989).

B. Further Corrective Action

1. The Contractor Maintenance Electrician was counselled on the importance of remaining within the authorized bounds of plant work packages and in the specifics of rigorously following the "Determ/Reterm Data Sheet." This action was completed on May 24, 1989 at 1315 hours0.0152 days <br />0.365 hours <br />0.00217 weeks <br />5.003575e-4 months <br />.
2. Contractor personnel working on the Leak Detection Plant modification were retrained on the applicable Plant procedures and reminded of the proper methods for obtaining authorization prior to performing work outside the scope of that contained in the work package. This action was completed on May 30, .1989 at 1630 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br />.
3. Tool box meeting training sessions for all Contractor Maintenance Electricians were held emphasizing the necessity of remaining within the bounds of approved work packages. Emphasis was given to rigorously following "Determ/Reterm Data Sheets" and stopping work when it appeared necessary to disturb other equipment. Changes to work packages utilizing the Field Engineer to intiate the appropriate documentation was also discussed. This action was completed on May 30, 1989 at 1630 hour0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br /> s.
4. An overall assessment of the RHR Shutdown Cooling isolations which have occurred is currently being performed by the Plant Technical and Nuclear Safety Assurance Groups.

Safety Si nificance There is no safety significance associated with this event. At the time of the event, the reactor vessel head was removed and reactor water level was greater than 22 feet above the reactor vessel flange. These conditions provide a large heat sink for core cooling with adequate time to restore RHR Shutdown Cooling or initiate an alternate methoa of decay heat removal. RHR Shutdown Cooling was restored within eight minutes, well within the time frame allowed by Technical Specifications.

Accordingly, this event caused no threat to the safety of either the public or Plant personnel.

Similar Events LERs87-005, 87-008 and 89-017 NAC SOAM 388A ~ V.s. CPor (988-520-589r00090 (943)

f NR'O Form 368A U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (SM) r, LICENSEE EV REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTIN UATI APPROVED OMS NO. 3160M)04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (I ) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) PACE (3)

YEAR SSQVSNTIAL REVISION NVMSSR NVMSSR Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 9 7 Q 9 0 1 9 0 0 4 oF0 TEXT ///more space /s nor/rad, use addr'0)roa/NRC Form 388A's/ (17)

EIIS Information Text Reference EIIS Reference System Component Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling Supply Valve (RHR-V-9) BO I SV Pump RHR-P-2A BO P Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System BD Pump RHR-P-2B BO Leak Detection System IJ Residual Heat Removal Shutdown Cooling Supply Valve Relay (LD-RLY-K04B) BO 94 NRO FORM 088A rV.S. CPOr (988 520 589r00070 (983)