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| {{#Wiki_filter:l, REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9107050214 DOC.DATE: 91/06/28, NOTARIZED: | | {{#Wiki_filter:l, REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS) |
| NO FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ARBUCKLE,J.D. | | ACCESSION NBR:9107050214 DOC.DATE: 91/06/28, NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ARBUCKLE,J.D. Washington Public Power Supply System BAKER,J.W. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION |
| Washington Public Power Supply System BAKER,J.W. | |
| Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET 05000397 | |
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| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| LER 91-015-00:on 910602,high HPCS sys pump suction switchover from condensate storage tanks to suppression pool occurred.Caused by personnel error.Operator involved ack&reset alarm.W/910628 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR (ENCL I SIZE TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES: D/A RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 LA ENG, P.L.INTERNAL: ACNW AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DSP NRR/DET/EMEB 7E NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 NRR/DST/SICB8H3 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL: EG&G BRYCE,J.H NRC PDR NSIC POORE,W.COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 PD ACRS AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DET/ECMB 9H NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10 NRR/DOEA/OEAB NRR/DST/SELB 8D N~D LB8D1 REG FILE 02 LE 01 L ST LOBBY WARD NSIC MURPHY,G.A NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D D D NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS: | | LER 91-015-00:on 910602,high HPCS sys pump suction switchover from condensate storage tanks to suppression pool D occurred. Caused by personnel error. Operator involved ack & |
| PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE~VASTE!CONI ACT f HE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT.X079)TO i'LIMINA I E YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!D D FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 33 ENCL 33 ai~WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O.Box 968~3000 George Washington Way~Richland, Washington 99352 G02-91-125 Docket No.50-397 June 28, 1991 Document Control Desk U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555 | | reset alarm. W/910628 ltr. |
| | DISTRIBUTION CODE IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ( ENCL I SIZE TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc. / |
| | NOTES: A RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES D ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 D ENG, P. L. 1 1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/ECMB 9H 1 1 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB8H3 1 1 N~D LB8D1 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1 REG FILE 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 LE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G BRYCE,J.H 3 3 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NSIC POORE,W. 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 D |
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| | NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS: |
| | PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE ~VASTE! CONI ACT fHE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. X079) TO i'LIMINAI E YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED! |
| | FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 33 ENCL 33 |
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| | WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99352 G02-91-125 Docket No. 50-397 June 28, 1991 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 |
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| ==Subject:== | | ==Subject:== |
| NUCLEAR PLANT NO.2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.91-015 | | NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 91-015 |
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| | ==Dear Sir:== |
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| ==Dear Sir:==
| | Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 91-015 for the WNP-2 Plant. |
| Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.91-015 for the WNP-2 Plant.This report is submitted in response to the report requirements oF lOCFR50,73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence. | | This report is submitted in response to the report requirements oF lOCFR50,73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence. |
| Very truly yours, J.W.Baker (M/D 927M)WNP-2 Plant Manager JWB:ac | | Very truly yours, J.W. Baker (M/D 927M) |
| | WNP-2 Plant Manager JWB:ac |
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| ==Enclosure:== | | ==Enclosure:== |
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| Licensee Event Report No.91-015 cc: Hr.John B.Martin, NRC-Region V Hr.C.J.Bosted, NRC Site (M/D 901A)INPO Records Center-Atlanta, GA Hs.Dottie Sherman, ANI Hr.D.L.Williams, BPA (H/D 399)'~1070502) g PDR ADOCK O.,ot43O7 , PDR | | Licensee Event Report No. 91-015 cc: Hr. John B. Martin, NRC Region V Hr. C. J. Bosted, NRC Site (M/D 901A) |
| | INPO Records Center Atlanta, GA Hs. Dottie Sherman, ANI Hr. D. L. Williams, BPA (H/D 399) |
| | '~1070502) g PDR ADOCK O.,ot43O7 |
| | , PDR |
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| | NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR 4EGULATORY COMMISSION (668) APPROVEO OMB NO. 3)SOO(04 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 I'IMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECOADS AND AEPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F630), U.S. NUCLEAR RFGULATOAY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503. |
| | FACILITY NAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE 3 Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 39 71 oF 06 TITLE (4) |
| | High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System Pump Suction Valve Switchover Actuation on Hi h Su ression Pool Level due to Personnel Error FVENT DATE(5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) |
| | MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR gart SEQUENTIAL REVIStGN MONTH OAY YEAR FACILITYNAMFS DOCKET NUMBER(S) |
| | NUMBER 0 5 0 0 0 0 2 1 9 1 1 5 0 0 89 1 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T0 THE 4LQUIREMENTS OF 10 CF 4 (): /Chrch one or morr of the Iollovrinp/ (11) |
| | OPERATING MODE (8) 4 20.402(8) 20.405(cl 60.73(al(2)(iv) 73.71(II) |
| | POWER 20A05( ~ l(1) (I) 6048(cl(1 I 50,73(a)(2)(v)l(vill)(A) 73.71(cl LEYEL 0 0 20.405 (a ) (I ) (ii) 50.38(c)(2) 50,73(a)(2)(vill OTHER /Sprcily /n Attttrect INlovr rnd In Tent, NRC Form 20.405(a l(1) (iii) 50.73(a ) (2) Ii) 50.73(v ) (2 36$ A/ |
| | ra((arpr)L/t 20AOS( ~ )(1)(iv) 50.73(a) (2) (8) 50.73(al(2)(viiil(B) 20A05 (a I (1)(vl 60.73(a l (2)(iii) 50.73( ~ ) (2)(a I LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) |
| | NAME TELEPHONE NUMSFR AREA CODE J. D. Arbuckle Com liance En ineer 5 0 3 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESC4IBED IN THIS 4EPORT (13) p" P?n birr ".n3. |
| | CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC. EPORTABLE i@5K~r@P44 4~< CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC EPORTABLE TUAER TO NPRDS g?PM)@~ TUAER TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) |
| | EXPECTED MONTH IÃ% DAY YEAR SUBMISSION DATE (15I YES IIIyrL comPlrtr EXPECTED SIIShtISSIOII DATE/ NO ABST4ACT /Limit to te00 tprcrt, I r., rpproalmrtrly Iiltren tlnprr.apecr typrvrritNn linml (18) |
| | On June 2, 1991 at 0106 hours while the Plant was shutdown for maintenance, a High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System pump suction switchover from the Condensate Storage Tanks to the Suppression Pool occurred due to a Suppression Pool high water level condition. |
| | Plant configuration at the time was such that HPCS suction was lined up to the Condensate Storage Tanks (CSTs) with CST Suction Valve HPCS-V-1 open and Suppression Pool Suction Valve HPCS-V-15 closed, the normal system lineup (reference Figure 1). |
| | The switchover, an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF ) actuation, was the automatic closure of HPCS-V-1 and the opening of HPCS-V-15. |
| | During the event period, Plant Control Room Operators were lowering Reactor Vessel level through the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) HAH Heat Exchanger Vents to the Suppression Pool following excess Flow Check (EFC) Valve testing. During this period the Suppression Pool high level alarm annunciator had sealed in [the alarm annunciates at +0.5 inches (0.5 inches above normal pool level)j. However, after acknowledging and resetting the alarm, a Plant Control Room Operator failed to take action to either lower Suppression Pool level or manually switchover the HPCS suction valves as directed by procedure. When Suppression Pool water volume reached approximately +3.0 inches indicated level, the automatic switchover occurred. |
| | NRC Form 386 (6691 |
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| | APPROVED OMB NO. 3)500104 (64)9) |
| | EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EV REPORT (LER) IN RMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50A) HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P4)30), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO 1HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504))04). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503. |
| | FACILITYNAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) PAGE (3) |
| | YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION iS@ NUMBER 'A$> NUMSEIl Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 o s o o o 3 79 1 015 0 00 2oF 0 6 TEXT /I/ moro opooo /4 ror/o/rod, ooo oddio'ooo///RC Form 36543/ (12) |
| | Abstract (continued) |
| | As an immediate corrective action Plant Control Room Operators took action to lower Suppression Pool level and then realigned the HPCS suction from the Suppression Pool to the Condensate Storage Tanks (HPCS-V-15 was closed and HPCS-V-1 was re-opened). |
| | The cause of this event is personnel error in that the Plant Control Room Operator involved failed to follow procedures. Further corrective action consisted of counselling the Operator involved on procedural requirements and performance expectations, and including this LER for discussion during Licensed Operator Requalification Training. |
| | This event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or Plant personnel. |
| | Plant Conditions Power Level - OX Plant Mode - 4 (Cold Shutdown) |
| | Event Descri tion On June 2, 1991 at 0106 hours a High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System pump suction switchover from the Condensate Storage Tanks to the Suppression Pool occurred while the Plant was shutdown for maintenance. The switchover occurred as the result of a Suppression Pool high water level condition. |
| | Plant configuration at the time was such that HPCS suction was lined up to the Condensate Storage Tanks (CSTs) with CST Suction Valve HPCS-V-1 open and Suppression Pool Suction Valve HPCS-V-15 closed, the normal system lineup (reference Figure 1). |
| | The switchover, an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation, was the automatic closure of HPCS-V-1 and the opening of HPCS-V-15. |
| | During the event period, Plant Control Room Operators were lowering Reactor Vessel level through the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) "A" Heat Exchanger Vents to the Suppression Pool following Excess Flow Check (EFC) Valve testing. During this period the Suppression Pool high level alarm (annunciator) sealed in [the alarm annunciates at + 0.5 inches (0.5 inches above normal pool level)j. Although the Plant Control Room Operator involved acknowledged and reset the alarm, he failed to take action to either lower Suppression Pool level, or manually switchover the HPCS suction valves as directed by procedure. When Suppression Pool water volume reached approximately +3.0 inches indicated level, the automatic transfer occurred. The Suppression Pool high level trip setpoint which would automatically cause a suction transfer is +5 inches. However, because the tolerance band (accuracy ) for the level instrumentation is plus or minus two inches, the automatic transfer could occur as low as +3 inches or as high as +7 inches. |
| | The closure of HPCS-V-1 and the opening of HPCS-V-15 was by Plant design and Plant Control Room Operators took appropriate action to lower Suppression Pool level. |
| | NRC Form 3EEA (689) |
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| | )689) APPROVED 0MB NO. 31600)04 o EXP IR ES: 6/30/92 LICENSEE EVW REPORT ILER) ATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS IN RMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 508) HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT )31500104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503. |
| | FACILITY NAME I1) DOCKET NUMBER I2I LER NUMBER I6) PAGE I3I |
| | : SEQUENTIAL N.'UMBER 'O% re REVISION NUMBER Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 o s o o o3 97 1 015 0 0 0 3oF TEXT /// moro a>>co /s ror/Ir/)od, Irso sdde'ono/NRC Form 3664's/ OT) |
| | Immediate Corrective Action Plant Control Room Operators responded by taking action to lower Suppression Pool level and realigning the HPCS Suction from the Suppression Pool to the Condensate Storage Tanks (HPCS-V-15 was closed and HPCS-V-1 was re-opened). |
| | Further Evaluation and Corrective Action A. Further Evaluation |
| | : 1. This event is reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature. |
| | : 2. There were no structures, systems or components the were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event. |
| | : 3. The circuit operation is such that the HPCS switchover logic is designed to actuate based on either low Condensate Storage Tank or high Suppression Pool levels. Once initiated, the logic opens Suppression Pool Suction Valve HPCS-V-15. When HPCS-V-15 is full open, design logic closes Condensate Storage Tank Suction Valve HPCS-V-1. These valves are interlocked in this manner to prevent losing suction to pump HPCS-P-l. |
| | There are two magnetically-activated float switches (HPCS-LS-2A and HPCS-LS-2B) that actuate on high Suppression Pool level. Because of the one-out-of-one logic, either switch can initiate opening of the Suppression Pool suction valve. |
| | The cause of this event is Personnel Error due to Lack of Attention/Concentration. The Plant Control Room Operator involved failed to take appropriate and timely action to lower the Suppression Pool as directed by procedure when level is greater than +0.5 inches. Plant Annunciator Response Procedures (PPMs) 4.601.All and 4.601.A12, "Annunciator Panel Alarms" for Suppression Pool Level, require that when level is greater than +0.5 inches, Plant Control Room Operators are to either lower Suppression Pool level by means of aligning the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System to the radwaste system, or manually switchover the HPCS suction valves to preclude an inadvertent ESF actuation. As a result of a previous event (LER 90-014), the procedure also included the caution that an automatic HPCS suction valve transfer could occur as early +3.0 inches due to instrument inaccuracy. The Plant Control Room Operator involved was aware of this procedural guidance. When Suppression Pool water volume reached approximately +3.0 inches indicated level, the automatic transfer occurred. |
| | NR C Form 366A )669) |
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| | (649) Al'VISUVCO QMm I>U. elOVOlvm ExplREs: e/30/92 ATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EV REPORT (LER) I~RMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P.530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO 1HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504)04). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503. |
| | FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) |
| | SEOUENTIAL NUMBER PN (ssre: |
| | REVISION NUMSER Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 7 9 1 1 5 0 0 0 4 OF 0 6 TEXT /// mare e/seem /s rer)lr/red, Iree eddni'one////IC %%drm 366A'e/ (17) |
| | B. Further Corrective Action |
| | : 1. The Plant Control Room Operator involved was counselled on procedural requirements and performance expectations. |
| | : 2. This LER will be included as a topic for discussion during the Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program. |
| | Safet Si nificance There is no safety significance associated with this event. All systems operated as designed to cause a HPCS System pump suction valve switchover on the high Suppression Pool water level condition. In addition, there are no Suppression Pool high level restrictions during Operational Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) because there is insufficient energy in the reactor during this condition to place significant loads on the containment. Furthermore, Plant Control Room Operators responded by lowering the Suppression Pool and realigning the system to pre-event status. Accordingly, this event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or Plant personnel. |
| | Similar Events LER 90-014, "High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System Pump Suction Valve Switchover Actuation on High Suppression Pool Level due to Procedural Inadequacy." |
| | EIIS Information EIIS Reference |
| | ~Sstem ~Com onent High Pressure Core Spray(HPCS) System BG HPCS-V-1 BG HPCS-V-15 BG Excess Flow Check (EFC) Valve Suppression Pool NH Condensate Storage Tank KA TK HPCS-P-1 BG HPCS-L IS-2A BG LIS NRC Ferro 366A 1669) |
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| | Af'PKvvED vrrlB Nv. 4lovs)iv>> |
| | (64)9) |
| | EXP IR ES: 4/30/92 ATEO BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EV REPORT HLER) I ORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50JI HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13(500104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON. OC 20503. |
| | FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2I LER NUMBER (5) PAGE (3) |
| | SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR NVMSER NUMBER Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 7 9 1 015 0 0 0 5 oF0 TEXT /lfmore 4Oese /s ser)rrlred, vse eddioone/ NRC Form Si/64'4/ (17) |
| | E I IS Information EIIS Reference |
| | ~Sstem ~Com onent HPCS-L IS-28 BG LIS Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System 80 RHR "A" Heat Exchanger 80 HX NRC Form 356A (669) |
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| NRC FORM 366 (668)U.S.NUCLEAR 4EGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)APPROVEO OMB NO.3)SOO(04 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 I'IMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECOADS AND AEPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F630), U.S.NUCLEAR RFGULATOAY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500104).
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| OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (I)DOCKET NUMBER (2)PAGE 3 Washin ton Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 39 71 oF 06 TITLE (4)High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS)System Pump Suction Valve Switchover Actuation on Hi h Su ression Pool Level due to Personnel Error FVENT DATE(5)MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR LER NUMBER (6)gart SEQUENTIAL REVIStGN NUMBER MONTH OAY YEAR REPORT DATE (7)DOCKET NUMBER(S)0 5 0 0 0 FACILITY NAMFS OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)0 2 1 9 1 1 5 0 0 89 1 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATING MODE (8)4 POWER LEYEL 0 0 ra((arpr)L/t 20.402(8)20A05(~l(1)(I)20.405 (a)(I)(ii)20.405(a l(1)(iii)20AOS(~)(1)(iv)20A05 (a I (1)(vl 20.405(cl 6048(cl(1 I 50.38(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)Ii)50.73(a)(2)(8)60.73(a l (2)(iii)LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)60.73(al(2)(iv) 50,73(a)(2)(v) 50,73(a)(2)(vill 50.73(v)(2 l(vill)(A) 50.73(al(2)(viiil(B) 50.73(~)(2)(a I THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 0 THE 4LQUIREMENTS OF 10 CF 4 ():/Chrch one or morr of the Iollovrinp/
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| (11)73.71(II)73.71(cl OTHER/Sprcily/n Attttrect INlovr rnd In Tent, NRC Form 36$A/NAME AREA CODE TELEPHONE NUMSFR J.D.Arbuckle Com liance En ineer COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESC4IBED IN THIS 4EPORT (13)5 0 3 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.TUAER p" P?n birr".n3.EPORTABLE i@5K~r@P44 TO NPRDS g?PM)@~4~<CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC TUAER EPORTABLE TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES III yrL comPlrtr EXPECTED SIIShtISSIOII DATE/NO ABST4ACT/Limit to te00 tprcrt, I r., rpproalmrtrly Iiltren tlnprr.apecr typrvrritNn linml (18)EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15I IÃ%MONTH DAY YEAR On June 2, 1991 at 0106 hours while the Plant was shutdown for maintenance, a High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS)System pump suction switchover from the Condensate Storage Tanks to the Suppression Pool occurred due to a Suppression Pool high water level condition.
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| Plant configuration at the time was such that HPCS suction was lined up to the Condensate Storage Tanks (CSTs)with CST Suction Valve HPCS-V-1 open and Suppression Pool Suction Valve HPCS-V-15 closed, the normal system lineup (reference Figure 1).The switchover, an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)actuation, was the automatic closure of HPCS-V-1 and the opening of HPCS-V-15.
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| During the event period, Plant Control Room Operators were lowering Reactor Vessel level through the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)HAH Heat Exchanger Vents to the Suppression Pool following excess Flow Check (EFC)Valve testing.During this period the Suppression Pool high level alarm annunciator had sealed in[the alarm annunciates at+0.5 inches (0.5 inches above normal pool level)j.However, after acknowledging and resetting the alarm, a Plant Control Room Operator failed to take action to either lower Suppression Pool level or manually switchover the HPCS suction valves as directed by procedure.
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| When Suppression Pool water volume reached approximately
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| +3.0 inches indicated level, the automatic switchover occurred.NRC Form 386 (6691 (64)9)LICENSEE EV REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO.3)500104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS IN RMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50A)HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P4)30), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO 1HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504))04).
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| OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NAM E (I)DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (8)PAGE (3)Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TEXT/I/moro opooo/4 ror/o/rod, ooo oddio'ooo///RC Form 36543/(12)YEAR iS@o s o o o 3 79 1 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER'A$>015 REVISION NUMSEIl 0 00 2oF 0 6 Abstract (continued)
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| As an immediate corrective action Plant Control Room Operators took action to lower Suppression Pool level and then realigned the HPCS suction from the Suppression Pool to the Condensate Storage Tanks (HPCS-V-15 was closed and HPCS-V-1 was re-opened).
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| The cause of this event is personnel error in that the Plant Control Room Operator involved failed to follow procedures.
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| Further corrective action consisted of counselling the Operator involved on procedural requirements and performance expectations, and including this LER for discussion during Licensed Operator Requalification Training.This event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or Plant personnel.
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| Plant Conditions Power Level-OX Plant Mode-4 (Cold Shutdown)Event Descri tion On June 2, 1991 at 0106 hours a High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS)System pump suction switchover from the Condensate Storage Tanks to the Suppression Pool occurred while the Plant was shutdown for maintenance.
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| The switchover occurred as the result of a Suppression Pool high water level condition.
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| Plant configuration at the time was such that HPCS suction was lined up to the Condensate Storage Tanks (CSTs)with CST Suction Valve HPCS-V-1 open and Suppression Pool Suction Valve HPCS-V-15 closed, the normal system lineup (reference Figure 1).The switchover, an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)actuation, was the automatic closure of HPCS-V-1 and the opening of HPCS-V-15.
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| During the event period, Plant Control Room Operators were lowering Reactor Vessel level through the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)"A" Heat Exchanger Vents to the Suppression Pool following Excess Flow Check (EFC)Valve testing.During this period the Suppression Pool high level alarm (annunciator) sealed in[the alarm annunciates at+0.5 inches (0.5 inches above normal pool level)j.Although the Plant Control Room Operator involved acknowledged and reset the alarm, he failed to take action to either lower Suppression Pool level, or manually switchover the HPCS suction valves as directed by procedure.
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| When Suppression Pool water volume reached approximately
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| +3.0 inches indicated level, the automatic transfer occurred.The Suppression Pool high level trip setpoint which would automatically cause a suction transfer is+5 inches.However, because the tolerance band (accuracy)for the level instrumentation is plus or minus two inches, the automatic transfer could occur as low as+3 inches or as high as+7 inches.The closure of HPCS-V-1 and the opening of HPCS-V-15 was by Plant design and Plant Control Room Operators took appropriate action to lower Suppression Pool level.NRC Form 3EEA (689)
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| )689)o LICENSEE EVW REPORT ILER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED 0MB NO.31600)04 EXP IR ES: 6/30/92 ATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS IN RMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 508)HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP430), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.
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| WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT)31500104).
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| OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NAME I1)Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TEXT///moro a>>co/s ror/Ir/)od, Irso sdde'ono/NRC Form 3664's/OT)DOCKET NUMBER I2I o s o o o3 97 1 LER NUMBER I6): SEQUENTIAL re REVISION N.'UMBER'O%NUMBER 015-0 0 PAGE I3I 0 3oF Immediate Corrective Action Plant Control Room Operators responded by taking action to lower Suppression Pool level and realigning the HPCS Suction from the Suppression Pool to the Condensate Storage Tanks (HPCS-V-15 was closed and HPCS-V-1 was re-opened).
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| Further Evaluation and Corrective Action A.Further Evaluation 1.This event is reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature.2.There were no structures, systems or components the were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event.3.The circuit operation is such that the HPCS switchover logic is designed to actuate based on either low Condensate Storage Tank or high Suppression Pool levels.Once initiated, the logic opens Suppression Pool Suction Valve HPCS-V-15.
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| When HPCS-V-15 is full open, design logic closes Condensate Storage Tank Suction Valve HPCS-V-1.These valves are interlocked in this manner to prevent losing suction to pump HPCS-P-l.There are two magnetically-activated float switches (HPCS-LS-2A and HPCS-LS-2B) that actuate on high Suppression Pool level.Because of the one-out-of-one logic, either switch can initiate opening of the Suppression Pool suction valve.The cause of this event is Personnel Error due to Lack of Attention/Concentration.
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| The Plant Control Room Operator involved failed to take appropriate and timely action to lower the Suppression Pool as directed by procedure when level is greater than+0.5 inches.Plant Annunciator Response Procedures (PPMs)4.601.All and 4.601.A12,"Annunciator Panel Alarms" for Suppression Pool Level, require that when level is greater than+0.5 inches, Plant Control Room Operators are to either lower Suppression Pool level by means of aligning the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)System to the radwaste system, or manually switchover the HPCS suction valves to preclude an inadvertent ESF actuation.
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| As a result of a previous event (LER 90-014), the procedure also included the caution that an automatic HPCS suction valve transfer could occur as early+3.0 inches due to instrument inaccuracy.
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| The Plant Control Room Operator involved was aware of this procedural guidance.When Suppression Pool water volume reached approximately
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| +3.0 inches indicated level, the automatic transfer occurred.NR C Form 366A)669)
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| (649)LICENSEE EV REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION Al'VISUVCO QMm I>U.elOVOlvm ExplREs: e/30/92 ATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS I~RMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P.530), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO 1HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504)04).
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| OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (6)SEOUENTIAL NUMBER PN REVISION (ssre: NUMSER PAGE (3)Washin ton Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TEXT///mare e/seem/s rer)lr/red, Iree eddni'one////IC
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| %%drm 366A'e/(17)0 5 0 0 0 3 7 9 1 1 5 0 0 0 4 OF 0 6 B.Further Corrective Action 1.The Plant Control Room Operator involved was counselled on procedural requirements and performance expectations.
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| 2.This LER will be included as a topic for discussion during the Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program.Safet Si nificance There is no safety significance associated with this event.All systems operated as designed to cause a HPCS System pump suction valve switchover on the high Suppression Pool water level condition.
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| In addition, there are no Suppression Pool high level restrictions during Operational Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown)because there is insufficient energy in the reactor during this condition to place significant loads on the containment.
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| Furthermore, Plant Control Room Operators responded by lowering the Suppression Pool and realigning the system to pre-event status.Accordingly, this event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or Plant personnel.
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| Similar Events LER 90-014,"High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS)System Pump Suction Valve Switchover Actuation on High Suppression Pool Level due to Procedural Inadequacy." EIIS Information EIIS Reference~Sstem High Pressure Core Spray(HPCS)
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| System BG~Com onent HPCS-V-1 HPCS-V-15 Excess Flow Check (EFC)Valve Suppression Pool Condensate Storage Tank HPCS-P-1 HPCS-L IS-2A BG BG NH KA BG BG TK LIS NRC Ferro 366A 1669)
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| (64)9)LICENSEE EV REPORT HLER)TEXT CONTINUATION Af'PKvvED vrrlB Nv.4lovs)iv>>EXP IR ES: 4/30/92 ATEO BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS I ORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50JI HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F430), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13(500104).
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| OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON.
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| OC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)DOCKET NUMBER (2I YEAR LER NUMBER (5)SEQUENTIAL NVMSER REVISION NUMBER PAGE (3)Washin ton Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TEXT/lf more 4Oese/s ser)rrlred, vse eddioone/NRC Form Si/64'4/(17)0 5 0 0 0 3 7 9 1 015 0 0 0 5 oF0 E I IS Information EIIS Reference HPCS-L IS-28 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)System RHR"A" Heat Exchanger~Sstem BG 80 80~Com onent LIS HX NRC Form 356A (669)
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| ~~~..gq~ICl Q~'4 0V QQm8I~RW~~
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| f}} | | f}} |
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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr ML17292B1111997-11-10010 November 1997 LER 97-011-00:on 971010,HPCS Battery Charger Failed.Caused by Failure of a Phase Firing Control Circuit Board Due to Aging During 7 Yrs of Use.Hpcs Sys Was Immediately Declared inoperable.W/971110 Ltr ML17292B1151997-11-0707 November 1997 LER 97-010-00:on 970906,discovered That TS SR 3.4.5.1 for Identified Portion of RCS Total Leakage Would Not Be Able to Perform within Time Limits of SR 3.0.2.Caused by Inadequate Methods.Method of Meeting SR 3.4.5.1 Established ML17292B0641997-09-24024 September 1997 LER 97-004-01:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Indication of Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail.Established Event Evaluation teams.W/970924 Ltr ML17292B0241997-08-18018 August 1997 LER 97-009-00:on 970717,discovered Error in Recently Performed Inservice Testing procedure,OSP-TIP/IST-R701. Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Plant Procedure OSP/TIP/IST-R701 Will Be changed.W/970818 Ltr ML17292B0291997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970716,wire Seal Used to Lock Containment Instrument Air Pressure Control valve,CIA-PCV-2B,found Not Intact.Cause of Misadjustment of CIA-PCV-2B Unknown.Event Will Be Communicated to Plant employees.W/970815 Ltr ML17292B0201997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-S01-00:on 970718,failure to Take Compensatory Measure for Inoperative Microwave Security Zone Occurred. Caused by Personnel Error.Training Will Be Conducted W/ Appropriate Members of Security force.W/970815 Ltr ML17292A9481997-07-23023 July 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970611,voluntary Rept of Automatic Start of DG-1 & DG-2 Was Experienced.Caused by Undervoltage Condition on Electrical Busses SM-7 & SM-8.Circulating Water Pump CW-P-1C Control Switch Placed in pull-to-lock.W/970723 Ltr ML17292A9201997-06-26026 June 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970527,non-performance of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.2 for Blind Fanges,Was Noted.Caused Because Misunderstanding of Intent of Specs.Added Five Structural Assemblies for SP.W/970626 Ltr ML17292A8331997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map Following Planned Trip of Single Mfp. Event Evaluation teams,established.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8311997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970327,valid Reactor Scram Signal Received Due to Low Water Level Condition During Preparations for SRV Testing.Caused by Risks & Consequences of Decisions Not Completely Identified.Restored Water level.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8251997-04-21021 April 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970320,notification of Noncompliance W/Ts as TS SRs for Response Time Testing Were Not Being Met for Specified Instrumentation in Rps,Pcis & Eccs.Requested Enforcement Discretion for One Time exemption.W/970421 Ltr ML17292A7431997-03-20020 March 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970218,determined That Rod Block Monitor (RBM) Calibr Values Were Not Set IAW Tech Specs.Caused by Calibr Procedures Inadequacies.Revised & re-performed RBM Channel Calibr procedures.W/970330 Ltr ML17292A7401997-03-13013 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970211,reactor Water Cleanup Sys Blowdown Flow Isolation Setpoint Was Slightly Above TS Allowable Valve Occurred Due to Calculation Error.Lds Fss LD-FS-15 LD-FS-16 Were Declared inoperable.W/970313 Ltr ML17292A6641997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-009-00:on 961220,miscalculation of Instantaneous Overcurrent Relay Settings Resulted in Inoperability of safety-related Equipment.Caused by Utilization of Inappropriate Design.Testing Was completed.W/970122 Ltr ML17292A6461997-01-0606 January 1997 LER 96-008-00:on 961205,failure to Comply with TS Action Requirement for Emergency Core Cooling Sys Actuation Instrumentation Occurred Due to Unidentified Inoperability Condition.Pmr initiated.W/970106 Ltr ML17292A6371996-12-19019 December 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 961122,electrical Breakers Were Not Seismically Qualified in Test/Disconnect Position.Circuit Breaker Mfg Did Not Consider Raced Out Breaker Position During Testing.Relocated Circuit breakers.W/961217 Ltr ML17292A4121996-08-0808 August 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960709,average Power Range Monitor Rod Block Downscale Surveillance Not Performed Prior to Entry Into Mode 1.Caused by long-standing Misinterpretation of Requirements of Tss.Procedures revised.W/960808 Ltr ML17292A3801996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-004-00:on 960624,plant Was Manually Scrammed by Control Room Personnel Due to Reactor Water Level Transient Experienced During Testing of Digital Feedwater Sys.Caused by Programming Error.Sys Was corrected.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3771996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960624,determined Missed Surveillance Test Re Channel Check of Average Power Range Monitor.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure Re When APRM Checks Must Be performed.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3641996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960615,required Surveillance Test Not Performed When Required by TS 3.4.1.3.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Implementing Surveillance Procedure & Reactor Plant Startup Procedures revised.W/960712 Ltr ML17292A3361996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960504,critical Bus SM-8 Lost Power When Supply Breaker 3-8 Tripped.Caused by Personnel Error. Operators Counselled & Procedures revised.W/960620 Ltr ML17292A2861996-05-24024 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960425,inadvertent ESF Actuations Occurred Due to Tripping of Temporary Power Supply to IN-3.Caused by Personnel Error.Operations Restored to IN-3 Loads & Reset ESF actuations.W/960524 Ltr ML17291B0891995-10-19019 October 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 950919,failed to Comply W/Ts SR for RCIC Sys Due to Analysis Deficiency That Resulted in Inadequate Surveillance Test Procedure.Surveillance Procedure Revised to Correct deficiency.W/951019 Ltr ML17291A9021995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950609,HPCS DG Declared Inoperable Due to Discovery That TS Test Method Incomplete.Caused by Inadequate Testing Procedure.Test Procedure for HPCS DG Reviewed & Special Test Procedures written.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A9031995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950607,inadvertent MSIV Closure Occurred During Surveillance Test Due to Poor Communication Between Test Team.Determined That MSIV Closure Not Valid Because Closure Not Triggered by Plant conditions.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A8501995-06-0808 June 1995 LER 95-006-01:on 950405,reactor Scram Occurred During Surveillance Testing Due to Protective Sys Relay Failure. Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant Startup ML17291A8101995-05-12012 May 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 940125,TS Wording Lead to Potential TS Violation.Caused by Lack of Clarity in Ts.Submitted Improved TS for Plant to Provide Addl clarity.W/950512 Ltr ML17291A7841995-05-0505 May 1995 LER 95-007-00:on 950222,emergency Diesel Start Occurred Due to Voltage Transient on BPA Grid.Confirmation Was Received at 17:51 H That Disturbance Had Originated in BPA Grid ML17291A7801995-05-0404 May 1995 LER 95-006-00:on 950405,main Turbine Trip Occurred During Performance of Surveillance Test Due to Protective Sys Relay Failed.Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant startup.W/950504 Ltr ML17291A7851995-05-0303 May 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950222,inoperable IRM Had Been Relied Upon to Meet TS Requirements During Reactor Startup.Caused by Lack of Neutron Source to Test Instrumentation. Sys Knowledge Gained Will Be incorporated.W/950503 Ltr ML17291A7071995-03-25025 March 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950226,malfunction in Main Turbine DEH Control Sys Caused All Four High Pressure Turbine Governor Valves to Rapidly Close.Caused by Blown Fuse.Suspected Faulty Circuit Card replaced.W/950325 Ltr ML17291A7011995-03-20020 March 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950218,automatic Reactor Scram Occurred. Caused by Erroneous Positioning of Control During Performance of Scheduled Periodic Functional Test.Control repositioned.W/950320 Ltr 1999-07-20
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr ML17292B1111997-11-10010 November 1997 LER 97-011-00:on 971010,HPCS Battery Charger Failed.Caused by Failure of a Phase Firing Control Circuit Board Due to Aging During 7 Yrs of Use.Hpcs Sys Was Immediately Declared inoperable.W/971110 Ltr ML17292B1151997-11-0707 November 1997 LER 97-010-00:on 970906,discovered That TS SR 3.4.5.1 for Identified Portion of RCS Total Leakage Would Not Be Able to Perform within Time Limits of SR 3.0.2.Caused by Inadequate Methods.Method of Meeting SR 3.4.5.1 Established ML17292B0641997-09-24024 September 1997 LER 97-004-01:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Indication of Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail.Established Event Evaluation teams.W/970924 Ltr ML17292B0241997-08-18018 August 1997 LER 97-009-00:on 970717,discovered Error in Recently Performed Inservice Testing procedure,OSP-TIP/IST-R701. Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Plant Procedure OSP/TIP/IST-R701 Will Be changed.W/970818 Ltr ML17292B0291997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970716,wire Seal Used to Lock Containment Instrument Air Pressure Control valve,CIA-PCV-2B,found Not Intact.Cause of Misadjustment of CIA-PCV-2B Unknown.Event Will Be Communicated to Plant employees.W/970815 Ltr ML17292B0201997-08-15015 August 1997 LER 97-S01-00:on 970718,failure to Take Compensatory Measure for Inoperative Microwave Security Zone Occurred. Caused by Personnel Error.Training Will Be Conducted W/ Appropriate Members of Security force.W/970815 Ltr ML17292A9481997-07-23023 July 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970611,voluntary Rept of Automatic Start of DG-1 & DG-2 Was Experienced.Caused by Undervoltage Condition on Electrical Busses SM-7 & SM-8.Circulating Water Pump CW-P-1C Control Switch Placed in pull-to-lock.W/970723 Ltr ML17292A9201997-06-26026 June 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970527,non-performance of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.2 for Blind Fanges,Was Noted.Caused Because Misunderstanding of Intent of Specs.Added Five Structural Assemblies for SP.W/970626 Ltr ML17292A8331997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map Following Planned Trip of Single Mfp. Event Evaluation teams,established.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8311997-04-28028 April 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970327,valid Reactor Scram Signal Received Due to Low Water Level Condition During Preparations for SRV Testing.Caused by Risks & Consequences of Decisions Not Completely Identified.Restored Water level.W/970428 Ltr ML17292A8251997-04-21021 April 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970320,notification of Noncompliance W/Ts as TS SRs for Response Time Testing Were Not Being Met for Specified Instrumentation in Rps,Pcis & Eccs.Requested Enforcement Discretion for One Time exemption.W/970421 Ltr ML17292A7431997-03-20020 March 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970218,determined That Rod Block Monitor (RBM) Calibr Values Were Not Set IAW Tech Specs.Caused by Calibr Procedures Inadequacies.Revised & re-performed RBM Channel Calibr procedures.W/970330 Ltr ML17292A7401997-03-13013 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970211,reactor Water Cleanup Sys Blowdown Flow Isolation Setpoint Was Slightly Above TS Allowable Valve Occurred Due to Calculation Error.Lds Fss LD-FS-15 LD-FS-16 Were Declared inoperable.W/970313 Ltr ML17292A6641997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-009-00:on 961220,miscalculation of Instantaneous Overcurrent Relay Settings Resulted in Inoperability of safety-related Equipment.Caused by Utilization of Inappropriate Design.Testing Was completed.W/970122 Ltr ML17292A6461997-01-0606 January 1997 LER 96-008-00:on 961205,failure to Comply with TS Action Requirement for Emergency Core Cooling Sys Actuation Instrumentation Occurred Due to Unidentified Inoperability Condition.Pmr initiated.W/970106 Ltr ML17292A6371996-12-19019 December 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 961122,electrical Breakers Were Not Seismically Qualified in Test/Disconnect Position.Circuit Breaker Mfg Did Not Consider Raced Out Breaker Position During Testing.Relocated Circuit breakers.W/961217 Ltr ML17292A4121996-08-0808 August 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960709,average Power Range Monitor Rod Block Downscale Surveillance Not Performed Prior to Entry Into Mode 1.Caused by long-standing Misinterpretation of Requirements of Tss.Procedures revised.W/960808 Ltr ML17292A3801996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-004-00:on 960624,plant Was Manually Scrammed by Control Room Personnel Due to Reactor Water Level Transient Experienced During Testing of Digital Feedwater Sys.Caused by Programming Error.Sys Was corrected.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3771996-07-24024 July 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960624,determined Missed Surveillance Test Re Channel Check of Average Power Range Monitor.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure Re When APRM Checks Must Be performed.W/960724 Ltr ML17292A3641996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960615,required Surveillance Test Not Performed When Required by TS 3.4.1.3.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Implementing Surveillance Procedure & Reactor Plant Startup Procedures revised.W/960712 Ltr ML17292A3361996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960504,critical Bus SM-8 Lost Power When Supply Breaker 3-8 Tripped.Caused by Personnel Error. Operators Counselled & Procedures revised.W/960620 Ltr ML17292A2861996-05-24024 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960425,inadvertent ESF Actuations Occurred Due to Tripping of Temporary Power Supply to IN-3.Caused by Personnel Error.Operations Restored to IN-3 Loads & Reset ESF actuations.W/960524 Ltr ML17291B0891995-10-19019 October 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 950919,failed to Comply W/Ts SR for RCIC Sys Due to Analysis Deficiency That Resulted in Inadequate Surveillance Test Procedure.Surveillance Procedure Revised to Correct deficiency.W/951019 Ltr ML17291A9021995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950609,HPCS DG Declared Inoperable Due to Discovery That TS Test Method Incomplete.Caused by Inadequate Testing Procedure.Test Procedure for HPCS DG Reviewed & Special Test Procedures written.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A9031995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950607,inadvertent MSIV Closure Occurred During Surveillance Test Due to Poor Communication Between Test Team.Determined That MSIV Closure Not Valid Because Closure Not Triggered by Plant conditions.W/950707 Ltr ML17291A8501995-06-0808 June 1995 LER 95-006-01:on 950405,reactor Scram Occurred During Surveillance Testing Due to Protective Sys Relay Failure. Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant Startup ML17291A8101995-05-12012 May 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 940125,TS Wording Lead to Potential TS Violation.Caused by Lack of Clarity in Ts.Submitted Improved TS for Plant to Provide Addl clarity.W/950512 Ltr ML17291A7841995-05-0505 May 1995 LER 95-007-00:on 950222,emergency Diesel Start Occurred Due to Voltage Transient on BPA Grid.Confirmation Was Received at 17:51 H That Disturbance Had Originated in BPA Grid ML17291A7801995-05-0404 May 1995 LER 95-006-00:on 950405,main Turbine Trip Occurred During Performance of Surveillance Test Due to Protective Sys Relay Failed.Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant startup.W/950504 Ltr ML17291A7851995-05-0303 May 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950222,inoperable IRM Had Been Relied Upon to Meet TS Requirements During Reactor Startup.Caused by Lack of Neutron Source to Test Instrumentation. Sys Knowledge Gained Will Be incorporated.W/950503 Ltr ML17291A7071995-03-25025 March 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950226,malfunction in Main Turbine DEH Control Sys Caused All Four High Pressure Turbine Governor Valves to Rapidly Close.Caused by Blown Fuse.Suspected Faulty Circuit Card replaced.W/950325 Ltr ML17291A7011995-03-20020 March 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950218,automatic Reactor Scram Occurred. Caused by Erroneous Positioning of Control During Performance of Scheduled Periodic Functional Test.Control repositioned.W/950320 Ltr 1999-07-20
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17284A9001999-10-31031 October 1999 Rev 0 to COLR 99-15, WNP-2 Cycle 15,COLR GO2-99-177, LER 99-S01-00:on 990903,failure to Take Compensatory Measure within Required Time Upon Failure of Isolation Zone Microwave Unit,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Provided Refresher Training on Compensatory Measures.With1999-10-0101 October 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990903,failure to Take Compensatory Measure within Required Time Upon Failure of Isolation Zone Microwave Unit,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Provided Refresher Training on Compensatory Measures.With ML17284A8941999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for WNP-2.With 991012 Ltr ML17284A8801999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for WNP-2.With 990910 Ltr ML17284A8691999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for WNP-2.With 990813 Ltr ML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr ML17292B7271999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for WNP-2.With 990707 Ltr ML17292B6961999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for WNP-2.With 990608 Ltr ML17292B6641999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for WNP-2.With 990507 Ltr ML17292B6391999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for WNP-2.With 990413 Ltr ML17292B5871999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for WNP-2.With 990311 Ltr ML17292B5571999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for WNP-2.With 990210 Ltr ML17292B5621999-01-31031 January 1999 Rev 1 to COLR 98-14, WNP-2 Cycle 14 Colr. ML17292B5341999-01-15015 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Incorrect Modeling of BWR Lower Plenum Vol in Bison.Defect Applies Only to Reload Fuel Assemblies Currently in Operation at WNP-2.BISON Code Model for WNP-2 Has Been Revised to Correct Error ML17292B5331999-01-15015 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re XL-S96 CPR Correlation for SVEA-96 Fuel. Defect Applies Only to WNP-2,during Cycles 12,13 & 14 Operation.Evaluations of Defect Performed by ABB-CE ML17292B4791998-12-31031 December 1998 Washington Public Power Supply Sys 1998 Annual Rept. with 981215 Ltr ML17292B5351998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for WNP-2.With 990112 Ltr ML17292B5741998-12-31031 December 1998 WNP-2 1998 Annual Operating Rept. with 990225 Ltr ML17284A8231998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for WNP-2.With 981207 Ltr ML17284A8081998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for WNP-2.With 981110 Ltr ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr ML17284A7831998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for WNP-2.With 981007 Ltr ML17284A7491998-09-10010 September 1998 WNP-2 Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Refueling Outage RF13 Spring,1998. ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr ML17284A7681998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for WNP-2.With 980915 Ltr ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr ML17284A7261998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for WNP-2.W/980810 Ltr ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr ML17284A6751998-06-30030 June 1998 Ro:On 980617,flooding of RB Northeast Stairwell with Consequential Flooding of Two ECCS Pump Rooms.Caused by Inadequate Fire Protection Sys Design.Pumped Out Water from Affected Areas to Point Below Berm Areas of Pump Rooms ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr ML17284A6491998-05-31031 May 1998 Rev 0 to COLR 98-14, WNP-2,Cycle 14 Colr. ML17292B4031998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for WNP-2.W/980608 Ltr ML17292B3921998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for WNP-2.W/980513 Ltr ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D ML17292B3371998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for WNP-2.W/980409 Ltr ML17292B2641998-03-0404 March 1998 Performance Self Assessment,WNP-2. ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr ML17292B2911998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for WNP-2.W/980313 Ltr ML17284A7971998-02-17017 February 1998 Rev 28 to Operational QA Program Description, WPPSS-QA-004.With Proposed Rev 29 ML17292B3591998-02-12012 February 1998 WNP-2 Cycle 14 Reload Design Rept. 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
l, REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9107050214 DOC.DATE: 91/06/28, NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ARBUCKLE,J.D. Washington Public Power Supply System BAKER,J.W. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
SUBJECT:
LER 91-015-00:on 910602,high HPCS sys pump suction switchover from condensate storage tanks to suppression pool D occurred. Caused by personnel error. Operator involved ack &
reset alarm. W/910628 ltr.
DISTRIBUTION CODE IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ( ENCL I SIZE TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc. /
NOTES: A RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES D ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 D ENG, P. L. 1 1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/ECMB 9H 1 1 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB8H3 1 1 N~D LB8D1 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1 REG FILE 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 LE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G BRYCE,J.H 3 3 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NSIC POORE,W. 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 D
D D
NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE ~VASTE! CONI ACT fHE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. X079) TO i'LIMINAI E YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
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ai ~
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99352 G02-91-125 Docket No. 50-397 June 28, 1991 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.91-015
Dear Sir:
Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.91-015 for the WNP-2 Plant.
This report is submitted in response to the report requirements oF lOCFR50,73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.
Very truly yours, J.W. Baker (M/D 927M)
WNP-2 Plant Manager JWB:ac
Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report No.91-015 cc: Hr. John B. Martin, NRC Region V Hr. C. J. Bosted, NRC Site (M/D 901A)
INPO Records Center Atlanta, GA Hs. Dottie Sherman, ANI Hr. D. L. Williams, BPA (H/D 399)
'~1070502) g PDR ADOCK O.,ot43O7
, PDR
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR 4EGULATORY COMMISSION (668) APPROVEO OMB NO. 3)SOO(04 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 I'IMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECOADS AND AEPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F630), U.S. NUCLEAR RFGULATOAY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE 3 Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 39 71 oF 06 TITLE (4)
High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System Pump Suction Valve Switchover Actuation on Hi h Su ression Pool Level due to Personnel Error FVENT DATE(5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR gart SEQUENTIAL REVIStGN MONTH OAY YEAR FACILITYNAMFS DOCKET NUMBER(S)
NUMBER 0 5 0 0 0 0 2 1 9 1 1 5 0 0 89 1 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T0 THE 4LQUIREMENTS OF 10 CF 4 (): /Chrch one or morr of the Iollovrinp/ (11)
OPERATING MODE (8) 4 20.402(8) 20.405(cl 60.73(al(2)(iv) 73.71(II)
POWER 20A05( ~ l(1) (I) 6048(cl(1 I 50,73(a)(2)(v)l(vill)(A) 73.71(cl LEYEL 0 0 20.405 (a ) (I ) (ii) 50.38(c)(2) 50,73(a)(2)(vill OTHER /Sprcily /n Attttrect INlovr rnd In Tent, NRC Form 20.405(a l(1) (iii) 50.73(a ) (2) Ii) 50.73(v ) (2 36$ A/
ra((arpr)L/t 20AOS( ~ )(1)(iv) 50.73(a) (2) (8) 50.73(al(2)(viiil(B) 20A05 (a I (1)(vl 60.73(a l (2)(iii) 50.73( ~ ) (2)(a I LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMSFR AREA CODE J. D. Arbuckle Com liance En ineer 5 0 3 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESC4IBED IN THIS 4EPORT (13) p" P?n birr ".n3.
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC. EPORTABLE i@5K~r@P44 4~< CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC EPORTABLE TUAER TO NPRDS g?PM)@~ TUAER TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED MONTH IÃ% DAY YEAR SUBMISSION DATE (15I YES IIIyrL comPlrtr EXPECTED SIIShtISSIOII DATE/ NO ABST4ACT /Limit to te00 tprcrt, I r., rpproalmrtrly Iiltren tlnprr.apecr typrvrritNn linml (18)
On June 2, 1991 at 0106 hours0.00123 days <br />0.0294 hours <br />1.752645e-4 weeks <br />4.0333e-5 months <br /> while the Plant was shutdown for maintenance, a High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System pump suction switchover from the Condensate Storage Tanks to the Suppression Pool occurred due to a Suppression Pool high water level condition.
Plant configuration at the time was such that HPCS suction was lined up to the Condensate Storage Tanks (CSTs) with CST Suction Valve HPCS-V-1 open and Suppression Pool Suction Valve HPCS-V-15 closed, the normal system lineup (reference Figure 1).
The switchover, an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF ) actuation, was the automatic closure of HPCS-V-1 and the opening of HPCS-V-15.
During the event period, Plant Control Room Operators were lowering Reactor Vessel level through the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) HAH Heat Exchanger Vents to the Suppression Pool following excess Flow Check (EFC) Valve testing. During this period the Suppression Pool high level alarm annunciator had sealed in [the alarm annunciates at +0.5 inches (0.5 inches above normal pool level)j. However, after acknowledging and resetting the alarm, a Plant Control Room Operator failed to take action to either lower Suppression Pool level or manually switchover the HPCS suction valves as directed by procedure. When Suppression Pool water volume reached approximately +3.0 inches indicated level, the automatic switchover occurred.
NRC Form 386 (6691
APPROVED OMB NO. 3)500104 (64)9)
EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EV REPORT (LER) IN RMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50A) HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P4)30), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO 1HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504))04). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITYNAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION iS@ NUMBER 'A$> NUMSEIl Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 o s o o o 3 79 1 015 0 00 2oF 0 6 TEXT /I/ moro opooo /4 ror/o/rod, ooo oddio'ooo///RC Form 36543/ (12)
Abstract (continued)
As an immediate corrective action Plant Control Room Operators took action to lower Suppression Pool level and then realigned the HPCS suction from the Suppression Pool to the Condensate Storage Tanks (HPCS-V-15 was closed and HPCS-V-1 was re-opened).
The cause of this event is personnel error in that the Plant Control Room Operator involved failed to follow procedures. Further corrective action consisted of counselling the Operator involved on procedural requirements and performance expectations, and including this LER for discussion during Licensed Operator Requalification Training.
This event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or Plant personnel.
Plant Conditions Power Level - OX Plant Mode - 4 (Cold Shutdown)
Event Descri tion On June 2, 1991 at 0106 hours0.00123 days <br />0.0294 hours <br />1.752645e-4 weeks <br />4.0333e-5 months <br /> a High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System pump suction switchover from the Condensate Storage Tanks to the Suppression Pool occurred while the Plant was shutdown for maintenance. The switchover occurred as the result of a Suppression Pool high water level condition.
Plant configuration at the time was such that HPCS suction was lined up to the Condensate Storage Tanks (CSTs) with CST Suction Valve HPCS-V-1 open and Suppression Pool Suction Valve HPCS-V-15 closed, the normal system lineup (reference Figure 1).
The switchover, an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation, was the automatic closure of HPCS-V-1 and the opening of HPCS-V-15.
During the event period, Plant Control Room Operators were lowering Reactor Vessel level through the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) "A" Heat Exchanger Vents to the Suppression Pool following Excess Flow Check (EFC) Valve testing. During this period the Suppression Pool high level alarm (annunciator) sealed in [the alarm annunciates at + 0.5 inches (0.5 inches above normal pool level)j. Although the Plant Control Room Operator involved acknowledged and reset the alarm, he failed to take action to either lower Suppression Pool level, or manually switchover the HPCS suction valves as directed by procedure. When Suppression Pool water volume reached approximately +3.0 inches indicated level, the automatic transfer occurred. The Suppression Pool high level trip setpoint which would automatically cause a suction transfer is +5 inches. However, because the tolerance band (accuracy ) for the level instrumentation is plus or minus two inches, the automatic transfer could occur as low as +3 inches or as high as +7 inches.
The closure of HPCS-V-1 and the opening of HPCS-V-15 was by Plant design and Plant Control Room Operators took appropriate action to lower Suppression Pool level.
NRC Form 3EEA (689)
)689) APPROVED 0MB NO. 31600)04 o EXP IR ES: 6/30/92 LICENSEE EVW REPORT ILER) ATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS IN RMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 508) HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT )31500104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME I1) DOCKET NUMBER I2I LER NUMBER I6) PAGE I3I
- SEQUENTIAL N.'UMBER 'O% re REVISION NUMBER Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 o s o o o3 97 1 015 0 0 0 3oF TEXT /// moro a>>co /s ror/Ir/)od, Irso sdde'ono/NRC Form 3664's/ OT)
Immediate Corrective Action Plant Control Room Operators responded by taking action to lower Suppression Pool level and realigning the HPCS Suction from the Suppression Pool to the Condensate Storage Tanks (HPCS-V-15 was closed and HPCS-V-1 was re-opened).
Further Evaluation and Corrective Action A. Further Evaluation
- 1. This event is reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature.
- 2. There were no structures, systems or components the were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event.
- 3. The circuit operation is such that the HPCS switchover logic is designed to actuate based on either low Condensate Storage Tank or high Suppression Pool levels. Once initiated, the logic opens Suppression Pool Suction Valve HPCS-V-15. When HPCS-V-15 is full open, design logic closes Condensate Storage Tank Suction Valve HPCS-V-1. These valves are interlocked in this manner to prevent losing suction to pump HPCS-P-l.
There are two magnetically-activated float switches (HPCS-LS-2A and HPCS-LS-2B) that actuate on high Suppression Pool level. Because of the one-out-of-one logic, either switch can initiate opening of the Suppression Pool suction valve.
The cause of this event is Personnel Error due to Lack of Attention/Concentration. The Plant Control Room Operator involved failed to take appropriate and timely action to lower the Suppression Pool as directed by procedure when level is greater than +0.5 inches. Plant Annunciator Response Procedures (PPMs) 4.601.All and 4.601.A12, "Annunciator Panel Alarms" for Suppression Pool Level, require that when level is greater than +0.5 inches, Plant Control Room Operators are to either lower Suppression Pool level by means of aligning the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System to the radwaste system, or manually switchover the HPCS suction valves to preclude an inadvertent ESF actuation. As a result of a previous event (LER 90-014), the procedure also included the caution that an automatic HPCS suction valve transfer could occur as early +3.0 inches due to instrument inaccuracy. The Plant Control Room Operator involved was aware of this procedural guidance. When Suppression Pool water volume reached approximately +3.0 inches indicated level, the automatic transfer occurred.
NR C Form 366A )669)
(649) Al'VISUVCO QMm I>U. elOVOlvm ExplREs: e/30/92 ATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EV REPORT (LER) I~RMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P.530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO 1HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504)04). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
SEOUENTIAL NUMBER PN (ssre:
REVISION NUMSER Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 7 9 1 1 5 0 0 0 4 OF 0 6 TEXT /// mare e/seem /s rer)lr/red, Iree eddni'one////IC %%drm 366A'e/ (17)
B. Further Corrective Action
- 1. The Plant Control Room Operator involved was counselled on procedural requirements and performance expectations.
- 2. This LER will be included as a topic for discussion during the Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program.
Safet Si nificance There is no safety significance associated with this event. All systems operated as designed to cause a HPCS System pump suction valve switchover on the high Suppression Pool water level condition. In addition, there are no Suppression Pool high level restrictions during Operational Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) because there is insufficient energy in the reactor during this condition to place significant loads on the containment. Furthermore, Plant Control Room Operators responded by lowering the Suppression Pool and realigning the system to pre-event status. Accordingly, this event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or Plant personnel.
Similar Events LER 90-014, "High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System Pump Suction Valve Switchover Actuation on High Suppression Pool Level due to Procedural Inadequacy."
EIIS Information EIIS Reference
~Sstem ~Com onent High Pressure Core Spray(HPCS) System BG HPCS-V-1 BG HPCS-V-15 BG Excess Flow Check (EFC) Valve Suppression Pool NH Condensate Storage Tank KA TK HPCS-P-1 BG HPCS-L IS-2A BG LIS NRC Ferro 366A 1669)
Af'PKvvED vrrlB Nv. 4lovs)iv>>
(64)9)
EXP IR ES: 4/30/92 ATEO BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EV REPORT HLER) I ORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50JI HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13(500104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON. OC 20503.
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2I LER NUMBER (5) PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR NVMSER NUMBER Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 7 9 1 015 0 0 0 5 oF0 TEXT /lfmore 4Oese /s ser)rrlred, vse eddioone/ NRC Form Si/64'4/ (17)
E I IS Information EIIS Reference
~Sstem ~Com onent HPCS-L IS-28 BG LIS Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System 80 RHR "A" Heat Exchanger 80 HX NRC Form 356A (669)
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