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{{#Wiki_filter:--TS 3.7-2a 3. The requirements of Specification 3.0.1 and 6.6.2 are not applicable.
{{#Wiki_filter:TS 3.7-2a
F. The accident monitoring instrumentation for its associated operable components listed in TS Table 3.7-6 shall be operable in accordance with the following:
: 3. The requirements of Specification 3.0.1 and 6.6.2 are not applicable.
: 1. With the number of operable accident monitoring tation channels less than the total number of channels shown in TS Table 3.7-6, either restore the inoperable channel ( s) to operable status within 7 days or be in at least hot shutdown within the next 12 hours. 2. With the number of operable accident monitoring tation channels less than the minimum channels operable requirement of TS Table 3.7-6, either restore the able channel(s) to operable status within 48 hours or be in at least hot shutdown within the next 12 hours. 8806170023 880610 PDR ADOC~~ 05000:280 p DCD e TS 3.7-9b control room. The supply lines installed from the containment penetrations to the hydrogen analyzers have Category 1 Class IE heat tracing applied. The heat tracing system receives the same transferable emergency power as is provided to the containment hydrogen analyzers.
F. The accident monitoring instrumentation for its     associated operable components listed in TS Table 3.7-6 shall be operable in accordance with the following:
The heat trace system is de-energized during normal system operation.
: 1. With the number of operable accident monitoring instrumen-tation channels less than the total number of channels shown in TS Table 3.7-6, either restore the inoperable channel ( s) to operable status within 7 days or be in at least hot shutdown within the next 12 hours.
Upon receipt of a safety injection signal (Train A or Train B), the system is automatically started, after a preset time delay, to bring the piping process temperature to 250°F +/- 10°F within 20 minutes. Each heat trace circuit is equipped with an RTD to provide individual circuit readout, over temperature alarm and cycles the circuit to maintain the process temperature via the sol id state control modules. The hydrogen analyzer heat trace system is equipped with high temperature, loss of D.C. power, loss of A.C. power, loss of control power and failure of automatic initiation alarms.
: 2. With the number of operable accident monitoring instrumen-tation channels less than the minimum channels operable requirement of TS Table 3.7-6, either restore the inoper-able channel(s) to operable status within 48 hours or be in at least hot shutdown within the next 12 hours.
I--I e TS 3.7-22 TABLE DELETED PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK I j
- -
: 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. TABIE 4.1-1 (Continued)
8806170023 880610 PDR ADOC~~ 05000:280 p               DCD
MINIMUM FREXXJENCIES FOR Clll'XX. CALIBRATIONS .AND TEST OF INSmlJMENl' rnANNEI.S Channel Description Check calibrate Test Remarks loss of Power a. 4.16 1W Eme:rgency Bus Under-N.A. R M voltage (loss of voltage) b. 4 .16 1W Eme:rgency Bus Under-N.A. R M voltage (Degraded voltage) Deleted Manual Reactor Trip N.A. N.A. R The test shall independently verify the operability of the undervoltage and shunt trip attacinnents for the manual reactor trip function.
 
The test shall also verify the operability of the bypass breaker trip circuit. Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker N.A. N.A. M(l), R(2) (1) IDcal manual undervoltage trip prior to placing breaker in service. (2) Automatic shunt trip. Safety Injection Input from FSF N.A. N.A. R Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker N.A. N.A. R Position Trip Stearn/Feedwater Flow and low s R M S/G Water I.evel s -Each shift M -Monthly D -Daily P -Prior to each startup if not done within the N.A. -Not Applicable previous week Q -Every 90 effective full power days R -Each Refueling Shutdown
e           TS 3.7-9b control room.
* See Specification 4.1.D --l V) ..i::,. ,__. I CX> llJ ATIACHMENT 2 Safety Evaluation e DISCUSSION The Sewage Treatment Plant Modification project is presently replacing the existing sewage disinfection system with a new type of system which does not require chlorine gas. Upon completion of this project, the existing chlorine gas stored on site will be removed. The sewage treatment plant was the only source of chlorine gas which could cause Control Room habitability concerns based on the NUS Corporation Report No. 3735 (Volumes 1 and 2), entitled "Surry Onsite Toxic Chemical Release Analysis" and "Surry Offsite Toxic Chemical Release Analysis." These studies were submitted to the NRC on January 19, 1981, June 30, 1981, and December 9, 1981, in response to NUREG-0737, Item 111.D.3.4.
The supply lines installed from the containment penetrations to the hydrogen analyzers have Category 1 Class IE heat tracing applied.
The resulting NRC Safety Evaluation was issued on June 28, 1982. The chlorine sensors (SNSRA and SNSRB), analyzers (CLA-VA-lOOA and CLA-VA-100B), and the associated annunciation points and damper controls were originally installed, placed in operation, and required by Technical Specifications based on the risk identified with a chlorine release from the storage facility located at the sewage treatment pl ant. The removal of this source of chlorine gas eliminates such a risk. Therefore, compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.95, "Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine Release" and Criteria 19, "Control Room," of Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50 would not be affected by the proposed change to remove the chlorine detectors.
The heat tracing system receives the same transferable emergency power as is provided to the containment hydrogen analyzers.         The heat trace system is de-energized during normal       system operation.
The removal of the chlorine monitors eliminates the interconnections between the chlorine monitors and the Control Room's normal ventilation intake and exhaust dampers, and the high chlorine level alarm on the ventilation system annunciator in the Control Room. The chlorine monitor's operation, requirements and interconnection with the Control Room normal ventilation intake and exhaust dampers, and the chlorine level alarm annunciator, are listed in UFSAR Section 9.13.3.6, Control Room and Relay Room Ventilation.
Upon receipt of a safety injection signal (Train A or Train B), the system is automatically started, after a preset time delay, to bring the piping process temperature to 250°F +/- 10°F within 20 minutes.
-------------------------------------
Each heat   trace circuit   is   equipped with an   RTD to provide individual circuit readout, over temperature alarm and cycles the circuit to maintain the process temperature via the sol id state control modules.
The hydrogen   analyzer heat   trace system is equipped with high temperature, loss of D.C. power, loss of A.C. power, loss of control power and failure of automatic initiation alarms.
 
I--
e TS 3.7-22 TABLE DELETED PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK j
 
TABIE 4.1-1 (Continued)
MINIMUM FREXXJENCIES FOR Clll'XX. CALIBRATIONS .AND TEST OF INSmlJMENl' rnANNEI.S Channel Description                 Check     calibrate       Test                 Remarks
: 33. loss of Power
: a. 4.16 1W Eme:rgency Bus Under-       N.A.             R         M voltage   (loss of voltage)
: b. 4 .16 1W Eme:rgency Bus Under-       N.A.             R         M voltage   (Degraded voltage) 34.
35.
Deleted Manual Reactor Trip                       N.A.           N.A.       R       The test shall independently verify the operability of the undervoltage and shunt trip
                                                                                                                      -
attacinnents for the manual reactor trip function. The test shall also verify the operability of the bypass breaker trip circuit.
: 36. Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker               N.A.           N.A. M(l), R(2)   (1) IDcal manual undervoltage trip prior to placing breaker in service.
(2) Automatic shunt trip.
: 37. Safety Injection Input from FSF           N.A.           N.A.       R
: 38. Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker             N.A.           N.A.       R Position Trip
: 39. Stearn/Feedwater Flow and low             s               R         M
                                                                                                                  -l S/G Water I.evel                                                                                             V)
                                                                                                                  ..i::,.
                                                                                                                  ,__.
s     - Each shift                                   M - Monthly CX>
I D     - Daily                                       P - Prior to each startup if not done within the         llJ N.A. - Not Applicable                                     previous week Q     - Every 90 effective full power days           R - Each Refueling Shutdown
* See Specification 4.1.D
 
ATIACHMENT 2 Safety Evaluation
 
e DISCUSSION The Sewage Treatment Plant Modification project is presently replacing the existing sewage disinfection system with a new type of system which does not require chlorine gas. Upon completion of this project, the existing chlorine gas stored on site will be removed. The sewage treatment plant was the only source of chlorine gas which could cause Control Room habitability concerns based on the NUS Corporation Report No. 3735 (Volumes 1 and 2), entitled "Surry Onsite Toxic Chemical Release Analysis" and "Surry Offsite Toxic Chemical Release Analysis." These studies were submitted to the NRC on January 19, 1981, June 30, 1981, and December 9, 1981, in response to NUREG-0737, Item 111.D.3.4. The resulting NRC Safety Evaluation was issued on June 28, 1982.
The chlorine sensors (SNSRA and SNSRB), analyzers (CLA-VA-lOOA and CLA-VA-100B), and the associated annunciation points and damper controls were originally installed, placed in operation, and required by Technical Specifications based on the risk identified with a chlorine release from the storage facility located at the sewage treatment pl ant. The removal of this source of chlorine gas eliminates such a risk. Therefore, compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.95, "Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine Release" and Criteria 19, "Control Room," of Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50 would not be affected by the proposed change to remove the chlorine detectors.
The removal of the chlorine monitors eliminates the interconnections between the chlorine monitors and the Control Room's normal ventilation intake and exhaust dampers, and the high chlorine level alarm on the ventilation system annunciator in the Control Room.         The chlorine monitor's operation, requirements and interconnection with the Control Room normal ventilation intake and exhaust dampers, and the chlorine level alarm annunciator, are listed in UFSAR Section 9.13.3.6, Control Room and Relay Room Ventilation.
 
  ~
REVIEW OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The proposed removal of the chlorine monitoring system would have impact on the following Technical Specifications:
REVIEW OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The proposed removal of the chlorine monitoring system would have impact on the following Technical Specifications:
Technical Specification Section 3.19 requires one of the redundant Main Control Room bottled air systems to remain in service. If both bottled air systems are removed from service, one system is required to be back in service within eight (8) hours or the Station will be required to be placed in the hot shutdown condition in accordance with Technical Specification 3.19, Sections A and B. The chlorine monitors to be removed are energized by two separate 120 VAC vital power supplies which also supply power for the bottled air systems. During the removal of the chlorine monitors, the vital bus circuits will be temporarily de-energized which will remove the bottled air systems from service. The monitors will be removed one at a time to avoid removing both bottled air systems from service simultaneously.
Technical Specification Section 3.19 requires one of the redundant Main Control Room bottled air systems to remain in service. If both bottled air systems are removed from service, one system is required to be back in service within eight (8) hours or the Station will be required to be placed in the hot shutdown condition in accordance with Technical Specification 3.19, Sections A and B. The chlorine monitors to be removed are energized by two separate 120 VAC vital power supplies which also supply power for the bottled air systems.
Technical Specification Section 3.19 is not required to be revised since the requirements or equipment listed in Section 3.19 will not be modified.
During the removal of the chlorine monitors, the vital bus circuits will be temporarily de-energized which will remove the bottled air systems from service. The monitors will be removed one at a time to avoid removing both bottled air systems from service simultaneously. Technical Specification Section 3.19 is not required to be revised since the requirements or equipment listed in Section 3.19 will not be modified.
Technical Specifications Section 3.7 and Tables 3.7-7 and 4.1-1 include: specifications; basis; descriptions; instrument operating conditions; and frequency for, checking, calibration and testing for the Main Contra l Room chlorine monitors.
Technical Specifications Section 3.7 and Tables 3.7-7 and 4.1-1 include:
These Technical Specifications require revision to delete the references to the chlorine monitors being removed from service. The requirements for chlorine detection listed in Section 3.7 will be no longer applicable since the source of chlorine gas will have been eliminated.
specifications; basis; descriptions; instrument operating conditions; and frequency for, checking, calibration and testing for the Main Contra l Room chlorine monitors. These Technical Specifications require revision to delete the references to the chlorine monitors being removed from service. The requirements for chlorine detection listed in Section 3.7 will be no longer applicable since the source of chlorine gas will have been eliminated.
SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Following the removal of the source of chlorine gas, the subsequent removal of the control room chlorine monitors poses no significant hazard as defined in 10 CFR 50.92. a. The implementation of this modification does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Following the removal of the source of chlorine gas, the subsequent removal of the control room chlorine monitors poses no significant hazard as defined in 10 CFR 50.92.
The Control Room chlorine monitors provide an alarm and control of the Control Room isolation dampers in the event of chlorine gas release creating a hazardous environment in the Control Room. As identified in our 1981 NUREG-0737, Item III.D.3.4, submittals, the sewage treatment plant is the only regulatory significant source of chlorine gas from which a release could cause Control Room habitability concerns.
: a. The implementation of this modification does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The Control Room chlorine monitors provide an alarm and control of the Control Room isolation dampers in the event of chlorine gas release creating a hazardous environment in the Control Room. As identified in our 1981 NUREG-0737, Item III.D.3.4, submittals, the sewage treatment plant is the only regulatory significant source of chlorine gas from which a release could cause Control Room habitability concerns.
Chlorine gas storage at the sewage treatment plant is being eliminated.
Chlorine gas storage at the sewage treatment plant is being eliminated.
Based on our previous studies, the chlorine gas release which could adversely affect Control Room habitability will be eliminated after removal of the chlorine gas storage from the site. The chlorine monitors are then no longer required since the chlorine gas source will have been eliminated.
Based on our previous studies, the chlorine gas release which could adversely affect Control Room habitability will be eliminated after removal of the chlorine gas storage from the site. The chlorine monitors are then no longer required since the chlorine gas source will have been eliminated. The chlorine monitors can be removed and the associated modifications can be completed without increasing the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The chlorine monitors can be removed and the associated modifications can be completed without increasing the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
: b. The implementation of this modification does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The monitors are very specific in that they detect the presence of chlorine. The source of chlorine gas will be removed prior to the removal of the chlorine monitors. The associated modifications to the ventilation system damper controls and annunciator will eliminate unnecessary alarms and damper controls. These modifications will not change the function of or impinge upon any other existing safety system.
: b. The implementation of this modification does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
: c. The implementation of this modification does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed removal of the chlorine monitors is a result of eliminating the presence of chlorine gas.
The monitors are very specific in that they detect the presence of chlorine.
Eliminating the source of chlorine gas from the site eliminates the need to depend on equipment to monitor for and initiate safety systems based on detection of chlorine.
The source of chlorine gas will be removed prior to the removal of the chlorine monitors.
 
The associated modifications to the ventilation system damper controls and annunciator will eliminate unnecessary alarms and damper controls.
..._...
These modifications will not change the function of or impinge upon any other existing safety system. c. The implementation of this modification does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed removal of the chlorine monitors is a result of eliminating the presence of chlorine gas. Eliminating the source of chlorine gas from the site eliminates the need to depend on equipment to monitor for and initiate safety systems based on detection of chlorine.
e              e ATIACHMENT 3 Voucher Check}}
... _ ... e ATIACHMENT 3 Voucher Check e}}

Revision as of 01:05, 21 October 2019

Proposed Tech Specs,Deleting Requirements for & Refs to Control Room Chlorine Monitoring Sys
ML18152A941
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 06/10/1988
From:
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML18152A940 List:
References
NUDOCS 8806170023
Download: ML18152A941 (9)
v • d • e


Text

TS 3.7-2a

3. The requirements of Specification 3.0.1 and 6.6.2 are not applicable.

F. The accident monitoring instrumentation for its associated operable components listed in TS Table 3.7-6 shall be operable in accordance with the following:

1. With the number of operable accident monitoring instrumen-tation channels less than the total number of channels shown in TS Table 3.7-6, either restore the inoperable channel ( s) to operable status within 7 days or be in at least hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
2. With the number of operable accident monitoring instrumen-tation channels less than the minimum channels operable requirement of TS Table 3.7-6, either restore the inoper-able channel(s) to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

- -

8806170023 880610 PDR ADOC~~ 05000:280 p DCD

e TS 3.7-9b control room.

The supply lines installed from the containment penetrations to the hydrogen analyzers have Category 1 Class IE heat tracing applied.

The heat tracing system receives the same transferable emergency power as is provided to the containment hydrogen analyzers. The heat trace system is de-energized during normal system operation.

Upon receipt of a safety injection signal (Train A or Train B), the system is automatically started, after a preset time delay, to bring the piping process temperature to 250°F +/- 10°F within 20 minutes.

Each heat trace circuit is equipped with an RTD to provide individual circuit readout, over temperature alarm and cycles the circuit to maintain the process temperature via the sol id state control modules.

The hydrogen analyzer heat trace system is equipped with high temperature, loss of D.C. power, loss of A.C. power, loss of control power and failure of automatic initiation alarms.

I--

e TS 3.7-22 TABLE DELETED PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK j

TABIE 4.1-1 (Continued)

MINIMUM FREXXJENCIES FOR Clll'XX. CALIBRATIONS .AND TEST OF INSmlJMENl' rnANNEI.S Channel Description Check calibrate Test Remarks

33. loss of Power
a. 4.16 1W Eme:rgency Bus Under- N.A. R M voltage (loss of voltage)
b. 4 .16 1W Eme:rgency Bus Under- N.A. R M voltage (Degraded voltage) 34.

35.

Deleted Manual Reactor Trip N.A. N.A. R The test shall independently verify the operability of the undervoltage and shunt trip

-

attacinnents for the manual reactor trip function. The test shall also verify the operability of the bypass breaker trip circuit.

36. Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker N.A. N.A. M(l), R(2) (1) IDcal manual undervoltage trip prior to placing breaker in service.

(2) Automatic shunt trip.

37. Safety Injection Input from FSF N.A. N.A. R
38. Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker N.A. N.A. R Position Trip
39. Stearn/Feedwater Flow and low s R M

-l S/G Water I.evel V)

..i::,.

,__.

s - Each shift M - Monthly CX>

I D - Daily P - Prior to each startup if not done within the llJ N.A. - Not Applicable previous week Q - Every 90 effective full power days R - Each Refueling Shutdown

  • See Specification 4.1.D

ATIACHMENT 2 Safety Evaluation

e DISCUSSION The Sewage Treatment Plant Modification project is presently replacing the existing sewage disinfection system with a new type of system which does not require chlorine gas. Upon completion of this project, the existing chlorine gas stored on site will be removed. The sewage treatment plant was the only source of chlorine gas which could cause Control Room habitability concerns based on the NUS Corporation Report No. 3735 (Volumes 1 and 2), entitled "Surry Onsite Toxic Chemical Release Analysis" and "Surry Offsite Toxic Chemical Release Analysis." These studies were submitted to the NRC on January 19, 1981, June 30, 1981, and December 9, 1981, in response to NUREG-0737, Item 111.D.3.4. The resulting NRC Safety Evaluation was issued on June 28, 1982.

The chlorine sensors (SNSRA and SNSRB), analyzers (CLA-VA-lOOA and CLA-VA-100B), and the associated annunciation points and damper controls were originally installed, placed in operation, and required by Technical Specifications based on the risk identified with a chlorine release from the storage facility located at the sewage treatment pl ant. The removal of this source of chlorine gas eliminates such a risk. Therefore, compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.95, "Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine Release" and Criteria 19, "Control Room," of Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50 would not be affected by the proposed change to remove the chlorine detectors.

The removal of the chlorine monitors eliminates the interconnections between the chlorine monitors and the Control Room's normal ventilation intake and exhaust dampers, and the high chlorine level alarm on the ventilation system annunciator in the Control Room. The chlorine monitor's operation, requirements and interconnection with the Control Room normal ventilation intake and exhaust dampers, and the chlorine level alarm annunciator, are listed in UFSAR Section 9.13.3.6, Control Room and Relay Room Ventilation.

~

REVIEW OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The proposed removal of the chlorine monitoring system would have impact on the following Technical Specifications:

Technical Specification Section 3.19 requires one of the redundant Main Control Room bottled air systems to remain in service. If both bottled air systems are removed from service, one system is required to be back in service within eight (8) hours or the Station will be required to be placed in the hot shutdown condition in accordance with Technical Specification 3.19, Sections A and B. The chlorine monitors to be removed are energized by two separate 120 VAC vital power supplies which also supply power for the bottled air systems.

During the removal of the chlorine monitors, the vital bus circuits will be temporarily de-energized which will remove the bottled air systems from service. The monitors will be removed one at a time to avoid removing both bottled air systems from service simultaneously. Technical Specification Section 3.19 is not required to be revised since the requirements or equipment listed in Section 3.19 will not be modified.

Technical Specifications Section 3.7 and Tables 3.7-7 and 4.1-1 include:

specifications; basis; descriptions; instrument operating conditions; and frequency for, checking, calibration and testing for the Main Contra l Room chlorine monitors. These Technical Specifications require revision to delete the references to the chlorine monitors being removed from service. The requirements for chlorine detection listed in Section 3.7 will be no longer applicable since the source of chlorine gas will have been eliminated.

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Following the removal of the source of chlorine gas, the subsequent removal of the control room chlorine monitors poses no significant hazard as defined in 10 CFR 50.92.

a. The implementation of this modification does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The Control Room chlorine monitors provide an alarm and control of the Control Room isolation dampers in the event of chlorine gas release creating a hazardous environment in the Control Room. As identified in our 1981 NUREG-0737, Item III.D.3.4, submittals, the sewage treatment plant is the only regulatory significant source of chlorine gas from which a release could cause Control Room habitability concerns.

Chlorine gas storage at the sewage treatment plant is being eliminated.

Based on our previous studies, the chlorine gas release which could adversely affect Control Room habitability will be eliminated after removal of the chlorine gas storage from the site. The chlorine monitors are then no longer required since the chlorine gas source will have been eliminated. The chlorine monitors can be removed and the associated modifications can be completed without increasing the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

b. The implementation of this modification does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The monitors are very specific in that they detect the presence of chlorine. The source of chlorine gas will be removed prior to the removal of the chlorine monitors. The associated modifications to the ventilation system damper controls and annunciator will eliminate unnecessary alarms and damper controls. These modifications will not change the function of or impinge upon any other existing safety system.
c. The implementation of this modification does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed removal of the chlorine monitors is a result of eliminating the presence of chlorine gas.

Eliminating the source of chlorine gas from the site eliminates the need to depend on equipment to monitor for and initiate safety systems based on detection of chlorine.

..._...

e e ATIACHMENT 3 Voucher Check

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