05000255/FIN-2014008-08: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.21 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.21 | ||
| Inspector = A Stone, C Baron, C Brown, C Zoia, H Leake, J Corujo | | Inspector = A Stone, C Baron, C Brown, C Zoia, H Leake, J Corujo-Sandin, L Rodriguez, S Sheldon | ||
| CCA = H.14 | | CCA = H.14 | ||
| INPO aspect = DM.2 | | INPO aspect = DM.2 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for the licensees failure to establish an adequate test program for the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) Heat Exchangers (HXs) to demonstrate they can perform as designed. Specifically, the licensee failed to take actions to ensure the SDC HXs heat transfer capability met its design bases, as assumed in design bases calculations. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it impacted the Design Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and adversely affected the associated cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that containment could protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the licensee failed to verify the SDC HXs heat transfer capability met their design bases, as assumed in design bases calculations, to limit containment temperatures and pressures during an event. The finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, or heat removal components and did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. The inspectors determined this finding had an associated cross-cutting aspect, Conservative Bias, in the Human Performance cross-cutting area. Specifically, on several occasions when the licensee identified the need to perform testing and/or inspection of the SDC HXs, the licensee did not take actions because they did not believe any regulatory requirements or technical issues existed that required the testing and/or inspections. | | description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for the licensees failure to establish an adequate test program for the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) Heat Exchangers (HXs) to demonstrate they can perform as designed. Specifically, the licensee failed to take actions to ensure the SDC HXs heat transfer capability met its design bases, as assumed in design bases calculations. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it impacted the Design Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and adversely affected the associated cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that containment could protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the licensee failed to verify the SDC HXs heat transfer capability met their design bases, as assumed in design bases calculations, to limit containment temperatures and pressures during an event. The finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, or heat removal components and did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. The inspectors determined this finding had an associated cross-cutting aspect, Conservative Bias, in the Human Performance cross-cutting area. Specifically, on several occasions when the licensee identified the need to perform testing and/or inspection of the SDC HXs, the licensee did not take actions because they did not believe any regulatory requirements or technical issues existed that required the testing and/or inspections. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:52, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Palisades  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000255/2014008 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2014 (2014Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Stone C Baron C Brown C Zoia H Leake J Corujo-Sandin L Rodriguez S Sheldon |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XI |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
| ' | |