05000482/FIN-2015002-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = C Henderson, C Peabody, C Smith, C Speer, G Guerra, J O | | Inspector = C Henderson, C Peabody, C Smith, C Speer, G Guerra, J O'Donnell, M Williams, P Hernandez, R Kopriva, R Stroble, W Sifre, A Rosebrook | ||
| CCA = H.4 | | CCA = H.4 | ||
| INPO aspect = PA.3 | | INPO aspect = PA.3 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, for not installing the current transformer wiring in the Class 1E 4kV alternate feeder breaker cubicles from the station blackout diesel generators per the design drawings. As a result, testing performed seven months after the system was declared operational identified that the connections were unable to power the safety-related buses due to incorrect wiring of the current transformers. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 83379. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, due to the incorrect wiring of the current transformers, the SBO diesel generators were unable to power safety related buses as they were designed. The inspectors performed the initial significance determination for the finding using NRC Inspection Manual 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012. The finding required a detailed evaluation because it had the potential to degrade at least one train of a system that supports a risk significant system or function. Therefore, a senior reactor analyst performed a bounding detailed risk evaluation. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the risk assessment programs quantified the change in core damage frequency less than 1.0x10-6. The inspectors determined that the finding had a teamwork cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance. The licensee individuals and work groups did not communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries. Specifically a drawing revision was not properly attached to the work order which resulted in the incorrect wiring of both trains, and because different groups were completing different components, parts of the wiring were incorrectly installed per a superseded revision. | | description = The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, for not installing the current transformer wiring in the Class 1E 4kV alternate feeder breaker cubicles from the station blackout diesel generators per the design drawings. As a result, testing performed seven months after the system was declared operational identified that the connections were unable to power the safety-related buses due to incorrect wiring of the current transformers. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 83379. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, due to the incorrect wiring of the current transformers, the SBO diesel generators were unable to power safety related buses as they were designed. The inspectors performed the initial significance determination for the finding using NRC Inspection Manual 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012. The finding required a detailed evaluation because it had the potential to degrade at least one train of a system that supports a risk significant system or function. Therefore, a senior reactor analyst performed a bounding detailed risk evaluation. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the risk assessment programs quantified the change in core damage frequency less than 1.0x10-6. The inspectors determined that the finding had a teamwork cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance. The licensee individuals and work groups did not communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries. Specifically a drawing revision was not properly attached to the work order which resulted in the incorrect wiring of both trains, and because different groups were completing different components, parts of the wiring were incorrectly installed per a superseded revision. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 00:22, 22 February 2018
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000482/2015002 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2015 (2015Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Henderson C Peabody C Smith C Speer G Guerra J O'Donnell M Williams P Hernandez R Kopriva R Stroble W Sifre A Rosebrook |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
| CCA | H.4, Teamwork |
| INPO aspect | PA.3 |
| ' | |