05000482/FIN-2014007-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Include the Containment Coolers in a Test Program |
| Description | The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for the licensees failure to include the containment coolers in the heat exchanger inspection program that would demonstrate their leak tight integrity and capability to perform their safety function. During the period since the last problem and identification program inspection, the licensee had not implemented any means to assess the amount of corrosion in the tubing to support continued assurance of operability of containment coolers. Containment cooler operability earlier this year was the subject of NRC inspectors questions due to the lack of inspection and testing of the containment coolers. The containment coolers were subsequently hydrostatically tested to assure operability for a limited period of time. The licensee entered this finding in its corrective action program as CR-87668. The failure to include the containment coolers in the heat exchanger inspection program to demonstrate their leak tight integrity and capability to perform their safety function is a performance deficiency. The deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it adversely affects the objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Therefore, the performance deficiency is a finding. The inspectors performed the significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. Using Appendix A, Exhibit 2, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a design or qualification deficiency that was confirmed, not to result in loss of system operability or functionality. Any leaks that had occurring during this period were isolated or repaired such that the containment coolers were restored to operable status prior to exiting outages. In addition, the inspectors determined that the finding also had a potential to bypass the containment barrier, if containment pressure, in a loss of coolant accident, was greater than essential service water pressure in a containment cooler tube with a leak. Therefore, the inspectors evaluated the finding using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination process dated May 6, 2004. It was determined that this is a Type B finding since there is no impact on delta core damage frequency. During Phase 1 screening, the finding does not screen out, because a pinhole leak can be considered a breach of a containment penetration. A Phase 2 assessment was performed assuming greater than a 30-day exposure. Essential service water (cooling water running through the containment cooler tubes) pressure was determined to be greater than the maximum containment pressure during a design basis accident. This would cause no leakage from containment to environment. Additionally, analysis shows any leakage would be less than 100 percent containment volume/day through a pinhole leak. Therefore, this resulted in a Green finding. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of identification in the problem identification and resolution area, associated with individuals identifying issues completely in accordance with the corrective action program. Licensee staff failed to identify that the lack of non-destructive inspection for the containment coolers was an item that required corrective action program implementation [P.1]. |
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000482/2014007 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2014 (2014Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Willoughby R Stroble S Hedger Z Hollcraft G Miller H Freeman L Brandt |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XI |
| CCA | P.1, Identification |
| INPO aspect | PI.1 |
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Finding - Wolf Creek - IR 05000482/2014007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Wolf Creek) @ 2014Q3
Self-Identified List (Wolf Creek)
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