05000482/FIN-2015009-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Provide Adequate Instructions for Control of Feedwater Flow in Startup Procedures |
Description | The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, because the licensee did not assure the procedures for reactor startup were appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, prior to May 3, 2015, the licensee failed to include adequate instructions for transferring feedwater flow from the main feedwater regulating valve bypass valves to the main feedwater regulating valves in Procedure GEN 00-003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load. As a result, operations personnel did not properly control feedwater flow during a reactor startup, which led to a plant trip on May 3, 2015. The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program as Condition Reports 96064 and 100583. The corrective action taken to restore compliance was to revise Procedure GEN 00-003 to update the process for transferring main feedwater control from the main feedwater regulating valve bypass valves to the main feedwater regulating valves, including the monitoring of necessary parameters steam flow and feedwater flow. The failure to assure the procedures for reactor startup were appropriate to the circumstances was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it adversely affected the human performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, prior to May 4, 2015, the licensee did not provide adequate guidance for the control of feedwater flow during plant startup, resulting in a plant trip on May 3, 2015. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not cause a trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition. Specifically, following the plant trip, all mitigation equipment responded as designed. The inspectors concluded that the finding reflected current licensee performance and had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, avoid complacency, in that the licensee did not recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk even while expecting successful outcomes. Specifically, the licensee did not recognize and plan for potential of mistakes when using a procedure that did not contain adequate guidance for minimizing mismatches in steam flow and feedwater flow. |
Site: | Wolf Creek ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000482/2015009 Section 4OA3 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2015 (2015Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
Inspectors (proximate) | C Speer N Taylor R Stroble |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Wolf Creek - IR 05000482/2015009 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Wolf Creek) @ 2015Q2
Self-Identified List (Wolf Creek)
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