Information Notice 2016-08, Inadequate Work Practices Resulting in Faulted Circuit Breaker Connection: Difference between revisions

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| issue date = 06/17/2016
| issue date = 06/17/2016
| title = Inadequate Work Practices Resulting in Faulted Circuit Breaker Connection
| title = Inadequate Work Practices Resulting in Faulted Circuit Breaker Connection
| author name = Cheok M C, Lund L
| author name = Cheok M, Lund L
| author affiliation = NRC/NRO/DCIP, NRC/NRR/DPR
| author affiliation = NRC/NRO/DCIP, NRC/NRR/DPR
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
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| page count = 6
| page count = 6
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:ML16104A214 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
{{#Wiki_filter:ML16104A214 UNITED STATES


OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS WASHINGTON, D.C.  20555-0001  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
 
OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS
 
WASHINGTON, D.C.  20555-0001  


June 17, 2016  
June 17, 2016  


NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2016-08: INADEQUATE WORK PRACTICES RESULTING IN FAULTED CIRCUIT BREAKER CONNECTIONS
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2016-08:  
INADEQUATE WORK PRACTICES RESULTING
 
IN FAULTED CIRCUIT BREAKER
 
CONNECTIONS


==ADDRESSEES==
==ADDRESSEES==
All holders of an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power reactor under
All holders of an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power reactor under


Title 10 of the
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of


Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," except t
Production and Utilization Facilities, except those that have permanently ceased operations


hose that have permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.
and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.


All holders of and applicants for a power reactor early site permit, combined license, standard
All holders of and applicants for a power reactor early site permit, combined license, standard


design approval, or manufacturing license under 10 CFR Part 52, "Licenses, Certifications, and
design approval, or manufacturing license under 10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and


Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants." All applicants for a standard design certification, including
Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.  All applicants for a standard design certification, including


such applicants after initial issuance of a design certification rule.
such applicants after initial issuance of a design certification rule.


==PURPOSE==
==PURPOSE==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is is
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform


suing this information notice (IN) to inform addressees of operating experience related to circuit breaker overheating and fires caused by
addressees of operating experience related to circuit breaker overheating and fires caused by


inadequate and high-resistance connections.  Information from these events may apply to the
inadequate and high-resistance connections.  Information from these events may apply to the


design, installation, testing, inspection, and maintenance of circuit breakers.  The NRC expects that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities, and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.  However, suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
design, installation, testing, inspection, and maintenance of circuit breakers.  The NRC expects
 
that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities, and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.  However, suggestions contained in this IN are not
 
NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.


==DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES==
==DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES==
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On June 7, 2011, at Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 a fire occurred in the feeder breaker for a
On June 7, 2011, at Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 a fire occurred in the feeder breaker for a


safety-related 480-volt bus.  The fire resulted in significant damage to the breaker, bus, and an extended facility shutdown.  The fire occurred in a low-voltage breaker that had been installed in 2009 as part of a design modification to replace obsolete breakers.  The new breaker assembly
safety-related 480-volt bus.  The fire resulted in significant damage to the breaker, bus, and an


consisted of a Square D
extended facility shutdown.  The fire occurred in a low-voltage breaker that had been installed in


breaker and Masterpact
2009 as part of a design modification to replace obsolete breakers.  The new breaker assembly


cradle assembly that served as the interface between the breaker and cubicle.  Licensee investigation revealed that the main cause of the
consisted of a Square D breaker and Masterpact cradle assembly that served as the interface
 
between the breaker and cubicle.  Licensee investigation revealed that the main cause of the


fire was inadequate engagement of the breaker cradle primary disconnect assembly (PDA)  
fire was inadequate engagement of the breaker cradle primary disconnect assembly (PDA)  
fingers and the bus stabs.  Licensee inspection of Masterpact
fingers and the bus stabs.  Licensee inspection of Masterpact cradles installed in the other


cradles installed in the other safety-related buses revealed that the fingers on the cradles were longer than the original breaker fingers.  The point where the fingers of the new cradle engaged the bus extended past the silver-plated portion on the copper bus stab, in an area that contained hardened grease.  This likely led to high resistance, overheating, and ultimately the fire.  During the design change process associated with the new breaker configuration, the licensee did not consider new failure
safety-related buses revealed that the fingers on the cradles were longer than the original


modes caused by the new finger-stab connections.  Additionally, the installation procedures did not require post-modification testing to verify the resistance of the connections between the
breaker fingers.  The point where the fingers of the new cradle engaged the bus extended past the silver-plated portion on the copper bus stab, in an area that contained hardened grease.
 
This likely led to high resistance, overheating, and ultimately the fire.  During the design change
 
process associated with the new breaker configuration, the licensee did not consider new failure
 
modes caused by the new finger-stab connections.  Additionally, the installation procedures did
 
not require post-modification testing to verify the resistance of the connections between the


cradle PDA fingers and bus stabs.
cradle PDA fingers and bus stabs.
Line 72: Line 97:
The licensee took corrective actions as a result of this event that included repairing the affected
The licensee took corrective actions as a result of this event that included repairing the affected


bus, inspecting and testing the other breakers and buses, silver-plating the affected 480-volt bus stabs, and revising maintenance procedures to enhance installation and post-installation
bus, inspecting and testing the other breakers and buses, silver-plating the affected 480-volt bus
 
stabs, and revising maintenance procedures to enhance installation and post-installation


inspection.
inspection.


Additional information regarding this event is available in Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000285-2011-008 Revision 1, dated October 27, 2011 (Agencywide Documents Access and
Additional information regarding this event is available in Licensee Event Report (LER)  
05000285-2011-008 Revision 1, dated October 27, 2011 (Agencywide Documents Access and


Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML113010208, and NRC Special Inspection Report 05000285/2011014, dated March 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12072A128).
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML113010208, and NRC Special Inspection
 
Report 05000285/2011014, dated March 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12072A128).


Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3  
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3  
Line 86: Line 116:
smoke coming from a 480-volt bus.  Further licensee inspection revealed hotspots on the bus
smoke coming from a 480-volt bus.  Further licensee inspection revealed hotspots on the bus


feeder breaker.  This breaker was a Square D
feeder breaker.  This breaker was a Square D breaker with Masterpact cradle assembly


breaker with Masterpact
(similar to the breaker assembly at Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 described above).  The bus was


cradle assembly (similar to the breaker assembly at Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 described above).
transferred to the alternate feeder source, and the normal supply breaker was removed for
 
inspection.  The licensee found the cradle PDA fingers discolored from excessive heat. The


The bus was transferred to the alternate feeder source, and the normal supply breaker was removed for
licensee sent the affected Masterpact cradle and breaker to the supplier, Nuclear Logistics Inc.


inspectionThe licensee found the cradle PDA fingers discolored from excessive heat.  The
(NLI), for failure analysisNLI determined the direct cause of the overheating primary


licensee sent the affected Masterpact
disconnects was the loss of vertical movement (float) on the primary disconnects of the breaker


cradle and breaker to the supplier, Nuclear Logistics Inc. (NLI), for failure analysis.  NLI determined the direct cause of the overheating primary disconnects was the loss of vertical movement (float) on the primary disconnects of the breaker cradle.  The cradle primary disconnects are designed to account for vertical misalignment of the
cradle.  The cradle primary disconnects are designed to account for vertical misalignment of the


stabs in the switchgear.  The primary disconnect fingers have vertical float that maintains the
stabs in the switchgear.  The primary disconnect fingers have vertical float that maintains the
Line 104: Line 136:
finger pressure on the bus stabs when the bus stabs are not completely aligned in the vertical
finger pressure on the bus stabs when the bus stabs are not completely aligned in the vertical


bus.  The loss of vertical float was caused by an incorrectly specified tolerance in the PDA's fabrication drawing.  The licensee's installation procedures did not include steps to inspect for freedom of vertical float of the primary disconnects.  Additionally, the supplier did not provide guidance for testing freedom of vertical float of primary disconnects.
bus.  The loss of vertical float was caused by an incorrectly specified tolerance in the PDAs


Because of this event, the licensee performed inspections on the installed Masterpact
fabrication drawing.  The licensees installation procedures did not include steps to inspect for


cradle assembly PDAs for signs of overheating, and to verify freedom of vertical float of primary disconnects.  NLI generated a technical bulletin, and alerted licensees to inspect the affected assemblies for the manufacturing defect, and submitted a report under 10 CFR Part 21,  
freedom of vertical float of the primary disconnects.  Additionally, the supplier did not provide
"Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance.
 
guidance for testing freedom of vertical float of primary disconnects.
 
Because of this event, the licensee performed inspections on the installed Masterpact cradle
 
assembly PDAs for signs of overheating, and to verify freedom of vertical float of primary
 
disconnects.  NLI generated a technical bulletin, and alerted licensees to inspect the affected
 
assemblies for the manufacturing defect, and submitted a report under 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance.


Additional information regarding this event is available in 10 CFR Part 21 Report 2014-09-00,  
Additional information regarding this event is available in 10 CFR Part 21 Report 2014-09-00,  
dated February 26, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14069A467), and NRC Integrated


dated February 26, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14069A467), and NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2012004, 05000260/2012004, and 05000296/2012004, dated November 13, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12319A182).
Inspection Report 05000259/2012004, 05000260/2012004, and 05000296/2012004, dated


Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 On August 21, 2015, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 used an incorrectly configured
November 13, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12319A182).


grounding cart that caused damage to the line-side connections in a 4160-volt breaker cubicle. A grounding cart is a device used to apply grounds to switchgear assemblies during maintenance activities to ensure personnel protection.  The grounding cart used in this case
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2
 
On August 21, 2015, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 used an incorrectly configured
 
grounding cart that caused damage to the line-side connections in a 4160-volt breaker cubicle. A grounding cart is a device used to apply grounds to switchgear assemblies during
 
maintenance activities to ensure personnel protection.  The grounding cart used in this case


was configured for-2000 amp stabs versus the 1200-amp stabs required for the breaker cubicle.
was configured for-2000 amp stabs versus the 1200-amp stabs required for the breaker cubicle.
Line 125: Line 173:
for their intended application.  As a result, the stabs that were installed on the cart were one
for their intended application.  As a result, the stabs that were installed on the cart were one


inch larger in diameter than the stabs required for the breaker cubicle.  The larger stabs caused damage to the draw-out connections on the load side of the breaker cubicle.  Workers did not observe the damage following maintenance and removal of the grounding cart, and proceeded
inch larger in diameter than the stabs required for the breaker cubicle.  The larger stabs caused
 
damage to the draw-out connections on the load side of the breaker cubicle.  Workers did not
 
observe the damage following maintenance and removal of the grounding cart, and proceeded


with breaker re-installation.  When the breaker was re-energized, an arc flash occurred as a
with breaker re-installation.  When the breaker was re-energized, an arc flash occurred as a
Line 131: Line 183:
result of the damaged connections.  This led to loss of the switchgear, loss of an electric fire
result of the damaged connections.  This led to loss of the switchgear, loss of an electric fire


pump, loss of a feedwater drain pump, and an unplanned 10 percent downpower transient on the reactor.  The cause of this event was determined to be the lack of procedural guidance for using the grounding cart in the breaker cubicle.
pump, loss of a feedwater drain pump, and an unplanned 10 percent downpower transient on
 
the reactor.  The cause of this event was determined to be the lack of procedural guidance for
 
using the grounding cart in the breaker cubicle.


As a result of this event, the licensee took corrective actions that included implementing
As a result of this event, the licensee took corrective actions that included implementing


procedural guidance to compare the configured grounding cart to the respective breaker cubicle, rather than relying on "skill-of-the-craft" knowledge.
procedural guidance to compare the configured grounding cart to the respective breaker
 
cubicle, rather than relying on skill-of-the-craft knowledge.
 
Additional information regarding this event is available in NRC Integrated Inspection Report


Additional information regarding this event is available in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000220/2015003 and 05000410/2015003, dated November 9, 2015 (ADAMS Accession
05000220/2015003 and 05000410/2015003, dated November 9, 2015 (ADAMS Accession


No. ML15314A506).
No. ML15314A506).


Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 On September 16, 2015, at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2, a breaker arc
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2
 
On September 16, 2015, at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2, a breaker arc


flash and rapid combustion occurred, resulting in the licensee declaring a Notification of
flash and rapid combustion occurred, resulting in the licensee declaring a Notification of


Unusual Event (under the NRC's emergency classification system for grouping off-normal events or conditions).  When racking in a non-class 1E load center 480-volt circuit breaker, operators unknowingly caused damage to the breaker's internal connections.  During
Unusual Event (under the NRCs emergency classification system for grouping off-normal
 
events or conditions).  When racking in a non-class 1E load center 480-volt circuit breaker, operators unknowingly caused damage to the breakers internal connections.  During


installation, vertical misalignment between the ground clip and ground stab damaged the clip, causing the clip to spread apart as the breaker was racked in.  One side of the ground clip came
installation, vertical misalignment between the ground clip and ground stab damaged the clip, causing the clip to spread apart as the breaker was racked in.  One side of the ground clip came
Line 151: Line 215:
into contact with one of the phases of the line side of the breaker.  When the operator locally
into contact with one of the phases of the line side of the breaker.  When the operator locally


shut the breaker, an arc flash occurred, causing significant damage to the back door of the cubicle, and creating an occupational safety hazard to the operator.  The supply breaker to the bus tripped, de-energizing the fault.  This breaker supplied power to non-essential loads, and its
shut the breaker, an arc flash occurred, causing significant damage to the back door of the
 
cubicle, and creating an occupational safety hazard to the operator.  The supply breaker to the
 
bus tripped, de-energizing the fault.  This breaker supplied power to non-essential loads, and its


failure did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant.  The licensee declared a
failure did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant.  The licensee declared a
Line 157: Line 225:
notification of unusual event as a result of the explosion in the breaker cubicle; however, the
notification of unusual event as a result of the explosion in the breaker cubicle; however, the


operator was dressed out for 4160-volt work, and avoided serious injury.  The cause of this incorrect installation was a lack of procedural guidance to verify proper breaker alignment during racking of the breaker.  Several months prior, a similar event had occurred on a different
operator was dressed out for 4160-volt work, and avoided serious injury.  The cause of this
 
incorrect installation was a lack of procedural guidance to verify proper breaker alignment during
 
racking of the breaker.  Several months prior, a similar event had occurred on a different


breaker at Palo Verde.  However, in this event, the ground clip was forced outward instead of
breaker at Palo Verde.  However, in this event, the ground clip was forced outward instead of
Line 165: Line 237:
side of breaker.
side of breaker.


The licensee found that misalignment of the breaker ground clip to the cubicle ground stab was limited to ABB K-Line 480-volt circuit breakers.  The
The licensee found that misalignment of the breaker ground clip to the cubicle ground stab was


licensee took corrective actions as a result of the September 16, 2015 event, which included revising procedures to check alignment of the
limited to ABB K-Line 480-volt circuit breakers.  The licensee took corrective actions as a result


breaker ground clip to cubicle ground stab while racking in 480-volt breakers. Additional information regarding this event is available in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000528/2015003, 05000529/2015003, and 05000530/2015003, dated October 22, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15295A435).
of the September 16, 2015 event, which included revising procedures to check alignment of the
 
breaker ground clip to cubicle ground stab while racking in 480-volt breakers. Additional information regarding this event is available in NRC Integrated Inspection Report
 
05000528/2015003, 05000529/2015003, and 05000530/2015003, dated October 22, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15295A435).


==BACKGROUND==
==BACKGROUND==
Related NRC Generic Communications
Related NRC Generic Communications


NRC IN 2002-27, "Recent Fires at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States,"
NRC IN 2002-27, Recent Fires at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States, dated September 20, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML022630147).  The NRC issued this IN to
dated September 20, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML022630147).  The NRC issued this IN to
 
alert addressees of several fire events, one of which was caused by a poor electrical connection
 
between the breaker PDA and the bus stabs.
 
NRC IN 2007-34, Operating Experience Regarding Electrical Circuit Breakers, dated


alert addressees of several fire events, one of which was caused by a poor electrical connection between the breaker PDA and the bus stabs.
October 22, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML072390061).  The NRC issued this IN to alert


NRC IN 2007-34, "Operating Experience Regarding Electrical Circuit Breakers," dated October 22, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML072390061).  The NRC issued this IN to alert
addressees of several circuit breaker problems including deficient fit-ups, inadequate


addressees of several circuit breaker problems including deficient fit-ups, inadequate maintenance practices, and issues with design changes.
maintenance practices, and issues with design changes.


NRC IN 2008-18, "Loss of a Safety-Related Motor Control Center Caused by a Bus Fault,"
NRC IN 2008-18, Loss of a Safety-Related Motor Control Center Caused by a Bus Fault, dated December 1, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082540130).  The NRC issued this IN to
dated December 1, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082540130).  The NRC issued this IN to


alert addressees of an electrical fire caused by a bus fault, which resulted in the loss of
alert addressees of an electrical fire caused by a bus fault, which resulted in the loss of


safety-related equipment.  The fault was caused by inadequate contact of a motor control center's stab fingers to its bus bars.
safety-related equipment.  The fault was caused by inadequate contact of a motor control
 
centers stab fingers to its bus bars.
 
NRC IN 2010-25, Inadequate Electrical Connections, dated November 17, 2010 (ADAMS


NRC IN 2010-25, "Inadequate Electrical Connections," dated November 17, 2010 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML102530012).  The NRC issued this IN to alert addressees of operating


Accession No. ML102530012).  The NRC issued this
experience involving loose electrical connection that resulted in unanticipated plant transients


IN to alert addressees of operating experience involving loose electrical connection that resulted in unanticipated plant transients and failures or unavailability of safety-related equipment.
and failures or unavailability of safety-related equipment.


==DISCUSSION==
==DISCUSSION==
Circuit breakers are relied upon to provide electrical power to equipment credited in accident
Circuit breakers are relied upon to provide electrical power to equipment credited in accident


analyses.  Industry operating experience has shown that effective breaker maintenance procedures should include provisions to ensure proper alignment during installation, and steps to ensure that there are no high resistance connections in the interface between breakers and
analyses.  Industry operating experience has shown that effective breaker maintenance
 
procedures should include provisions to ensure proper alignment during installation, and steps
 
to ensure that there are no high resistance connections in the interface between breakers and


electrical buses following breaker installation.  The examples provided in this IN illustrate how
electrical buses following breaker installation.  The examples provided in this IN illustrate how


inadequate breaker connections can result in adverse impacts to safety-related equipment, introduce occupational safety concerns, and present fire hazards.  These examples illustrate the importance of adequate breaker testing, inspection, maintenance procedures, and the proper licensee oversight of physical modifications to circuit breaker designs.
inadequate breaker connections can result in adverse impacts to safety-related equipment, introduce occupational safety concerns, and present fire hazards.  These examples illustrate the
 
importance of adequate breaker testing, inspection, maintenance procedures, and the proper
 
licensee oversight of physical modifications to circuit breaker designs.


==CONTACT==
==CONTACT==
Line 210: Line 302:
This IN requires no specific action or written response.  Please direct any questions about this
This IN requires no specific action or written response.  Please direct any questions about this


matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager.
matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
 
Regulation project manager.
 
/ra/
 
/ra/


/ra/      /ra/
Michael C. Cheok, Director
Michael C. Cheok, Director


Louise Lund, Director   Division of Construction Inspection   Division of Policy and Rulemaking   and Operational Programs   Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Louise Lund, Director
 
Division of Construction Inspection
 
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
 
and Operational Programs
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Office of New Reactors
Office of New Reactors


===Technical Contact:===
===Technical Contact:===
Jesse Robles, NRR 301-415-2940 E-mail: Jesse.Robles@nrc.gov
Jesse Robles, NRR
 
301-415-2940  
 
E-mail: Jesse.Robles@nrc.gov


Note:  NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
Note:  NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.


ML16104A214 *concurred via e-mail   TAC MF7575 OFFICE QTE* NRR/DIRS/IOEB/TL* NRR/DIRS/IOEB/BC* NRR/DE/EEEB/BC
ML16104A214  
 
*concurred via e-mail
 
TAC MF7575 OFFICE
 
QTE*  
NRR/DIRS/IOEB/TL*  
NRR/DIRS/IOEB/BC*  
NRR/DE/EEEB/BC *
NRO/DCIP/QVIB1/BC*
NRO/DEIA/ICE/BC*
NRR/DIRS/D
 
NAME
 
CHsu
 
JRobles
 
HChernoff
 
JZimmerman
 
TJackson
 
DCurtis, acting
 
SMorris
 
DATE
 
04/13/16
04/20/16
04/20/16
05/02/2016
04/20/2016
04/25/2016
04/20/2016 OFFICE
 
NRR/DE/D*
NRO/DEIA/D*
NRR/DPR/PGCB/LA
 
NRR/DPR/PGCB/PM*
NRR/DPR/PGCB/BC*
NRO/DCIP/D
 
NRR/DPR/D
 
NAME
 
JLubinski
 
MMayfield
 
ELee
 
ASchwab
 
SStuchell
 
MCheok
 
LLund
 
DATE


* NRO/DCIP/QVIB1/BC* NRO/DEIA/ICE/BC* NRR/DIRS/D NAME CHsu JRobles HChernoff JZimmerman TJackson DCurtis, acting SMorris DATE 04/13/16 04/20/16 04/20/16 05/02/2016 04/20/2016 04/25/2016 04/20/2016 OFFICE NRR/DE/D* NRO/DEIA/D* NRR/DPR/PGCB/LA NRR/DPR/PGCB/PM* NRR/DPR/PGCB/BC* NRO/DCIP/D NRR/DPR/D NAME JLubinski MMayfield ELee ASchwab SStuchell MCheok LLund DATE 05/31/2016 05/31/2016 06/07/2016 06/01/2016 06/08/2016 06/16/2016 06/17/2016}}
05/31/2016  
05/31/2016  
06/07/2016  
06/01/2016  
06/08/2016  
06/16/2016  
06/17/2016}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 01:04, 10 January 2025

Inadequate Work Practices Resulting in Faulted Circuit Breaker Connection
ML16104A214
Person / Time
Issue date: 06/17/2016
From: Michael Cheok, Louise Lund
Division of Construction Inspection and Operational Programs, Division of Policy and Rulemaking
To:
Schwab A
References
IN-16-008
Download: ML16104A214 (6)


ML16104A214 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

June 17, 2016

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2016-08:

INADEQUATE WORK PRACTICES RESULTING

IN FAULTED CIRCUIT BREAKER

CONNECTIONS

ADDRESSEES

All holders of an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power reactor under

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of

Production and Utilization Facilities, except those that have permanently ceased operations

and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.

All holders of and applicants for a power reactor early site permit, combined license, standard

design approval, or manufacturing license under 10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and

Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants. All applicants for a standard design certification, including

such applicants after initial issuance of a design certification rule.

PURPOSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform

addressees of operating experience related to circuit breaker overheating and fires caused by

inadequate and high-resistance connections. Information from these events may apply to the

design, installation, testing, inspection, and maintenance of circuit breakers. The NRC expects

that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities, and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this IN are not

NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1

On June 7, 2011, at Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 a fire occurred in the feeder breaker for a

safety-related 480-volt bus. The fire resulted in significant damage to the breaker, bus, and an

extended facility shutdown. The fire occurred in a low-voltage breaker that had been installed in

2009 as part of a design modification to replace obsolete breakers. The new breaker assembly

consisted of a Square D breaker and Masterpact cradle assembly that served as the interface

between the breaker and cubicle. Licensee investigation revealed that the main cause of the

fire was inadequate engagement of the breaker cradle primary disconnect assembly (PDA)

fingers and the bus stabs. Licensee inspection of Masterpact cradles installed in the other

safety-related buses revealed that the fingers on the cradles were longer than the original

breaker fingers. The point where the fingers of the new cradle engaged the bus extended past the silver-plated portion on the copper bus stab, in an area that contained hardened grease.

This likely led to high resistance, overheating, and ultimately the fire. During the design change

process associated with the new breaker configuration, the licensee did not consider new failure

modes caused by the new finger-stab connections. Additionally, the installation procedures did

not require post-modification testing to verify the resistance of the connections between the

cradle PDA fingers and bus stabs.

The licensee took corrective actions as a result of this event that included repairing the affected

bus, inspecting and testing the other breakers and buses, silver-plating the affected 480-volt bus

stabs, and revising maintenance procedures to enhance installation and post-installation

inspection.

Additional information regarding this event is available in Licensee Event Report (LER)

05000285-2011-008 Revision 1, dated October 27, 2011 (Agencywide Documents Access and

Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML113010208, and NRC Special Inspection

Report 05000285/2011014, dated March 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12072A128).

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3

On November 4, 2013, an operator at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3 noted the smell of

smoke coming from a 480-volt bus. Further licensee inspection revealed hotspots on the bus

feeder breaker. This breaker was a Square D breaker with Masterpact cradle assembly

(similar to the breaker assembly at Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 described above). The bus was

transferred to the alternate feeder source, and the normal supply breaker was removed for

inspection. The licensee found the cradle PDA fingers discolored from excessive heat. The

licensee sent the affected Masterpact cradle and breaker to the supplier, Nuclear Logistics Inc.

(NLI), for failure analysis. NLI determined the direct cause of the overheating primary

disconnects was the loss of vertical movement (float) on the primary disconnects of the breaker

cradle. The cradle primary disconnects are designed to account for vertical misalignment of the

stabs in the switchgear. The primary disconnect fingers have vertical float that maintains the

finger pressure on the bus stabs when the bus stabs are not completely aligned in the vertical

bus. The loss of vertical float was caused by an incorrectly specified tolerance in the PDAs

fabrication drawing. The licensees installation procedures did not include steps to inspect for

freedom of vertical float of the primary disconnects. Additionally, the supplier did not provide

guidance for testing freedom of vertical float of primary disconnects.

Because of this event, the licensee performed inspections on the installed Masterpact cradle

assembly PDAs for signs of overheating, and to verify freedom of vertical float of primary

disconnects. NLI generated a technical bulletin, and alerted licensees to inspect the affected

assemblies for the manufacturing defect, and submitted a report under 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance.

Additional information regarding this event is available in 10 CFR Part 21 Report 2014-09-00,

dated February 26, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14069A467), and NRC Integrated

Inspection Report 05000259/2012004, 05000260/2012004, and 05000296/2012004, dated

November 13, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12319A182).

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2

On August 21, 2015, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 used an incorrectly configured

grounding cart that caused damage to the line-side connections in a 4160-volt breaker cubicle. A grounding cart is a device used to apply grounds to switchgear assemblies during

maintenance activities to ensure personnel protection. The grounding cart used in this case

was configured for-2000 amp stabs versus the 1200-amp stabs required for the breaker cubicle.

There was no procedure for ensuring that the stabs on the grounding cart were the proper size

for their intended application. As a result, the stabs that were installed on the cart were one

inch larger in diameter than the stabs required for the breaker cubicle. The larger stabs caused

damage to the draw-out connections on the load side of the breaker cubicle. Workers did not

observe the damage following maintenance and removal of the grounding cart, and proceeded

with breaker re-installation. When the breaker was re-energized, an arc flash occurred as a

result of the damaged connections. This led to loss of the switchgear, loss of an electric fire

pump, loss of a feedwater drain pump, and an unplanned 10 percent downpower transient on

the reactor. The cause of this event was determined to be the lack of procedural guidance for

using the grounding cart in the breaker cubicle.

As a result of this event, the licensee took corrective actions that included implementing

procedural guidance to compare the configured grounding cart to the respective breaker

cubicle, rather than relying on skill-of-the-craft knowledge.

Additional information regarding this event is available in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000220/2015003 and 05000410/2015003, dated November 9, 2015 (ADAMS Accession

No. ML15314A506).

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

On September 16, 2015, at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2, a breaker arc

flash and rapid combustion occurred, resulting in the licensee declaring a Notification of

Unusual Event (under the NRCs emergency classification system for grouping off-normal

events or conditions). When racking in a non-class 1E load center 480-volt circuit breaker, operators unknowingly caused damage to the breakers internal connections. During

installation, vertical misalignment between the ground clip and ground stab damaged the clip, causing the clip to spread apart as the breaker was racked in. One side of the ground clip came

into contact with one of the phases of the line side of the breaker. When the operator locally

shut the breaker, an arc flash occurred, causing significant damage to the back door of the

cubicle, and creating an occupational safety hazard to the operator. The supply breaker to the

bus tripped, de-energizing the fault. This breaker supplied power to non-essential loads, and its

failure did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant. The licensee declared a

notification of unusual event as a result of the explosion in the breaker cubicle; however, the

operator was dressed out for 4160-volt work, and avoided serious injury. The cause of this

incorrect installation was a lack of procedural guidance to verify proper breaker alignment during

racking of the breaker. Several months prior, a similar event had occurred on a different

breaker at Palo Verde. However, in this event, the ground clip was forced outward instead of

inward toward the breaker, and therefore did not come into contact with the phase on the line

side of breaker.

The licensee found that misalignment of the breaker ground clip to the cubicle ground stab was

limited to ABB K-Line 480-volt circuit breakers. The licensee took corrective actions as a result

of the September 16, 2015 event, which included revising procedures to check alignment of the

breaker ground clip to cubicle ground stab while racking in 480-volt breakers. Additional information regarding this event is available in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000528/2015003, 05000529/2015003, and 05000530/2015003, dated October 22, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15295A435).

BACKGROUND

Related NRC Generic Communications

NRC IN 2002-27, Recent Fires at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States, dated September 20, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML022630147). The NRC issued this IN to

alert addressees of several fire events, one of which was caused by a poor electrical connection

between the breaker PDA and the bus stabs.

NRC IN 2007-34, Operating Experience Regarding Electrical Circuit Breakers, dated

October 22, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML072390061). The NRC issued this IN to alert

addressees of several circuit breaker problems including deficient fit-ups, inadequate

maintenance practices, and issues with design changes.

NRC IN 2008-18, Loss of a Safety-Related Motor Control Center Caused by a Bus Fault, dated December 1, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082540130). The NRC issued this IN to

alert addressees of an electrical fire caused by a bus fault, which resulted in the loss of

safety-related equipment. The fault was caused by inadequate contact of a motor control

centers stab fingers to its bus bars.

NRC IN 2010-25, Inadequate Electrical Connections, dated November 17, 2010 (ADAMS

Accession No. ML102530012). The NRC issued this IN to alert addressees of operating

experience involving loose electrical connection that resulted in unanticipated plant transients

and failures or unavailability of safety-related equipment.

DISCUSSION

Circuit breakers are relied upon to provide electrical power to equipment credited in accident

analyses. Industry operating experience has shown that effective breaker maintenance

procedures should include provisions to ensure proper alignment during installation, and steps

to ensure that there are no high resistance connections in the interface between breakers and

electrical buses following breaker installation. The examples provided in this IN illustrate how

inadequate breaker connections can result in adverse impacts to safety-related equipment, introduce occupational safety concerns, and present fire hazards. These examples illustrate the

importance of adequate breaker testing, inspection, maintenance procedures, and the proper

licensee oversight of physical modifications to circuit breaker designs.

CONTACT

S

This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this

matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation project manager.

/ra/

/ra/

Michael C. Cheok, Director

Louise Lund, Director

Division of Construction Inspection

Division of Policy and Rulemaking

and Operational Programs

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Office of New Reactors

Technical Contact:

Jesse Robles, NRR

301-415-2940

E-mail: Jesse.Robles@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.

ML16104A214

  • concurred via e-mail

TAC MF7575 OFFICE

QTE*

NRR/DIRS/IOEB/TL*

NRR/DIRS/IOEB/BC*

NRR/DE/EEEB/BC *

NRO/DCIP/QVIB1/BC*

NRO/DEIA/ICE/BC*

NRR/DIRS/D

NAME

CHsu

JRobles

HChernoff

JZimmerman

TJackson

DCurtis, acting

SMorris

DATE

04/13/16

04/20/16

04/20/16

05/02/2016

04/20/2016

04/25/2016

04/20/2016 OFFICE

NRR/DE/D*

NRO/DEIA/D*

NRR/DPR/PGCB/LA

NRR/DPR/PGCB/PM*

NRR/DPR/PGCB/BC*

NRO/DCIP/D

NRR/DPR/D

NAME

JLubinski

MMayfield

ELee

ASchwab

SStuchell

MCheok

LLund

DATE

05/31/2016

05/31/2016

06/07/2016

06/01/2016

06/08/2016

06/16/2016

06/17/2016