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| {{#Wiki_filter:ADAMS ACCESSION NO. ML17012A308 From: Michael Mulligan [mailto:steamshovel2002@yahoo.com] Sent: Thursday, January 12, 2017 10:08 AM To: Barkley, Richard <Richard.Barkley@nrc.gov> | | {{#Wiki_filter:ADAMS ACCESSION NO. ML17012A308 From: Michael Mulligan [mailto:steamshovel2002@yahoo.com] |
| | Sent: Thursday, January 12, 2017 10:08 AM To: Barkley, Richard <Richard.Barkley@nrc.gov> |
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| ==Subject:== | | ==Subject:== |
| [External_Sender] Re: Nice speaking with you again today regarding Hope Creek Richard, This is a cover-up as illuminated by the NRC and Hope Creek- in they won't describe the troubles with bringing on better designed valves and the weaselly and slippery words you both use. A perfect Truism: First they corrupt language, then the accident happens! In a court of law or court of public opinion, I'd ripped the NRC's credibility to shreds with your own documents or lack of appropriate documentation. The fundamental research and studies understanding the process of corrosion bonding on SRVs is sadly lacking. I think this is on purpose. Remember there is tremendous amount of energy and forces going though the SRVs when fully open and a relatively small dp from shut to full open with the pilot valves Where in the FSAR or any reference material does the documental allow\describe having the SRVs and S/RV system be both inop and safe at the same time? The word inop has a special definition for the NRC. This is a unapproved drastic change to the facility-you created a unapproved operating region without the documentation to prove it is safe. Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 3 Licensee Event Report 50-296/2016-004-00 "TS 3.4.3 requires twelve of the thirteen S/the to be operable for S/RV system operability. The three failed MS RVs rendered the entire S/RV system inoperable for the duration of the fuel cycle, from March 19, 2014 to February 20, 2016." "The two-stage pilot valves failed due to the valve disc corrosion bonding to the valve seat." "TS 3.4.3 requires twelve of the thirteen S/RVs to be operable for S/RV system operability. The three failed MS RVs rendered the entire S/RV system inoperable for the duration of the fuel cycle, from March 19, 2014 to February 20, 2016." Today you described the rate corrosion bonding as stable and predictable ("What if 10 SRVs set pressure is greater than 10%".. But the OE says the corrosion rate is totally unpredictable. I'd sure like to see that OE. The NRC has been giving me inaccurate and incomplete information surrounding Hope Creek hoping to throw me off track. 1) I asked you if Hope Creek has a undisclosed SRV now who is inop? You never answered that question. Hope Creek should be shutdown right now because more than one SRV is inop and failed. 2) You implied Hope Creek with the SRVs upon start-up always begins with a clean state absent any historic record. The NRC expects there to be no setpoint drift during the operating period. This assertion is called regulatory and engineering malpractice. 3) You said the target rock SRV issues is highly sensitive to the NRC implying everyone knows a cover-up is ongoing. There is potentially a generic issues effecting more than one plant.
| | [External_Sender] Re: Nice speaking with you again today regarding Hope Creek |
| : 4) I asked you how does the NRC explain the fifteen year old trend of zero, one or two fail valves and it slowly trending up to ten valves twice in a row today?. Again the passive-aggressive syndrome non answers. It is violence against transparency and contrary to the meaning of our Constitution. Remember a few years back they weaken the pressure setpoint testing from plus or minus 1% to today's plus or minus 3% (a regulator accommodating these defective valves through campaign contribution). That is a 200% weakening of the setpoint lift testing and it drastically shot up to now ten valves failing the last two cycles. It is looks really bad on the raw data in the new LER-.but it is really really bad if today's 3% inop rate was normalized to 1%. It is a short term drastic change in corrosion bonding rate. 5) You implied the SRV were safe because when the corrosion bonded valves are tested, when it enmediarely is retested, it comes back to the original setpoint. It is the essence of the NRC gives selective information to support an illegal agenda of the agency. I asked, well why don't you make the licensees cycle the valve one a month so they can break corrosion bonding and return it to original setpoint lift. Again, the deafening sound of a passive/ aggressive violent silence of a non-answer ("Mike, this is really is a sensitive issues for the NRC.) These valves are notorious for leaking once the corrosion bonding is broken (normal valve cycling) and ends up requiring a shutdown do to a leaking SRV. It is profits and buddies over safety! "On March 18, 2014, all thirteen BFN, Unit 3 MSRVs were replaced with refurbished valves which were certified to lift within +/- 1 percent of their setpoint. Industrial operating experience (OE) has shown that Target Rock two-stage MSRV setpoint drift is not a uniform, linear process. The corrosion bonding increases at a random rate. Without an accurate and reliable model for predicting or estimating the setpoint drift development, the point in time where the setpoint exceeded the +/- 3 percent limit cannot be reliably determined." I called your boss and left a recording wondering if I could have a discussion about this today like we discussed. I wonder if information is being kept from your senior management? I think this thing all is a illegal accommodation to the fact that Hope Creek can't get any manufacturer (at any price) to supply new valves to the plant or any junk Target Rock SRVs based on liability issues with the manufacturer. As you know, there are similar valves out in the market who have no history of set point drift. Instead, Hope Creek is stuck with crappy vendor services, maintenance and testing- I talked to Hope Creek's licensing manager over this. I think Hope Creek and Salem are generally declining perilously and the NRC doesn't have the tools to stop to the decline (put a floor on it) until a big event shows up. The agency can't anticipate and act on the decline of a plant, congress only enables the NRC to get involved in changing the behavior of the organization once the organizational dysfunction is intractably entrenched in the enormous organization. Is your Indian Point moment approaching? Collectively the NRC and Hope/ Salem site and staff's are "overwhelmed" and underfunded in the second largest nuclear facility in the USA. I remind everyone Hope Creek needs 15 of 16 SRVs to be operability in order to remain up at power. There isn't a lot of excess slack in this system. Could you put this e-mail in Hope Creek's docket? Sincerely, Mike Mulligan}} | | : Richard, This is a cover-up as illuminated by the NRC and Hope Creek in they wont describe the troubles with bringing on better designed valves and the weaselly and slippery words you both use. |
| | A perfect Truism: First they corrupt language, then the accident happens! |
| | In a court of law or court of public opinion, Id ripped the NRCs credibility to shreds with your own documents or lack of appropriate documentation. The fundamental research and studies understanding the process of corrosion bonding on SRVs is sadly lacking. I think this is on purpose. Remember there is tremendous amount of energy and forces going though the SRVs when fully open and a relatively small dp from shut to full open with the pilot valves Where in the FSAR or any reference material does the documental allow\describe having the SRVs and S/RV system be both inop and safe at the same time? The word inop has a special definition for the NRC. This is a unapproved drastic change to the facilityyou created a unapproved operating region without the documentation to prove it is safe. |
| | Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 3 Licensee Event Report 50-296/2016-004-00 TS 3.4.3 requires twelve of the thirteen S/the to be operable for S/RV system operability. The three failed MS RVs rendered the entire S/RV system inoperable for the duration of the fuel cycle, from March 19, 2014 to February 20, 2016. |
| | The two-stage pilot valves failed due to the valve disc corrosion bonding to the valve seat. |
| | TS 3.4.3 requires twelve of the thirteen S/RVs to be operable for S/RV system operability. The three failed MS RVs rendered the entire S/RV system inoperable for the duration of the fuel cycle, from March 19, 2014 to February 20, 2016. |
| | Today you described the rate corrosion bonding as stable and predictable (What if 10 SRVs set pressure is greater than 10%.. But the OE says the corrosion rate is totally unpredictable. Id sure like to see that OE. The NRC has been giving me inaccurate and incomplete information surrounding Hope Creek hoping to throw me off track. |
| | : 1) I asked you if Hope Creek has a undisclosed SRV now who is inop? You never answered that question. Hope Creek should be shutdown right now because more than one SRV is inop and failed. |
| | : 2) You implied Hope Creek with the SRVs upon start-up always begins with a clean state absent any historic record. The NRC expects there to be no setpoint drift during the operating period. This assertion is called regulatory and engineering malpractice. |
| | : 3) You said the target rock SRV issues is highly sensitive to the NRC implying everyone knows a cover-up is ongoing. There is potentially a generic issues effecting more than one plant. |
| | : 4) I asked you how does the NRC explain the fifteen year old trend of zero, one or two fail valves and it slowly trending up to ten valves twice in a row today?. Again the passive-aggressive syndrome non answers. It is violence against transparency and contrary to the meaning of our Constitution. Remember a few years back they weaken the pressure setpoint testing from plus or minus 1% to todays plus or minus 3% (a regulator accommodating these defective valves through campaign contribution). That is a 200% weakening of the setpoint lift testing and it drastically shot up to now ten valves failing the last two cycles. It is looks really bad on the raw data in the new LER.but it is really really bad if todays 3% inop rate was normalized to 1%. It is a short term drastic change in corrosion bonding rate. |
| | : 5) You implied the SRV were safe because when the corrosion bonded valves are tested, when it enmediarely is retested, it comes back to the original setpoint. It is the essence of the NRC gives selective information to support an illegal agenda of the agency. I asked, well why dont you make the licensees cycle the valve one a month so they can break corrosion bonding and return it to original setpoint lift. Again, the deafening sound of a passive/ aggressive violent silence of a non-answer (Mike, this is really is a sensitive issues for the NRC.) These valves are notorious for leaking once the corrosion bonding is broken (normal valve cycling) and ends up requiring a shutdown do to a leaking SRV. It is profits and buddies over safety! |
| | On March 18, 2014, all thirteen BFN, Unit 3 MSRVs were replaced with refurbished valves which were certified to lift within +/- 1 percent of their setpoint. Industrial operating experience (OE) has shown that Target Rock two-stage MSRV setpoint drift is not a uniform, linear process. The corrosion bonding increases at a random rate. Without an accurate and reliable model for predicting or estimating the setpoint drift development, the point in time where the setpoint exceeded the +/- 3 percent limit cannot be reliably determined. |
| | I called your boss and left a recording wondering if I could have a discussion about this today like we discussed. I wonder if information is being kept from your senior management? |
| | I think this thing all is a illegal accommodation to the fact that Hope Creek cant get any manufacturer (at any price) to supply new valves to the plant or any junk Target Rock SRVs based on liability issues with the manufacturer. As you know, there are similar valves out in the market who have no history of set point drift. Instead, Hope Creek is stuck with crappy vendor services, maintenance and testing I talked to Hope Creeks licensing manager over this. I think Hope Creek and Salem are generally declining perilously and the NRC doesnt have the tools to stop to the decline (put a floor on it) until a big event shows up. The agency cant anticipate and act on the decline of a plant, congress only enables the NRC to get involved in changing the behavior of the organization once the organizational dysfunction is intractably entrenched in the enormous organization. Is your Indian Point moment approaching? Collectively the NRC and Hope/ Salem site and staffs are overwhelmed and underfunded in the second largest nuclear facility in the USA. |
| | I remind everyone Hope Creek needs 15 of 16 SRVs to be operability in order to remain up at power. There isn't a lot of excess slack in this system. |
| | Could you put this e-mail in Hope Creek's docket? |
| | Sincerely, Mike Mulligan}} |
|
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Category:E-Mail
MONTHYEARML24002A7222023-12-29029 December 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Salem Generating Station - 2023 Annual Report - Inspection of the Circulating Water Intake Structure (Cwis) Trash Rack Bars ML23355A2732023-12-21021 December 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) PSEG Response to Questions Associated with Supplement to Salem-Hope Creek Eab Reduction LAR ML23277A0482023-10-0404 October 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - 10/4/2023 Email: Acceptance Review - Hope Creek and Salem 1 and 2 - LAR to Modify Exclusion Area Boundary ML23277A0732023-09-29029 September 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) 9/29/2023 Email from PSEG: Supplement to Proposed Amendment to PSEG Master Decommissioning Trust Amendment ML23129A7892023-05-0909 May 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Hope Creek - Revise Trip and Standby Auto-Start Logic Associated with Safety Related HVAC Trains ML23122A1672023-05-0202 May 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Hope Creek and Salem 1 and 2 - Revise TS to Delete TS Section 5.5 - Meteorological Tower Location ML23079A0032023-03-17017 March 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Hope Creek, Salem 1 and 2 - Evacuation Time Estimate Review ML23065A0452023-02-23023 February 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Salem & Hope Creek Generating STATIONS-ANNUAL Incidental Take REPORT-STATION & REMP ML22194A0522022-07-13013 July 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Hope Creek, Salem 1 and 2 - Relocate Staff Qualification Requirements to Licensee Quality Assurance Topical Report ML22038A1552022-02-0404 February 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Salem & Hope Creek Generating STATIONS-ANNUAL Incidental Take REPORT-STATION & REMP ML22021A7012022-01-21021 January 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Hope Creek -Relief Request HC-I4R-220 Regarding Partial Penetration Nozzle Repairs (L-2022-LLR-0003) ML22006A3212022-01-0606 January 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Final RAI - Hope Creek - Revise TS Limits for Ultimate Heat Sink ML21334A1182021-11-30030 November 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Hope Creek -Revise SRs for Electric Power Monitor Channels for RPS and Power Range Neutron Monitoring System ML21154A0102021-05-28028 May 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Hope Creek - Revise TS Limits for Ultimate Heat Sink ML20295A4922020-10-21021 October 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Hope Creek - Final RAI Revise ECCS TS with Respect to HPCI System Inoperability (L-2020-LLA-0131) ML20293A1832020-10-19019 October 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Hope Creek - Adopt TSTF-582, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control (RPV WIC) Enhancements ML20289A7062020-10-15015 October 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Hope Creek - Revise Low Pressure Safety Limit to Address GE Part-21 Safety Communication SC05-03 ML20246G5952020-09-0202 September 2020 Acceptance Review - Hope Creek - Adopt TSTF-427, Allowance for Non TS Barrier Degradation ML20191A0202020-07-0202 July 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Hope Creek - Revise ECCS TS with Respect to HPCI System Inoperability ML20153A3782020-06-0101 June 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Hope Creek - Revise TS Actions for Suppression Pool Cooling ML20006E2802020-01-0606 January 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Hope Creek: LAR Regarding Proposed Adoption of 10 CFR 50.69, Risk- Informed Categorization and Treatment of SSCs for Nuclear Power Plants ML19280A0002019-10-0303 October 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Hope Creek, Salem 1 and 2 - Final RAI Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements (L-2019-LLA-0145) ML19267A1622019-09-24024 September 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Hope Creek - Acceptance Review: Alternative for Exam of ASME Section XI, Exam Category B-G-1, Item Number B6.40, Threads in Flange (L-2019-LLR-0090) ML19226A3932019-08-14014 August 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Salem 1 & 2, Hope Creek - Acceptance Review: Delete License Conditions Related to Decommissioning Trust Provisions and License Transfer ML19198A0992019-07-17017 July 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Salem 1 & 2, Hope Creek - Acceptance Review: Changes to Emergency Plan Staffing ML19186A3842019-07-0505 July 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Hope Creek, Revise TS to Adopt TSTF-563, Revise Instrumentation Testing Definition ML19123A2172019-05-0303 May 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Re Acceptance Review - Hope Creek, Revise TS to Adopt TSTF-564, Safety Limit MCPR ML19081A1532019-03-22022 March 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review: Hope Creek - Revise TS to Adopt TSTF-546 (L-2019-LLA-0032) ML19046A2382019-02-15015 February 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review Result: Hope Creek-Relief Request to Use ASME Code Case OMN-17 (L-2019-LLR-0010) ML18323A0252018-11-16016 November 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review: Hope Creek - Remote Shutdown System I & C Amendment (L-2018-LLA-0295) ML18288A2512018-10-15015 October 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review Result: Hope Creek-Relief Request Associated with Third 10-Year ISI Interval (L-2018-LLR-0124) ML18271A0342018-09-13013 September 2018 Receipt of Stephen Comley, We the People, September 6, 11 and 12 2018 Voicemail and Email ML18263A1442018-09-12012 September 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Final RAI from Apla: Revise Technical Specifications to Increase Inverter AOT Extension (L-2018-LLA-0101) ML18250A3142018-09-0606 September 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Final RAI: Revise Technical Specifications to Increase Inverter AOT Extension (L-2018-LLA-0101) ML18206A7302018-07-27027 July 2018 (50-272, 50-311, 50-354), Transmittal Email 26.717 Updates ML18201A1112018-07-20020 July 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review Results: Hope Creek, Salem 1 & 2 Revise TS to Adopt TSTF-529 (L-2018-LLA-0185) ML18150A6912018-05-30030 May 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Hope Creek - Final RAI Revise TS to Adopt TSTF-542 ML18128A3862018-05-0808 May 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review Results: Hope Creek Revise Inverter AOT TS Actions (L-2018-LLA-0101) ML18122A2392018-05-0202 May 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review Results: Revise Emergency Diesel Generator Technical Specifications Action to Remove Salem Unit 3 Gas Turbine Generator (L-2018-LLA-0079) ML17348A6242017-12-14014 December 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Final Request for Additional Information for Human Factors Associated with the Hope Creek Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Uprate Request (L-2017-LLS-002) ML17348A9972017-12-14014 December 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Final Request for Additional Information for Steam Dryer Analysis with the Hope Creek Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Uprate Request (L-2017-LLS-002) ML17349A0812017-12-14014 December 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Final Request for Additional Information for Reactor Systems Branch (Srxb) - Hope Creek Mur ML17340B2682017-12-0606 December 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Notification to State of New Jersey of Impending License Amendment Issuance for Hope Creek (MF9501; EPID L-2017-LLA-0183) ML17338A2742017-12-0404 December 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - State of New Jersey: Notification of Impending Amendment Issuance for Hope Creek - Relocate Pressure-Temperature Limits Curves to the Pressure-Temperature Limits Report ML17338A2752017-12-0404 December 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Hope Creek License Amendment Request to Revise the Safety Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio ML17331A0072017-11-21021 November 2017 E-mail Regarding Final Eicb Request for Additional Information - Hope Creek Power Uprate ML17348A6282017-11-21021 November 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Draft Request for Additional Information for Steam Dryer Analysis with the Hope Creek Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Uprate Request (L-2017-LLS-002) ML17324A2602017-11-17017 November 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Final Request for Additional Information - Hope Creek Mur Electrical Instrumentation and Controls ML17320A2152017-11-16016 November 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Hope Creek Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Application Review - Electrical Engineering (Eeob) Request for Additional Information (L-2017-LLS-0002) ML17324A0522017-11-0909 November 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Draft Request for Additional Information - Hope Creek Mur Chemical, Corrosion, and Steam Generator 2023-09-29
[Table view] |
Text
ADAMS ACCESSION NO. ML17012A308 From: Michael Mulligan [1]
Sent: Thursday, January 12, 2017 10:08 AM To: Barkley, Richard <Richard.Barkley@nrc.gov>
Subject:
[External_Sender] Re: Nice speaking with you again today regarding Hope Creek
- Richard, This is a cover-up as illuminated by the NRC and Hope Creek in they wont describe the troubles with bringing on better designed valves and the weaselly and slippery words you both use.
A perfect Truism: First they corrupt language, then the accident happens!
In a court of law or court of public opinion, Id ripped the NRCs credibility to shreds with your own documents or lack of appropriate documentation. The fundamental research and studies understanding the process of corrosion bonding on SRVs is sadly lacking. I think this is on purpose. Remember there is tremendous amount of energy and forces going though the SRVs when fully open and a relatively small dp from shut to full open with the pilot valves Where in the FSAR or any reference material does the documental allow\describe having the SRVs and S/RV system be both inop and safe at the same time? The word inop has a special definition for the NRC. This is a unapproved drastic change to the facilityyou created a unapproved operating region without the documentation to prove it is safe.
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 3 Licensee Event Report 50-296/2016-004-00 TS 3.4.3 requires twelve of the thirteen S/the to be operable for S/RV system operability. The three failed MS RVs rendered the entire S/RV system inoperable for the duration of the fuel cycle, from March 19, 2014 to February 20, 2016.
The two-stage pilot valves failed due to the valve disc corrosion bonding to the valve seat.
TS 3.4.3 requires twelve of the thirteen S/RVs to be operable for S/RV system operability. The three failed MS RVs rendered the entire S/RV system inoperable for the duration of the fuel cycle, from March 19, 2014 to February 20, 2016.
Today you described the rate corrosion bonding as stable and predictable (What if 10 SRVs set pressure is greater than 10%.. But the OE says the corrosion rate is totally unpredictable. Id sure like to see that OE. The NRC has been giving me inaccurate and incomplete information surrounding Hope Creek hoping to throw me off track.
- 1) I asked you if Hope Creek has a undisclosed SRV now who is inop? You never answered that question. Hope Creek should be shutdown right now because more than one SRV is inop and failed.
- 2) You implied Hope Creek with the SRVs upon start-up always begins with a clean state absent any historic record. The NRC expects there to be no setpoint drift during the operating period. This assertion is called regulatory and engineering malpractice.
- 3) You said the target rock SRV issues is highly sensitive to the NRC implying everyone knows a cover-up is ongoing. There is potentially a generic issues effecting more than one plant.
- 4) I asked you how does the NRC explain the fifteen year old trend of zero, one or two fail valves and it slowly trending up to ten valves twice in a row today?. Again the passive-aggressive syndrome non answers. It is violence against transparency and contrary to the meaning of our Constitution. Remember a few years back they weaken the pressure setpoint testing from plus or minus 1% to todays plus or minus 3% (a regulator accommodating these defective valves through campaign contribution). That is a 200% weakening of the setpoint lift testing and it drastically shot up to now ten valves failing the last two cycles. It is looks really bad on the raw data in the new LER.but it is really really bad if todays 3% inop rate was normalized to 1%. It is a short term drastic change in corrosion bonding rate.
- 5) You implied the SRV were safe because when the corrosion bonded valves are tested, when it enmediarely is retested, it comes back to the original setpoint. It is the essence of the NRC gives selective information to support an illegal agenda of the agency. I asked, well why dont you make the licensees cycle the valve one a month so they can break corrosion bonding and return it to original setpoint lift. Again, the deafening sound of a passive/ aggressive violent silence of a non-answer (Mike, this is really is a sensitive issues for the NRC.) These valves are notorious for leaking once the corrosion bonding is broken (normal valve cycling) and ends up requiring a shutdown do to a leaking SRV. It is profits and buddies over safety!
On March 18, 2014, all thirteen BFN, Unit 3 MSRVs were replaced with refurbished valves which were certified to lift within +/- 1 percent of their setpoint. Industrial operating experience (OE) has shown that Target Rock two-stage MSRV setpoint drift is not a uniform, linear process. The corrosion bonding increases at a random rate. Without an accurate and reliable model for predicting or estimating the setpoint drift development, the point in time where the setpoint exceeded the +/- 3 percent limit cannot be reliably determined.
I called your boss and left a recording wondering if I could have a discussion about this today like we discussed. I wonder if information is being kept from your senior management?
I think this thing all is a illegal accommodation to the fact that Hope Creek cant get any manufacturer (at any price) to supply new valves to the plant or any junk Target Rock SRVs based on liability issues with the manufacturer. As you know, there are similar valves out in the market who have no history of set point drift. Instead, Hope Creek is stuck with crappy vendor services, maintenance and testing I talked to Hope Creeks licensing manager over this. I think Hope Creek and Salem are generally declining perilously and the NRC doesnt have the tools to stop to the decline (put a floor on it) until a big event shows up. The agency cant anticipate and act on the decline of a plant, congress only enables the NRC to get involved in changing the behavior of the organization once the organizational dysfunction is intractably entrenched in the enormous organization. Is your Indian Point moment approaching? Collectively the NRC and Hope/ Salem site and staffs are overwhelmed and underfunded in the second largest nuclear facility in the USA.
I remind everyone Hope Creek needs 15 of 16 SRVs to be operability in order to remain up at power. There isn't a lot of excess slack in this system.
Could you put this e-mail in Hope Creek's docket?
Sincerely, Mike Mulligan