ML20195H065

Revised Bases Pages B 3/4 10-2 & B 3/4 2-4 for LGS Units 1 & 2,in Order to Clarify That Requirements for Reactor Enclosure Secondary Containment Apply to Extended Area Encompassing Both Reactor Enclosure & Refueling Area

ML20195H065
Person / Time
Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	06/09/1999
From:	PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:
Shared Package
ML20195H059	List: ML20195H053 ML20195H065
References
NUDOCS 9906160260
Download: ML20195H065 (8)

Text

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3/4 ~ 10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS BASES I

3.4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITV  ;

_ The requirement for PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is not applicable during the period when open vessel tests are being performed during the low power .

PHYSICS TESTS.

3/4.10.2 R00 WORTH MijuglZig In order to perform the tests required in the technical specifications .

it is necessary to bypass the sequence restraints on control rod movement. The additional surveillance requirements ensure that the specifications on heat generation rates and shutdown margin requirements are not exceeded during the period when these tests are being performed and that individual rod worths do not exceed the values assumed in the safety analysis.

3/4.10.3 SHUTD0WN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS Performance of shutdown margin demonstrations with the vessel head removed requires additional restrictions in order to ensure that criticality does not occur. These additional restrictions are specified in this LCO.

3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION LOOPS This special test exception permits reactor criticality under no flow l conditions and is required to perform certain startup and PHYSICS TESTS while ,

at low THERMAL POWER levels. i 3/4.10.5 OXYGEN CONCENTR/. TION Relief from the oxygen concentration specifications is necessary in order  !

to provide access to the primary containment during the iattial startup and testing phase of operation. Without this access the startup and test program could be restricted and delayed.

-3/4.10.6 TRAINING STARTUPS This special test exception permits training startups to be performed with the reactor vessel depressurized at low THERMAL POWER and temperature while controlling RCS temperature with one RHR subsystem aligned in the shutdown cooling mode in order to minimize contaminated water discharge to the radioactive waste disposal system.

3/4.10.7 RESERVED - CURRENTLY NOT USED l

LIMERICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 10-1 1-Lht No. Y7, 75,133 FEB 1 1 1999

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9906160260 990609 PDR ADOCK 05000352 P PDR .

o 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS BASES 3/4.10.8 INSERVICE LEAK AND HYDROSTATIC TESTING This special test exception permits certain reactor coolant pressure tests to be performed in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 when the metallurgical characteristics of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) or plant temperature control capabilities during these tests require the pressure testing at temperatures greater than 200*F and less than or equal to 212*F (normally corresponding to OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3). The additionally imposed OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 requirements for SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY provide conservatism in response to an operational event.

Invoking the requirement for Refueling Area Secondary Containment Integrity along with the requirement for Reactor Enclosure Secondary Containment Integrity applies the requirements for Reactor Enclosure Secondary Containment Integrity to an extended area encompassing Zones I and 3. Operations with the Potential for Draining the Vessel, Core alterations, and fuel handling are prohibited in this secondary containment configuration. . Drawdown and inleakage testing performed for the combined zone system alignment shall be considered adequate to demonstrate integrity of the combined zones.

Inservice hydrostatic testing and inservice leak pressure tests required by Section XI of the American Society of. Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code are performed prior to the reactor going critical after a refueling outage. The minimum temperatures (at the required pressures) allowed for these tests are determined from the RPV pressure and temperature (P/T) limits required by LCO 3.4.6, Reactor Coolant- System Pressure / Temperature Limits. These limits are conservatively based on the fracture toughness of the reactor vessel, taking into account anticipated vessel neutron fluence. With increased reactor fluence over time, the minimum allowable vessel temperature increases at a given pressure. Periodic updates to the RCS P/T limit curves are performed as necessary, based upon the results of analysis of irradiated surveillance specimens removed from the vessel.

MAY 0. 61999 LIMERICK - UNIT I B 3/4 10-2 Amendment No. 188 ECR 99-00864 o ___ _ _ -

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS BASES 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINNENT INTEGRITY The requirement for PRIMARY CONTAIMENT INTEGRITY is not applicable during the period when open vessel tests are being perfomed during the low power PHYSICS TESTS.

3/4.10.2 R00 WORTH MINIMIZE'R '

In order to perform the tests required in the technical specifications it is necessary to bypass the sequence restraints on control rod movement. The additional surveillance requirements ensure that the specifications on heat .

generation rates and shutdown margin requirements are not exceeded during the period when these tests are being performed and that individual rod worths do not exceed the values assumed in the safety analysis.

3/4.10.3 SNUTDOWN MARGIN D'EMONSTRATIONS Performance of shutdown margin demonstretions with the vessel head removed requires additional restrictions in order to ensure that criticality does not occur. These additional restrictions are specified in this LCo.

3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION 4.00PS This special test exception permits reactor criticality under n'o flow conditions and is required to perform certain startup and PHYSICS TESTS while at low THERMAL PCWER levels.

3/4.10.5 OXYGEN CONCENTRATION Relief from the oxygen concentration specifications is necessary in order

' to provide access to the primary containment during the initial startup and testing phase of operation. Without this access the startup and test program could be restricted and delayed.

,' 3/4.10.6 TRAINING STARTUPS This special test exception permits training startups to be perfomed with the reactor vessel depressurized at lov. THERMAL POWER and temperature while controlling RCS temperature with one Rhd subsystem aligned in the shutdown

• cooling mode in order to minimize contaminated water discharge to the radioactive waste disposal system.

3/4.10.7 SPECIAL INSTRUMENTATION - INITIAL CORE LOADING This special test exception pemits relief from the requirements for a minimum count rate while loading the first 16 fuel bundles to allow sufficient source-to-detector coupling such that minimum count rate can be achieved on an SRM. This is acceptable because of the significant margin to criticality while loading the initial 16 fuel bundles. -

LIMERICK - UNIT 2 8 3/4 10-1 AM 2 5 W l

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS BASES 3/4.10.8' INSERVICE LEAK AND HYDROSTATIC TESTING ,

1 This special test exception permits certain reactor coolant pressure tests to be I performed in OPERATIONAL- CONDITION 4 when the metallurgical characteristics of the I reactor pressure vessel (RPV) or plant temperature control capabilities during these tests require the pressure testing at temperatures greater than 200*F and les> than or equal to 212*F (normally corresponding to OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3). The additionally imposed OPERATIONAL. CONDITION 3 requirements for SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY provide conservatism in response to an operational event. '

Invoking the requirement for Refueling Area Secondary Containment Integrity along with the requirement for Reactor Enclosure Secondary Containment Integrity applies the requirements for Reactor Enclosure Secondary Containment Integrity to an extended area encompassing Zones 2 and 3. Operations with the Potential for Draining the Vessel, Core alterations, and fuel handling are prohibited in this secondary containment configuration. Drawdown and inleakage testing performed for the combined zone system alignment shall be considered adequate to demonstrate integrity of the combined zones. );

Inservice hydrostatic testing and inservice leak pressure tests required by Section XI of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code are performed prior to the reactor going critical after a refueling outage. The minimum temperatures (at the required pressures) allowed for these tests are determined from the RPV pressure and temperature (P/T) limits required by LCO 3.4.6, Reactor Coolant System Pressure / Temperature Limits. These limits are conservatively based on the fracture toughness of the reactor vessel, taking into account anticipated vessel neutron fluence. With increased reactor fluence over time, the minimum allowable vessel temperature increases at a given pressure. Periodic updates to the RCS P/T limit curves are performed as necessary, based upon the results of analysis of-irradiated surveillance specimens removed from the vessel.

l MAY 0 61999 LIMERICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 10-2 Amendment No. 95 ECR 99-00864 I

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POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES '

3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO The required operating limit MCPRs at steady-state operating conditions as specified in Specification 3.2.3 are derived from the established fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit MCPR, and an analysis of abnormal operational transients. For any abnormal operating transient analysis evaluation with the initial condition of the reactor being at the steady-state operating limit, it 1 is required that the resulting MCPR does not decrease below the Safety Limit MCPR at any time during the transient assuming instrument trip setting given {

in Specification 2.2.

To assure that the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is not exceeded 4 during any anticipated abnormal operational transient, the most limiting tran- I sients have been analyzed to determine which result in the largest reduction in CRITICAL POWER RATIO (CPR . The ty flow, increase in pressure an)d power, pe of reactivity positive transientsinsertion, evaluatedand were loss of coolant temperature decrease.  !

The evaluation of a given transie' nt begins with the system initial para-meters shown in FSAR Table 15.0-2 that are input to a GE-core dynamic behavior transient computer program. The codes used to evaluate transients are discussed j in Reference 2. i The MCPR operating limits derived from the transient analysis are dependent on the operating core flow and power state (MCPR(F), and MCPR(P), respectively) to ensure adherence to fuel design limits during the worst transient that occurs with moderate frequency (Ref. 6). Flow dependent MCPR limits determined by steady state thermal hydraulic methods with key p(MCPR(F))

hysics response are  ;

inputs benchmarked using the three dimensional BWR simulator code (Ref. 7) to l analyze slow flow runout transients.

Power dependent MCPR limits (MCPR(P)) are determined mainly by the one dimensional transient code (Ref. 8). Due to the sensitivity of the transient response to initial core flow levels at power levels below those at which the turbine stop valve closure and turbine control valve fast closure scrams are bypassed, high and low flow MCPR(P), operating limits are provided for operating between 25% RTP and 30% RTP.

Tne MCPR operating limits specified in the COLR are the result of the l Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analysis. The operating limit MCPR is determined by the larger of the MCPR(F), and MCPR(P) limits.

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I Jult 0 31999 _,

j LIMERICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 2-4 Amendment No. 7 49,30,37,46' ,

ECRLG99-0113d i

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POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES . .

3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO The required operating limit MCPRs at steady-state operating conditions as specified in Specification 3.2.3 are derived from the established fuel cladding integrity Safety. Limit MCPR, and an analysis of abnormal operational transients. For any abnormal operating transient analysis evaluation with the initial ' condition of the reactor being at the steady-state operating limit, it is required.that the resulting MCPR does not decrease below the Safety Limit MCPR at any time during the transient assuming instrument trip setting given in Specification 2.2.

.To assure that the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is not exceeded during any anticipated abnormal operational transient, the most limiting tran-sients have been analyzed to determine which result in the largest reduction in CRITICAL POWER RATIO (CPR). The type of transients evaluated were loss of flow, increase in pressure and power, positive reactivity insertion, and coolant temperature decrease.

The evaluation of a given transient begins with the system initial para-meters shown in FSAR Table 15.0-2 that are input to a GE-core dynamic behavior transient computer program. The codes used to evaluate transients are discussed in Reference 2.

The MCPR operating limits derived from the transient analysis are dependent on the operating core flow and power state (MCPR(F), and MCPR(P), rsspectively) to ensure adherence to fuel design limits during the worst transient that occurs with moderate frequency (Ref. 6). Flow dependent MCPR limits -

determined by steady state thermal hydraulic methods with key p(MCPR(F))

hysics response are inputs benchmarked using the three dimensional BWR simulator code (Ref. 7) to analyze slow flow runout transients.

Power dependent MCPP. limits (MCPR(P)) are determined mainly by the one dimensional transient code (Ref. 8). Due to the sensitivity of the transient response to initial core flow levels at power levels below those at which the turbine stop valve closure and turbine control valve fast closure scrans are bypassed, high and low flow MCPR(P), operating limits are provided for operating between 25% RTP and 30% RTP.

,.- The MCPR operating limits specified in the COLR are the result of the j Design Basit Accident (DBA) and transient analysis. The operating limit MCPR is determined by the larger of the MCPR(F), and MCPR(P) limits.

I JUN 0 31999 LIMERICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 2-4 Amendment No. +, 48-ECR LG 99-01138 2

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POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES - .

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3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO The required operating limit MCPRs at steady-state operating conditions as specified .in Specification 3.2.3 are derived from the established fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit MCPR, and an analysis of abnormal operational transients. For any abnormal operating transient analysis evaluation with the initial condition of the reactor being at the steady-state operating limit, it is. required that the resulting MCPR does not decrease below the Safety Limit MCPR at any time during the transient assuming instrument trip setting given

.in Specification 2.2.

To assure that the fue1~ cladding integrity Safety Limit is not exceeded during any anticipated abnormal operational transient, the most limiting tran-sients have been analyzed to determine which result in the largest reduction in CRITICAL POWER RATIO The type of transients evaluated were loss of

' flow, increase in pressur(CPR).e and power, positive reactivity insertion, and coolant temperature decrease.

The evaluation of a given transient begins with the system it'.tial para-meters shown in FSAR Table 15.0-2 that are input to a GE-core dynamic behavior transient computer program. The codes used to evaluate transients are discussed in Reference 2.

The MCPR operating limits derived from the transient analysis are dependent on the operating core flow and power state (MCPR(F), and MCPR(P), respectively) to ensure adherence to fuel design limits during the worst transient that occurs with moderate frequency (Ref. 6). Flow dependent MCPR limits (MCPR(F)) are determined by steady state thermal hydraulic methods with key physics response inputs benchmarked using the three dimensional BWR simulator code (Ref. 7) to analyze slow flow runout transients.

Power dependent MCPR limits (MCPR(P)) are determined mainly by the one dimensional transient code (Ref. 8). Due to the sensitivity of the transient response to initial core flow levels at power levels below those at which the turbine stop valve closure and turbine control valve fast closure scrans are bypassed, high and low flow MCPR(P), operating limits are provided for operating between 25% RTP and 30% RTP.

The MCPR operating limits specified in the COLR are the result of the Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analysis. The operating limit MCPR is determined by the larger of the MCPR(F), and MCPR(P) limits.

JUN 0 31999 LIMERICK - UNIT 2- B 3/4 2-4 Amendment No. +, 48-EC1 LG 99-01138 1

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS i

BASES - .

j 3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO The required operating limit MCPRs at steady-state operating conditions as specified in Specification.3.2.3 are derived from the established fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit MCPR, and an analysis of abnormal operational transients. For any abnormal operating transient analysis evaluation with the

' initial condition of the reactor being at the steady-state operating limit, it is required that the resulting MCPR does not decrease below the Safety Limit MCPR at any time during the transient assuming instrument trip setting given in Specification 2.2.

To assure that the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is not exceeded during any anticipated abnormal operational transient, the most limiting tran-sients have been analyzed to determine which result in the largest reduction in CRITICAL POWER RATIO (CPR . The type of transients evaluated were loss of flow, increase in pressure an)d power, positive reactivity insertion, and coolant temperature decrease.

The evaluation of a given transient begins with the system initial para-meters shown in FSAR Table 15.0-2 that are input to a GE-core dynamic behavior transient computer program. The codes used to evaluate transients are discussed in Reference 2.

The MCPR operating limits derived from the transient analysis are dependent on'the operating core flow and power state (MCPR(F), and MCPR(P), respectively) to ensure adherence to fuel design limits during the worst transient that occurs with moderate frequency (Ref. 6). Flow dependent MCPR limits determined by steady state thermal hydraulic methods with key p(MCPR(F))

hysics response are inputs benchmarked using the three dimensional BWR simulator code (Ref. 7) to analyze slow flow runout transients.

Power dependent MCPR limits (MCPR(P)) are determined mainly by the one dimensional transient code-(Ref. 8). Due to the sensitivity of the transient

. response' to initial core flow levels at power levels below those at which the turbine stop valve closure and turbine control valve fast closure scrams are bypassed, high and low flow MCPR(P), operating limits are provided for operating between 25% RTP and 30% RTP.

The MCPR operating limits specified in the COLR are the result of the Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analysis. The operating limit MCPR is determined by the larger of the MCPR(F), and MCPR(P) limits.

JUN 0 31999 LIMERICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 2-4 Amendment No. +, 48-ECR LG 99-01138

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n POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES - .

3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO The required operating limit MCPRs at steady-state operating conditions as specified in Specification 3.2.3 are-derived from the established fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit MCPR, and an analysis of abnormal operational transients. .For any abnormal operating transient analysis evaluation with the initial condition of the reactor being at the steady-state . operating limit, it is required that the resulting MCPR does not decrease below the Safety Limit MCPR at any time during the transient assuming instrument trip setting given in Specification 2.2.

To assure that.the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is not exceeded during any anticipated abnormal operational transient, the most limiting tran-sients have been' analyzed to determine which result in the largest reduction in CRITICAL POWER RATIO (CPR). The type of transients evaluated were loss of flow,' increase in pressure and power, positive reactivity insertion, and coolant temperature decrease.

- The evaluation of a given transient begins with the system initial para-meters shown in FSAR Table 15.0-2 that are input to a GE-core dynamic behavior transient computer. program. The codes used to evaluate transients are discussed in Reference 2.

The MCPR operating limits derived from the transient analysis are dependent on the operating core flow and power state-(MCPR(F), and MCPR(P), respectively) to ensure adherence to fuel design limits during the worst transient that occurs with moderate frequency (Ref. 6). Flow dependent MCPR limits (MCPR(F)) are determined by steady state thermal hydraulic methods with key physics response inputs benchmarked using the three dimensional BWR simulator code (Ref. 7) to analyze slow flow runout transients.

Power dependent MCPR limits (MCPR(P)) are determined mainly by the one dimensional transient code (Ref. 8). Due to the sensitivity of the transient response to initial core flow levels at power levels below those at which the

. turbine stop valve closure and turbine control valve fast closure scrams are bypassed, high and low flow MCPR(P), operating limits are provided for operating between 25% RTP and 30% RTP.

The MCPR operating limits specified in the COLR are the result of the Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analysis. The operating limit MCPR is determined by the larger of the MCPR(F), and MCPR(P) limits.

JUN 0 31999 LIMERICK - UNIT.2 B 3/4 2-4 Amendment No. +, 48-ECR LG 99-01138

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