ML20127E626: Difference between revisions

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| document type = DEFICIENCY REPORTS (PER 10CFR50.55E & PART 21), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| document type = DEFICIENCY REPORTS (PER 10CFR50.55E & PART 21), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| page count = 3
| page count = 3
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| stage = Other
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Latest revision as of 06:14, 22 August 2022

Part 21 Rept Re Failure to Follow Design Control Procedures Resulting in Misapplication of Switch CR2940 on Standby Liquid Control Sys Which May Cause Failure of Class 1E Equipment.Design Drawing Change in Progress
ML20127E626
Person / Time
Site: Grand Gulf, River Bend, Clinton, 05000000
Issue date: 06/17/1985
From: Sherwood G
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To: Taylor J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
References
REF-PT21-85 MFN-089-85, MFN-89-85, RLG-069-85, RLG-69-85, NUDOCS 8506240602
Download: ML20127E626 (3)


Text

7 GENER AL $ ELECTRIC NUCLEAR ENERGY BUslNESs OPERATIONS GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY e 175 CURTNER AVENUE e SAN JOSE, CAUFORNIA 95125 MC682,(408)-925-5040 June 17, 1985 MFN-089-85 RLG-069-85 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: J. M. Taylor Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

10CFR PART 21, REPORTABLE CONDITION UNQUALIFIED TEST SWITCH This letter is to inform the NRC of a reportable defect per 10CFR Part 21, as reported to W. R. Jones by G. B. Stramback on June 17, 1985.

The condition is the failure to follow design control procedures resulting in the misapplication of Switch CR2940 on the Standby Liquid Control System which may cause failure of Class 1E equipment. Actions have already been taken to implement the necessary changes on the affected plants.

The attached evaluation identifies all pertinent information required by 10CFR Part 21.

Very truly urs, Gle n G. Sher ood, Manager Nuclear Safety & Licensing Operation GGS: cal: rm/K05014*

Attachment cc: J. M. Taylor (2)

T. E. Murley J. N. Grace W. R. Jones J. G. Keppler R. D. Martin J. B. Martin C. E. Rossi G. G. Zech L. 5. Gifford 8506240602 850617 A 4

PDR S

ADOCK 05000416 PDR y ,9.t

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1. Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

Dr. G. G. Sherwood Manager of Safety & Licensing Operation General Electric Company 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, CA 95125

2. Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

-Grand Gulf, River Bend, and Clinton Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS) test switches (CR 2940) not qualified for containment environment.

3. Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

General Electric Company Nuclear Energy Business Operation 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, California 95125

4. Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

GE SLCS drawings specified test switches (CR 2940) which were not quali-fled for the environment (harsh) at that location (inside containment).

Switches were to be qualified during environmental qualification program.

Design control procedures require conditional application of equipment pending completion of equipment qualification. Preliminary evaluation during the program indicated they would be difficult to qualify (could not meet radiation level requirements). They were subsequently dropped from the program and drawing changes were initiated.

Since a conditional application was not identified per procedure, the above sequence of events has led to a misapplication of the switches.

Since previous evaluations of the switches pursuant to IE Notice 83-45, a new failure scenario has been developed. Failure of the switches during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) has been postulated to degrade the emer-gency power supply enough to inhibit operation of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) equipment. Switch failure could start the valved out SLCS pump or valve motor leading to motor overheating and shorting of the emergency bus which is protected only by fault current protective devices.

Both Division 1 and 2 emergency power buses are affected.

5. The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

June 17, 1985 RTH: cal:rm/K05015*-1 6/17/85

e

6. In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of all such components in use at, supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

Two CR 2940 switches on each of two SLC systems inside the containment were specified for Clinton, Grand Gulf, and River Bend and four foreign plants. Other domestic BWR's do not have this configuration.

7. The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization res)onsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will 3e taken to complete the action.

The corrective action is.to complete the design drawing change currently in progress. The plant changes will be implemented by FDDR LD1-2264 Rev.1 for River Bend, FDDR JB1-2066 for Grand Gulf, and FDI SKUH for Clinton. A formal communication to each affected utility is being made concurrent with this report to the NRC.

8. Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees See 7 above.

RTH: cal:rm/K05015*-2 6/17/85

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