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| {{#Wiki_filter:(l Xcel Energy* Ah\ 1 4 2016 U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 Dockets 50-282 and 50-306 Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant 1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, MN 55089 L-PI-16-031 10 CFR 50.90 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-42 and DPR-60 Response to Requests for Additional Information-- | | {{#Wiki_filter:(l Xcel Energy* Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant 1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, MN 55089 L-PI-16-031 Ah\ 1 4 2016 10 CFR 50.90 U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 Dockets 50-282 and 50-306 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-42 and DPR-60 Response to Requests for Additional Information-- License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to AdoptTSTF-523. "Generic Letter 2008-01. Managing Gas Accumulation." Revision 2. Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CAC Nos. MF6449 and MF6450) |
| License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to AdoptTSTF-523. "Generic Letter 2008-01. Managing Gas Accumulation." Revision 2. Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CAC Nos. MF6449 and MF6450) | |
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| ==References:== | | ==References:== |
| : 1. NSPM letter, S. Sharp to NRC Document Control Desk, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523, "Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation," Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process, PI-15-030, dated June 29, 2015 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML15187A259) 2. Technical Specification Task Force Traveler No. 523 (TSTF-523), "Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation," Revision 2 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13053A075). | | : 1. NSPM letter, S. Sharp to NRC Document Control Desk, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523, "Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation," Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process, L-PI-15-030, dated June 29, 2015 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML15187A259) |
| TSTF-523 Notice of Availability, 79 Fed. Reg. 2700 (January 15, 2014) 3. NRC email, T. Beltz to G. Carlson, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Requests for Additional Information (Draft) re: License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-523 (CAC Nos. MF6449 and MF6450), dated October 27, 2015 4. NSPM letter, K. Davison to NRC Document Control Desk, License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) to Adopt TSTF-523, "Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation," Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process -Response to Request for Additional Information, L-PI-15-105, dated December 30, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15364A466) | | : 2. Technical Specification Task Force Traveler No. 523 (TSTF-523), "Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation," Revision 2 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13053A075). TSTF-523 Notice of Availability, 79 Fed. Reg. 2700 (January 15, 2014) |
| : 5. NSPM letter, K. Davison to NRC Document Control Desk, Supplement to License . Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523, "Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing GasAccumulation", Revision 2, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CAC Nos. MF6449 and MF6450), L-PI-16-003, dated January 25, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16025A162) | | : 3. NRC email, T. Beltz to G. Carlson, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Requests for Additional Information (Draft) re: License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-523 (CAC Nos. MF6449 and MF6450), dated October 27, 2015 |
| Document Control Desk Page2 6. NRC email, R. Kuntz to G. Carlson, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-523, "GL 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation" (CAC Nos. MF6449 and MF6450), dated March 2, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16075A080) | | : 4. NSPM letter, K. Davison to NRC Document Control Desk, License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) to Adopt TSTF-523, "Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation," Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process - Response to Request for Additional Information, L-PI-15-105, dated December 30, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15364A466) |
| : 7. NSPM letter, S. Northard to NRC Document Control Desk, Response to Requests for Additional Information | | : 5. NSPM letter, K. Davison to NRC Document Control Desk, Supplement to License . |
| --License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523. "Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation," Revision 2, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CAC Nos. MF6449 and MF6450), L-PI-16-029, dated March 31, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16091A405) . 8. NRC email, R. Kuntz to G. Carlson, dated 3/29/2015 By Reference 1, Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota corporation, doing business as Xcel Energy (hereafter "NSPM"), submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) a License Amendment Request (LAR) to revise the Technical Specifications for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP), Units 1 and 2, to adopt TSTF-523 (Reference | | Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523, "Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing GasAccumulation", Revision 2, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CAC Nos. MF6449 and MF6450), |
| : 2) using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process. By Reference 3, the NRC Staff provided a request for additional information (RAI) on the LAR. By Reference 4, NSPM responded to the staff RAI and committed to submit a supplement to the LAR. By Reference 5, NSPM submitted the LAR supplement.
| | L-PI-16-003, dated January 25, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16025A162) |
| By Reference 6, the NRC Staff provided additional RAis SR3.5.2.5-1, SR3.5.2.5-2, and SR3.5.2.5-3 on the LAR. By Reference 7, NSPM responded to RAis SR3.5.2.5-2 and SR3.5.2.5-3. | | |
| As agreed between the NRC Project Manager for PINGP and NSPM (Reference 8), NSPM herewith submits Attachment 1 in response to RAI SR3.5.2.5-1. | | Document Control Desk Page2 |
| NSPM submits this letter in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90. This letter does not change the conclusions of the No Significant Hazards Consideration determination nor the Environmental Evaluation in Reference | | : 6. NRC email, R. Kuntz to G. Carlson, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-523, "GL 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation" (CAC Nos. MF6449 and MF6450), dated March 2, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16075A080) |
| : 1. NSPM requests the NRC issue the requested license amendment by June 30, 2016, with the amendment to be implemented within 90 days of issuance.
| | : 7. NSPM letter, S. Northard to NRC Document Control Desk, Response to Requests for Additional Information -- License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523. "Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation," Revision 2, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CAC Nos. MF6449 and MF6450), L-PI-16-029, dated March 31, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16091A405) . |
| | : 8. NRC email, R. Kuntz to G. Carlson, dated 3/29/2015 By Reference 1, Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota corporation, doing business as Xcel Energy (hereafter "NSPM"), submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) a License Amendment Request (LAR) to revise the Technical Specifications for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP), Units 1 and 2, to adopt TSTF-523 (Reference 2) using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process. |
| | By Reference 3, the NRC Staff provided a request for additional information (RAI) on the LAR. By Reference 4, NSPM responded to the staff RAI and committed to submit a supplement to the LAR. By Reference 5, NSPM submitted the LAR supplement. |
| | By Reference 6, the NRC Staff provided additional RAis SR3.5.2.5-1, SR3.5.2.5-2, and SR3.5.2.5-3 on the LAR. By Reference 7, NSPM responded to RAis SR3.5.2.5-2 and SR3.5.2.5-3. As agreed between the NRC Project Manager for PINGP and NSPM (Reference 8), NSPM herewith submits Attachment 1 in response to RAI SR3.5.2.5-1. |
| | NSPM submits this letter in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90. This letter does not change the conclusions of the No Significant Hazards Consideration determination nor the Environmental Evaluation in Reference 1. |
| | NSPM requests the NRC issue the requested license amendment by June 30, 2016, with the amendment to be implemented within 90 days of issuance. |
| In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, NSPM is providing a copy of this letter to the designated State of Minnesota official. | | In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, NSPM is providing a copy of this letter to the designated State of Minnesota official. |
| If there is any question or if additional information is needed, please contact Dr. Glenn A. Carlson, P.E., at 651-267-1755. | | If there is any question or if additional information is needed, please contact Dr. Glenn A. Carlson, P.E., at 651-267-1755. |
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| Document Control Desk Page3 Summary of Commitments PINGP will evaluate potential modifications to enhance the monitoring of the inaccessible locations at a 31-day frequency. | | Document Control Desk Page3 Summary of Commitments PINGP will evaluate potential modifications to enhance the monitoring of the inaccessible locations at a 31-day frequency. |
| I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on APR 1 4 2016 Scott Northard Acting Site Vice President-Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company-Minnesota Attachment (1) cc: Administrator, Region Ill, NRC Project Manager, PINGP, NRC Resident Inspectors, PINGP, NRC State of Minnesota ATTACHMENT 1 Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information RAI SR3.5.2.5-1 LAR Section 2.2 states that if the first-off check valve is leaking at a rate greater than the second-off check valve, then the volume between the check valves will pressurize and a void cannot form. Provide the following information related to the potential for void formation between these two check valves: If a leak should occur, could the pressure in the volume between the valves initially be low enough for outgassing to occur with the gas volume not being immediately reabsorbed as the volume pressurizes? | | I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. |
| If so, the leak rate through the first valve will decrease and through the second valve will increase as the intermediate gas volume is pressurized. | | Executed on APR 14 2016 Scott Northard Acting Site Vice President- Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company- Minnesota Attachment (1) cc: Administrator, Region Ill, NRC Project Manager, PINGP, NRC Resident Inspectors, PINGP, NRC State of Minnesota |
| Could the resulting condition result in void formation? | | |
| PINGP Response Safety injection system inaccessible location configuration The four inaccessible locations are designated 1 Sl-44 and 1 Sl-45 for Unit 1 and 2SI-14A and 2SI-14B for Unit 2. The inaccessible locations are located on corresponding line numbers 2-SI-35A, 2-SI-358, 2-2SI-35A and 2-2SI-35B. | | ATTACHMENT 1 Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information RAI SR3.5.2.5-1 LAR Section 2.2 states that if the first-off check valve is leaking at a rate greater than the second-off check valve, then the volume between the check valves will pressurize and a void cannot form. |
| These locations are adjacent to the reactor coolant system (RCS) first-off pressure isolation check valves and are inaccessible during normal operations due to dose and temperature concerns. | | Provide the following information related to the potential for void formation between these two check valves: |
| The safety injection (SI) system piping injects into each of the RCS cold legs through a single common pipe that branches into two separate 2-inch lines. On each of the 2-inch branches, there are two check valves installed that are the pressure boundary valves for the RCS. The first-off check valves (SI-9-1, Sl-9-2, 2SI-9-1, and 2SI-9-2) are 6-inch swing disc check valves. The second-off check valves (SI-16-4, Sl-16-5, 2SI-16-4, and 2SI-16-6) are 2-inch spring loaded plug type check valves. The geometry of the four inaccessible locations consists of a vertically oriented 6-inch check valve that connects to the RCS loop piping with RCS pressure on the downstream side of the disc. These locations are all high points that would allow gas to accumulate inside the check valve on the upstream side. The locations are inaccessible due to high dose rates during power operation and their proximity to the RCS loop piping. The locations are examined at the piping adjacent the check valve due to the valve configuration and examination limitations. | | If a leak should occur, could the pressure in the volume between the valves initially be low enough for outgassing to occur with the gas volume not being immediately reabsorbed as the volume pressurizes? If so, the leak rate through the first valve will decrease and through the second valve will increase as the intermediate gas volume is pressurized. Could the resulting condition result in void formation? |
| Document Control Desk Page 5 Gas intrusion source The Sl piping connects directly to a pressurized RCS. Dissolved gases in the reactor coolant are controlled by the Chemical and Volume Control System (VC) that maintains the concentration of hydrogen or nitrogen gas present through the Volume Control Tank (VCT). The current Gas Accumulation Management Program (GAMP) indicates if back-leakage were to occur, the lower pressure on the upstream side of the check valve would result in hydrogen gas coming out of solution and a void formation. | | PINGP Response Safety injection system inaccessible location configuration The four inaccessible locations are designated 1Sl-44 and 1Sl-45 for Unit 1 and 2SI-14A and 2SI-14B for Unit 2. The inaccessible locations are located on corresponding line numbers 2-SI-35A, 2-SI-358, 2-2SI-35A and 2-2SI-35B. These locations are adjacent to the reactor coolant system (RCS) first-off pressure isolation check valves and are inaccessible during normal operations due to dose and temperature concerns. |
| Thus these locations meet the definition of susceptible locations according to the program documents. | | The safety injection (SI) system piping injects into each of the RCS cold legs through a single common pipe that branches into two separate 2-inch lines. On each of the 2-inch branches, there are two check valves installed that are the pressure boundary valves for the RCS. The first-off check valves (SI-9-1, Sl-9-2, 2SI-9-1, and 2SI-9-2) are 6-inch swing disc check valves. The second-off check valves (SI-16-4, Sl-16-5, 2SI-16-4, and 2SI-16-6) are 2-inch spring loaded plug type check valves. |
| | The geometry of the four inaccessible locations consists of a vertically oriented 6-inch check valve that connects to the RCS loop piping with RCS pressure on the downstream side of the disc. These locations are all high points that would allow gas to accumulate inside the check valve on the upstream side. |
| | The locations are inaccessible due to high dose rates during power operation and their proximity to the RCS loop piping. The locations are examined at the piping adjacent the check valve due to the valve configuration and examination limitations. |
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| | Document Control Desk Page 5 Gas intrusion source The Sl piping connects directly to a pressurized RCS. Dissolved gases in the reactor coolant are controlled by the Chemical and Volume Control System (VC) that maintains the concentration of hydrogen or nitrogen gas present through the Volume Control Tank (VCT). The current Gas Accumulation Management Program (GAMP) indicates if back-leakage were to occur, the lower pressure on the upstream side of the check valve would result in hydrogen gas coming out of solution and a void formation. Thus these locations meet the definition of susceptible locations according to the program documents. |
| Three scenarios describe the specific leakage conditions that must exist for a void to form at the inaccessible locations: | | Three scenarios describe the specific leakage conditions that must exist for a void to form at the inaccessible locations: |
| Scenario 1 -If only a single check valve is leaking, a void cannot form. Scenario 2 -If the first-off check valve is leaking at a rate that is greater than the second-off check valve, then the area between the check valves will pressurize and a void cannot form. The design leakage limit for these check valves is 3 cc/hr per inch of nominal pipe size. This means that the 6" first-off check valves would have a design leakage rate of 18 cc/hr and the 2" second-off check valves would have a design leakage rate of 6 cc/hr. This design leakage rate is important to consider since it is impossible to design a zero leakage check valve with hard seats. Since the first-off check valves have a higher design leakage rate than the second-off check valves, void formation is unlikely. | | Scenario 1 - If only a single check valve is leaking, a void cannot form. |
| This is because a higher leakage through the first-off . check valves, when compared to the second-off check valves, would tend to pressurize the piping between the check valves, which would prevent void formation. | | Scenario 2 - If the first-off check valve is leaking at a rate that is greater than the second-off check valve, then the area between the check valves will pressurize and a void cannot form. |
| Scenario 3 -For void formation to occur, both the first-off and second-off pressure boundary check valves need to be leaking under special circumstances: | | The design leakage limit for these check valves is 3 cc/hr per inch of nominal pipe size. This means that the 6" first-off check valves would have a design leakage rate of 18 cc/hr and the 2" second-off check valves would have a design leakage rate of 6 cc/hr. This design leakage rate is important to consider since it is impossible to design a zero leakage check valve with hard seats. Since the first-off check valves have a higher design leakage rate than the second-off check valves, void formation is unlikely. This is because a higher leakage through the first-off . |
| : a. First"'off check valve is leaking at a rate that is greater than the second-off check valve, refer to Scenario 2. b. Second-off check valve stuck opened or malfunction; a void will only form if the second-off check valve is leaking at a greater rate than the first-off check valve, since that is the only condition that will simultaneously allow leakage from the RCS and also prevent pressure buildup between the check valves. | | check valves, when compared to the second-off check valves, would tend to pressurize the piping between the check valves, which would prevent void formation. |
| | Scenario 3 - For void formation to occur, both the first-off and second-off pressure boundary check valves need to be leaking under special circumstances: |
| | : a. First"'off check valve is leaking at a rate that is greater than the second-off check valve, refer to Scenario 2. |
| | : b. Second-off check valve stuck opened or malfunction; a void will only form if the second-off check valve is leaking at a greater rate than the first-off check valve, since that is the only condition that will simultaneously allow leakage from the RCS and also prevent pressure buildup between the check valves. |
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| Document Control Desk Page6 Alternative monitoring Alternative monitoring is proposed for the four inaccessible locations on the Sl injection lines to the RCS cold legs that are susceptible to gas accumulation between pressure isolation check valves. The current GAMP indicates specific circumstances are required for void formation due to gas coming out of solution. | | Document Control Desk Page6 Alternative monitoring Alternative monitoring is proposed for the four inaccessible locations on the Sl injection lines to the RCS cold legs that are susceptible to gas accumulation between pressure isolation check valves. The current GAMP indicates specific circumstances are required for void formation due to gas coming out of solution. |
| For the inaccessible locations, inservice testing (1ST) of the pressurize isolation check valves (PIV) is performed each cycle and leakage rates are determined. | | For the inaccessible locations, inservice testing (1ST) of the pressurize isolation check valves (PIV) is performed each cycle and leakage rates are determined. |
| PINGP will verify no measurable leakage is present or the leakage rate of the first-off . check valves is greater than the corresponding second-off check valves in accordance with the needs of the GAMP program. Reasonable assurance of safety is maintained by verifying the as-left conditions necessary for a void formation are not present at the beginning of the cycle; surveillance testing of the pumps on a quarterly basis and by monitoring of the locations when accessible. | | PINGP will verify no measurable leakage is present or the leakage rate of the first-off |
| Operating experience PINGP Gas Accumulation Management Program performs inspection of the locations during shutdown for verification that no void growth has occurred. | | . check valves is greater than the corresponding second-off check valves in accordance with the needs of the GAMP program. |
| The operating experience for these locations has shown no void due to the intrusion mechanism for each unit. PINGP will continue analysis of the intrusion mechanism and will evaluate potential modifications to enhance the monitoring of the inaccessible locations at a 31-day frequency.}} | | Reasonable assurance of safety is maintained by verifying the as-left conditions necessary for a void formation are not present at the beginning of the cycle; surveillance testing of the pumps on a quarterly basis and by monitoring of the locations when accessible. |
| | Operating experience PINGP Gas Accumulation Management Program performs inspection of the locations during shutdown for verification that no void growth has occurred. The operating experience for these locations has shown no void due to the intrusion mechanism for each unit. PINGP will continue analysis of the intrusion mechanism and will evaluate potential modifications to enhance the monitoring of the inaccessible locations at a 31-day frequency.}} |
Letter Sequence Response to RAI |
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MONTHYEARL-PI-14-125, Notification of Change in Commitment for Implementation of Technical Specification Task Force 523. Generic Letter 2008-01. Managing Gas Accumulation.2015-01-15015 January 2015 Notification of Change in Commitment for Implementation of Technical Specification Task Force 523. Generic Letter 2008-01. Managing Gas Accumulation. Project stage: Request L-PI-15-030, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process2015-06-29029 June 2015 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process Project stage: Request L-PI-15-105, License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) to Adopt TSTF-523, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process - Response to Request..2015-12-30030 December 2015 License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) to Adopt TSTF-523, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process - Response to Request.. Project stage: Request L-PI-16-003, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation, Revision 2, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process2016-01-25025 January 2016 Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation, Revision 2, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process Project stage: Supplement ML16075A0802016-03-15015 March 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-523, GL 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation Project stage: RAI L-PI-16-029, Response to Requests for Additional Information - License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation, Revision 2,,Using the Consolidated..2016-03-31031 March 2016 Response to Requests for Additional Information - License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation, Revision 2,,Using the Consolidated.. Project stage: Response to RAI L-08-001, Response to Requests for Additional Information - License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation, Revision 2, Using the Consolidated..2016-04-14014 April 2016 Response to Requests for Additional Information - License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation, Revision 2, Using the Consolidated.. Project stage: Response to RAI ML16133A4062016-06-16016 June 2016 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 217 and 205, Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force TSTF-523, Revision 2, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation (CAC Nos. MF6449 and MF6450) Project stage: Approval 2016-01-25
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Category:Letter type:L
MONTHYEARL-PI-23-034, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.8, Cooling Water (Cl) System,2024-01-0202 January 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.8, Cooling Water (Cl) System, L-PI-23-035, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications Section 5.6.6, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure and Temperature Limits Report2023-12-20020 December 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications Section 5.6.6, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure and Temperature Limits Report L-PI-23-033, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.8.1, Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.2, Note 32023-12-0505 December 2023 Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.8.1, Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.2, Note 3 L-PI-23-025, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.8.1, Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.2, Note 32023-09-28028 September 2023 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.8.1, Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.2, Note 3 L-PI-23-023, Baffle Former Bolts Alternate Aging Management Strategy2023-09-11011 September 2023 Baffle Former Bolts Alternate Aging Management Strategy L-PI-23-018, License Amendment Request to Revise ISFSI Technical Specification 4.4 to Allow Use of a Code Alternative to ASME Code, NB-5130, Examination of Weld Edge Preparation Surfaces, for the TN-40HT2023-07-14014 July 2023 License Amendment Request to Revise ISFSI Technical Specification 4.4 to Allow Use of a Code Alternative to ASME Code, NB-5130, Examination of Weld Edge Preparation Surfaces, for the TN-40HT L-PI-23-006, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.8 Required Actions2023-06-22022 June 2023 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.8 Required Actions L-PI-23-016, 2022 10 CFR 50.46 LOCA Annual Report2023-06-14014 June 2023 2022 10 CFR 50.46 LOCA Annual Report L-PI-23-010, Annual Report of Individual Monitoring2023-04-27027 April 2023 Annual Report of Individual Monitoring L-PI-23-007, Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specification Section 5.6.6, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR)2023-03-28028 March 2023 Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specification Section 5.6.6, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) L-PI-23-005, CFR 50.55a Requests Nos. 1-RR-5-15 and 2-RR-5-15, Proposed Use of Subsequent ASME Code Edition and Addenda in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4)(iv)2023-03-0303 March 2023 CFR 50.55a Requests Nos. 1-RR-5-15 and 2-RR-5-15, Proposed Use of Subsequent ASME Code Edition and Addenda in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4)(iv) L-PI-23-001, Day Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report2023-01-30030 January 2023 Day Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report L-PI-22-047, Resubmittal of Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) 2018 Unit 1 180-Day Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report2022-12-21021 December 2022 Resubmittal of Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) 2018 Unit 1 180-Day Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report L-PI-22-020, Application to Revise Technical Specification Section 5.6.6, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR)2022-12-0202 December 2022 Application to Revise Technical Specification Section 5.6.6, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) L-PI-22-040, Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections2022-10-0606 October 2022 Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections L-PI-22-037, Updated Approach for Prairie Island Unit 1 and Unit 2 Baffle Former Bolts2022-09-20020 September 2022 Updated Approach for Prairie Island Unit 1 and Unit 2 Baffle Former Bolts L-PI-22-032, CFR 50.46 LOCA Annual Report2022-06-16016 June 2022 CFR 50.46 LOCA Annual Report L-PI-22-033, Response to Request for Additional Information Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Amendment to Adopt 24-Month Operating Cycles2022-06-10010 June 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Amendment to Adopt 24-Month Operating Cycles L-PI-22-003, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections2022-06-0707 June 2022 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections L-PI-22-024, Supplement to Application for License Amendment to Implement 24-Month Operating Cycle2022-03-0707 March 2022 Supplement to Application for License Amendment to Implement 24-Month Operating Cycle L-PI-21-047, Response to Request for Additional Information 24-Month Cycle Amendment Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 22021-12-0707 December 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information 24-Month Cycle Amendment Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 L-PI-21-045, Response to Request for Additional Information Cooling Water System License Amendment Request2021-11-0404 November 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Cooling Water System License Amendment Request L-PI-21-029, Exigent License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.8 to Allow a One-Time Extension of the Completion Time of Required Action B.12021-10-0707 October 2021 Exigent License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.8 to Allow a One-Time Extension of the Completion Time of Required Action B.1 L-PI-21-006, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, to Incorporate Installed Bypass Test Capability for the Power Range RTS Functions2021-10-0202 October 2021 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, to Incorporate Installed Bypass Test Capability for the Power Range RTS Functions L-PI-21-032, Response to Request for Additional Information Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-471 and 571-T for Prairie Island2021-09-30030 September 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-471 and 571-T for Prairie Island L-PI-21-016, Application for License Amendment to Implement 24-Month Operating Cycle2021-08-0606 August 2021 Application for License Amendment to Implement 24-Month Operating Cycle L-PI-21-027, 2020 10 CFR 50.46 LOCA Annual Report2021-06-28028 June 2021 2020 10 CFR 50.46 LOCA Annual Report L-PI-21-023, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - 2020 Annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program Report2021-05-14014 May 2021 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - 2020 Annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program Report L-PI-21-007, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-471, Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alterations in Actions and Notes2021-04-19019 April 2021 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-471, Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alterations in Actions and Notes L-PI-20-050, Request for a One-Time Exemption from 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Biennial Emergency Preparedness Exercise Requirements, Due to COVID-19 Pandemic2020-10-0707 October 2020 Request for a One-Time Exemption from 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Biennial Emergency Preparedness Exercise Requirements, Due to COVID-19 Pandemic L-PI-20-051, Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-547, Clarification of Rod Position Requirements2020-09-28028 September 2020 Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-547, Clarification of Rod Position Requirements L-PI-20-026, Response to Request for Additional Information: License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiativ2020-09-0101 September 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information: License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4 L-PI-20-035, = Request for Revision to Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Capsule Removal Schedule2020-07-28028 July 2020 = Request for Revision to Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Capsule Removal Schedule L-PI-20-023, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Response to Request for Additional Information: License Amendment Request to Expand the Storage Capacity of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)2020-06-10010 June 2020 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Response to Request for Additional Information: License Amendment Request to Expand the Storage Capacity of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) L-PI-20-014, Supplement to License Amendment Request: Expand the Storage Capacity of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI2020-04-29029 April 2020 Supplement to License Amendment Request: Expand the Storage Capacity of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI L-PI-20-004, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) to Remove Note I from Limiting Condition for Operating (LCO) 3.4.12 and LCO 3.4.132020-03-30030 March 2020 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) to Remove Note I from Limiting Condition for Operating (LCO) 3.4.12 and LCO 3.4.13 L-PI-20-001, License Amendment Request to Address Issues Identified in Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter NSAL-09-5, Revision 1, and NSAL-15-12020-01-29029 January 2020 License Amendment Request to Address Issues Identified in Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter NSAL-09-5, Revision 1, and NSAL-15-1 L-PI-19-041, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-547, Clarification of Rod Position Requirements2019-12-23023 December 2019 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-547, Clarification of Rod Position Requirements L-PI-19-031, License Amendment Request: Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b2019-12-16016 December 2019 License Amendment Request: Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b L-PI-19-040, License Amendment Request: Revise Technical Specification 5.5.14 to Permanently Extend Containment Leakage Rate Test Frequency2019-10-0707 October 2019 License Amendment Request: Revise Technical Specification 5.5.14 to Permanently Extend Containment Leakage Rate Test Frequency L-PI-19-038, Submittal of Revised Pressure and Temperature Limits Report2019-09-19019 September 2019 Submittal of Revised Pressure and Temperature Limits Report L-PI-19-037, Response to Request for Additional Information: 10 CFR 50.55a Requests Nos. 1-RR-5-10 and 2-RR-5-10, Proposed Alternative to Reactor Vessel Inservice Inspection (ISI) Intervals2019-09-16016 September 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information: 10 CFR 50.55a Requests Nos. 1-RR-5-10 and 2-RR-5-10, Proposed Alternative to Reactor Vessel Inservice Inspection (ISI) Intervals L-PI-19-025, Request to Approve Site-Specific Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Model for Flowserve N-Seal Abeyance Seal and Dynamic Testing for the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP)2019-08-27027 August 2019 Request to Approve Site-Specific Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Model for Flowserve N-Seal Abeyance Seal and Dynamic Testing for the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) L-PI-19-029, Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information: Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components For...2019-08-0505 August 2019 Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information: Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components For... L-PI-19-002, 10 CFR 50.55a Requests Nos. 1-RR-5-10 and 2-RR-5-10, Proposed Alternative to Reactor Vessel Inservice Inspection (ISI) Intervals for Prairie Island, Unit 1 and Unit 22019-06-13013 June 2019 10 CFR 50.55a Requests Nos. 1-RR-5-10 and 2-RR-5-10, Proposed Alternative to Reactor Vessel Inservice Inspection (ISI) Intervals for Prairie Island, Unit 1 and Unit 2 L-PI-19-014, Response to Request for Additional Information: Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors2019-04-29029 April 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information: Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors L-PI-19-003, Request for Revision to Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Capsule Removal Schedule for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP)2019-02-0404 February 2019 Request for Revision to Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Capsule Removal Schedule for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) L-PI-19-006, Emergency License Amendment Request Regarding One-Time Extension for Technical Specification Completion Time Requirements2019-01-29029 January 2019 Emergency License Amendment Request Regarding One-Time Extension for Technical Specification Completion Time Requirements L-PI-19-005, Online Reference Portal for NRC Review of License Amendment Request to Implement 10 CFR 50.692019-01-15015 January 2019 Online Reference Portal for NRC Review of License Amendment Request to Implement 10 CFR 50.69 L-PI-18-063, Response to Request for Additional Information: Revise License Condition Associated with Implementation of NFPA 8052018-12-0606 December 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information: Revise License Condition Associated with Implementation of NFPA 805 2024-01-02
[Table view] Category:Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI)
MONTHYEARL-PI-23-034, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.8, Cooling Water (Cl) System,2024-01-0202 January 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.8, Cooling Water (Cl) System, L-PI-23-035, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications Section 5.6.6, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure and Temperature Limits Report2023-12-20020 December 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications Section 5.6.6, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure and Temperature Limits Report L-PI-23-033, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.8.1, Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.2, Note 32023-12-0505 December 2023 Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.8.1, Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.2, Note 3 ML23262B0372023-09-19019 September 2023 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding the 2023 Monticello and Prairie Island Plant Decommissioning Funding Status Reports L-PI-22-034, Response to RAI, Alternative RR-08 Related to Pressure Isolation Valve Monitoring and Testing2022-07-14014 July 2022 Response to RAI, Alternative RR-08 Related to Pressure Isolation Valve Monitoring and Testing ML22161A9152022-06-10010 June 2022 and Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Response to a Request for Additional Information Xcel Energy Amendment Request to Create a Common Emergency Plan and Emergency Operations. L-PI-22-033, Response to Request for Additional Information Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Amendment to Adopt 24-Month Operating Cycles2022-06-10010 June 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Amendment to Adopt 24-Month Operating Cycles L-PI-21-047, Response to Request for Additional Information 24-Month Cycle Amendment Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 22021-12-0707 December 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information 24-Month Cycle Amendment Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 L-PI-21-045, Response to Request for Additional Information Cooling Water System License Amendment Request2021-11-0404 November 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Cooling Water System License Amendment Request L-PI-21-032, Response to Request for Additional Information Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-471 and 571-T for Prairie Island2021-09-30030 September 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-471 and 571-T for Prairie Island L-PI-20-026, Response to Request for Additional Information: License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiativ2020-09-0101 September 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information: License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4 L-PI-20-023, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Response to Request for Additional Information: License Amendment Request to Expand the Storage Capacity of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)2020-06-10010 June 2020 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Response to Request for Additional Information: License Amendment Request to Expand the Storage Capacity of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) ML20045E8942020-02-14014 February 2020 Response to a Request for Additional Information for Proposed 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(2) Alternatives to Utilize ASME Code Case N-786-3, Alternative Requirements for Sleeve Reinforcement of Class 2 and 3 Moderate-Energy Carbon Steel Piping, and AS ML20127J0002019-11-0707 November 2019 Xcel Reply to PIIC Expansion Application L-PI-19-037, Response to Request for Additional Information: 10 CFR 50.55a Requests Nos. 1-RR-5-10 and 2-RR-5-10, Proposed Alternative to Reactor Vessel Inservice Inspection (ISI) Intervals2019-09-16016 September 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information: 10 CFR 50.55a Requests Nos. 1-RR-5-10 and 2-RR-5-10, Proposed Alternative to Reactor Vessel Inservice Inspection (ISI) Intervals L-PI-19-029, Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information: Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components For...2019-08-0505 August 2019 Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information: Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components For... L-PI-19-014, Response to Request for Additional Information: Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors2019-04-29029 April 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information: Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors L-PI-18-063, Response to Request for Additional Information: Revise License Condition Associated with Implementation of NFPA 8052018-12-0606 December 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information: Revise License Condition Associated with Implementation of NFPA 805 L-PI-18-051, Response to Request for Additional Information: Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program2018-09-17017 September 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information: Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program L-PI-18-038, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise License Condition Associated with Implementation of NFPA 8052018-07-10010 July 2018 Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise License Condition Associated with Implementation of NFPA 805 ML18131A2232018-05-11011 May 2018 Prairie and Monticello - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Section XI, Di L-PI-17-042, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise the NDE Inspection Interval for Special Lifting Devices2017-11-0606 November 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise the NDE Inspection Interval for Special Lifting Devices ML17279A1212017-10-0404 October 2017 Enclosure 2 to L-PI-17-041, Westinghouse-Prepared RAI Responses CE-17-3, Rev. 1, Attachment 2 and Enclosure 3, Marked-Up Technical Specification Page 4.0-7 L-PI-17-035, License Amendment Request to Revise the Emergency Action Level (EAL) Scheme - Supplement and Response to Requests for Additional Information2017-09-27027 September 2017 License Amendment Request to Revise the Emergency Action Level (EAL) Scheme - Supplement and Response to Requests for Additional Information L-PI-17-032, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Emergency Plan Staff Augmentation Response Times2017-09-20020 September 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Emergency Plan Staff Augmentation Response Times L-PI-17-007, Response to Request for Additional Information on License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors2017-03-0606 March 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information on License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors L-PI-17-002, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.8.7 to Remove Non-Conservative Required Action2017-02-16016 February 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.8.7 to Remove Non-Conservative Required Action L-PI-16-100, Response to NRC Request for Information - License Amendment Request for Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Technical Specification Changes2017-02-16016 February 2017 Response to NRC Request for Information - License Amendment Request for Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Technical Specification Changes L-PI-16-090, Response to Request for Additional Information on License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors2016-12-14014 December 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information on License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors ML16351A2102016-12-13013 December 2016 External Flooding Assessment Focused Evaluation. (Redacted) ML16288A0972016-10-14014 October 2016 and Monticello - Response to Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools L-PI-16-076, Supplement to the Response to March 12, 2012, Request for Information Enclosure 2, Recommendation 2.1, Flooding, Required Response 2, Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report2016-09-29029 September 2016 Supplement to the Response to March 12, 2012, Request for Information Enclosure 2, Recommendation 2.1, Flooding, Required Response 2, Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report ML16279A4792016-09-29029 September 2016 Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report - Response to Requested Information L-PI-16-067, License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors- Response to Request for Additional Information2016-08-17017 August 2016 License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors- Response to Request for Additional Information L-PI-16-063, Seventh Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events2016-08-17017 August 2016 Seventh Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events L-PI-16-005, License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors - Response to Request for Additional Information2016-05-24024 May 2016 License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors - Response to Request for Additional Information ML16144A8062016-05-23023 May 2016 Supplement to License Amendment Request for Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Technical Specification Changes: Response to RAI-2 (Enclosure 1) & Marked-Up Technical Specification Page (Enclosure 2) L-PI-16-040, Supplement to License Amendment Request for Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Technical Specification Changes: Westinghouse-Prepared Response to RAI, CE-16-237, Attachment 2 (Enclosure 4)2016-05-23023 May 2016 Supplement to License Amendment Request for Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Technical Specification Changes: Westinghouse-Prepared Response to RAI, CE-16-237, Attachment 2 (Enclosure 4) ML16133A0412016-05-0909 May 2016 Response to March 12, 2012, Request for Information Enclosure 2, Recommendation 2.1, Flooding, Required Response 2, Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report L-08-001, Response to Requests for Additional Information - License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation, Revision 2, Using the Consolidated..2016-04-14014 April 2016 Response to Requests for Additional Information - License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation, Revision 2, Using the Consolidated.. L-PI-16-029, Response to Requests for Additional Information - License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation, Revision 2,,Using the Consolidated..2016-03-31031 March 2016 Response to Requests for Additional Information - License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation, Revision 2,,Using the Consolidated.. L-PI-16-004, License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors- Response to Request for Additional Information2016-01-20020 January 2016 License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors- Response to Request for Additional Information L-PI-16-001, Enclosure 2: Responses to Open and Pending Items from the NRC Audit Report2016-01-14014 January 2016 Enclosure 2: Responses to Open and Pending Items from the NRC Audit Report L-PI-15-105, License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) to Adopt TSTF-523, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process - Response to Request..2015-12-30030 December 2015 License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) to Adopt TSTF-523, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process - Response to Request.. L-PI-15-052, License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors - Response to Request for Additional Information - 90-Day Responses2015-06-19019 June 2015 License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors - Response to Request for Additional Information - 90-Day Responses L-PI-14-113, Updated Final Response to NRC Request for Information Per 10CFR50.54(f) Re Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2015-01-16016 January 2015 Updated Final Response to NRC Request for Information Per 10CFR50.54(f) Re Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident 2024-01-02
[Table view] |
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(l Xcel Energy* Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant 1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, MN 55089 L-PI-16-031 Ah\ 1 4 2016 10 CFR 50.90 U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 Dockets 50-282 and 50-306 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-42 and DPR-60 Response to Requests for Additional Information-- License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to AdoptTSTF-523. "Generic Letter 2008-01. Managing Gas Accumulation." Revision 2. Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CAC Nos. MF6449 and MF6450)
References:
- 1. NSPM letter, S. Sharp to NRC Document Control Desk, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523, "Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation," Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process, L-PI-15-030, dated June 29, 2015 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML15187A259)
- 2. Technical Specification Task Force Traveler No. 523 (TSTF-523), "Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation," Revision 2 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13053A075). TSTF-523 Notice of Availability, 79 Fed. Reg. 2700 (January 15, 2014)
- 3. NRC email, T. Beltz to G. Carlson, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Requests for Additional Information (Draft) re: License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-523 (CAC Nos. MF6449 and MF6450), dated October 27, 2015
- 4. NSPM letter, K. Davison to NRC Document Control Desk, License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) to Adopt TSTF-523, "Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation," Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process - Response to Request for Additional Information, L-PI-15-105, dated December 30, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15364A466)
- 5. NSPM letter, K. Davison to NRC Document Control Desk, Supplement to License .
Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523, "Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing GasAccumulation", Revision 2, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CAC Nos. MF6449 and MF6450),
L-PI-16-003, dated January 25, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16025A162)
Document Control Desk Page2
- 6. NRC email, R. Kuntz to G. Carlson, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-523, "GL 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation" (CAC Nos. MF6449 and MF6450), dated March 2, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16075A080)
- 7. NSPM letter, S. Northard to NRC Document Control Desk, Response to Requests for Additional Information -- License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523. "Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation," Revision 2, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CAC Nos. MF6449 and MF6450), L-PI-16-029, dated March 31, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16091A405) .
- 8. NRC email, R. Kuntz to G. Carlson, dated 3/29/2015 By Reference 1, Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota corporation, doing business as Xcel Energy (hereafter "NSPM"), submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) a License Amendment Request (LAR) to revise the Technical Specifications for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP), Units 1 and 2, to adopt TSTF-523 (Reference 2) using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process.
By Reference 3, the NRC Staff provided a request for additional information (RAI) on the LAR. By Reference 4, NSPM responded to the staff RAI and committed to submit a supplement to the LAR. By Reference 5, NSPM submitted the LAR supplement.
By Reference 6, the NRC Staff provided additional RAis SR3.5.2.5-1, SR3.5.2.5-2, and SR3.5.2.5-3 on the LAR. By Reference 7, NSPM responded to RAis SR3.5.2.5-2 and SR3.5.2.5-3. As agreed between the NRC Project Manager for PINGP and NSPM (Reference 8), NSPM herewith submits Attachment 1 in response to RAI SR3.5.2.5-1.
NSPM submits this letter in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90. This letter does not change the conclusions of the No Significant Hazards Consideration determination nor the Environmental Evaluation in Reference 1.
NSPM requests the NRC issue the requested license amendment by June 30, 2016, with the amendment to be implemented within 90 days of issuance.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, NSPM is providing a copy of this letter to the designated State of Minnesota official.
If there is any question or if additional information is needed, please contact Dr. Glenn A. Carlson, P.E., at 651-267-1755.
Document Control Desk Page3 Summary of Commitments PINGP will evaluate potential modifications to enhance the monitoring of the inaccessible locations at a 31-day frequency.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on APR 14 2016 Scott Northard Acting Site Vice President- Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company- Minnesota Attachment (1) cc: Administrator, Region Ill, NRC Project Manager, PINGP, NRC Resident Inspectors, PINGP, NRC State of Minnesota
ATTACHMENT 1 Responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information RAI SR3.5.2.5-1 LAR Section 2.2 states that if the first-off check valve is leaking at a rate greater than the second-off check valve, then the volume between the check valves will pressurize and a void cannot form.
Provide the following information related to the potential for void formation between these two check valves:
If a leak should occur, could the pressure in the volume between the valves initially be low enough for outgassing to occur with the gas volume not being immediately reabsorbed as the volume pressurizes? If so, the leak rate through the first valve will decrease and through the second valve will increase as the intermediate gas volume is pressurized. Could the resulting condition result in void formation?
PINGP Response Safety injection system inaccessible location configuration The four inaccessible locations are designated 1Sl-44 and 1Sl-45 for Unit 1 and 2SI-14A and 2SI-14B for Unit 2. The inaccessible locations are located on corresponding line numbers 2-SI-35A, 2-SI-358, 2-2SI-35A and 2-2SI-35B. These locations are adjacent to the reactor coolant system (RCS) first-off pressure isolation check valves and are inaccessible during normal operations due to dose and temperature concerns.
The safety injection (SI) system piping injects into each of the RCS cold legs through a single common pipe that branches into two separate 2-inch lines. On each of the 2-inch branches, there are two check valves installed that are the pressure boundary valves for the RCS. The first-off check valves (SI-9-1, Sl-9-2, 2SI-9-1, and 2SI-9-2) are 6-inch swing disc check valves. The second-off check valves (SI-16-4, Sl-16-5, 2SI-16-4, and 2SI-16-6) are 2-inch spring loaded plug type check valves.
The geometry of the four inaccessible locations consists of a vertically oriented 6-inch check valve that connects to the RCS loop piping with RCS pressure on the downstream side of the disc. These locations are all high points that would allow gas to accumulate inside the check valve on the upstream side.
The locations are inaccessible due to high dose rates during power operation and their proximity to the RCS loop piping. The locations are examined at the piping adjacent the check valve due to the valve configuration and examination limitations.
Document Control Desk Page 5 Gas intrusion source The Sl piping connects directly to a pressurized RCS. Dissolved gases in the reactor coolant are controlled by the Chemical and Volume Control System (VC) that maintains the concentration of hydrogen or nitrogen gas present through the Volume Control Tank (VCT). The current Gas Accumulation Management Program (GAMP) indicates if back-leakage were to occur, the lower pressure on the upstream side of the check valve would result in hydrogen gas coming out of solution and a void formation. Thus these locations meet the definition of susceptible locations according to the program documents.
Three scenarios describe the specific leakage conditions that must exist for a void to form at the inaccessible locations:
Scenario 1 - If only a single check valve is leaking, a void cannot form.
Scenario 2 - If the first-off check valve is leaking at a rate that is greater than the second-off check valve, then the area between the check valves will pressurize and a void cannot form.
The design leakage limit for these check valves is 3 cc/hr per inch of nominal pipe size. This means that the 6" first-off check valves would have a design leakage rate of 18 cc/hr and the 2" second-off check valves would have a design leakage rate of 6 cc/hr. This design leakage rate is important to consider since it is impossible to design a zero leakage check valve with hard seats. Since the first-off check valves have a higher design leakage rate than the second-off check valves, void formation is unlikely. This is because a higher leakage through the first-off .
check valves, when compared to the second-off check valves, would tend to pressurize the piping between the check valves, which would prevent void formation.
Scenario 3 - For void formation to occur, both the first-off and second-off pressure boundary check valves need to be leaking under special circumstances:
- a. First"'off check valve is leaking at a rate that is greater than the second-off check valve, refer to Scenario 2.
- b. Second-off check valve stuck opened or malfunction; a void will only form if the second-off check valve is leaking at a greater rate than the first-off check valve, since that is the only condition that will simultaneously allow leakage from the RCS and also prevent pressure buildup between the check valves.
Document Control Desk Page6 Alternative monitoring Alternative monitoring is proposed for the four inaccessible locations on the Sl injection lines to the RCS cold legs that are susceptible to gas accumulation between pressure isolation check valves. The current GAMP indicates specific circumstances are required for void formation due to gas coming out of solution.
For the inaccessible locations, inservice testing (1ST) of the pressurize isolation check valves (PIV) is performed each cycle and leakage rates are determined.
PINGP will verify no measurable leakage is present or the leakage rate of the first-off
. check valves is greater than the corresponding second-off check valves in accordance with the needs of the GAMP program.
Reasonable assurance of safety is maintained by verifying the as-left conditions necessary for a void formation are not present at the beginning of the cycle; surveillance testing of the pumps on a quarterly basis and by monitoring of the locations when accessible.
Operating experience PINGP Gas Accumulation Management Program performs inspection of the locations during shutdown for verification that no void growth has occurred. The operating experience for these locations has shown no void due to the intrusion mechanism for each unit. PINGP will continue analysis of the intrusion mechanism and will evaluate potential modifications to enhance the monitoring of the inaccessible locations at a 31-day frequency.