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' Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit January 13, 1995 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Attn.: Document Control Desk MONTHLY OPERATING REPORT SALEMNO. 2 DOCKET NO: 50-311 In compliance with Section 6.9.1.6, Reporting Requirements for the Salem Technical Specifications, the original copy of the monthly operating reports for the month of December are being sent to you. The following sections are included: | |||
Average Daily Unit Power Level Operating Data Report Unit Shutdowns and Power Reductions 10CFR50.59 Evaluations Operating Summary Refueling Information John C. Summers General Manager - | |||
* 9*501-2303-oa 941231--------\ PDR ADOCK 05000311 R. _ . . PDR The power is in your hands. | Salem Operations RH:vls Enclosures C Mr. Thomas T. Martin Regional Administrator USNRC, Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19046 8-1-7.R4 r -* *9*501-2303-oa 941231- - ------\ | ||
* 95-2168 REV. 6/94 | PDR ADOCK 05000311 R. _ . . PDR The power is in your hands. | ||
* | * 95-2168 REV. 6/94 | ||
* AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL | |||
1 * * | |||
339-5142 Month December 1994 Day Average Daily Power Level Day Average Daily Power Level (MWe-NET) (MWe-NET) 1 0 17 0 2 0 18 0 3 0 19 0 4 0 20 0 5 0 21 0 6 O* 22 0 7 0 23 0 8 0 24 0 9 0 25 0 10 0 26 0 11 0 27 0 12 0 28 0 13 0 29 0 14 0 30 0 15 0 31 0 16 0 P. 8.1-7 Rl | * AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL Docket No.: | ||
Unit Name: | |||
50-311 Salem #2 Date: 1-10-95 Completed by: Mike Morroni Telephone: 339-5142 Month December 1994 Day Average Daily Power Level Day Average Daily Power Level (MWe-NET) (MWe-NET) 1 0 17 0 2 0 18 0 3 0 19 0 4 0 20 0 5 0 21 0 6 O* 22 0 7 0 23 0 8 0 24 0 9 0 25 0 10 0 26 0 11 0 27 0 12 0 28 0 13 0 29 0 14 0 30 0 15 0 31 0 16 0 P. 8.1-7 Rl | |||
* OPERATING DATA REPORT | * OPERATING DATA REPORT | ||
* Docket No: Date: Completed by: Mike Morroni Telephone: | * Docket No: 50-311 Date: 1/10/95 Completed by: Mike Morroni Telephone: 339-5142 Operating Status | ||
Operating Status 1. unit Name *Salem No. 2 Notes 2. Reporting Period December 1994 3. Licensed Thermal Power (MWt) 3411 4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe) 1170 5*. Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe) 1115 6. Maximum Dependable Capacity(Gross MWe) 1149 7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe) 1106 8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (items 3 through 7) Report, Give Reason N A. 9. Power Level to Which Restricted, if any (Net MWe) 10. Reasons for Restrictions, if any 11. Hours in Reporting Period 12. No. of Hrs. Rx. was Critical 13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hrs. 14. Hours Generator On-Line 15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours 16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWH) Gross Elec. Energy Generated (MWH) 18. Net Elec. Energy Gen. (MWH) 19. Unit Service Factor 20. Unit Availability Factor 21. Unit Capacity Factor (using MDC Net) 22. Unit Capacity Factor (using DER Net) 23. Unit Forced Outage Rate | : 1. unit Name *Salem No. 2 Notes | ||
: 2. Reporting Period December 1994 | |||
: 3. Licensed Thermal Power (MWt) 3411 | |||
: 4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe) 1170 5*. Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe) 1115 | |||
: 6. Maximum Dependable Capacity(Gross MWe) 1149 | |||
: 7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe) 1106 | |||
: 8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (items 3 through 7) since Last Report, Give Reason N A. | |||
: 9. Power Level to Which Restricted, if any (Net MWe) N/A | |||
: 10. Reasons for Restrictions, if any NA This Month Year to Date Cumulative | |||
: 11. Hours in Reporting Period 744 8760 115873 | |||
: 12. No. of Hrs. Rx. was Critical 0 6335.7 75615.2 | |||
: 13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hrs. 0 0 0 | |||
: 14. Hours Generator On-Line 0 6078. 4 72967.9 | |||
: 15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours 0 0 0 | |||
: 16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWH) 0 18510844.8 180973784.2 Gross Elec. Energy Generated (MWH) 0 5903490 76450008 | |||
: 18. Net Elec. Energy Gen. (MWH) -8818 5596267 72723544 | |||
: 19. Unit Service Factor 0 69.4 63.0 | |||
: 20. Unit Availability Factor 0 69.4 63.0 | |||
: 21. Unit Capacity Factor (using MDC Net) 0 57.8 56.7 | |||
: 22. Unit Capacity Factor (using DER Net) 0 57.3 56.3 | |||
: 23. Unit Forced Outage Rate 0 10.1 21.8 | |||
: 24. Shutdowns scheduled over next 6 months (type, date and duration of each) | |||
We are presently in a maintenance and refueling outage. | |||
: 25. If shutdown at end of Report Period, Estimated Date of Startup: | |||
January 13, 1995 8-l-7.R2 | |||
UNIT SHUTDOWN AND POWER REDUCTIONS REPORT MONTH DECEMBER 1994 DOCKET NO.: -'5"-'0'--=27:....::2=------ | |||
UNIT NAME: Salem #2 | UNIT NAME: Salem #2 | ||
* DATE: 1-10-95 COMPLETED BY: Mike Morroni TELEPHONE: | * DATE: 1-10-95 COMPLETED BY: Mike Morroni TELEPHONE: 339~5142 METHOD OF SHUTTING LICENSE DURATION DOWN EVENT SYSTEM COMPONENT CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION NO. DATE TYPE 1 (HOURS) REASON 2 REACTOR REPORT # CODE 4 CODE 5 TO PREVENT RECURRENCE 1881 12-01-94 s 744 c 4 -------- RC FUEL XX NORMAL REFUELING 1 2 3 4 5 F: Forced Reason Method: Exhibit G - Instructions Exhibit 1 - Same S: Scheduled A-Equipment Failure (explain) 1-Manual for Preparation of Data Source B-Maintenance or Test 2-Manual Scram Entry Sheets for Licensee C-Refueling 3-Automatic Scram Event Report CLER) File D-Requlatory Restriction 4-Continuation of CNUREG-0161) | ||
CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TO PREVENT RECURRENCE FUEL XX NORMAL REFUELING 4 Exhibit G -Instructions for Preparation of Data Entry Sheets for Licensee Event Report CLER) File | E-Operator Training & License Examination Previous Outage F-Administrative ** 5-Load Reduction G-Operational Error (Explain) 9-0ther H-Other (Explain) | ||
* | |||
10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS DOCKET NO: 50-311 MONTH: DECEMBER 1994 UNIT NAME: SALEM2 DATE: 01/10/95 COMPLETED BY: R. HELLER TELEPHONE: 609-339-5162 The following items were evaluated in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.59. The Station Operations Review Committee has reviewed and concurs with these evaluations. | |||
R. HELLER 609-339-5162 The following items were evaluated in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.59. | : 1. Design Change Packages (DCP) 2EC-3342, Pkg. 2 Room Cooler Drain Piping Addition - This DCP provides condensate drain pipe for the Room Cooler (1 VHE35) located in the Auxiliary Building, elevation 84'. The Room cooler drip pan is presently plugged. This DCP proposes to remove the plug and install a 1 inch diameter drain pipe to the floor to the nearest floor drain. This piping does not perform any safety related function and does not affect any equipment that is important to safety. The proposed modification does not alter the design criteria, modes of operation, or function for which the contaminated drain system is currently analyzed. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. (SORC 94-094) | ||
The Station Operations Review Committee has reviewed and concurs with these evaluations. | : 2. DR Use-As-Is: Safety Evaluations (S/E) | ||
: 1. Design Change Packages (DCP) 2EC-3342, Pkg. 2 Room Cooler Drain Piping Addition -This DCP provides condensate drain pipe for the Room Cooler (1 VHE35) located in the Auxiliary Building, elevation 84'. The Room cooler drip pan is presently plugged. This DCP proposes to remove the plug and install a 1 inch diameter drain pipe to the floor to the nearest floor drain. This piping does not perform any safety related function and does not affect any equipment that is important to safety. The proposed modification does not alter the design criteria, modes of operation, or function for which the contaminated drain system is currently analyzed. | S/E - 2SJ69 Valve Yoke to Operator Shim Plate Weld, Unit 2 - The 2SJ69 valve yoke to operator adapter plate has a shim plate and weld design that is not per the vendor drawing. The welds and plate have been inspected under seating loads and no cracks or deformation were noted. Pursuant to the requirements of Generic Letter 89-10, a MOY capability evaluation of2SJ69 was performed (system calculation S SJ-MDC-0908). The results of this analysis indicate that the thrust output of the operator may be capable of failing the welds upon closing the valve. With the valve in the open position, the welded connection is capable of withstanding seismic loading. | ||
There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. (SORC 94-094) 2. DR Use-As-Is: | |||
Safety Evaluations (S/E) S/E -2SJ69 Valve Yoke to Operator Shim Plate Weld, Unit 2 -The 2SJ69 valve yoke to operator adapter plate has a shim plate and weld design that is not per the vendor drawing. The welds and plate have been inspected under seating loads and no cracks or deformation were noted. Pursuant to the requirements of Generic Letter 89-10, a MOY capability evaluation of2SJ69 was performed (system calculation S | I t . | ||
The results of this analysis indicate that the thrust output of the operator may be capable of failing the welds upon closing the valve. With the valve in the open position, the welded connection is capable of withstanding seismic loading. | * IOCFR50.59 EVALUATIONS DOCKET NO: 50-311 I | ||
t . | MONTH: DECEMBER 1994 UNIT NAME: SALEM 2 DATE: 01/10/95 COMPLETED BY: R.HELLER TELEPHONE: 609-339-5162 However, when closed, seismic loading would be superimposed upon the actuator thrust loading which could yield the weld. The 2SJ69 is considered operable for the following reasons: 1.) Inspection of the welded joint showed no visible signs of damage; 2.) Changes to the operating conditions evaluation for the GL 89-10 program have resulted in a decrease in the as-left maximum thrust setting from ~45,000 lbf. To ~35,000 lbf. This results in stress levels being proportionally lowered and decreases the likelihood of the weld failing; 3.) The 2SJ69 is seismically qualified in the open position. The valve is open during power operations and is exempt from stroke testing at power. The only circumstance for which the valve is closed is the initiation of cold leg recirculation, which is a post LOCA event. The Salem accident analysis does not require the component to endure seismic loading in addition to a LOCA; and 4.) The safety function of2SJ69 is assured since the valve is open and would not be closed unless the plant is in a post LOCA condition. If the actuator delivers enough thrust to fail the welds, it will already have closed the valve with enough force to wedge the valve closed. | ||
* IOCFR50.59 EVALUATIONS MONTH: DECEMBER 1994 | (SORC 94-094) | ||
However, when closed, seismic loading would be superimposed upon the actuator thrust loading which could yield the weld. The 2SJ69 is considered operable for the following reasons: 1.) Inspection of the welded joint showed no visible signs of damage; 2.) Changes to the operating conditions evaluation for the GL 89-10 program have resulted in a decrease in the as-left maximum thrust setting from lbf. To lbf. This results in stress levels being proportionally lowered and decreases the likelihood of the weld failing; 3.) The 2SJ69 is seismically qualified in the open position. | S/E-2C DIG 2C Diesel Generator Slow Voltage Buildup During Engine Start - 2C Diesel Generator (D/G) failed to achieve rated speed and voltage prior to closing the DIG 4KV output breaker, and failed to achieve rated voltage within 10 seconds. When the breaker was closed, the 4KV Vital Bus, the 230/480 Volt Switchgear and the motor control centers were energized with less than 90% nominal bus voltage. | ||
The valve is open during power operations and is exempt from stroke testing at power. The only circumstance for which the valve is closed is the initiation of cold leg recirculation, which is a post LOCA event. The Salem accident analysis does not require the component to endure seismic loading in addition to a LOCA; and 4.) The safety function of2SJ69 is assured since the valve is open and would not be closed unless the plant is in a post LOCA condition. | However, all electrical equipment did start/function properly during the Mode-Op loaded sequence. There are no credible failure modes because: 1.) The 4KV bus did not achieve rated voltage within 10 seconds (2: 4160 volts per UFSAR) but did achieve 4250 volts at T+ 13 seconds | ||
If the actuator delivers enough thrust to fail the welds, it will already have closed the valve with enough force to wedge the valve closed. (SORC 94-094) | |||
There are no credible failure modes because: 1.) The 4KV bus did not achieve rated voltage within 10 seconds (2: 4160 volts per UFSAR) but did achieve 4250 volts at T+ 13 seconds I | I | ||
* | * 10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS DOCKET NO: 50-311 MONTH: DECEMBER 1994 UNIT NAME: SALEM 2 DATE: 01/10/95 COMPLETED BY: R.HELLER TELEPHONE: 609-339-5162 (Cont'd) | ||
(2:3950 volts per Tech. Spec. 4.8.1.2.D.3.b and 4.8.1.2.d.6.b); | (2:3950 volts per Tech. Spec. 4.8.1.2.D.3.b and 4.8.1.2.d.6.b); 2.) No. 22 Charging Pump and all other auto connected shutdown and emergency loads did start successfully and operated for 2: 5 minutes during Mode-Op tests per Tech. Spec. Requirements above, and 3.) although 2C vital Bus loads were energized prior to T+ 13 seconds from the auto start signal, the loads did have sufficient voltage to perform their safety functions had they been energized at T + 13 seconds. Although the generator voltage buildup was degraded, the 2C DIG can perform its safety functions because: 1.) The voltage regulator returned generator voltage to 90% of nominal (2: 3744 volts) in .::S 2.4 seconds, per Reg. Guide 1. 9 requirements, when the largest load (Service Water Pump) was started. (SORC 94-095) | ||
2.) No. 22 Charging Pump and all other auto connected shutdown and emergency loads did start successfully and operated for 2: 5 minutes during Mode-Op tests per Tech. Spec. Requirements above, and 3.) although 2C vital Bus loads were energized prior to T+ 13 seconds from the auto start signal, the loads did have sufficient voltage to perform their safety functions had they been energized at T + 13 seconds. Although the generator voltage buildup was degraded, the 2C DIG can perform its safety functions because: 1.) The voltage regulator returned generator voltage to 90% of nominal (2: 3744 volts) in .::S 2.4 seconds, per Reg. Guide 1. 9 requirements, when the largest load (Service Water Pump) was started. (SORC 94-095) 3. Technical Specification Interpretation (TSI) TSI Tech. Spec. Bases 3.4.10.3 (Unit 2)-POPS -Mass Addition of an ECCS Pump -The Bases of the Technical Specification is being changed to reflect a high head safety injection pump combined with a positive displacement charging pump. This change reflects actual mass addition. | : 3. Technical Specification Interpretation (TSI) | ||
transient assumptions based on actual plant operating procedures and administrative controls for preventing the injection of an intermediate head safety injection pump into a water solid Reactor Coolant System (RCS). The net effect of this change is minimal since the flow of the combined high head safety injection pump and the positive displacement charging pump is equivalent to an intermediate head safety injection pump. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. (SORC 94-096) r | TSI Tech. Spec. Bases 3.4.10.3 (Unit 2)- POPS - Mass Addition of an ECCS Pump - The Bases of the Technical Specification is being changed to reflect a high head safety injection pump combined with a positive displacement charging pump. This change reflects actual mass addition. | ||
* 10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS | transient assumptions based on actual plant operating procedures and administrative controls for preventing the injection of an intermediate head safety injection pump into a water solid Reactor Coolant System (RCS). The net effect of this change is minimal since the flow of the combined high head safety injection pump and the positive displacement charging pump is equivalent to an intermediate head safety injection pump. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. (SORC 94-096) | ||
R. HELLER 609-339-5162 | |||
: 4. Temporary Modifications (T-Mods) T-Mod 94-117 "Salem 2 Pressurizer Safety Valves/PORV Loop Seal" -This T-Mod will re-establish the loop seals for pressurizer safety valves (PR 3, 4 & 5) and possibly the Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV) (PR 1 & 2), in an attempt to stop steam leakage through the PR 3, 4 & 5 valves at normal operating pressure and temperature. | r * | ||
This T-Mod would permit current Salem Unit 2 operation (only in Mode III), with the (water) loop seals formed on both PORVs and all three pressurizer safety valves by temporarily modifying the plant design basis as described in the SAR. The pressurizer safety valves (PR 3, 4 & 5) and PORVs (PR 1 & 2) will be operable with the required lift setpoints along with the | * 10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS DOCKET NO: 50-311 I | ||
There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. (SORC 94-098) | I MONTH: DECEMBER 1994 UNIT NAME: SALEM 2 DATE: 01/10/95 COMPLETED BY: R. HELLER TELEPHONE: 609-339-5162 | ||
: 4. Temporary Modifications (T-Mods) | |||
r -* | T-Mod 94-117 "Salem 2 Pressurizer Safety Valves/PORV Loop Seal" - | ||
This T-Mod will re-establish the loop seals for pressurizer safety valves (PR 3, 4 & 5) and possibly the Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV) (PR 1 & 2), in an attempt to stop steam leakage through the PR 3, 4 & 5 valves at normal operating pressure and temperature. This T-Mod would permit current Salem Unit 2 operation (only in Mode III), with the (water) loop seals formed on both PORVs and all three pressurizer safety valves by temporarily modifying the plant design basis as described in the SAR. The pressurizer safety valves (PR 3, 4 & 5) and PORVs (PR 1 & 2) will be operable with the required lift setpoints along with the PORVs during Mode III operation. | |||
There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. (SORC 94-098) | |||
r - * | |||
* SALEM GENERATING STATION MONTHLY OPERATING | * SALEM GENERATING STATION MONTHLY OPERATING | ||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
-UNIT 2 DECEMBER 1994 SALEM UNIT NO. 2 The Unit remained shutdown throughout the entire period as the 2R8 Refueling Outage activities continued. | - UNIT 2 DECEMBER 1994 SALEM UNIT NO. 2 The Unit remained shutdown throughout the entire period as the 2R8 Refueling Outage activities continued. | ||
(' . , | |||
(' ., | |||
REFUELING INFORMATION DOCKET NO: 50-311 MONTH: DECEMBER 1994 UNIT NAME: SALEM2 DATE: 01/10/95 COMPLETED BY: R.HELLER TELEPHONE: 609-339-5162 MONTH: DECEMBER 1994 | |||
: 1. Refueling information has changed from last month: YES X NO _ _ | |||
: 1. Refueling information has changed from last month: YES X NO | : 2. Scheduled date for next refueling: October 14. 1994 | ||
October 14. 1994 3. Scheduled date for restart following refueling: | : 3. Scheduled date for restart following refueling: January 21. 1995 | ||
January 21. 1995 4. a. Will Technical Specification changes or other license amendments be required? | : 4. a. Will Technical Specification changes or other license amendments be required? | ||
YES NO_A_ NOT DETERMINED TO DATE --b. Has the reload fuel design been reviewed by the Station Operating Review Committee? | YES NO_A_ | ||
NOT DETERMINED TO DATE - - | |||
: b. Has the reload fuel design been reviewed by the Station Operating Review Committee? | |||
YES_X_NO If no, when is it scheduled? | YES_X_NO If no, when is it scheduled? | ||
: 5. Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action: | : 5. Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action: _ _ ____,.N~/_A_____ | ||
: 6. Important licensing considerations associated with refueling: | |||
: 7. Number of Fuel Assemblies: | : 7. Number of Fuel Assemblies: | ||
: a. Incore b. In Spent Fuel Storage 8. Present licensed spent fuel storage capacity: | : a. Incore 193 | ||
Future spent fuel storage capacity: | : b. In Spent Fuel Storage 556 | ||
: 9. Date of last refueling that can be discharged to the spent fuel pool assuming the present licensed capacity: | : 8. Present licensed spent fuel storage capacity: 1632 Future spent fuel storage capacity: 1632 | ||
8-l-7.R4 | : 9. Date of last refueling that can be discharged to the spent fuel pool assuming the present licensed capacity: March 2012 8-l-7.R4}} |
Latest revision as of 05:48, 3 February 2020
ML18101A468 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Salem ![]() |
Issue date: | 12/31/1994 |
From: | Heller R, Morroni M Public Service Enterprise Group |
To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
References | |
NUDOCS 9501230308 | |
Download: ML18101A468 (10) | |
Text
i . PS~G * *
' Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit January 13, 1995 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Attn.: Document Control Desk MONTHLY OPERATING REPORT SALEMNO. 2 DOCKET NO: 50-311 In compliance with Section 6.9.1.6, Reporting Requirements for the Salem Technical Specifications, the original copy of the monthly operating reports for the month of December are being sent to you. The following sections are included:
Average Daily Unit Power Level Operating Data Report Unit Shutdowns and Power Reductions 10CFR50.59 Evaluations Operating Summary Refueling Information John C. Summers General Manager -
Salem Operations RH:vls Enclosures C Mr. Thomas T. Martin Regional Administrator USNRC, Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19046 8-1-7.R4 r -* *9*501-2303-oa 941231- - ------\
PDR ADOCK 05000311 R. _ . . PDR The power is in your hands.
- 95-2168 REV. 6/94
1 * *
- AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL Docket No.:
Unit Name:
50-311 Salem #2 Date: 1-10-95 Completed by: Mike Morroni Telephone: 339-5142 Month December 1994 Day Average Daily Power Level Day Average Daily Power Level (MWe-NET) (MWe-NET) 1 0 17 0 2 0 18 0 3 0 19 0 4 0 20 0 5 0 21 0 6 O* 22 0 7 0 23 0 8 0 24 0 9 0 25 0 10 0 26 0 11 0 27 0 12 0 28 0 13 0 29 0 14 0 30 0 15 0 31 0 16 0 P. 8.1-7 Rl
- OPERATING DATA REPORT
- Docket No: 50-311 Date: 1/10/95 Completed by: Mike Morroni Telephone: 339-5142 Operating Status
- 1. unit Name *Salem No. 2 Notes
- 2. Reporting Period December 1994
- 3. Licensed Thermal Power (MWt) 3411
- 4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe) 1170 5*. Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe) 1115
- 6. Maximum Dependable Capacity(Gross MWe) 1149
- 7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe) 1106
- 8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (items 3 through 7) since Last Report, Give Reason N A.
- 9. Power Level to Which Restricted, if any (Net MWe) N/A
- 10. Reasons for Restrictions, if any NA This Month Year to Date Cumulative
- 11. Hours in Reporting Period 744 8760 115873
- 12. No. of Hrs. Rx. was Critical 0 6335.7 75615.2
- 13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hrs. 0 0 0
- 14. Hours Generator On-Line 0 6078. 4 72967.9
- 15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours 0 0 0
- 16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWH) 0 18510844.8 180973784.2 Gross Elec. Energy Generated (MWH) 0 5903490 76450008
- 18. Net Elec. Energy Gen. (MWH) -8818 5596267 72723544
- 19. Unit Service Factor 0 69.4 63.0
- 20. Unit Availability Factor 0 69.4 63.0
- 21. Unit Capacity Factor (using MDC Net) 0 57.8 56.7
- 22. Unit Capacity Factor (using DER Net) 0 57.3 56.3
- 23. Unit Forced Outage Rate 0 10.1 21.8
- 24. Shutdowns scheduled over next 6 months (type, date and duration of each)
We are presently in a maintenance and refueling outage.
- 25. If shutdown at end of Report Period, Estimated Date of Startup:
January 13, 1995 8-l-7.R2
UNIT SHUTDOWN AND POWER REDUCTIONS REPORT MONTH DECEMBER 1994 DOCKET NO.: -'5"-'0'--=27:....::2=------
UNIT NAME: Salem #2
- DATE: 1-10-95 COMPLETED BY: Mike Morroni TELEPHONE: 339~5142 METHOD OF SHUTTING LICENSE DURATION DOWN EVENT SYSTEM COMPONENT CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION NO. DATE TYPE 1 (HOURS) REASON 2 REACTOR REPORT # CODE 4 CODE 5 TO PREVENT RECURRENCE 1881 12-01-94 s 744 c 4 -------- RC FUEL XX NORMAL REFUELING 1 2 3 4 5 F: Forced Reason Method: Exhibit G - Instructions Exhibit 1 - Same S: Scheduled A-Equipment Failure (explain) 1-Manual for Preparation of Data Source B-Maintenance or Test 2-Manual Scram Entry Sheets for Licensee C-Refueling 3-Automatic Scram Event Report CLER) File D-Requlatory Restriction 4-Continuation of CNUREG-0161)
E-Operator Training & License Examination Previous Outage F-Administrative ** 5-Load Reduction G-Operational Error (Explain) 9-0ther H-Other (Explain)
10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS DOCKET NO: 50-311 MONTH: DECEMBER 1994 UNIT NAME: SALEM2 DATE: 01/10/95 COMPLETED BY: R. HELLER TELEPHONE: 609-339-5162 The following items were evaluated in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.59. The Station Operations Review Committee has reviewed and concurs with these evaluations.
- 1. Design Change Packages (DCP) 2EC-3342, Pkg. 2 Room Cooler Drain Piping Addition - This DCP provides condensate drain pipe for the Room Cooler (1 VHE35) located in the Auxiliary Building, elevation 84'. The Room cooler drip pan is presently plugged. This DCP proposes to remove the plug and install a 1 inch diameter drain pipe to the floor to the nearest floor drain. This piping does not perform any safety related function and does not affect any equipment that is important to safety. The proposed modification does not alter the design criteria, modes of operation, or function for which the contaminated drain system is currently analyzed. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. (SORC 94-094)
- 2. DR Use-As-Is: Safety Evaluations (S/E)
S/E - 2SJ69 Valve Yoke to Operator Shim Plate Weld, Unit 2 - The 2SJ69 valve yoke to operator adapter plate has a shim plate and weld design that is not per the vendor drawing. The welds and plate have been inspected under seating loads and no cracks or deformation were noted. Pursuant to the requirements of Generic Letter 89-10, a MOY capability evaluation of2SJ69 was performed (system calculation S SJ-MDC-0908). The results of this analysis indicate that the thrust output of the operator may be capable of failing the welds upon closing the valve. With the valve in the open position, the welded connection is capable of withstanding seismic loading.
I t .
- IOCFR50.59 EVALUATIONS DOCKET NO: 50-311 I
MONTH: DECEMBER 1994 UNIT NAME: SALEM 2 DATE: 01/10/95 COMPLETED BY: R.HELLER TELEPHONE: 609-339-5162 However, when closed, seismic loading would be superimposed upon the actuator thrust loading which could yield the weld. The 2SJ69 is considered operable for the following reasons: 1.) Inspection of the welded joint showed no visible signs of damage; 2.) Changes to the operating conditions evaluation for the GL 89-10 program have resulted in a decrease in the as-left maximum thrust setting from ~45,000 lbf. To ~35,000 lbf. This results in stress levels being proportionally lowered and decreases the likelihood of the weld failing; 3.) The 2SJ69 is seismically qualified in the open position. The valve is open during power operations and is exempt from stroke testing at power. The only circumstance for which the valve is closed is the initiation of cold leg recirculation, which is a post LOCA event. The Salem accident analysis does not require the component to endure seismic loading in addition to a LOCA; and 4.) The safety function of2SJ69 is assured since the valve is open and would not be closed unless the plant is in a post LOCA condition. If the actuator delivers enough thrust to fail the welds, it will already have closed the valve with enough force to wedge the valve closed.
(SORC 94-094)
S/E-2C DIG 2C Diesel Generator Slow Voltage Buildup During Engine Start - 2C Diesel Generator (D/G) failed to achieve rated speed and voltage prior to closing the DIG 4KV output breaker, and failed to achieve rated voltage within 10 seconds. When the breaker was closed, the 4KV Vital Bus, the 230/480 Volt Switchgear and the motor control centers were energized with less than 90% nominal bus voltage.
However, all electrical equipment did start/function properly during the Mode-Op loaded sequence. There are no credible failure modes because: 1.) The 4KV bus did not achieve rated voltage within 10 seconds (2: 4160 volts per UFSAR) but did achieve 4250 volts at T+ 13 seconds
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- 10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS DOCKET NO: 50-311 MONTH: DECEMBER 1994 UNIT NAME: SALEM 2 DATE: 01/10/95 COMPLETED BY: R.HELLER TELEPHONE: 609-339-5162 (Cont'd)
(2:3950 volts per Tech. Spec. 4.8.1.2.D.3.b and 4.8.1.2.d.6.b); 2.) No. 22 Charging Pump and all other auto connected shutdown and emergency loads did start successfully and operated for 2: 5 minutes during Mode-Op tests per Tech. Spec. Requirements above, and 3.) although 2C vital Bus loads were energized prior to T+ 13 seconds from the auto start signal, the loads did have sufficient voltage to perform their safety functions had they been energized at T + 13 seconds. Although the generator voltage buildup was degraded, the 2C DIG can perform its safety functions because: 1.) The voltage regulator returned generator voltage to 90% of nominal (2: 3744 volts) in .::S 2.4 seconds, per Reg. Guide 1. 9 requirements, when the largest load (Service Water Pump) was started. (SORC 94-095)
- 3. Technical Specification Interpretation (TSI)
TSI Tech. Spec. Bases 3.4.10.3 (Unit 2)- POPS - Mass Addition of an ECCS Pump - The Bases of the Technical Specification is being changed to reflect a high head safety injection pump combined with a positive displacement charging pump. This change reflects actual mass addition.
transient assumptions based on actual plant operating procedures and administrative controls for preventing the injection of an intermediate head safety injection pump into a water solid Reactor Coolant System (RCS). The net effect of this change is minimal since the flow of the combined high head safety injection pump and the positive displacement charging pump is equivalent to an intermediate head safety injection pump. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. (SORC 94-096)
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- 10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS DOCKET NO: 50-311 I
I MONTH: DECEMBER 1994 UNIT NAME: SALEM 2 DATE: 01/10/95 COMPLETED BY: R. HELLER TELEPHONE: 609-339-5162
- 4. Temporary Modifications (T-Mods)
T-Mod 94-117 "Salem 2 Pressurizer Safety Valves/PORV Loop Seal" -
This T-Mod will re-establish the loop seals for pressurizer safety valves (PR 3, 4 & 5) and possibly the Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV) (PR 1 & 2), in an attempt to stop steam leakage through the PR 3, 4 & 5 valves at normal operating pressure and temperature. This T-Mod would permit current Salem Unit 2 operation (only in Mode III), with the (water) loop seals formed on both PORVs and all three pressurizer safety valves by temporarily modifying the plant design basis as described in the SAR. The pressurizer safety valves (PR 3, 4 & 5) and PORVs (PR 1 & 2) will be operable with the required lift setpoints along with the PORVs during Mode III operation.
There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. (SORC 94-098)
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- SALEM GENERATING STATION MONTHLY OPERATING
SUMMARY
- UNIT 2 DECEMBER 1994 SALEM UNIT NO. 2 The Unit remained shutdown throughout the entire period as the 2R8 Refueling Outage activities continued.
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REFUELING INFORMATION DOCKET NO: 50-311 MONTH: DECEMBER 1994 UNIT NAME: SALEM2 DATE: 01/10/95 COMPLETED BY: R.HELLER TELEPHONE: 609-339-5162 MONTH: DECEMBER 1994
- 1. Refueling information has changed from last month: YES X NO _ _
- 2. Scheduled date for next refueling: October 14. 1994
- 3. Scheduled date for restart following refueling: January 21. 1995
- 4. a. Will Technical Specification changes or other license amendments be required?
YES NO_A_
NOT DETERMINED TO DATE - -
- b. Has the reload fuel design been reviewed by the Station Operating Review Committee?
YES_X_NO If no, when is it scheduled?
- 5. Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action: _ _ ____,.N~/_A_____
- 6. Important licensing considerations associated with refueling:
- 7. Number of Fuel Assemblies:
- a. Incore 193
- b. In Spent Fuel Storage 556
- 8. Present licensed spent fuel storage capacity: 1632 Future spent fuel storage capacity: 1632
- 9. Date of last refueling that can be discharged to the spent fuel pool assuming the present licensed capacity: March 2012 8-l-7.R4