ML17297B786: Difference between revisions
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{{#Wiki_filter:Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation B 3.10.1 General Electric BWR/4 STS B 3.10.1-2 Rev. 4.0 BASES | {{#Wiki_filter:Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation B 3.10.1 General Electric BWR/4 STS B 3.10.1-2 Rev. 4.0 BASES | ||
BACKGROUND (continued) | BACKGROUND (continued) | ||
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Under these conditions, the potential for failed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant activity above the LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Specific Activity," limits are minimized. In addition, the secondary containment will be OPERABLE, in accordance with this Special Operations LCO, and will be capable of handling any airborne radioactivity or steam leaks that could occur during the performance of hydrostatic or leak testing. The required pressure testing conditions provide adequate assurance that the consequences of a steam leak will be conservatively bounded by the consequences of the postulated main steam line break outside of primary containment described in Reference 2. Therefore, these requirements will conservatively limit radiation releases to the environment. | Under these conditions, the potential for failed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant activity above the LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Specific Activity," limits are minimized. In addition, the secondary containment will be OPERABLE, in accordance with this Special Operations LCO, and will be capable of handling any airborne radioactivity or steam leaks that could occur during the performance of hydrostatic or leak testing. The required pressure testing conditions provide adequate assurance that the consequences of a steam leak will be conservatively bounded by the consequences of the postulated main steam line break outside of primary containment described in Reference 2. Therefore, these requirements will conservatively limit radiation releases to the environment. | ||
In the unlikely event of a large any primary system leak that could result in draining of the RPV, the reactor vessel would rapidly depressurize | In the unlikely event of a large any primary system leak that could result in draining of the RPV, the reactor vessel would rapidly depressurize , allowing the low pressure core cooling systems to operate. The make-up capability of the low pressure coolant injection and core spray subsystems, as required in MODE 4 by LCO 3.5.2, "RPV WIC ECCS - Shutdown," would be more than adequate to keep the RPV water level above the TAF core flooded under this low decay heat load condition. Small system leaks would be detected by leakage inspections before significant inventory loss occurred. | ||
, allowing the low pressure core cooling systems to operate. The make-up capability of the low pressure coolant injection and core spray subsystems, as required in MODE 4 by LCO 3.5.2, "RPV | |||
For the purposes of this test, the protection provided by normally required MODE 4 applicable LCOs, in addition to the secondary containment requirements required to be met by this Special Operations LCO, will ensure acceptable consequences during normal hydrostatic test conditions and during postulated accident conditions.}} | For the purposes of this test, the protection provided by normally required MODE 4 applicable LCOs, in addition to the secondary containment requirements required to be met by this Special Operations LCO, will ensure acceptable consequences during normal hydrostatic test conditions and during postulated accident conditions.}} | ||
Revision as of 10:46, 6 July 2018
| ML17297B786 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Technical Specifications Task Force |
| Issue date: | 10/24/2017 |
| From: | - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TSTF-542, Rev 2 | |
| Download: ML17297B786 (1) | |
Text
Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation B 3.10.1 General Electric BWR/4 STS B 3.10.1-2 Rev. 4.0 BASES
BACKGROUND (continued)
The hydrostatic [and/or RCS System leakage] tests requires increasing pressure to approximately [ ] psig. Scram time testing required by SR 3.1.4.1 and SR 3.1.4.4 requires reactor pressure > [800] psig.
Other testing may be performed in conjunction with the allowances for inservice leak or hydrostatic tests and control rod scram time tests.
APPLICABLE Allowing the reactor to be considered in MODE 4 when the reactor SAFETY coolant temperature is > 200°F, during, or as a consequence of, ANALYSES hydrostatic or leak testing, or as a consequence of control rod scram time testing initiated in conjunction with an inservice leak or hydrostatic test, effectively provides an exception to MODE 3 requirements, including OPERABILITY of primary containment and the full complement of redundant Emergency Core Cooling Systems. Since the tests are performed nearly water solid, at low decay heat values, and near MODE 4 conditions, the stored energy in the reactor core will be very low.
Under these conditions, the potential for failed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant activity above the LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Specific Activity," limits are minimized. In addition, the secondary containment will be OPERABLE, in accordance with this Special Operations LCO, and will be capable of handling any airborne radioactivity or steam leaks that could occur during the performance of hydrostatic or leak testing. The required pressure testing conditions provide adequate assurance that the consequences of a steam leak will be conservatively bounded by the consequences of the postulated main steam line break outside of primary containment described in Reference 2. Therefore, these requirements will conservatively limit radiation releases to the environment.
In the unlikely event of a large any primary system leak that could result in draining of the RPV, the reactor vessel would rapidly depressurize , allowing the low pressure core cooling systems to operate. The make-up capability of the low pressure coolant injection and core spray subsystems, as required in MODE 4 by LCO 3.5.2, "RPV WIC ECCS - Shutdown," would be more than adequate to keep the RPV water level above the TAF core flooded under this low decay heat load condition. Small system leaks would be detected by leakage inspections before significant inventory loss occurred.
For the purposes of this test, the protection provided by normally required MODE 4 applicable LCOs, in addition to the secondary containment requirements required to be met by this Special Operations LCO, will ensure acceptable consequences during normal hydrostatic test conditions and during postulated accident conditions.