ML13268A421

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 - Updated Reply to Notice of Violation; EA-1 1-252; and Follow-up to 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and Accuracy of Information, Notification

ML13268A421
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	08/30/2013
From:	Shea J W Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
EA-11-252
Download: ML13268A421 (19)

Text

Tennessee Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402August 30, 201310 CFR 2.20110 CFR 50.9(b)ATTN: Document Control DeskU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68NRC Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296

Subject:

Updated Reply to Notice of Violation; EA-1 1-252; and Follow-up to10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and accuracy of information,"

Notification

References:

1. Letter from NRC to TVA, "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant -NRCInspection Procedure 95003 Supplemental Inspection Report05000259/2011011, 05000260/2011011, and 05000296/2011011 (Part 1),"dated November 17, 20112. Letter from TVA to NRC, "Response to an Apparent Violation in Inspection Report 05000259/2011011, 05000260/2011011, 05000296/2011011; EA-11-252,"

dated December 19, 20113. Letter from NRC to WVA, "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant -Notice of Violation NRC Inspection Report 05000259/2012010, 05000260/2012010, and05000296/2012010,"

dated January 23, 20124. Letter from TVA to NRC, "Reply to Notice of Violation; EA-1 1-252," datedFebruary 22, 20125. Letter from TVA to NRC, "Updated Reply to Notice of Violation; EA-1 1-252;and Follow-up to 10 CFR 50.9, 'Completeness and accuracy of information,'

Notification,"

dated September 28, 20126. Letter from WVA to NRC, "Updated Reply to Notice of Violation; EA-1 1-252;and Follow-up to 10 CFR 50.9, 'Completeness and accuracy of information,'

Notification,"

dated March 1, 2013Printed o. recycled paper U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2August 30, 2013In accordance with the NRC letter dated November 17, 2011 (Reference 1), Tennessee ValleyAuthority (TVA) submitted a response to Apparent Violation EA-1 1-252 (Reference 2).Subsequently, the NRC issued Notice of Violation EA-11-252 on January 23, 2012(Reference 3). In accordance with the Reference 3 letter, TVA was required to respond to theNotice of Violation within 30 days of the date of the letter, i.e., by February 22, 2012. The TVAresponse to this notice of violation, including information regarding extent of condition reviews,was provided in the Reference 4 letter, in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations (10 CFR) 2.201, "Notice of violation."

In References 5 and 6 TVA provided updates to the Reply to Notices of Violation EA-1 1-252(Enclosure 1 of Reference 5 and 6), 1OCFR 50.9 "Completeness and accuracy of information,"

Notification

-Alternate Leakage Treatment (Enclosure 2 of Reference 5 and 6), and10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and accuracy of information,"

Notification

-Generic Letter89-10 Program (Enclosure 3 of Reference 6).The purpose of this letter is to provide a revision to the schedule for completion of corrective actions for resolving the two non-conforming conditions previously discussed in References 5and 6. Enclosure 1 is unchanged.

Enclosure 2 contains a revision to the actions and schedulefor completion of corrective actions associated with Alternate Leakage Treatment.

Thesechanges resulted from a re-evaluation of the approach to restoring the non-conforming condition.

Enclosure 3 contains a revision to the schedule for completion of corrective actionsassociated with the Generic Letter 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor Operated Valve Testing andSurveillance" program.There is one new regulatory commitment contained in this response.

Should you have anyquestions concerning this submittal, please contact J. E. Emens, Jr., Nuclear Site Licensing

Manager, at (256) 729-2636.

Resp tfully,J W. SheaVice President, Nuclear Licensing

Enclosures:

1. Updated Reply to Notice of Violation; EA-1 1-2522. Follow-up to 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and accuracy of information,"

Notification

-Alternate Leakage Treatment

3. Follow-up to 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and accuracy of information,"

Notification

-Generic Letter 89-10 Program4. List of Commitments cc: see page 3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3August 30, 2013cc (Enclosures):

NRC Regional Administrator

-Region IINRC Senior Resident Inspector

-Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant ENCLOSURE ITennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3Updated Reply to Notice of Violation; EA-11-252 Updated Reply to Notice of Violation; EA-11-252 Restatement of Violation 10 CFR 50.9 requires, in part, that information provided to the Commission by anapplicant for a license or by a licensee or information required by statute or by theCommission's regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by theapplicant or the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects.

Contrary to the above, on January 6, 1997, and May 5, 2004, TVA provided information to the Commission that was not complete and accurate in all material

respects, relatedto NRC Generic Letter 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing andSurveillance" testing program.

Specifically, in a letter dated January 6, 1997, TVAresponded to a prior NRC question and stated that "Closure of valves FCV-74-52 andFCV-74-66 is not required by plant procedures to operate the RHR system in thesuppression pool cooling mode. Therefore, these valves have no 'redundant' safetyfunction and will not be included in the GL 89-10 program."

This information wasinaccurate because the FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 valves do have a safety function toshut to operate the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode as described inEOI Appendix-17A, "RHR System Operation Suppression Pool Cooling,"

and shouldtherefore have been included in Browns Ferry's GL 89-10 MOV monitoring program.Additionally, TVA also provided incomplete and inaccurate information in a letter to theNRC dated May 5, 2004. This letter referenced 18 valves, including FCV-74-52 andFCV-74-66, "that are not in the GL 89-10 program, since the valves are normally in theirsafety position."

This letter stated that "TVA's review and documentation of the designbasis for the operation of each Unit I MOV within the scope of the GL 89-10 program,the methods for determining and adjusting its switch settings,

testing, surveillance, andmaintenance are the same as with the Units 2 and 3 program."

This information was material to the NRC because it was used, in part, as the basis fordetermining that valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 did not meet the conditions necessary that would require them to be in Browns Ferry's GL 89-10 MOV monitoring program.Background WVA incorrectly determined that flow control valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 were "passive" based on operating in their safety position during normal alignment.

Additionally, TVA failed toidentify that FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 are required to be closed to enable Residual HeatRemoval (RHR) to operate to the suppression pool cooling mode, per Emergency Operating Instruction (EOI) Appendix-17A.

By letter dated January 6, 1997, WVA responded to the NRC inspector follow-up item 50-260,296/95-19-01 regarding the reduced scope of motor-operated valves (MOVs) in the NRCGeneric Letter (GL) 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance,"

program for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Units 2 and 3. This letter stated in part that"Closure of valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 is not required by plant procedures to operate theRHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode..."

As a result, FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 were removed from the GL 89-10 program in 1997, in accordance with Supplement 1 toGL 89-10.E1-1 of 5 Updated Reply to Notice of Violation; EA-11-252 As identified during the root cause analysis conducted to address the issues associated with thefailure of FCV-74-66 in the BFN, Unit 1, TVA discovered that the statement "Closure of valvesFCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 is not required by plant procedures to operate the RHR system inthe suppression pool cooling mode. .." was inaccurate.

Specifically, the revision of the EOI,Appendix-17A that was in place in January 1997, included a step to verify that the FCV-74-52 orFCV-74-66 valve was closed as part of performing the steps to place the RHR system in thesuppression pool cooling mode. As required by 10 CFR 50.9(b),

TVA provided writtennotification to the NRC by letter dated October 20, 2011, acknowledging the inaccuracy of itsJanuary 6, 1997 letter. Additionally, TVA provided written notification to the NRC. by letter datedDecember 19, 2011, acknowledging the inaccuracy of its May 5, 2004, letter.With respect to FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 and the GL 89-10 program, TVA will implement thefollowing actions.* Add 1, 2, 3 -FCV-74-52 and 1, 2, 3 -FCV-74-66 to the.GL 89-10 program.Develop or revise an existing procedure to specifically provide the criteria fordetermining GL 89-10 program scope, including active/passive classification.

Reason for the Violation The reasons for this violation of 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and accuracy of information,"

areas follows.* TVA failed to apply adequate technical rigor to the review process for regulatory submittals.

The responsible licensing engineer was requested by a reviewer of theJanuary 1997 submittal to verify the statement regarding closure of valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66.

Verification was done through verbal confirmation from Engineering without documentation supporting the conclusion.

• The TVA procedures did not contain sufficient details governing the verification processfor regulatory submittals.

The TVA procedures in place at the time of the 1997 letteronly provided guidance on acceptable methods of verification.

In addition, the procedure stated that method of verification remained at the discretion of the technical lead; not theresponsible licensing engineer.

" The TVA personnel assigned to the BFN, Unit 1, restart licensing failed to followprocedures governing the verification process for regulatory submittals.

The information provided in the May 5, 2004, letter related to the BFN, Unit 1, was verified to the extentrequired to ensure the BFN, Unit 1, valves were described in a manner equivalent to theBFN, Units 2 and 3, valves. As stated in the 2004 letter, the basis for excluding theBFN, Unit 1, valves from the GL 89-10 program was the same as the BFN, Units 2 and3, valves.E1-2 of 5 Updated Reply to Notice of Violation; EA-1 1-252Corrective Steps That Have Been Taken and Results AchievedAs stated above, TVA provided written notification to the NRC by letter dated October 20, 2011,acknowledging the inaccuracy of its January 6, 1997 letter, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.9(b).Additionally, TVA provided written notification to the NRC by letter dated December 19, 2011,acknowledging the inaccuracy of its May 5, 2004, letter.Procedural requirements in the TVA procedure BP-213, "Managing TVA's Interface with NRC,"governing the verification of information contained in NRC submittals were enhanced in 2002.These enhancements, which included the following, are contained in the current revision ofBP-213:* Designating oversight responsibility for the submittal verification process to Licensing.

" Specifying which NRC submittals require verification.

• Describing which types of statements in NRC submittals require verification.

• Providing detailed requirements for verification packages.

With respect to the failure of the BFN, Unit 1, restart licensing personnel to follow the procedure governing the verification process for regulatory submittals (i.e. BP-213),

procedure use andadherence has since been reinforced as one of the TVA's fundamental human performance tools. Management expectations regarding procedure use and adherence are communicated regularly through the TVA Nuclear corporate and site communications and are further reinforced through the TVA's Nuclear Fleet Focus Handbook.

Extent of Condition Misapplication of the criteria for determination of active/passive function of 1-FCV-74-66 resulted in inappropriate classification and removal from the GL 89-10 program.

Thiscontributed to the untimely identification of the valve failure.

This misapplication of the criteriaalso resulted in providing the NRC inaccurate information in associated correspondence andsubmittals used by the NRC in making the decision to approve the exclusion of the FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 valves from the BFN GL 89-10 program.

As a result, the extent of condition isconsidered to include submittals to the NRC that included information describing the results ofthe TVA's application of criteria for defining the scope of regulatory programs.

To address this extent of condition, the following actions have been taken.For the following regulatory

programs, applicable information submitted to the NRC in otherBFN GL 89-10 submittals, other BFN, Unit 1, restart submittals, and other BFN, Units 2 and 3,submittals related to these regulatory

programs, starting from time of program development, were identified.

• Air Operated Valve Program" Aging Management Program* Breaker Testing and Maintenance Program* Buried Cable Program" Buried Piping/Groundwater Protection ProgramE1-3 of 5 Updated Reply to Notice of Violation; EA-1 1-252* Equipment Qualification Program" Flow Accelerated Corrosion Program" Inservice Inspection Program* Inservice Testing Program* Instrument Setpoint Program* Maintenance Rule Program* Motor Operated Valve Program* Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program* Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Program* Equipment Seismic Qualification Program* Snubber Program* Pump Program" Motor Program* Heat Exchangers Program* Chillers Program* Probabilistic Risk Assessment Program* Appendix R Program" Reactor Vessel Internals ProgramUsing guidance derived from the TVA procedure BP-213, each of the NRC submittals identified for these regulatory programs were reviewed to validate that the information associated with theprogram scope provided to the NRC was complete and accurate as required by 10 CFR 50.9.Any information that could not be validated as complete and accurate was documented in theTVA Corrective Action Program (CAP).In accordance with procedure NPG-SPP-03.5, "Regulatory Reporting Requirements,"

theinformation documented in the TVA CAP that could not be validated was reviewed andevaluated to determine if the condition was reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.9.The TVA notified the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.9(b) for identified conditions that metthe reporting requirements delineated in 10 CFR 50.9.On September 4, 2012, as a result of the ongoing extent of condition reviews at the time, theTVA determined that information previously provided to the NRC in certain BFN licenseamendment requests and associated responses to the NRC requests for additional information regarding Alternate Leakage Treatment was incomplete.

As required by 10 CFR 50.9(b),

anotification was made within two working days, i.e., on September 6, 2012, to the NRC Region IIoffice via a telephone call. As requested during that telephone call, the TVA provided afollow-up to that notification as part of this updated reply to the notice of violation.

Therequested information is provided in Enclosure 2.On January 29, 2013, as a result of the completed extent of condition

reviews, the TVAdetermined that information previously provided to the NRC in certain BFN submittals regarding the GL 89-10 program was incomplete and inaccurate.

As required by 10 CFR 50.9(b),

anotification was made within two working days, i.e., on January 31, 2013, to the NRC Region IIoffice via a telephone call between K. J. Poison, BFN Site Vice President, with other TVArepresentatives and F. D. Brown, NRC Region II (acting on behalf of V. M. McCree, NRCRegion II Administrator).

As requested during that telephone call, the TVA is providing afollow-up to that notification as part of this letter. The requested information is provided inEnclosure 3.E1-4 of 5 Updated Reply to Notice of Violation; EA-11-252 Corrective Steps That Will Be TakenAll identified corrective actions to avoid future violations have been implemented.

The extent of condition reviews and the required NRC notifications were completed byFebruary 1, 2013.Date When Full Compliance Will Be AchievedFor the 10 CFR 50.9 violation described in EA-1 1-252, the TVA achieved full compliance withthe October 20, 2011, and December 19, 2011, NRC notification letters.E1-5 of 5 ENCLOSURE 2Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3Follow-up to 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and accuracy of information,"

Notification

-Alternate Leakage Treatment Follow-up to 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and accuracy of information,"

Notification

-Alternate Leakage Treatment On September 4, 2012, as part of the ongoing extent of condition reviews for corrective actionsfor the Notice of Violation EA-1 1-252, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) determined thatinformation previously provided to the NRC in certain Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) licenseamendment requests and associated responses to the NRC requests for additional information was incomplete.

As required by 10 CFR 50.9(b),

a notification was made within two workingdays, i.e., on September 6, 2012, to the NRC Region II office via a telephone call betweenK. J. Poison, BFN Site Vice President, with other TVA representatives and NRC Region IIrepresentatives F. D. Brown (acting on behalf of V. M. McCree, NRC Region II Administrator) and E. F. Guthrie.

As requested during that telephone call, the TVA is providing this follow-up tothat notification.

Alternate Leakage Treatment (ALT) was credited by the TVA for BFN in NRC submittals toincrease Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) leakage acceptance criteria and to allow use ofAlternative Source Term (AST). The submittals containing information that have beendetermined to be incomplete are as follows.* The MSIV leakage acceptance criteria increase submittals for BFN, Units 2 and 3, datedSeptember 28, 1999 (Reference 2), and February 4, 2000 (Reference 3)." The MSIV leakage acceptance criteria increase submittal for BFN, Unit 1, dated July 9, 2004(Reference 4).* The AST submittal for BFN, Units 1, 2, and 3, dated August 24, 2004 (Reference 5).The NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for NEDC-31858P, Revision 2, "BWROG Report forIncreasing MSIV Leakage Rate Limits and Elimination of Leakage Control Systems,"

datedMarch 3, 1999 (Reference 1), required the following to be addressed.

"In parallel to the plant-specific reviews conducted in the past, the staff determined that alllicensees referencing the generic report should provide assurance for the reliability of theentire ALT pathway, including all of its boundary valves. The licensees should also provideassurance that valves required to open the ALT path to the condenser are provided withhighly reliable power sources, and that a secondary path to the condenser with orifice flowexists. In addition, valves which are required to open the ALT path to the condenser are tobe included in the plant's Inservice Testing (IST) program."

The TVA submittals dated September 28, 1999 (Reference 2), and July 9, 2004 (Reference 4),addressed compliance with NEDC-31858P and the associated SER (Reference

1) and statedthat valves in each of the four drain lines from the main steam lines (flow control valves(FCVs) 168, 169, 170, and 171) are normally open motor operated valves whichwould remain open on loss of offsite power. However, these submittals should have alsodescribed that if any MSIV is closed and turbine speed is greater than 1700 revolutions perminute (rpm), these valves close and will reopen after turbine speed drops below 1700 rpm. Asa result, these TVA submittals failed to address the following.

-Reliability of power sources for these valves. Valves FCVs-1-168, 169, 170, and-1-171 are powered from non-safety related motor operated valve boards that do not haveemergency diesel generator (EDG) back-up power supplies.

E2-1 of 4 Follow-up to 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and accuracy of information,"

Notification

-Alternate Leakage Treatment

-Reliability of valve logic to reopen the valves to establish the ALT pathway.-The need to include these valves in the IST Program.

These valves were not included in theIST Program, even though they close upon MSIV closure and are required to reopen.The TVA submittals dated September 28, 1999 (Reference 2), and July 9, 2004 (Reference 4),stated that two valves in the piping line downstream of the four main steam line drain lines priorto the condenser (FCV-1-58 and FCV-1-59) are normally closed valves which would requireoperator action to align the ALT path to the condenser.

These TVA submittals also stated thatthese two valves are powered from essential power buses with EDG back-up and to furtherensure valve reliability, these valves would be included in the IST program and periodically stroke tested. One of these valves (FCV-1 -59) has a 4-inch bypass containing no valves ororifices.

Therefore, there is not a concern associated with FCV-1 -59 with respect to ALTpathway availability.

The TVA submittals dated July 9, 2004 (Reference 4), andAugust 24, 2004 (Reference 5), also stated that these valves (FCV-1 -58 and FCV-1 -59) aredesigned to be available during and after a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) event concurrent with loss of offsite power. However, these submittals should have also described that thereactor motor operated valve board that powers FCV-1 -58 is not qualified for the post-LOCA environment, e.g., temperature, and is also required to be manually loaded onto the associated EDG. As a result, the TVA submittals failed to adequately address the reliability of the powersource for FCV-1-58 after a LOCA.The TVA submittals dated September 28, 1999 (Reference 2), February 4, 2000 (Reference 3),July 9, 2004 (Reference 4), and August 24, 2004 (Reference 5), indicate that a secondary orificed contingency path is provided in the unlikely event of a failure of the normally closedvalve without the 4-inch bypass line (FCV-1 -58) in the piping line downstream of the four mainsteam line drain lines prior to the condenser.

For BFN, the secondary ALT pathway consists oforificed bypass lines around each of the four drain lines (FCVs-1-168, 169, 170, and-1-171) from the main steam lines through an open valve (FCV-1-57) in the piping linedownstream of the four main steam line drain lines and then through an orificed bypass linearound a normally closed valve (FCV-1-58) and finally through a non-orificed 4-inch bypass linearound another closed valve (FCV-1-59) to the condenser.

These TVA submittals also statedthat with the 0.1875 inch orificed path around FCV-1-58, it is calculated that the majority ofMSIV leakage would still be directed to the condenser with a smaller remainder through theclosed Main Steam Stop and Control Valves to the high pressure turbine.

However, no TVAcalculation supporting the statement regarding the 0.1875 inch orifice has been located.The TVA determined that this condition was reportable to the NRC in accordance with10 CFR 50.9(b) on September 4, 2012, and the notification was made to the NRC Region IIoffice within two working days, on September 6, 2012.This condition has been included in the TVA Corrective Action Program.

The causal evaluation has been completed for the ALT pathway condition and has determined that the causes of thecondition associated with the previous 10 CFR 50.9 violation are similar to the causes of thiscondition.

The causes of the condition associated with the previous 10 CFR 50.9 violation arefailure to apply adequate technical rigor to the review process for regulatory submittals, procedures did not contain sufficient details governing the verification process for regulatory E2-2 of 4 Follow-up to 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and accuracy of information,"

Notification

-Alternate Leakage Treatment submittals, and failure of the BFN, Unit 1, restart licensing personnel to follow procedures governing the verification process for regulatory submittals.

The causal evaluation for theALT pathway condition determined the causes of the condition are procedures did not providespecific guidance to ensure adequate technical rigor in the preparation and verification of designchange documents used as input into the License Amendment Requests and procedures didnot provide enough guidance to ensure that source documents for License Amendment Requests are adequately validated.

Since the causes of this condition are similar to the causesassociated with the previous 10 CFR 50.9 violation, this condition represents an additional example.The causal evaluation also identified corrective actions and corrective actions to preventrecurrence.

These corrective actions and corrective actions to prevent recurrence are beingimplemented in accordance with the TVA Corrective Action Program.The identified issues with the ALT pathway are being treated as a non-conforming/degraded condition.

A Functional Evaluation has been performed that relies on the secondary ALTpathway.

While no TVA calculation supporting statement regarding the 0.1875 inch orifice waslocated as previously discussed, it has been determined that actual leakage flow area throughthe Main Steam Stop and Control Valves, based on actual BFN Main Steam Stop and ControlValve testing performed each refueling outage, is less than assumed in the BFN LOCA doseanalysis of record. With this decrease, the existing BFN LOCA dose analysis of record remainsbounding.

Consistent with NRC guidance for resolving non-conforming/degraded conditions, finalcorrective actions for this condition will involve modification of the facility or licensing basis otherthan restoration to the conditions as described in the licensing submittals.

The corrective actions to be taken are as follows.1. The BFN will use the ALT secondary flow path as the ALT primary flow path.2. The total allowable MSIV leakage rate will be decreased from current Technical Specification value of 150 standard cubic feet per hour to a value that supports meetingdose requirements in association with action item 1.3. A revised dose analysis will be performed which includes the changes made to theapplication of ALT described in items 1 and 2, above.4. A License Amendment Request will be submitted which reflects the changes made tothe application of ALT at BFN.The corrective actions for items 1 through 3 above are expected to be completed byOctober 21, 2013. The resulting License Amendment

Request, described in item 4 above, willbe submitted to the NRC for review by November 21, 2013.E2-3 of 4 Follow-up to 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and accuracy of information,"

Notification

-Alternate Leakage Treatment References

1. NRC letter to General Electric, "Safety Evaluation Report of GE Topical Report,NEDC-31858P, Revision 2, BWROG Report for Increasing MSIV Leakage Limits andElimination of Leakage Control Systems, September 1993," dated March 3, 19992. TVA letter to NRC, "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant -Units 2 and 3 -Technical Specification (TS) Change 399 -Increasing Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Leakage Rate Limits andExemption from 10 CFR 50, Appendix J," dated September 28, 19993. TVA letter to NRC, "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant -Units 2 and 3 -Response to Request forAdditional Information Regarding Technical Specification (TS) Change 399 -Increased MainSteam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Leakage Rate Limits and Exemption from 10 CFR 50,Appendix J -Revised TS Pages for MSIV Leakage Limits,"

dated February 4, 20004. TVA letter to NRC, "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 -Technical Specification (TS)Change 436 -Increased Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Leakage Rate Limits andExemption from 10 CFR 50, Appendix J," dated July 9, 20045. TVA letter to NRC, "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant -Units 1, 2, and 3 -Supplemental Information Associated with Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Relatedto Technical Specification (TS) Change No. TS-405 -Alternative Source Term (AST)," datedAugust 24, 2004E2-4 of 4 ENCLOSURE 3Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3Follow-up to 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and accuracy of information,"

Notification

-Generic Letter 89-10 Program Follow-up to 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and accuracy of information,"

Notification

-Generic Letter 89-10 ProgramOn January 29, 2013, as a result of the completed extent of condition reviews for corrective actions for the Notice of Violation EA-1 1-252, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)determined that information previously provided to the NRC in certain Browns Ferry NuclearPlant (BFN) submittals regarding the Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance,"

program was incomplete and inaccurate.

As required by 10 CFR 50.9(b),

a notification was made within two working days, i.e., onJanuary 31, 2013, to the NRC Region II office via a telephone call between K. J. Poison,BFN Site Vice President, with other TVA representatives and F. D. Brown, NRC Region II(acting on behalf of V. M. McCree, NRC Region II Administrator).

As requested during thattelephone call, the TVA is providing a follow-up to that notification.

In previous submittals to the NRC, the TVA provided information regarding the scope ofMotor-Operated Valves (MOVs) to be included in the BFN Generic Letter 89-10 program.The submittals containing information that has been determined to be incomplete andinaccurate are as follows.* The submittal providing the response to an Inspector Follow-up Item which requested reevaluation of the safety function of certain MOVs removed from, or not included, in theGL 89-10 program for BFN, Units 2 and 3, dated January 6, 1997 (Reference 1)." The submittal providing the updated response to GL 89-10 and Supplement 1 through 7for the BFN, Unit 1, dated May 5, 2004 (Reference 2). This submittal stated that the"TVA's review and documentation of the design basis for the operation of each Unit 1MOV within the scope of the Generic Letter 89-10 program, the valves included in theprogram, the methods for determining and adjusting switch settings, testing,surveillance, and maintenance are the same as with the Units 2 and 3 program."

Thissubmittal also referenced the January 6, 1997, letter (Reference

1) from the TVA to theNRC. As such, it has been determined that the inaccurate information included in theReference 1 letter also applied to the BFN, Unit 1.The TVA submittal dated January 6, 1997 (Reference 1), stated, for the Residual HeatRemoval (RHR) Loops I and II Low Pressure Coolant Injection valves (flow control valve(FCV)-74-52 and FCV-74-66),

that these valves were not required by plant procedures to beclosed to operate the RHR System in the Suppression Pool Cooling mode. However, plantprocedures do require these valves to be closed to operate the RHR System in theSuppression Pool Cooling mode. This issue was previously reported to the NRC inaccordance with 10 CFR 50.9(b),

on September 22, 2011, for the BFN, Units 2 and 3, andon December 19, 2011, for the BFN, Unit 1. Follow-up written reports (References 3 and 4,respectively) associated with these notifications were submitted by the TVA to the NRC onOctober 20, 2011, and December 19, 2011.The TVA submittal dated January 6, 1997 (Reference 1), stated, for the RHR Pump Suctionvalves from the torus (FCVs-74-01, 12, 24, and 35),

that these valves are intheir safety position, i.e., open, except during operability stroke time testing.

The submittal also indicated that when these valves are not in their safety position, the associated system/train would be declared inoperable.

However, the submittal should have alsodescribed that these valves are required to be closed to operate the RHR System in theE3-1 of 3 Follow-up to 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and accuracy of information,"

Notification

-Generic Letter 89-10 ProgramShutdown Cooling mode. As a result, the TVA submittal failed to adequately address thefunction and position of these valves in other modes of RHR System operation.

The TVA submittal dated January 6, 1997 (Reference 1), did not address the RHR PumpSuction valves from the shutdown cooling line (FCVs 02, 13, 25, and 36).These valves are normally in their safety position (i.e., closed).

However, these valves arerequired to be opened to operate the RHR System in the Shutdown Cooling mode. As aresult, the WVA submittal failed to address the function and position of these valves in othermodes of the RHR System operation and the need for inclusion of these valves in theGL 89-10 program.The TVA submittal dated January 6, 1997 (Reference 1), stated the BFN GL 89-10 scopewould be revised to include those MOVs required for Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)System operation.

However, the following RCIC System valves were excluded from theGL 89-10 program in the Reference 1 letter." RCIC Suction Valves from Torus (FCVs 17 and 18)" RCIC Suction Valve from Condensate Storage Tank (FCV-71-19)

As a result, the submittal failed to address that these valves are required to support theRCIC System operation as described in the BFN Updated Final Safety Analysis ReportSection 4.7, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, and the BFN Technical Specifications Bases B 3.5.3, RCIC System.The TVA determined that this condition was reportable to the NRC in accordance with10 CFR 50.9(b) on January 29, 2013, and the notification was made to the NRC Region IIoffice within two working days, on January 31, 2013.This condition has been included in the TVA Corrective Action Program.

Operability Determinations/Functional Evaluations have been performed for each of the valves includedin this condition.

The causes of this condition are the same as the causes associated withthe previous 10 CFR 50.9 violation, i.e., failure to apply adequate technical rigor to thereview process for regulatory submittals, procedures did not contain sufficient detailsgoverning the verification process for regulatory submittals, and failure of the BFN, Unit 1,restart licensing personnel to follow procedures governing the verification process forregulatory submittals.

Since the causes of this condition are the same as the causesassociated with the previous 10 CFR 50.9 violation, this condition represents an additional example.E3-2 of 3 Follow-up to 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and accuracy of information,"

Notification

-Generic Letter 89-10 ProgramThe condition is being treated as non-conforming condition.

Corrective actions areunderway to resolve this non-conforming condition.

These valves have been added to theBFN GL 89-10 program.

The MOVs discussed above are now in full compliance GL 89-10program requirements with the exception of 1-FCV-74-01, 1-FCV-74-02, 1-FCV-71-19, 2-FCV-71-19, and 3-FCV-71-19.

The remaining MOVs will be in full compliance according to the following schedule:

• Valves 1-FCV-74-01, 1-FCV-74-02, 1-FCV-71-19 will be in full compliance withGL 89-10 program requirements by the end of the BFN, Unit 1, fall 2014 refueling outage." Valve 2-FCV-71-19 will be in full compliance with GL 89-10 program requirements bythe end of the BFN, Unit 2, spring 2015 refueling outage.* Valve 3-FCV-71-19 will be in full compliance with GL 89-10 program requirements bythe end of the BFN, Unit 3, spring 2014 refueling outage.These schedule changes were previously provide via Reference 5, below.References

1. TVA letter to NRC, "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) -Units 2 and 3 -Generic Letter(GL) 89-10, Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve (MOV) Testing and Surveillance, NRC Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-260, 296/95-19-01, Response to Request forReevaluation Regarding Reduced Scope of MOVs," dated January 6, 19972. TVA letter to NRC, "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 1 -Generic Letter 89-10 andSupplements 1 to 7, Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve (MOV) Testing andSurveillance,"

dated May 5, 20043. TVA letter to NRC, "Follow-up Letter to 10 CFR 50.9, 'Completeness and accuracy ofinformation,'

Notification,"

dated October 20, 20114. WVA letter to NRC, "Revision to Follow-up Letter to 10 CFR 50.9, 'Completeness andaccuracy of information,'

Notification,"

dated December 19, 20115. TVA letter to NRC, "Revision to Commitment Summary associated with Generic Letter89-10, Safety-related Motor-operated Valve Program Requirements,"

datedApril 26, 2013E3-3 of 3 Enclosure 4Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3List of Commitments

1. By November 21, 2013, TVA will submit a License Amendment Request to resolve thenon-conforming/degraded conditions related to the alternate leakage path issue.E4-1 of 1