ML11362A379
| ML11362A379 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 12/19/2011 |
| From: | James Shea Tennessee Valley Authority |
| To: | Document Control Desk, NRC/RGN-II |
| References | |
| EA-11-252 IR-11-011 | |
| Download: ML11362A379 (6) | |
Text
Tennessee Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 December 19, 2011 10 CFR 2.201 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 NRC Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296
Subject:
Response to an Apparent Violation in Inspection Report 05000259/2011011, 0500026012011011, 0500029612011011; EA-1 1-252
Reference:
Letter from NRC to TVA, "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant - NRC Inspection Procedure 95003 Supplemental Inspection Report 05000259/2011011, 05000260/2011011, and 05000296/2011011 (Part 1)," dated November 17, 2011 In accordance with the reference letter, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is required to submit a response to the Notice of Violation EA-1 1-252 within 30 days of the date of the letter which transmitted the notice of violation, i.e., by December 17, 2011. Because December 17, 2011 fell on a Saturday, TVA's response is being submitted on December 19, 2011. The TVA response to this notice of violation is provided in the enclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 2.201.
There are no new regulatory commitments contained in this response. Should you have any questions concerning this submittal, please contact Tom Hess at (423) 751-3487.
L n u lly , Nuclear Licensing Rse aeCorporate
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 December 19, 2011
Enclosure:
Response to an Apparent Violation in Inspection Report 05000259/2011011, 05000260/2011011, 05000296/2011011; EA- 11-252 cc (Enclosure):
NRC Regional Administrator - Region II NRC Director, Office of Enforcement NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant NRC Project Manager - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
ENCLOSURE Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 Response to an Apparent Violation in Inspection Report 05000259/2011011, 05000260/2011011, 05000296/2011011; EA-11-252
Response to an Apparent Violation in Inspection Report 0500025912011011, 0500026012011011, 05000296/2011011; EA-1 1-252 Restatement of Violation Title 10 CFR 50.9 requires, in part, that information provided to the Commission by an applicant for a license or by a licensee or information required by statute or by the Commission's regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the applicant or the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects.
Contrary to the above, on January 6, 1997, TVA provided information to the Commission that was not complete and accurate in all material respects. Specifically, in a letter dated October 7, 1996, the NRC asked TVA to further consider and respond to questions about whether valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 had a redundant safety function to close to allow operation of the suppression pool cooling mode of the RHR System. In a letter dated January 6, 1997, TVA responded that "Closure of valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 is not required by plant procedures to operate the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode. Therefore, these valves have no 'redundant' safety function and will not be included in the GL-89-10 program." This information was inaccurate because the FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 valves do have a safety function to shut to operate the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode as described in EOI Appendix-17A, "RHR System Operation Suppression Pool Cooling," and should therefore have been included in Browns Ferry's GL 89-10 MOV monitoring program.
Additionally, The NRC identified that incomplete and inaccurate information was also provided in a letter dated May 5, 2004. This letter stated that "TVA's review and documentation of the design basis for the operation of each Unit 1 MOV within the scope of the GL 89-10 program, the methods for determining and adjusting its switch settings, testing, surveillance and maintenance are the same as with the Units 2 and 3 program."
This information was material to the NRC because it was used, in part, as the basis for determining that valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 did not meet the conditions necessary that would require them to be in Browns Ferry's GL 89-10 MOV monitoring program. The issue was preliminarily determined to be an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.9 (AV 05000259, 260, 296/2011011-02; Inaccurate Information Provided Regarding Scoping of Motor Operated Valves in the Generic Letter 89-10 Program). This issue was entered into BFN's CAP as SR 435463, "95003 - PER 430439 documented that Units 1, 2, and 3 RHR Outboard Injection Valves, FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66, Should have been Included in the Scope of the GL 89-10 Program. The Purpose of this SR is to Assess the Technical Basis and Adequacy of the NRC Correspondence for the GL 89-10 Scope removal of These Valves in the mid 1990's."
Background
Tennesse Valley Authority (TVA) incorrectly determined that flow control valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 were "passive" based on operating in their safety position during normal alignment.
Additionally, TVA failed to identify that FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 are required to be closed to enable Residual Heat Removal (RHR) to operate to the suppression pool cooling mode, per Emergency Operating Instruction (EOI) Appendix-1 7A.
E- 1 of 3
Response to an Apparent Violation in Inspection Report 05000259/2011011, 05000260/2011011, 0500029612011011; EA-1 1-252 By letter dated January 6, 1997, TVA responded to NRC inspector follow-up item 50-260, 296/95-19-01 regarding the reduced scope of motor-operated valves (MOVs) in the NRC Generic Letter 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance,"
program for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Units 2 and 3. This letter stated in part that "Closure of valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 is not required by plant procedures to operate the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode.. ." As a result, FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 were removed from the GL 89-10 program in 1997, in accordance with Supplement 1 to GL 89-10.
As identified during the root cause analysis being conducted to address the issues associated with the failure of FCV-74-66 in BFN Unit 1, TVA discovered that the statement "Closure of valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 is not required by plant procedures to operate the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode. . ." was inaccurate. Specifically, the revision of the EOI, Appendix 17A, that was in place in January 1997 included a step to verify that the FCV-74-52 or FCV-74-66 valve was closed as part of performing the steps to place the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode. As required by 10 CFR 50.9(b), TVA provided written notification to the NRC by letter dated October 20, 2011, acknowledging the inaccuracy of its January 6, 1997 letter. Additionally, TVA provided written notification to the NRC by letter dated December 19, 2011, acknowledging the inaccuracy of its May 5, 2004 letter.
With respect to FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 and the GL 89-10 program, TVA will implement the following actions:
" Add 1, 2, 3 - FCV-74-52 and 1, 2, 3 -FCV-74-66 to the GL 89-10 program.
- Develop or revise an existing procedure to specifically provide the criteria for determining GL 89-10 program scope, including active/passive classification.
Reason for the Violation The reasons for this violation of 10 CFR 50.9 are:
STVA failed to apply adequate technical rigor to the review process for regulatory submittals. The responsible licensing engineer was requested by a reviewer of the January 1997 submittal to verify the statement regarding closure of valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66. Verification was done through verbal confirmation from Engineering without documentation supporting the conclusion.
FVA procedures did not contain sufficient details governing the verification process for regulatory submittals. TVA procedures in place at the time of the 1997 letter only provided guidance on acceptable methods of verification. In addition, the procedure stated that method of verification remained at the discretion of the technical lead; not the responsible licensing engineer.
E- 2 of 3
Response to an Apparent Violation in Inspection Report 05000259/2011011, 05000260/2011011, 0500029612011011; EA-1 1-252 TVA personnel assigned to the BFN Unit 1 restart licensing failed to follow procedures governing the verification process for regulatory submittals. The information provided in the May 5, 2004 letter related to BFN Unit 1 was verified to the extent required to ensure the BFN Unit 1 valves were described in a manner equivalent to the BFN Units 2 and 3 valves. As stated in the 2004 letter, the basis for excluding the BFN Unit 1 valves from the GL 89-10 program was the same as the BFN Units 2 and 3 valves.
Corrective Steps That Have Been Taken and Results Achieved As stated above, TVA provided written notification to the NRC by letter dated October 20, 2011, acknowledging the inaccuracy of its January 6, 1997 letter, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.9(b).
Additionally, TVA provided written notification to the NRC by letter dated December 19, 2011, acknowledging the inaccuracy of its May 5, 2004 letter Procedural requirements in TVA procedure BP-213, "Managing TVA's Interface with NRC,"
governing the verification of information contained in NRC submittals were enhanced in 2002.
These enhancements, included the following, are contained in the current revision of BP-213:
- Designating oversight responsibility for the submittal verification process to Licensing.
" Specifying which NRC submittals require verification.
- Describing which types of statements in NRC submittals require verification.
- Providing detailed requirements for verification packages.
With respect to the failure of BFN Unit 1 restart licensing personnel to follow the procedure governing the verification process for regulatory submittals (i.e. BP-213), procedure use and adherence has since been reinforced as one of TVA's fundamental human performance tools.
Management expectations regarding procedure use and adherence are communicated regularly through TVA Nuclear corporate and site communications and are further reinforced through TVA's Nuclear Fleet Focus Handbook.
Corrective Steps That Will Be Taken to Avoid Future Violations All identified corrective actions to avoid future violations have been implemented.
Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved For the 10 CFR 50.9 violation described in EA-1 1-252, TVA achieved full compliance with the October 20, 2011 and December 19, 2011 NRC notification letters.
E-3 of 3