ML17355A570

"Issuance" is not in the list (Request, Draft Request, Supplement, Acceptance Review, Meeting, Withholding Request, Withholding Request Acceptance, RAI, Draft RAI, Draft Response to RAI, ...) of allowed values for the "Project stage" property.

Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 & 2, & Hope Creek Generating Station-Issuance of Amendment Nos. 322, 303, & 210, to Adopt Emergency Action Level Scheme Pursuant to NEI 99-01, Revision 6 (CAC Nos. MF9268/MF9269/MF9270; EPID L-2

ML17355A570
Person / Time
Site:	Salem, Hope Creek
Issue date:	02/16/2018
From:	Regner L M Plant Licensing Branch 1
To:	Sena P P Public Service Enterprise Group
Regner L M, NRR/DORL/LPL1
References
CAC MF9269, CAC MF9270, CAC MF9268, EPID L-2017-LLA-0173
Download: ML17355A570 (54)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Mr. Peter P. Sena, Ill President and Chief Nuclear Officer PSEG Nuclear LLC -N09 P.O. Box236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 16, 2018 SUBJECT: SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2, AND HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION-ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NOS. 322, 303, AND 210, TO ADOPT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL SCHEME PURSUANT TO NEI 99-01, REVISION 6, "DEVELOPMENT OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR NON-PASSIVE REACTORS" (CAC NOS. MF9268, MF9269, AND MF9270; EPID L-2017-LLA-0173) Dear Mr. Sena: The U.S. Nuclear Commission (NRC or the Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 322, 303, and 210, to Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-70, DPR-75, and NPF-57, for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (Salem), and Hope Creek Generating Station (Hope Creek), respectively. These amendments consist of changes to the emergency action level schemes in response to your application dated February 13, 2017, as supplemented by letter dated August 11, 2017 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Package Accession No. ML 17044A346 and Accession No. ML 17223A721, respectively). The amendments revise the emergency plan emergency action level scheme development methodology in use at Salem and Hope Creek from the guidance provided in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01, Revision 5, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels," to the revised emergency action level scheme described in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, "Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors." Revision 6 of NEI 99-01 was endorsed by the NRC staff by letter dated March 28, 2013.

P. Sena, Ill -2 -A copy of our related safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice. Docket Nos. 50-272, 50-311, and 50-354 Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 322 to License No. DPR-70 2. Amendment No. 303 to License No. DPR-75 3. Amendment No. 210 to License No. NPF-57 4. Safety Evaluation cc: Listserv Sincerely, Lisa M. Regner, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch I Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 PSEG NUCLEAR LLC EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC DOCKET NO. 50-272 SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 322 Renewed License No. DPR-70 1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission {the Commission) has found that: A. The application for amendment filed by PSEG Nuclear LLC, acting on behalf of itself and Exelon Generation Company, LLC {the licensees), dated February 13, 2017, as supplemented by letter dated August 11, 2017, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 1 O CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied. Enclosure 1

-2 -2. Accordingly, Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 is hereby amended by Amendment No. 322 to authorize revision to the Salem Nuclear Generating Station Emergency Plan as set forth in PSEG Nuclear LL C's application dated February 13, 2017, as supplemented by letter dated August 11, 2017, and evaluated in the NRC staff's safety evaluation enclosed with Amendment No. 322. 3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within a 365-day period after issuance. Date of Issuance: February 16, 2018 ~11i~1 Brian E. Holian, Acting Director Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 PSEG NUCLEAR LLC EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC DOCKET NO. 50-311 SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 303 Renewed License No. DPR-75 1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that: A. The application for amendment filed by PSEG Nuclear LLC, acting on behalf of itself and Exelon Generation Company, LLC (the licensees), dated February 13, 2017, as supplemented by letter dated August 11, 2017, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied. Enclosure 2

-2-2. Accordingly, Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-75 is hereby amended by Amendment No. 303 to authorize revision to the Salem Nuclear Generating Station Emergency Plan as set forth in PSEG Nuclear LLC's application dated February 13, 2017, as supplemented by letter dated August 11, 2017, and evaluated in the NRC staff's safety evaluation enclosed with Amendment No. 303. 3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within a 365-day period after issuance. Date of Issuance: February 16, 2018 ,..,-y:71,-. HE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION \J,ianii~~~;; Director Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 PSEG NUCLEAR LLC DOCKET NO. 50-354 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 210 Renewed License No. NPF-57 1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that: A. The application for amendment filed by PSEG Nuclear LLC, dated February 13, 2017, and supplemented by letter dated August 11, 2017 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; 8. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health. and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied. Enclosure 3

-2 -2. Accordingly, Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 is hereby amended by Amendment No. 210 to authorize revision to the Hope Creek Generating Station Emergency Plan as set forth in PSEG Nuclear LLC's application dated February 13, 2017, as supplemented by letter dated August 11, 2017, and evaluated in the NRC staff's safety evaluation enclosed with Amendment No. 210. 3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within a 365-day period after issuance. Date of Issuance: February 16, 2018 E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ~/(l~ Brian E. Holian, Acting Di~or Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 322,303, AND 210 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-70, DPR-75, AND NPF-57 PSEG NUCLEAR LLC EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NOS. 50-272, 50-311, AND 50-354 1.0 INTRODUCTION By application dated February 13, 2017 (Reference 1 ), as supplemented by letter dated August 11, 2017 (Reference 2), PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) requested a change to the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (Salem), emergency plan, and the Hope Creek Generating Station (Hope Creek) emergency plan. PSEG is the licensee for Hope Creek; PSEG and Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) together are the licensees for Salem, with PSEG authorized to act on behalf of Exelon. The proposed changes would revise the emergency action level (EAL) scheme for each to one based on the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) document NEI 99-01, Revision 6, "Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors," dated November 2012 (Reference 3). NEI 99-01, Revision 6, was endorsed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) by letter dated March 28, 2013 (Reference 4). The supplement dated August 11, 2017, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the NRC staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register on March 28, 2017 (82 FR 15384). 2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION The applicable regulations and guidance for the emergency plans are as follows. Enclosure 4

-2-2.1 Regulations Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.47, "Emergency plans," sets forth emergency plan requirements for nuclear power plant facilities. The regulations in 1 O CFR 50.47(a)(1 )(i) state, in part, that: ... no initial operating license for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a finding is made by the NRC that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Section 50.47(b) of 10 CFR establishes the planning standards that the onsite and offsite emergency response plans must meet for NRC staff to make a finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Planning Standard (4) of this section requires that onsite and offsite emergency response plans meet the following standard: A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures. Section 50.47(b)(4) of 10 CFR requires the use of a standard emergency classification and action level scheme, assuring that implementation methods are relatively consistent throughout the industry for a given reactor and containment design while simultaneously providing an opportunity for a licensee to modify its EAL scheme as necessary to address plant-specific design considerations or preferences.Section IV.B.1 of Appendix E, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities," to 1 O CFR Part 50, states, in part: The means to be used for determining the magnitude of, and for continually assessing the impact of, the release of radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies, the Commission, and other Federal agencies, and the emergency action levels that are to be used for determining when and what type of protective measures should be considered within and outside the site boundary to protect health and safety. The emergency action levels shall be based on in-plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and offsite monitoring. By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, these action levels must include hostile action that may adversely affect the nuclear power plant.Section IV.B.2 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 states, in part: A licensee desiring to change its entire emergency action level scheme shall submit an application for an amendment to its license and receive NRC approval before implementing the change.

-3 -2.2 Guidance The EAL development guidance was initially established in Generic Letter 79-50, "Emergency Plans Submittal Dates," dated October 10, 1979 (Reference 5). This guidance was subsequently revised in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 1980 (Reference 6), which was endorsed by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.101, Revision 2, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors," dated October 1981, and Revisions 3 and 4, dated August 1992 and July 2003, respectively (Reference 7), as an approach acceptable to the NRC for the development of an EAL scheme. As industry and regulatory experience increased with the implementation and use of EAL schemes, the industry issued revised EAL scheme development guidance to reflect lessons learned, many of which were provided to the NRC for review and endorsement as generic (i.e., non-plant-specific) EAL development guidance. Most recently, the industry provided NEI 99-01, Revision 6, to the NRC, which the NRC staff endorsed by letter dated March 28, 2013, as acceptable generic (i.e., not plant-specific) EAL scheme development guidance. Although the EAL development guidance contained in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, is generic and may not be entirely applicable for some non-passive, large light water reactor designs, it bounds the most typical accident and event scenarios for which emergency response is necessary, in a format that allows for industry standardization, and consistent regulatory oversight. Licensees may choose to develop plant-specific EAL schemes using NEI 99-01, Revision 6, with appropriate plant-specific alterations as applicable. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC evaluated the emergency preparedness planning basis to ensure it continued to protect the public health and safety in the current threat environment. The NRC issued NRC Bulletin 2005-02, "Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events," dated July 18, 2005 (Reference 8), to obtain information from licensees on progress in implementing security event-related emergency preparedness program enhancements. The staff later issued Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2006-12, "Endorsement of Nuclear Energy Institute Guidance 'Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Programs for Hostile Action,"' dated July 19, 2006 (Reference 9), for licensees to implement, regardless of the specific version of the generic EAL scheme development guidance used, or if the particular licensee developed its EAL scheme using an alternative approach. Based upon lessons learned from the implementation and use of security-based EALs, particularly the insights gained from combined security and emergency preparedness drills, the NRC staff and the industry worked to enhance the language of these EALs in NEI 99-01, Revision 6. NRC RIS 2003-18, including Supplements 1 and 2, "Use of NEI 99-01, 'Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels"' (Reference 10), also provides guidance for developing or changing a standard EAL scheme. In addition, this RIS and its supplements provide recommendations to assist licensees, consistent with Section IV.B of Appendix E to 1 O CFR Part 50, in determining whether to seek prior NRC approval of deviations from the guidance. In summary, the NRC staff considers that NEI 99-01, Revision 6, is an acceptable method to develop plant-specific EALs that meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to

-4-10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), with the understanding that licensees may develop EALs that differ from the guidance document as allowed in Regulatory Guide 1.101. 2.3 NRC Staff Review In its application dated February 13, 2017, PSEG proposed to revise the current Salem EAL scheme and Hope Creek EAL scheme to one based on NEI 99-01, Revision 6. PSEG submitted the proposed EAL scheme, the technical basis containing an evaluation and rationale for each proposed EAL change, and a comparison matrix providing a line-by-line comparison of the proposed initiating conditions, mode applicability, and EAL wording to that found in NEI 99-01, Revision 6. The comparison matrix also included a description of global changes applicable to the EAL scheme and a justification for any differences or deviations from NEI 99-01, Revision 6. The application states that PSEG used the terms "difference" and "deviation" as defined in RIS 2003-18, as supplemented, when comparing its proposed plant-specific EALs to the generic EALs in NEI 99-01, Revision 6. The NRC staff verified that each proposed EAL scheme for Salem and Hope Creek is consistent with the guidance provided in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, to assure that each proposed EAL scheme meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff reviewed the proposed site-specific EAL scheme, technical basis, comparison matrix, and all additional information provided in PSEG's application and supplemental letter. The NRC staff found that both the current and proposed EALs for Salem and Hope Creek have modifications from the NEI 99-01, Revision 6, guidance due to specific plant designs and licensees' preference. The NRC staff verified that the instrumentation and setpoints derived for both proposed EAL schemes are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme. Although the EALs must be plant-specific, the NRC staff reviewed the proposed EALs for the following key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme to ensure consistency and regulatory stability:

• Consistency, including standardization of intent, if not in actual wording (i.e., the EALs would lead to similar decisions under similar circumstances at different plants);

• Human factors engineering and user-friendliness;

• Potential for emergency classification level upgrade only when there is an increasing threat to public health and safety;

• Ease of upgrading and downgrading the emergency classification level;

• Thoroughness in addressing and disposing of the issues of completeness and accuracy raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654 (i.e., the EALs are unambiguous and are based on site-specific indicators);

• Technical completeness for each classification level;

• Logical progression in classification for multiple events; and

• The use of objective and observable values. The NRC staff verified for both Salem and Hope Creek EAL schemes that risk assessments were appropriately used to set the boundaries of the emergency classification levels and ensure that all EALs that trigger the declaration of an emergency classification are in the same range of relative risk. In addition, the NRC staff verified that both proposed EAL schemes are technically

-5 -complete for each classification level, accurate, and consistent with EAL schemes implemented at similarly designed plants. To aid in understanding the nomenclature used in this safety evaluation, the following conventions are used:

• The scheme's generic information is organized by recognition category in the following order. o A or R -Abnormal Radiation Levels/Radiological Effluent, o C -Cold Shutdown/Refueling System Malfunction, o E -Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, o F -Fission Product Barrier, o H -Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety, and o S or M -System Malfunction.

• The recognition category letter is the first letter for EALs;

• The second letter signifies the emergency classification level: o U = Notification of Unusual Event (UE), o A= Alert, o S = Site Area Emergency (SAE), and o G = General Emergency (GE).

• The number denotes the sequential subcategory designation from the plant-specific EAL scheme. An EAL set refers to EALs within an EAL Recognition Category that include an escalation path for one or more classification levels. Not all EAL Recognition Categories require an EAL set. This safety evaluation uses the numbering system from the proposed plant-specific EAL scheme; however, the numbering system from the generic EAL scheme development guidance contained in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, is annotated in [brackets] to aid in cross-referencing the site-specific EAL numbering convention with that of the guidance. 3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION FOR SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION 3.1 Recognition Category 'R' -Abnormal Radiological Release/Radiological Effluent 3.1.1 EAL Set RU1/RA1/RS1/RG1 [AU1/AA1/AS1/AG1] The intent of this EAL set is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared upon plant-specific indications of a release of radioactivity (gaseous and/or liquid). In recognition of the lower possible radioactivity concentrations, the assessment of liquid releases is limited to the UE and Alert classification levels. The set provides for accident assessments using precalculated values based on assumed conditions, real-time parameters, and field monitoring results. The NRC staff verified that the progression from a UE to a GE classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

• RU1 -This EAL addresses a potential decrease in the level of safety of the plant as indicated by a low-level radiological release that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extended period of time (e.g., an uncontrolled release).

-6 -* RA 1 -This EAL addresses a release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to 1 percent of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs) (Reference 11 ).

• RS 1 -This initiating condition addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to 10 percent of the EPA PAGs.

• RG1 -This initiating condition addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to the EPA PAGs. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, ease of upgrading/downgrading, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 1 O CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Salem. 3.1.2 EAL Set RU2/RA2/RS2/RG2 [AU2/AA2/AS2/AG2] The intent of this EAL set is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared upon plant-specific indications of potential or actual damage to an irradiated fuel assembly or multiple assemblies. It addresses a lowering of water level over irradiated fuel or fuel uncovery (i.e., level below the top of the fuel), a spectrum of fuel handling accidents that result in mechanical damage to irradiated fuel (e.g., a dropped fuel assembly), and NRC Order EA-12-051, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation," dated March 12, 2012 (Reference 12). The NRC staff has verified that the progression from a UE to a GE classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

• RU2 -This EAL addresses a decrease in water level above irradiated fuel sufficient to cause elevated radiation levels.

• RA2 -This EAL addresses events that have caused imminent or actual damage to an irradiated fuel assembly or a significant lowering of water level within the spent fuel pool.

• RS2 -This EAL addresses a significant loss of spent fuel pool inventory control and makeup capability leading to imminent fuel damage and addresses NRC Order EA-12-051.

• RG2 -This EAL addresses a significant loss of spent fuel pool inventory control and makeup capability leading to a prolonged uncovery of spent fuel and addresses NRC Order EA-12-051.

-7 -PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, ease of upgrading/downgrading, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for the Salem EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Salem. 3.1.3 EAL RA3 [AA3] The intent of this EAL is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared when elevated radiation levels in certain plant rooms and areas preclude or impede personnel from performing actions necessary to maintain normal plant operation or to perform a normal plant cooldown and shutdown. This includes equipment in the control room and the central alarm station. The Alert classification level is primarily intended to ensure that the plant emergency response organization (ERO) is activated to support the control room in removing the impediment to normal access, as well as assisting in quantifying potential damage to the fuel. Indications of increasing radiation levels in the plant are bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as RS1 and RG1. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 1 O CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Salem.

-8 -3.2 Recognition Category 'C' -Cold Shutdown/Refueling System Malfunction 3.2.1 EAL Set CU1/CA1/CS1/CG1 [CU1/CA1/CS1/CG1] The intent of this EAL is to ensure an emergency classification is declared upon a loss of reactor pressure vessel inventory and/or reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage. The NRC staff verified that the progression from a UE to a GE classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

• CU1 -This EAL addresses the inability to restore and maintain water level to a required minimum level (or the lower limit of a level band), or a loss of the ability to monitor reactor vessel/RCS level concurrent with indications of coolant leakage.

• CA 1 -This EAL addresses conditions that are precursors to a loss of the ability to adequately cool irradiated fuel (i.e., a precursor to a challenge to the fuel clad barrier).

• CS 1 -This EAL addresses a significant and prolonged loss of reactor vessel/RCS inventory control and makeup capability leading to imminent fuel damage.

• CG1 -This EAL addresses the inability to restore and maintain reactor vessel level above the top of active fuel with containment challenged. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, ease of upgrading/downgrading, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Salem. 3.2.2 EAL Set CU2/CA2 [CU2/CA2] The intent of this EAL set is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared upon a loss of available alternating current (AC) power to emergency power electrical buses. The NRC staff verified that the progression from a UE to an Alert classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The SAE and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by EALs RS1 and RG1.

• CU2 -This EAL describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources such that any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to safety systems.

-9 -* CA2 -This EAL addresses a total loss of AC power that compromises the performance of all safety systems requiring electric power, including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal, and the ultimate heat sink. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, and ease of upgrading/downgrading for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Salem. 3.2.3 EAL Set CU3/CA3 [CU3/CA3] The intent of this EAL set is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared based on the inability to maintain control of decay heat removal. The NRC staff verified that the progression from a UE to an Alert classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The SAE and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by EALs RS1 and RG1.

• CU3 -This EAL addresses an unplanned increase in RCS temperature above the technical specification cold shutdown temperature limit or the inability to determine RCS temperature and level.

• CA3 -This EAL addresses conditions involving a loss of decay heat removal capability or an addition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, and ease of upgrading/downgrading for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications.

-10 -Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Salem. 3.2.4 EAL CU4 [CU4] The intent of this EAL is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared upon a loss of vital direct current (DC) power, which compromises the ability to monitor and control operable safety systems when the plant is in the cold shutdown or refueling mode. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and offsite response organizations (OROs) are aware of the event, resources necessary to respond to the event are mobilized, and any necessary compensatory measures are promptly implemented. The Alert, SAE, and GE classification levels for a protracted loss of vital DC power are bounded by EALs CA 1, CA3, CS1, CG1, RA1, RS1 and RG1. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, formatting, logical progression, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b )( 4 ). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Salem. 3.2.5 EAL CU5 [CU5] The intent of this EAL is to highlight the importance of emergency communications by ensuring that an EAL is declared if normal communication methods for onsite and offsite personnel, or with OROs, including the NRC, are lost. It is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and OROs are aware of the loss of communications capabilities, the resources necessary to restore communications are mobilized, and compensatory measures are promptly implemented. The NRC staff verified that no escalation path is necessary for this EAL. The communication methods derived for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, and logical progression for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this

-11 -classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Salem. 3.2.6 EAL CA6 [CA6] The intent of this EAL is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared when hazardous events lead to potential damage to safety systems. The hazardous events of interest include, but are not limited to, an earthquake, flooding, high winds, tornado strike, explosion, fire, or any other hazard applicable for the site. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that the plant ERO is activated to support the control room in understanding the event impacts and restoring affected safety system equipment to service. Indications of hazard-induced damage to components containing radioactive materials are bounded by EALs CS1, CG1, RS1 and RG1. As described in NUREG 0654/FEMA REP 1, Revision 1, and the endorsed guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, an Alert Class exists when "[e]vents are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels." The endorsed guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, is intended to ensure that an Alert should be declared only when an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant has occurred as a result of a hazardous event. However, there may be cases where a hazardous event only causes damage to a single safety system component or a single safety system train. Additionally, an Alert classification should not be made if the damage from the hazardous event is limited to a safety system component or a safety system train that was inoperable or out of service prior to the event occurring. PSEG proposed that an Alert classification will be made when a hazardous event results in indications of degraded performance to one train of a safety system with either indications of degraded performance on a second safety system train or visible damage to a second safety system train, such that the operability or reliability of the second safety system train is a concern. Although different from the endorsed guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, this change is acceptable since it meets the intent of the NEI guidance by ensuring that an Alert is declared only when an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant has occurred as a result of a hazardous event. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, and logical progression for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications.

-12 -Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Salem. 3.3 Recognition Category 'E' -Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation 3.3.1 EAL RU4.1 [E-HU 11 This EAL applies to an event that results in damage to the confinement boundary of a storage cask containing irradiated fuel, regardless of the cause. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and OROs are aware of the cask damage resources necessary to respond to the event are mobilized, and protective measures, if warranted, are promptly implemented. PSEG elected to include this EAL under the Abnormal Radiation Levels/Radiological Effluent Recognition Category for Salem due to the indications for classification of the EAL being based on dose rates. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, and logical progression for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Salem. 3.4 Recognition Category 'F' -Fission Product Barrier Matrix 3.4.1 EAL Set FA1/FS1/FG1 [FA1/FS1/FG1] The intent of this EAL set is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared upon a loss or potential loss of one or more fission product barriers. This EAL set uses plant condition based thresholds as triggers within a particular logic configuration needed to reflect a loss or potential loss of a fission product barrier. Non-passive, large light water reactors in the United States have three fission product barriers: fuel cladding, the RCS, and primary containment. Licensees are to develop thresholds that provide EAL decisionmakers' input into making an event declaration based upon degradation of one or more of these fission product barriers. There are numerous triggers used as logic inputs to decide on the appropriate classification based upon the number of loss and/or potential loss indicators that are triggered for each barrier. By design, these indicators are redundant with other similar indicators in Recognition Categories 'R' and 'S.'

-13 -The NRC staff verified that the logic used to determine the appropriate emergency classification is consistent with the generic EAL scheme development guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6. The progression from an Alert to a GE classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

• FA1 -Any Loss or any Potential Loss of either the Fuel Clad or RCS barrier.

• FS 1 -Loss or Potential Loss of any two barriers.

• FG1 -Loss of any two barriers and Loss or Potential Loss of the third barrier. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, ease of upgrading/downgrading, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Salem. 3.5 Recognition Category 'H' -Hazards 3.5.1 EAL Set HU1/HA1/HS1 [HU1/HA1/HS1/HG1] The intent of this EAL set is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared based upon a security-related event. This EAL set was developed in accordance with the guidance from NRC Bulletin 2005-02 and RIS 2006-12 for licensees to implement, regardless of the specific version of the generic EAL scheme development guidance used, or if the particular licensee developed its EAL scheme using an alternative approach. Based upon lessons learned from the implementation and use of this EAL set, particularly the insights gained from combined security and emergency preparedness drills, PSEG is proposing not to develop EAL [HG1] for Salem. A hostile action resulting in physical loss of physical control of the facility such that releases can reasonably be expected to exceed EPA PAG exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate area will be bound by the [HG?] ECL criteria. Additionally, any event that could result in a radiological release in excess of EPA PAGs would be bound by [AG1] or [AG2]. The NRC staff verified that Salem EALs RG1, RG2, and HG? are developed as endorsed and, therefore, bound the events of concern for EAL [HG1]. The NRC staff also verified that the progression from a UE to a GE classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

-14 -* HU1 -This EAL addresses events that pose a threat to plant personnel or safety system equipment.

• HA 1 -This EAL addresses the occurrence of a hostile action within the owner controlled area or notification of an aircraft attack threat.

• HS1 -This EAL addresses the occurrence of a hostile action within the protected area. The NRC staff verified that this EAL set is consistent with the guidance provided in NRC Bulletin 2005-02 and RIS 2006-12, as further enhanced by the lessons learned from implementation and drills and revised in NEI 99-01, Revision 6. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, and ease of upgrading/downgrading for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Salem. 3.5.2 EAL HU2 (HU2] The intent of this EAL is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared based upon a seismic event that results in accelerations at the plant site greater than specified for an operating basis earthquake. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and OROs are aware of the earthquake magnitude at the plant site and that post-event damage assessments are promptly implemented. This EAL is considered part of an EAL set containing EALs CA6 and SA9, depending on the operating mode applicable at the time of the event. Indications of earthquake-induced damag~ to components containing radioactive materials are bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as EALs RS1 or RG1. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b}(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications.

-15 -Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Salem. 3.5.3 EAL HU3 [HU3] The intent of this EAL is to ensure an emergency classification is declared based upon the effects that natural or technological hazard events may have on the facility that are considered to be precursors to a more significant event or condition or have potential impacts that warrant emergency notification to local, State, and Federal authorities. Specific hazards addressed include:

• Tornado strike within the protected area;

• Internal room or area flooding requiring electrical isolation of a safety system component;

• Movement in the protected area impeded by an offsite event (gaseous);

• An external event that prohibits the plant staff from accessing the site; and

• Other site-specific events. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and OROs are aware of the hazardous event affecting the plant site and that post-event damage assessments are promptly implemented. In addition, other events that may impact the effective implementation of the site emergency plan are considered. This EAL is considered part of an EAL set containing EALs CA6 and SA9, depending on the operating mode applicable at the time of the event. Indications of hazard-induced damage to components containing radioactive materials are bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as EALs RA1, RS1, or RG1. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, and logical progression for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 1 O CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Salem. 3.5.4 EAL HU4 [HU4] The intent of this EAL is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared based upon the effect that a fire may have on the facility, which would be indicative of a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and OROs are aware of the fire and that post-event damage assessments are promptly

-16 -implemented. This EAL is considered part of an EAL set containing EALs CA6 and SA9, depending on the operating mode applicable at the time of the event. Indications of a protracted fire involving radioactive materials are bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as EALs RS1 and RG1. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, and logical progression for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Salem. 3.5.5 EAL HAS (HAS] The intent of this EAL is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared based upon the effect that toxic, corrosive, asphyxiating, or flammable gases may have on the facility, which precludes or impedes access to equipment necessary to maintain normal plant operation or is required for a normal plant cooldown and shutdown. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that the plant ERO is activated to support the control room in removing the impediment to normal access to the affected area or room. Indications of a protracted loss of access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown, or shutdown are bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as EALs RS1 and RG1. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and formatting for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Salem.

-17 -3.5.6 EAL Set HA6/HS6 (HA6/HS6] The intent of this EAL set is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared based upon a control room evacuation with the inability to control critical plant systems remotely. The NRC staff verified that the progression from an Alert to an SAE classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The GE classification level for this specific accident progression is bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as EAL RG1.

• HA6 -This EAL addresses an evacuation of the control room that results in transfer of plant control to alternate locations outside the control room.

• HS6 -This EAL addresses an evacuation of the control room that results in transfer of plant control to alternate locations, and the control of a key safety function cannot be reestablished in a timely manner. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, and ease of upgrading/downgrading for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Salem. 3.5.7 EAL Set HU7/HA7/HS7/HG7 (HU7/HA7/HS7/HG7] The intent of this EAL set is to provide decisionmakers with an escalating emergency classification to consider when, in their judgment, entry into the site's emergency plan and mobilization of PSEG's ERO and the ORO is warranted. The NRC staff verified that the progression from a UE to a GE classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

• HU? -This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist that are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for a UE.

• HA? -This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist that are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for an Alert.

-18 -* HS? -This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist that are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for an SAE.

• HG? -This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist that are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for a GE. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, and ease of upgrading/downgrading for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Salem. 3.6 Recognition Category '[SJ' -System Malfunction 3.6.1 EAL Set SU1/SA1/SS1/SG1 [SU1/SA1/SS1/SG11 The intent of this EAL set is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared based upon a loss of available AC power sources to the emergency buses. The NRC staff reviewed PSEG's evaluation and justification for plant-specific changes associated with this EAL set and verified that the progression from a UE to a GE classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

• SU1 -This EAL addresses a prolonged loss of offsite power.

• SA 1 -This EAL describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources such that any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to safety systems.

• SS1 -This EAL addresses a total loss of AC power that compromises the performance of all safety systems requiring electric power, including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal, and the ultimate heat sink.

• SG1 -This EAL addresses a prolonged loss of all power sources to AC emergency buses. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing,

-19 -formatting, logical progression, ease of upgrading/downgrading, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Salem. 3.6.2 EAL Set SU3/SA3 [SU2/SA2j The intent of this EAL set is to ensure that an emergency declaration is declared based upon the effect that a loss of available indicators in the control room has on the facility. The NRC staff verified that the progression from a UE to an Alert classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The SAE and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as EALs RS1 and RG1.

• SU3 -This EAL addresses the difficulty associated with monitoring normal plant conditions without the ability to obtain safety system parameters from within the control room.

• SA3 -This EAL addresses the difficulty associated with monitoring rapidly changing plant conditions during a transient without the ability to obtain safety system parameters from within the control room. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, ease of upgrading/downgrading, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 1 O CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Salem. *

-20 -3.6.3 EAL SU4 [SU3] The intent of this EAL is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared when RCS activity is greater than the Salem technical specification allowable limits. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members are aware of the elevated reactor coolant activity and support the control room in implementation of appropriate response measures. Escalation of the emergency classification is bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as EALs RA 1, RS 1, and RG1. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.4 7(b )( 4 ). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Salem. 3.6.4 EAL SU5 [SU4] The intent of this EAL is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared when the plant has indications of RCS leakage. By design, the indications for this EAL are redundant to corresponding indicators for a loss or potential loss of fission product barriers, as well as radiation monitoring, to ensure reactor and/or fission product barrier events are recognized. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members are aware of the RCS leakage and support the control room in implementation of appropriate response measures. Escalation of the emergency classification is bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as EALs RA1, RS1, and RG1. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in

-21 -Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Salem. 3.6.5 EAL Set SU6/SA6/SS6 [SU5/SA5/SS5] The intent of this EAL set is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared based upon the effect that a failure of the reactor protection system (RPS) may have on the plant. The NRC staff verified that the progression from a UE to an SAE classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The GE classification level for this event is bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as EAL RG1.

• SU6 -This EAL addresses an event where the RPS fails to automatically shut down the reactor when required, yet the reactor is successfully shut down by taking manual action( s) at the reactor control consoles.

• SA6 -This EAL addresses an event where the RPS fails to automatically shut down the reactor when required and operator actions taken at the reactor control consoles to manually shut down the reactor are unsuccessful.

• SS6 -This EAL addresses an event where the RPS fails to automatically shut down the reactor when required, all operator actions to manually shut down the reactor are unsuccessful, and continued power generation is challenging the capability to adequately remove heat from the core, the RCS, or both. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, ease of upgrading/downgrading, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Salem. 3.6.6 EAL SU? [SU6] The intent of this EAL is to highlight the importance of emergency communications by ensuring that an emergency classification is declared if normal communication methods for onsite and offsite personnel, or with OROs including the NRC, are lost. It is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and OROs are aware of the loss of communications capabilities, the resources necessary to restore communications are mobilized, and compensatory measures are promptly implemented. The NRC staff verified that no escalation path is necessary for this EAL.

-22 -The communication methods derived for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, and logical progression for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Salem. 3.6. 7 EAL SU8 [SU?] The intent of this EAL is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared when the plant has indications of containment barrier degradation. It also addresses an event that results in high containment pressure with a concurrent failure of containment pressure control systems. By design, the indications for this EAL are redundant to corresponding indicators from a loss or potential loss of fission product barriers, as well as radiation monitoring, to ensure reactor and/or fission product barrier events are recognized. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and OROs are aware of significant challenges to containment integrity, and compensatory measures are promptly implemented. The escalation of the emergency classification level is bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as EALs RA1, RS1, and RG1. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 1 O CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Salem.

-23 -3.6.8 EAL Set SS2.1/SG2.1 [SS8/SG8] The intent of this EAL set is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared when a loss of DC power occurs, as this condition compromises the ability of PSEG to monitor and control the removal of decay heat. The NRC staff verified that the progression from an SAE to a GE classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

• SS2.1 -This EAL addresses a loss of vital DC power, which compromises the ability to monitor and control safety systems.

• SG2.1 -This EAL addresses a concurrent and prolonged loss of both AC and vital DC power. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, ease of upgrading/downgrading, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Salem. 3.6.9 EAL SA9 [SA9] The intent of this EAL is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared when a hazardous event leads to potential damage to safety systems needed for the current operating mode. The hazardous events of interest include, but are not limited to, an earthquake, flooding, high winds, tornado strike, explosion, fire, or any other hazard applicable for Salem. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that the plant ERO is activated to support the control room in understanding the event impacts and restoring affected safety system equipment to service. Indications of hazard-induced damage to components containing radioactive materials are bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as EALs RS1 and RG1. As described in NUREG 0654/FEMA REP 1, Revision 1, and the endorsed guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, an Alert Class exists when "[e]vents are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels." The endorsed guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, is intended to ensure that an Alert should be declared only when an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant has occurred as a result of a hazardous event. However, there may be cases where a hazardous event only causes damage to a single safety system component or a

-24 -single safety system train. Additionally, an Alert classification should not be made if the damage from the hazardous event is limited to a safety system component or a safety system train that was inoperable or out of service prior to the event occurring. PSEG proposed that an Alert classification will be made when a hazardous event results in indications of degraded performance to one train of a safety system with either indications of degraded performance on a second safety system train or visible damage to a second safety system train, such that the operability or reliability of the second safety system train is a concern. Although different from the endorsed guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, this change is acceptable since it meets the intent of the NEI guidance by ensuring that an Alert is declared only when an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant has occurred as a result of a hazardous event. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Salem. 3.7 Salem Generating Station EAL Scheme Change Review Summary The NRC staff has reviewed the technical bases for the proposed Salem EAL scheme, the modifications from NEI 99-01, Revision 6, and PSEG's evaluation of the proposed changes. PSEG chose to modify its proposed EAL scheme from the generic EAL scheme development guidance provided in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, in order to adopt a format that is better aligned with how it currently implements its Salem EALs, as well as with Salem-specific writer's guides and preferences. The NRC staff verified that these modifications do not alter the intent of any specific EAL within a set, recognition category, or within the entire EAL scheme described in NEI 99-01, Revision 6. Thus, the proposed changes meet the requirements in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). The NRC staff determined that the proposed Salem EAL scheme uses objective and observable values, is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, follows logical progressions for escalating events, and allows for event downgrading and upgrading based upon the potential risk to the public health and safety. Risk assessments were appropriately used to set the boundaries of the emergency classification levels and ensure that all EALs that trigger an emergency classification are in the same range of relative risk. In addition, the NRC staff determined that the proposed EAL scheme is technically complete and consistent with EAL schemes implemented at similarly designed plants.

-25 -The NRC staff verified that the instrumentation and setpoints derived for this proposed EAL scheme are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the Salem-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme. Based on its review, the NRC staff finds that PSEG's proposed EAL scheme is acceptable and provides reasonable assurance that PSEG can and will take adequate protective measures in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, the staff concludes that PSEG's proposed EAL scheme and site-specific EAL technical basis document provided by letter dated August 11, 2017, is acceptable for implementation at Salem. 4.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION FOR HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION 4.1 Recognition Category 'R' -Abnormal Radiological Release/Radiological Effluent 4.1.1 EAL Set RU1/RA1/RS1/RG1 [AU1/M1/AS1/AG1] The intent of this EAL set is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared upon plant-specific indications of a release of radioactivity (gaseous and/or liquid). In recognition of the lower possible radioactivity concentrations, the assessment of liquid releases is limited to the UE and Alert classification levels. The set provides for accident assessments using precalculated values based on assumed conditions, real-time parameters, and field monitoring results. The NRC staff verified that the progression from a UE to a GE classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

• RU1 -This EAL addresses a potential decrease in the level of safety of the plant as indicated by a low-level radiological release that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extended period of time (e.g., an uncontrolled release).

• RA 1 -This EAL addresses a release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to 1 percent of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs) (Reference 11 ).

• RS1 -This initiating condition addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to 10 percent of the EPA PAGs.

• RG1 -This initiating condition addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to the EPA PAGs. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, ease of upgrading/downgrading, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications.

-26 -Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.1.2 EAL Set RU2/RA2/RS2/RG2 [AU2/AA2/AS2/AG2] The intent of this EAL set is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared upon plant-specific indications of potential or actual damage to an irradiated fuel assembly or multiple assemblies. It addresses a lowering of water level over irradiated fuel or fuel uncovery (i.e., level below the top of the fuel), a spectrum of fuel handling accidents that results in mechanical damage to irradiated fuel (e.g., a dropped fuel assembly), and NRC Order EA-12-051, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation," dated March 12, 2012 (Reference 12). The NRC staff has verified that the progression from a UE to a GE classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

• RU2 -This EAL addresses a decrease in water level above irradiated fuel sufficient to cause elevated radiation levels.

• RA2 -This EAL addresses events that have caused imminent or actual damage to an irradiated fuel assembly or a significant lowering of water level within the spent fuel pool.

• RS2 -This EAL addresses a significant loss of spent fuel pool inventory control and makeup capability leading to imminent fuel damage and addresses NRC Order EA-12-051.

• RG2 -This EAL addresses a significant loss of spent fuel pool inventory control and makeup capability leading to a prolonged uncovery of spent fuel and addresses NRC Order EA-12-051. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, ease of upgrading or downgrading, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Hope Creek.

-27 -4.1.3 EAL RA3 (AA3] The intent of this EAL is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared when elevated radiation levels in certain plant rooms and areas preclude or impede personnel from performing actions necessary to maintain normal plant operation or to perform a normal plant cooldown and shutdown. This includes equipment in the control room and the central alarm station. The Alert classification level is primarily intended to ensure that the plant ERO is activated to support the control room in removing the impediment to normal access, as well as assisting in quantifying potential damage to the fuel. Indications of increasing radiation levels in the plant are bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as RS1 and RG1. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.2 Recognition Category 'C' -Cold Shutdown/Refueling System Malfunction 4.2.1 EAL Set CU1/CA1/CS1/CG1 (CU1/CA1/CS1/CG1] The intent of this EAL is to ensure an emergency classification is declared upon a loss of reactor pressure vessel inventory and/or RCS leakage. The NRC staff verified that the progression from a UE to a GE classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

• CU1 -This EAL addresses the inability to restore and maintain water level to a required minimum level (or the lower limit of a level band), or a loss of the ability to monitor reactor vessel/RCS level concurrent with indications of coolant leakage.

• CA 1 -This EAL addresses conditions that are precursors to a loss of the ability to adequately cool irradiated fuel (i.e., a precursor to a challenge to the fuel clad barrier).

• CS1 -This EAL addresses a significant and prolonged loss of reactor vessel/RCS inventory control and makeup capability leading to imminent fuel damage.

• CG1 -This EAL addresses the inability to restore and maintain reactor vessel level above the top of active fuel with containment challenged. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development

-28 -guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, ease of upgrading/downgrading, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.2.2 EAL Set CU2/CA2 [CU2/CA2] The intent of this EAL set is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared upon a loss of available AC power to emergency power electrical buses. The NRC staff verified that the progression from a UE to an Alert classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The SAE and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by EALs RS1 and RG1.

• CU2 -This EAL describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources such that any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to safety systems.

• CA2 -This EAL addresses a total loss of AC power that compromises the performance of all safety systems requiring electric power, including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal, and the ultimate heat sink. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, and ease of upgrading/downgrading for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Hope Creek.

-29 -4.2.3 EAL Set CU3/CA3 [CU3/CA3] The intent of this EAL set is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared based on the inability to maintain control of decay heat removal. The NRC staff verified that the progression from a UE to an Alert classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The SAE and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by EALs RS1 and RG1.

• CU3 -This EAL addresses an unplanned increase in RCS temperature above the Hope Creek technical specification cold shutdown temperature limit or the inability to determine RCS temperature and level.

• CA3 -This EAL addresses conditions involving a loss of decay heat removal capability or an addition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, and ease of upgrading/downgrading for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.2.4 EAL CU4 [CU4] The intent of this EAL is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared upon a loss of vital DC power, which compromises the ability to monitor and control operable safety systems when the plant is in the cold shutdown or refueling mode. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and OROs are aware of the event, resources necessary to respond to the event are mobilized, and any necessary compensatory measures are promptly implemented. The Alert, SAE, and GE classification levels for a protracted loss of vital DC power are bounded by EALs CA1, CA3, CS1, CG1, RA1, RS1, and RG1. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, formatting, logical progression, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this

-30 -classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.2.5 EAL CU5 (CU5] The intent of this EAL is to highlight the importance of emergency communications by ensuring that an EAL is declared if normal communication methods for onsite and offsite personnel, or with OROs, including the NRC, are lost. It is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and OROs are aware of the loss of communications capabilities, the resources necessary to restore communications are mobilized, and compensatory measures are promptly implemented. The NRC staff verified that no escalation path is necessary for this EAL. The communication methods derived for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, and logical progression for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.2.6 EAL CA6 (CA6] The intent of this EAL is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared when hazardous events lead to potential damage to safety systems. The hazardous events of interest include, but are not limited to, an earthquake, flooding, high winds, tornado strike, explosion, fire, or any other hazard applicable for the site. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that the plant ERO is activated to support the control room in understanding the event impacts and restoring affected safety system equipment to service. Indications of hazard-induced damage to components containing radioactive materials are bounded by EALs CS1, CG1, RS1, and RG1. As described in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, and the endorsed guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, an Alert Class exists when "fe]vents are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels." The endorsed guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, is intended to ensure that an Alert should be declared only when an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level

-31 -of safety of the plant has occurred as a result of a hazardous event. However, there may be cases where a hazardous event only causes damage to a single safety system component or a single safety system train. Additionally, an Alert classification should not be made if the damage from the hazardous event is limited to a safety system component or a safety system train that was inoperable or out of service prior to the event occurring. PSEG is proposing that an Alert classification will be made when a hazardous event results in indications of degraded performance to one train of a safety system with either indications of degraded performance on a second safety system train or visible damage to a second safety system train, such that the operability or reliability of the second safety system train is a concern. Although different from the endorsed guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, this change is acceptable, considering that the endorsed guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, is intended to ensure that an Alert should be declared only when an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant has occurred as a result of a hazardous event. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, and logical progression for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.3 Recognition Category 'E' -Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation 4.3.1 EAL RU4.1 [E-HU1) This EAL applies to an event that results in damage to the confinement boundary of a storage cask containing irradiated fuel, regardless of the cause. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and OROs are aware of the cask damage resources necessary to respond to the event are mobilized, and protective measures, if warranted, are promptly implemented. PSEG elected to include this EAL under the Abnormal Radiation Levels/Radiological Effluent Recognition Category for Hope Creek due to the indications for classification of the EAL being based on dose rates. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, and logical progression for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and

-32 -user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.4 Recognition Category 'F' -Fission Product Barrier Matrix 4.4.1 EAL Set FA1/FS1/FG1 [FA1/FS1/FG1) The intent of this EAL set is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared upon a loss or potential loss of one or more fission product barriers. This EAL set uses plant condition based thresholds as triggers within a particular logic configuration needed to reflect a loss or potential loss of a fission product barrier. Non-passive, large light water reactors in the United States have three fission product barriers: fuel cladding, the RCS, and primary containment. Licensees are to develop thresholds that provide EAL decisionmakers' input into making an event declaration based upon degradation of one or more of these fission product barriers. There are numerous triggers used as logic inputs to decide on the appropriate classification based upon the number of loss and/or potential loss indicators that are triggered for each barrier. By design, these indicators are redundant with other similar indicators in Recognition Categories 'R' and 'S.' The NRC staff verified that the logic used to determine the appropriate emergency classification is consistent with the generic EAL scheme development guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6. The progression from an Alert to a GE classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

• FA 1 -Any loss or any potential loss of either the fuel clad or RCS barrier

• FS 1 -Loss or potential loss of any two barriers

• FG1 -Loss of any two barriers and loss or potential loss of the third barrier PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, ease of upgrading/downgrading, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications.

-33 -Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.5 Recognition Category 'H' -Hazards 4.5.1 EAL Set HU1/HA1/HS1 [HU1/HA1/HS1/HG1] The intent of this EAL set is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared based upon a security-related event. This EAL set was developed in accordance with the guidance from NRC Bulletin 2005-02 and RIS 2006-12 for licensees to implement, regardless of the specific version of the generic EAL scheme development guidance used, or if the particular licensee developed its EAL scheme using an alternative approach. Based upon lessons learned from the implementation and use of this EAL set, particularly the insights gained from combined security and emergency preparedness drills, PSEG is proposing not to develop EAL [HG1] for Hope Creek. A Hostile Action resulting in physical loss of physical control of the facility such that releases can reasonably be expected to exceed EPA PAG exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate area will be bound by the [HG?] ECL criteria. Additionally, any event that could result in a radiological release in excess of EPA PAGs would be bound by [AG1] or [AG2]. The NRC staff verified that Hope Creek EALs RG1, RG2, and HG? are developed as endorsed and, therefore, bound the events of concern for EAL [HG1]. The NRC staff also verified that the progression from a UE to a GE classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

• HU1 -This EAL addresses events that pose a threat to plant personnel or safety system equipment.

• HA 1 -This EAL addresses the occurrence of a hostile action within the owner controlled area or notification of an aircraft attack threat.

• HS 1 -This EAL addresses the occurrence of a hostile action within the Protected Area. The NRC staff verified that this EAL set is consistent with the guidance provided in NRC Bulletin 2005-02 and RIS 2006-12, as further enhanced by the lessons learned from implementation and drills and revised in NEI 99-01, Revision 6. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, and ease of upgrading/downgrading for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications.

-34 -Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.5.2 EAL HU2 [HU2] The intent of this EAL is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared based upon a seismic event that results in accelerations at the plant site greater than specified for an operating basis earthquake. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and OROs are aware of the earthquake magnitude at the plant site and that post-event damage assessments are promptly implemented. This EAL is considered part of an EAL set containing EALs CA6 and SA9, depending on the operating mode applicable at the time of the event. Indications of earthquake-induced damage to components containing radioactive materials are bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as EALs RS1 or RG1. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.5.3 EAL HU3 [HU3] The intent of this EAL is to ensure an emergency classification is declared based upon the effects that natural or technological hazard events may have on the facility that are considered to be precursors to a more significant event or condition or have potential impacts that warrant emergency notification to local, State, and Federal authorities. Specific hazards addressed include:

• Tornado strike within the protected area;

• Internal room or area flooding requiring electrical isolation of a safety system component;

• Movement in the protected area impeded by an offsite event (gaseous);

• An external event that prohibits the plant staff from accessing the site, and

• Other site-specific events. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and OROs are aware of the hazardous event affecting the plant site and that post-event damage assessments are promptly

-35 -implemented. In addition, other events that may impact the effective implementation of the site emergency plan are considered. This EAL is considered part of an EAL set containing EALs CA6 and SA9, depending on the operating mode applicable at the time of the event. Indications of hazard-induced damage to components containing radioactive materials are bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as EALs RA1, RS1, or RG1. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, and logical progression for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.5.4 EAL HU4 [HU4] The intent of this EAL is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared based upon the effect that a fire may have on the facility, which would be indicative of a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and OROs are aware of the fire and that post-event damage assessments are promptly implemented. This EAL is considered part of an EAL set containing EALs CA6 and SA9, depending on the operating mode applicable at the time of the event. Indications of a protracted fire involving radioactive materials are bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as EALs RS1 and RG1. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, and logical progression for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of

-36 -Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.5.5 EAL HAS [HAS] The intent of this EAL is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared based upon the effect that toxic, corrosive, asphyxiating, or flammable gases may have on the facility, which precludes or impedes access to equipment necessary to maintain normal plant operation or is required for a normal plant cooldown and shutdown. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that the plant ERO is activated to support the control room in removing the impediment to normal access to the affected area or room. Indications of a protracted loss of access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown, or shutdown are bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as EALs RS1 and RG1. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, and formatting for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.5.6 EAL Set HA6/HS6 [HA6/HS6] The intent of this EAL set is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared based upon a control room evacuation with the inability to control critical plant systems remotely. The NRC staff verified that the progression from an Alert to an SAE classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The GE classification level for this specific accident progression is bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as EAL RG1.

• HA6 -This EAL addresses an evacuation of the control room that results in transfer of plant control to alternate locations outside the control room.

• HS6 -This EAL addresses an evacuation of the control room that results in transfer of plant control to alternate locations, and the control of a key safety function cannot be reestablished in a timely manner. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, and ease of upgrading/downgrading for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and

-37 -are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.5.7 EAL Set HU7/HA7/HS7/HG7 [HU7/HA7/HS7/HG7] The intent of this EAL set is to provide decisionmakers with an escalating emergency classification to consider when, in their judgment, entry into the site's emergency plan and mobilization of PSEG's ERO and ORO is warranted. The NRC staff verified that the progression from a UE to a GE classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

• HU? -This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist that are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for a UE.

• HA? -This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist that are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for an Alert.

• HS? -This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist that are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for an SAE.

• HG? -This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist that are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for a GE. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, and ease of upgrading/downgrading for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in

-38 -Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.6 Recognition Category '[SJ' -System Malfunction 4.6.1 EAL Set SU1/SA1/SS1/SG1 [SU1/SA1/SS1/SG1] The intent of this EAL set is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared based upon a loss of available AC power sources to the emergency buses. The NRC staff reviewed PSEG's evaluation and justification for plant-specific changes associated with this EAL set and verified that the progression from a UE to a GE classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

• SU1 -This EAL addresses a prolonged loss of offsite power.

• SA 1 -This EAL describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources such that any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to safety systems.

• SS1 -This EAL addresses a total loss of AC power that compromises the performance of all safety systems requiring electric power, including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal, and the ultimate heat sink.

• SG1 -This EAL addresses a prolonged loss of all power sources to AC emergency buses. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, ease of upgrading/downgrading, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.6.2 EAL Set SU3/SA3 [SU2/SA2] The intent of this EAL set is to ensure that an emergency declaration is declared based upon the effect that a loss of available indicators in the control room has on the facility. The NRC staff verified that the progression from a UE to an Alert classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The SAE and GE

-39 -classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as EALs RS1 and RG1.

• SU3 -This EAL addresses the difficulty associated with monitoring normal plant conditions without the ability to obtain safety system parameters from within the control room.

• SA3 -This EAL addresses the difficulty associated with monitoring rapidly changing plant conditions during a transient without the ability to obtain safety system parameters from within the control room. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, ease of upgrading/downgrading, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.6.3 EAL SU4 [SU3] The intent of this EAL is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared when RCS activity is greater than Hope Creek technical specification allowable limits. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members are aware of the elevated reactor coolant activity and support the control room in implementation of appropriate response measures. Escalation of the emergency classification is bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as EALs RA 1, RS1, and RG1. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in

-40 -Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.6.4 EAL SUS [SU4] The intent of this EAL is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared. when the plant has indications of RCS leakage. By design, the indications for this EAL are redundant to corresponding indicators for a loss or potential loss of fission product barriers, as well as radiation monitoring, to ensure reactor and/or fission product barrier events are recognized. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members are aware of the RCS leakage and support the control room in implementation of appropriate response measures. Escalation of the emergency classification is bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as EALs RA 1, RS 1, and RG1. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 1 O CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.6.5 EAL Set SU6/SA6/SS6 [SU5/SA5/SS5] The intent of this EAL set is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared based upon the effect that a failure of the RPS may have on the plant. The NRC staff verified that the progression from a UE to an SAE classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The GE classification level for this event is bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as EAL RG1.

• SU6 -This EAL addresses an event where the RPS fails to automatically shut down the reactor when required, yet the reactor is successfully shut down by taking manual action(s) at the reactor control consoles.

• SA6 -This EAL addresses an event where the RPS fails to automatically shut down the reactor when required and operator actions taken at the reactor control consoles to manually shut down the reactor are unsuccessful.

• SS6 -This EAL addresses an event where the RPS fails to automatically shut down the reactor when required, all operator actions to manually shut down the reactor are

-41 -unsuccessful, and continued power generation is challenging the capability to adequately remove heat from the core, the RCS, or both. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, ease of upgrading/downgrading, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.6.6 EAL SU? [SU6] The intent of this EAL is to highlight the importance of emergency communications by ensuring that an emergency classification is declared if normal communication methods for onsite and offsite personnel, or with OROs including the NRC, are lost. It is primarily intended to ensure that key ERO members and OROs are aware of the loss of communications capabilities, the resources necessary to restore communications are mobilized, and compensatory measures are promptly implemented. The NRC staff verified that no escalation path is necessary for this EAL. The communication methods derived for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, and logical progression for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Hope Creek.

-42 -4.6.7 EAL Set SS2.1/SG2.1 [SS8/SG8] The intent of this EAL set is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared when a loss of DC power occurs, as this condition compromises the ability of the licensee to monitor and control the removal of decay heat. The NRC staff verified that the progression from an SAE to a GE classification level is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

• 882.1 -This EAL addresses a loss of vital DC power, which compromises the ability to monitor and control safety systems.

• SG2.1 -This EAL addresses a concurrent and prolonged loss of both AC and vital DC power. PSEG chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, ease of upgrading/downgrading, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL set is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for each classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL set acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.6.8 EAL SA8 [SA9] The intent of this EAL is to ensure that an emergency classification is declared when a hazardous event leads to potential damage to safety systems needed for the current operating mode. The hazardous events of interest include, but are not limited to, an earthquake, flooding, high winds, tornado strike, explosion, fire, or any other hazard applicable for Hope Creek. This EAL is primarily intended to ensure that the plant ERO is activated to support the control room in understanding the event impacts and restoring affected safety system equipment to service. Indications of hazard-induced damage to components containing radioactive materials are bounded by Recognition Category 'F,' as well as EALs RS1 and RG1. As described in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, and the endorsed guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, an Alert Class exists when "[e]vents are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels." The endorsed guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, is intended to ensure that an Alert should be declared only when an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant has occurred as a result of a hazardous event. However, there may be cases where a hazardous event only causes damage to a single safety system component or a

-43 -single safety system train. Additionally, an Alert classification should not be made if the damage from the hazardous event is limited to a safety system component or a safety system train that was inoperable or out of service prior to the event occurring. PSEG proposed that an Alert classification will be made when a hazardous event results in indications of degraded performance to one train of a safety system with either indications of degraded performance on a second safety system train or visible damage to a second safety system train, such that the operability or reliability of the second safety system train is a concern. Although different from the endorsed guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, this change is acceptable since it meets the intent of the NEI guidance by ensuring that an Alert is declared only when an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant has occurred as a result of a hazardous event. PSEG chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff verified that the numbering, sequencing, formatting, logical progression, and instrumentation and setpoints for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are, therefore, consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC staff also verified that the EAL is worded in an unambiguous manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, is technically complete for this classification level, addresses completeness and accuracy issues raised in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, and uses objective and observable values based on site-specific indications. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme (identified in Section 2.3 above) and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this EAL acceptable for Hope Creek. 4.7 Hope Creek Generating Station EAL Scheme Change Review Summary The NRC staff has reviewed the technical bases for the proposed Hope Creek EAL scheme, the modifications from NEI 99-01, Revision 6, and PSEG's evaluation of the proposed changes. PSEG chose to modify its proposed EAL scheme from the generic EAL scheme development guidance provided in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, in order to adopt a format that is better aligned with how it currently implements its EALs, as well as with plant-specific writer's guides and preferences. The NRC staff verified that these modifications do not alter the intent of any specific EALs within a set, recognition category, or within the entire EAL scheme described in NEI 99-01, Revision 6. Thus, the proposed changes meet the requirements in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). The NRC staff determined that the proposed Hope Creek EAL scheme uses objective and observable values, is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user-friendliness concerns, follows logical progressions for escalating events, and allows for event downgrading and upgrading based upon the potential risk to the public health and safety. Risk assessments were appropriately used to set the boundaries of the emergency classification levels and ensure that all EALs that trigger an emergency classification are in the same range of relative risk. In addition, the NRC staff determined that the proposed Hope Creek EAL scheme

-44-is technically complete and consistent with EAL schemes implemented at similarly designed plants. The NRC staff verified that the instrumentation and setpoints derived for this proposed EAL scheme are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the Hope Creek-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme. Based on its review, the NRC staff finds that PSEG's proposed EAL scheme is acceptable and provides reasonable assurance that PSEG can and will take adequate protective measures in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, the staff concludes that PSEG's proposed EAL scheme and site-specific EAL technical basis document provided by letter dated August 11, 2017, is acceptable for implementation at Hope Creek. 5.0 ST ATE CONSULTATION In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New Jersey State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments on December 12, 2017. The State official had no comments. 6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION The amendments change requirements with respect to the use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding published in the Federal Register on March 28, 2017 (82 FR 15384 ). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments. 7.0 CONCLUSION The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. 8.0 REFERENCES 1. Letter from PSEG Nuclear LLC to NRC, re: Salem and Hope Creek, "Request to Adopt Emergency Action Level Scheme Pursuant to NEI 99-01, Revision 6, 'Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors,"' dated February 13, 2017 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Package Accession No. ML 17044A3476).

-45 -2. Letter from PSEG Nuclear LLC to NRC, re: Salem and Hope Creek, "Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request to Adopt Emergency Action Level Scheme Pursuant to NEI 99-01, Revision 6, "Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors," dated August 11, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 17223A721). 3. NEI 99-01, Revision 6, "Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors," dated November 2012 (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML 13091A209). 4. Thaggard, M., NRC, letter to Ms. Perkins-Grew, NEI, "U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Review and Endorsement of NEl-99-01, Revision 6, Dated November 2012," dated March 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 12346A463). 5. NRC Generic Letter 79-50, "Emergency Plans Submittal Dates," dated October 10, 1979 (ADAMS Accession No. ML031320278). 6. NRC and Federal Emergency Management Agency, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 1980 (ADAMS Accession No. ML040420012). 7. NRC, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors," Regulatory Guide 1.101, Revision 2 (dated October 1981), Revision 3 (dated August 1992), and Revision 4 (dated July 2003) (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML090440294, ML003740302, and ML032020276, respectively). 8. NRC Bulletin 2005-02, "Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events," dated July 18, 2005 (ADAMS Accession No. ML051740058). 9. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-12, "Endorsement of Nuclear Energy Institute Guidance 'Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Programs for Hostile Action,"' dated July 19, 2006 (ADAMS Accession No. ML072670421). 10. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2003-18, Revision 4, and Supplements 1 and 2, "Use of NEl-99-01, 'Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels,' dated January 2003," dated October 8, 2003; July 13, 2004; and December 12, 2005, respectively (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML032580518, ML041550395, and ML051450482, respectively). 11. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "PAG Manual: Protective Action Guides and Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents," dated January 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 17044A073). 12. Leeds, E. and Johnson, M., NRC, letter to All Power Reactor Licensees and Holders of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status, NRC Order EA-12-051, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Effective Immediately)," dated March 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 12056A044). Principal Contributor: Michael Wasem, NSIR Date: February 16, 2018 P. Sena, Ill -3 -SUBJECT: SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2, AND HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION -ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NOS. 322, 303, AND 210, TO ADOPT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL SCHEME PURSUANT TO NEI 99-01, REVISION 6, "DEVELOPMENT OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR NON-PASSIVE REACTORS" (CAC NOS. MF9268, MF9269, AND MF9270; EPID L-2017-LLA-0173) DATED FEBRUARY 16, 2018 DISTRIBUTION: PUBLIC RidsACRS_MailCTR Resource RidsNrrDssStsb Resource RidsRgn1 MailCenter Resource RidsNrrPMSalem Resource MWasem, NSIR RidsNrrOd Resource RidsNrrPMHopeCreek Resource RidsNrrDorlLpl1 Resource RidsNsirDpr Resource RidsNrrLALRonewicz Resource RidsNrrDorl Resource ADAMS Accession No.: ML 17355A570 *by e-mail memos dated 9/21/2017 and 10/4/2017 **by e-mail OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL 1 /PM NRR/DORL/LPL 1 /LA NSIR/MLB/BC* OGC-NLO** w/comments LRonewicz JAnderson NAME LRegner (w/BClayton peer DRoth review input) DATE 01/03/2018 02/02/2018 10/04/2017 01/26/2018 OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL 1 /BC NRR/DORL/D NRR/D(A) NRR/DORL/LPL 1/PM NAME JDanna JGiitter BHolian LRegner (KBrock for) (RLorson for) (MMarshall for) DATE 01/29/2018 02/01/2018 02/16/2018 02/16/2018 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY