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{{#Wiki_filter:UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA RESEARCH REACTOR | {{#Wiki_filter:UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA RESEARCH REACTOR | ||
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA RESEARCH REACTOR REACTOR OPERATIONS ANNUAL REPORT January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 INTRODUCTION The University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) is a multi-disciplinary research and education facility providing a broad range of analytical, materials science, and irradiation services to the research community and the commercial sector. Scientific programs include research in archaeometry, epidemiology, materials science, plant science, nuclear medicine, radiation effects, radioisotope studies, targeted radiotherapy, and nuclear engineering; as well as research techniques including neutron activation analysis, neutron scattering, and gamma-ray imaging. The heart of this facility is a pressurized, graphite and beryllium reflected, open pool-type, light water moderated and cooled, heterogeneous reactor designed for operation at a maximum steady-state power level of 10 Megawatts thermal | REACTOR OPERATIONS ANNUAL REPORT | ||
January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 | |||
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA RESEARCH REACTOR | |||
REACTOR OPERATIONS ANNUAL REPORT | |||
January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 | |||
INTRODUCTION | |||
The University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) is a multi-disciplinary research and education facility providing a broad range of analytical, materials science, and irradiation services to the research community and the commercial sector. Scientific programs include research in archaeometry, epidemiology, materials science, plant science, nuclear medicine, radiation effects, radioisotope studies, targeted radiotherapy, and nuclear engineering; as well as research techniques including neutron activation analysis, neutron scattering, and gamma-ray imaging. The heart of this facility is a pressurized, graphite and beryllium reflected, open pool-type, light water moderated and cooled, heterogeneous reactor designed for operation at a maximum steady-state power level of 10 Megawatts thermal | |||
- the highest-powered university-operated research reactor in the United States. | - the highest-powered university-operated research reactor in the United States. | ||
The Reactor Operations Annual Report presents a summary of reactor operating experience for calendar year 2021. | The Reactor Operations Annual Report presents a summary of reactor operating experience for calendar year 2021. | ||
Included within this report are changes to MURR Reactor Operations and Reactor Health Physics procedures, revisions to the Safety Analysis Report (SAR), facility modifications, new tests and experiments, reactor physics activities, and environmental and health physics data. | Included within this report are changes to MURR Reactor Operations and Reactor Health Physics procedures, revisions to the Safety Analysis Report (SAR), facility modifications, new tests and experiments, reactor physics activities, and environmental and health physics data. | ||
This report is being submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to meet the administrative requirements of MURR Technical Specification 6.6.e. | This report is being submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to meet the administrative requirements of MURR Technical Specification 6.6.e. | ||
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The success of MURR and its scientific programs is due to the dedication and hard work of many individuals and organizations. Included within this group are: the University of Missouri (MU) administration; the governing officials of the State of Missouri; the Missouri State Highway Patrol (MSHP); the City of Columbia Police Department (CPD); | |||
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS | |||
The success of MURR and its scientific programs is due to the dedication and hard work of many individuals and organizations. Included within this group are: the University of Missouri (MU) administration; the governing officials of the State of Missouri; the Missouri State Highway Patrol (MSHP); the City of Columbia Police Department (CPD); | |||
the University of Missouri Police Department (MUPD); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); our regulators; those who have provided funding, including the Department of Energy (DOE), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the NRC; Argonne National Laboratory (ANL); | the University of Missouri Police Department (MUPD); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); our regulators; those who have provided funding, including the Department of Energy (DOE), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the NRC; Argonne National Laboratory (ANL); | ||
Idaho National Laboratory (INL); Sandia National Laboratories (SNL); the researchers; the students; the Columbia Fire Department (CFD); the MU Campus Facilities organization; the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI); members of the National Organization of Test, Research and Training Reactors (TRTR); and many others who have made, and will continue to make, key contributions to our overall success. To these individuals and organizations, the staff of MURR wishes to extend its fondest appreciation. | Idaho National Laboratory (INL); Sandia National Laboratories (SNL); the researchers; the students; the Columbia Fire Department (CFD); the MU Campus Facilities organization; the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI); members of the National Organization of Test, Research and Training Reactors (TRTR); and many others who have made, and will continue to make, key contributions to our overall success. To these individuals and organizations, the staff of MURR wishes to extend its fondest appreciation. | ||
Some of the major facility projects that were supported by Reactor Operations during this past calendar year included: | Some of the major facility projects that were supported by Reactor Operations during this past calendar year included: | ||
(1) installing an uninterruptible power supply alternate source to inverter maintenance disconnect; (2) installing reactor plant LED status indicators and pushbuttons on the reactor control console; (3) removing, rebuilding, and reinstalling anti-siphon system isolation valves V543A and V543B; (4) transferring electrical power supply for the facility evacuation and containment isolation systems from the emergency electrical power system to the uninterruptible power supply system; (5) replacing the cabinet and solenoid-operated valves for the 16-inch ventilation exhaust system; (6) upgrading the facility evacuation and containment isolation system relays; (7) installing a variable i | (1) installing an uninterruptible power supply alternate source to inverter maintenance disconnect; (2) installing reactor plant LED status indicators and pushbuttons on the reactor control console; (3) removing, rebuilding, and reinstalling anti-siphon system isolation valves V543A and V543B; (4) transferring electrical power supply for the facility evacuation and containment isolation systems from the emergency electrical power system to the uninterruptible power supply system; (5) replacing the cabinet and solenoid-operated valves for the 16-inch ventilation exhaust system; (6) upgrading the facility evacuation and containment isolation system relays; (7) installing a variable | ||
i frequency drive on reactor containment building ventilation supply fan SF-2; (8) adding an approximately 1,600 ft2 expansion to the Shipping and Receiving Building; and (9) demolishing and renovating Rooms 231/231A to support a new radioisotope processing line. | |||
The facility continues to actively collaborate with the NNSA Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) | The facility continues to actively collaborate with the NNSA Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) | ||
Reactor Conversion Program and five other U.S. high-performance research and test reactor facilities, including one critical facility, that use highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to find a suitable low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel replacement. Although each one of the five high-performance reactors is responsible for its own feasibility and safety studies, regulatory interactions, fuel procurement, and conversion, there are common interests and activities among all five reactors that will benefit from a coordinated, working-group effort. This past year, work focused on: | Reactor Conversion Program and five other U.S. high-performance research and test reactor facilities, including one critical facility, that use highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to find a suitable low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel replacement. Although each one of the five high-performance reactors is responsible for its own feasibility and safety studies, regulatory interactions, fuel procurement, and conversion, there are common interests and activities among all five reactors that will benefit from a coordinated, working-group effort. This past year, work focused on: | ||
(1) LEU fuel element fabrication drawings and specifications; (2) the Design Demonstration Elements (DDE), one without uranium and one with uranium, that will be flow tested at the Oregon State University Hydro-Mechanical Fuel Testing Facility and inserted into an experimental position at the INL Advanced Test Reactor to achieve prototypic MURR operating conditions; (3) fuel specification impact assessment analyses; and (4) a technical report on preliminary shipping and backend information, which includes activities for analysis, licensing, and planning of fresh and spent LEU fuel element shipments and backend operations for receipt and storage of the spent nuclear fuel at DOE facilities, which is currently Savannah River Site. | (1) LEU fuel element fabrication drawings and specifications; (2) the Design Demonstration Elements (DDE), one without uranium and one with uranium, that will be flow tested at the Oregon State University Hydro-Mechanical Fuel Testing Facility and inserted into an experimental position at the INL Advanced Test Reactor to achieve prototypic MURR operating conditions; (3) fuel specification impact assessment analyses; and (4) a technical report on preliminary shipping and backend information, which includes activities for analysis, licensing, and planning of fresh and spent LEU fuel element shipments and backend operations for receipt and storage of the spent nuclear fuel at DOE facilities, which is currently Savannah River Site. | ||
Reactor Operations management also wishes to commend one individual who received their Reactor Operator certification and one individual who received their Senior Reactor Operator certification from the NRC. These individuals participated in a rigorous training program of classroom seminars, self-study, and on-the-job training. The results of this training are confident, well-versed, decisive individuals capable of performing the duties of licensed staff during normal and abnormal situations. | Reactor Operations management also wishes to commend one individual who received their Reactor Operator certification and one individual who received their Senior Reactor Operator certification from the NRC. These individuals participated in a rigorous training program of classroom seminars, self-study, and on-the-job training. The results of this training are confident, well-versed, decisive individuals capable of performing the duties of licensed staff during normal and abnormal situations. | ||
TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title | ii TABLE OF CONTENTS | ||
Section Title Pages | |||
I. Reactor Operations Summary............................................................................................... I -1 through 7 | |||
II. MURR Procedures............................................................................................................... II-1 through 5 A. Changes to Reactor Operations Procedures B. Changes to Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures C. Changes to Radiological Control, Byproduct Material Shipping, and Preparation of Byproduct Material for Shipping Procedures | |||
III. Revisions to the Safety Analysis Report............................................................................ III-1 through 2 | |||
IV. Plant and System Modifications......................................................................................... IV -1 through 5 | |||
V. New Tests and Experiments................................................................................................................. V-1 | |||
VI. Special Nuclear Material and Reactor Physics Activities.................................................................. VI-1 | |||
VII. Radioactive Effluent.......................................................................................................... VII-1 through 2 Table 1 - Sanitary Sewer Effluent Table 2 - Stack Effluent | |||
VIII. Environmental Monitoring and Health Physics Surveys................................................. VIII-1 through 6 Table 1 - Summary of Environmental Set 99 - Spring 2021 Table 2 - Summary of Environmental Set 100 - Fall 2021 Table 3 - Environmental TLD Summary Table 4 - Number of Facility Radiation and Contamination Surveys | |||
SECTION I REACTOR OPERATIONS | IX. Summary of Radiation Exposure to Facility Staff, Experimenters, and Visitors............................... IX-1 | ||
iii SECTION I | |||
REACTOR OPERATIONS | |||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 | |||
The following table and discussion summarize reactor operations during calendar year 2021. | |||
Month Full Power Hours Megawatt Days Full Power Full Power | |||
(% of total time) (% of scheduled*) | |||
January 681.34 283.94 91.6 102.5 February 602.71 251.23 89.7 100.5 March 653.48 272.36 87.8 98.3 April 563.24 234.77 78.2 87.7 May 662.00 275.93 89.0 99.6 June 655.80 273.33 91.1 102.1 July 682.55 284.45 91.7 102.7 August 656.29 273.56 88.2 98.8 September 655.59 274.06 91.1 102.1 October 669.15 278.87 89.9 100.7 November 614.26 256.11 85.3 95.7 December 622.35 259.40 83.6 93.7 | |||
Total for the Year 7,718.76 3,218.01 88.11 98.71 | |||
* MURR is scheduled to average at least 150 hours of full power operation per week. Total time is the number of hours in the month or year listed. | |||
JANUARY 2021 | |||
The reactor operated continuously in January with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling and one shutdown for a physics measurement. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. | |||
Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 88-11, Addendum 2: | Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 88-11, Addendum 2: | ||
Uninterruptible Power Supply Alternate Source to Inverter Maintenance Disconnect; repairing control blade selector switch 1S3; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B). | Uninterruptible Power Supply Alternate Source to Inverter Maintenance Disconnect; repairing control blade selector switch 1S3; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B). | ||
FEBRUARY 2021 The reactor operated continuously in February with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling and two unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. The NRC conducted a routine scheduled inspection of facility security. | I-1 FEBRUARY 2021 | ||
The reactor operated continuously in February with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling and two unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. The NRC conducted a routine scheduled inspection of facility security. | |||
On February 2, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor shutdown was initiated in accordance with operating procedure OP-RO-220, Reactor Shutdown or Power Reduction, to investigate a decrease in anti-siphon system pressure. Investigation revealed that the cause of the pressure drop was air leaking past anti-siphon system isolation valves V543A and V543B. Valves V543A and V543B were subsequently repositioned in accordance with Standing Order 21-01 to maintain system pressure. Permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the Lead Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO), and the reactor was returned to 10 MW operation. | On February 2, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor shutdown was initiated in accordance with operating procedure OP-RO-220, Reactor Shutdown or Power Reduction, to investigate a decrease in anti-siphon system pressure. Investigation revealed that the cause of the pressure drop was air leaking past anti-siphon system isolation valves V543A and V543B. Valves V543A and V543B were subsequently repositioned in accordance with Standing Order 21-01 to maintain system pressure. Permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the Lead Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO), and the reactor was returned to 10 MW operation. | ||
On February 10, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor shutdown was initiated in accordance with operating procedure OP-RO-220, Reactor Shutdown or Power Reduction, to investigate a decrease in anti-siphon system pressure. Investigation revealed that the cause of the pressure drop was air leaking past anti-siphon system isolation valve V543B. The pneumatic actuator for valve V543B and the anti-siphon system low pressure alarm set point were adjusted, and applicable portions of compliance procedure CP-11, Anti-Siphon High Level Rod Run-In and Low Pressure Alarm, were completed satisfactorily. Valves V543A and V543B were closed in accordance with Standing Order 21-02, and the primary coolant system was restarted. Permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the LSRO, and the reactor was returned to 10 MW operation. | On February 10, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor shutdown was initiated in accordance with operating procedure OP-RO-220, Reactor Shutdown or Power Reduction, to investigate a decrease in anti-siphon system pressure. Investigation revealed that the cause of the pressure drop was air leaking past anti-siphon system isolation valve V543B. The pneumatic actuator for valve V543B and the anti-siphon system low pressure alarm set point were adjusted, and applicable portions of compliance procedure CP-11, Anti-Siphon High Level Rod Run-In and Low Pressure Alarm, were completed satisfactorily. Valves V543A and V543B were closed in accordance with Standing Order 21-02, and the primary coolant system was restarted. Permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the LSRO, and the reactor was returned to 10 MW operation. | ||
Major maintenance items for the month included: replacing control blade C control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) with a rebuilt spare; and performing two reactivity worth measurements in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Control Blade, RTP-11(D). | Major maintenance items for the month included: replacing control blade C control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) with a rebuilt spare; and performing two reactivity worth measurements in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Control Blade, RTP-11(D). | ||
MARCH 2021 The reactor operated continuously in March with the following exceptions: five shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling and three shutdowns for physics measurements. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. The NRC conducted a routine scheduled inspection of the Radiation Protection and Shipping Programs. | |||
MARCH 2021 | |||
The reactor operated continuously in March with the following exceptions: five shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling and three shutdowns for physics measurements. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. The NRC conducted a routine scheduled inspection of the Radiation Protection and Shipping Programs. | |||
Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 21-01, Reactor Control Console LED Status Indicators; repairing a leak on the secondary coolant system in mechanical equipment Room 114; performing a chemical cleaning and backflush of the secondary coolant side of pool coolant heat exchanger HX-521; replacing the inlet filter cartridges on the primary coolant demineralizer system; and performing five reactivity worth measurements in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B). | Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 21-01, Reactor Control Console LED Status Indicators; repairing a leak on the secondary coolant system in mechanical equipment Room 114; performing a chemical cleaning and backflush of the secondary coolant side of pool coolant heat exchanger HX-521; replacing the inlet filter cartridges on the primary coolant demineralizer system; and performing five reactivity worth measurements in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B). | ||
APRIL 2021 The reactor operated continuously in April with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, one shutdown for a physics measurement, and two unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. | |||
APRIL 2021 | |||
The reactor operated continuously in April with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, one shutdown for a physics measurement, and two unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. | |||
On April 18, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, an automatic reactor scram and containment building isolation were initiated by Area Radiation Monitor System (ARMS) Air Plenum 1 Module. All immediate and subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedure REP-2, Reactor Scram, were completed. | On April 18, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, an automatic reactor scram and containment building isolation were initiated by Area Radiation Monitor System (ARMS) Air Plenum 1 Module. All immediate and subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedure REP-2, Reactor Scram, were completed. | ||
Investigation revealed that the module appeared to be operating erratically and was subsequently replaced with a spare. | I-2 Investigation revealed that the module appeared to be operating erratically and was subsequently replaced with a spare. | ||
Applicable portions of compliance procedure CP-30, ARMs and Associated Horns and Lights, were completed satisfactorily. Permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the LSRO, and the reactor was subsequently returned to 10 MW operation. | Applicable portions of compliance procedure CP-30, ARMs and Associated Horns and Lights, were completed satisfactorily. Permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the LSRO, and the reactor was subsequently returned to 10 MW operation. | ||
On April 21, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor shutdown was initiated in accordance with operating procedure OP-RO-220, Reactor Shutdown or Power Reduction, to investigate a decrease in anti-siphon system pressure. Investigation revealed that the cause of the pressure drop was air leaking past anti-siphon system isolation valves V543A and V453B. Valves V543A and V543B were subsequently removed, rebuilt, and reinstalled. Compliance procedures CP-11, Anti-Siphon High Level Rod Run-In and Low Pressure Alarm, and CP-24, Anti-Siphon System Valves 543A/B, were satisfactorily completed, and the anti-siphon system was channel tested per operating procedure OP-RO-410, Primary Coolant System. Permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the LSRO, and the reactor was subsequently returned to 10 MW operation. | On April 21, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor shutdown was initiated in accordance with operating procedure OP-RO-220, Reactor Shutdown or Power Reduction, to investigate a decrease in anti-siphon system pressure. Investigation revealed that the cause of the pressure drop was air leaking past anti-siphon system isolation valves V543A and V453B. Valves V543A and V543B were subsequently removed, rebuilt, and reinstalled. Compliance procedures CP-11, Anti-Siphon High Level Rod Run-In and Low Pressure Alarm, and CP-24, Anti-Siphon System Valves 543A/B, were satisfactorily completed, and the anti-siphon system was channel tested per operating procedure OP-RO-410, Primary Coolant System. Permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the LSRO, and the reactor was subsequently returned to 10 MW operation. | ||
Major maintenance items for the month included: removing, rebuilding, and reinstalling anti-siphon system isolation valves V543A and V543B; performing a chemical cleaning of the secondary coolant side of primary coolant heat exchanger HX-503A; loading new de-ionizing bed K and placing it on pool coolant system service; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B). | Major maintenance items for the month included: removing, rebuilding, and reinstalling anti-siphon system isolation valves V543A and V543B; performing a chemical cleaning of the secondary coolant side of primary coolant heat exchanger HX-503A; loading new de-ionizing bed K and placing it on pool coolant system service; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B). | ||
MAY 2021 The reactor operated continuously in May with the following exceptions: five shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling and one shutdown for a physics measurement. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. The NRC administered one reactor operator and one senior reactor operator licensing examination. | |||
MAY 2021 | |||
The reactor operated continuously in May with the following exceptions: five shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling and one shutdown for a physics measurement. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. The NRC administered one reactor operator and one senior reactor operator licensing examination. | |||
Major maintenance items for the month included: completing the biennial change-out of control blade A offset mechanism; completing compliance procedure CP-26, Containment Building Compliance Test; performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Blade, RTP-11(D); and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B). | Major maintenance items for the month included: completing the biennial change-out of control blade A offset mechanism; completing compliance procedure CP-26, Containment Building Compliance Test; performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Blade, RTP-11(D); and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B). | ||
JUNE 2021 The reactor operated continuously in June with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. | |||
JUNE 2021 | |||
The reactor operated continuously in June with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. | |||
Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 72-04, Addendum 1: Transfer Evacuation and Isolation Electrical Circuit Supply from Emergency Power to the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS); replacing relay 2K26; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Control Blade, RTP-11(D). | Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 72-04, Addendum 1: Transfer Evacuation and Isolation Electrical Circuit Supply from Emergency Power to the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS); replacing relay 2K26; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Control Blade, RTP-11(D). | ||
JULY 2021 The reactor operated continuously in July with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, one shutdown for a physics measurement, and two unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. | I-3 JULY 2021 | ||
The reactor operated continuously in July with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, one shutdown for a physics measurement, and two unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. | |||
On July 5, during a normal reactor startup at a transient power level of 2 MW in the manual control mode, a manual reactor scram was initiated due to sporadic height indication for shim control blade D on the rod position indication (RPI) panel. All immediate and subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedures REP-2, Reactor Scram, and REP-7, Rod Position Indication System Failure, were completed. Control blade D CRDM was removed and taken to the Instrumentation Support Shop for troubleshooting. It was determined that control blade D RPI encoder was failing. Control blade C CRDM was subsequently moved to the D position, and a spare CRDM was placed in the C position. Permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the LSRO, and the reactor was subsequently returned to 10 MW operation. | On July 5, during a normal reactor startup at a transient power level of 2 MW in the manual control mode, a manual reactor scram was initiated due to sporadic height indication for shim control blade D on the rod position indication (RPI) panel. All immediate and subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedures REP-2, Reactor Scram, and REP-7, Rod Position Indication System Failure, were completed. Control blade D CRDM was removed and taken to the Instrumentation Support Shop for troubleshooting. It was determined that control blade D RPI encoder was failing. Control blade C CRDM was subsequently moved to the D position, and a spare CRDM was placed in the C position. Permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the LSRO, and the reactor was subsequently returned to 10 MW operation. | ||
On July 26, during a normal reactor startup with the reactor operating in a subcritical condition in the manual control mode, the Blade Full In light illuminated for shim control blade B. Although RPI for CRDM B indicated a control blade height of approximately 10.30 inches, inspection revealed that the ball screw for CRDM B had detached from the top of the drive mechanism allowing the ball screw, electromagnet, and shim control blade B to fall to the fully inserted position. The LSRO directed another operator to shut down the reactor by initiating a manual scram by placing Master Control Switch 1S1 to the TEST position. All immediate and applicable subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedure REP-8, Control Rod Drive Mechanism Failure or Stuck Rod, were completed. | On July 26, during a normal reactor startup with the reactor operating in a subcritical condition in the manual control mode, the Blade Full In light illuminated for shim control blade B. Although RPI for CRDM B indicated a control blade height of approximately 10.30 inches, inspection revealed that the ball screw for CRDM B had detached from the top of the drive mechanism allowing the ball screw, electromagnet, and shim control blade B to fall to the fully inserted position. The LSRO directed another operator to shut down the reactor by initiating a manual scram by placing Master Control Switch 1S1 to the TEST position. All immediate and applicable subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedure REP-8, Control Rod Drive Mechanism Failure or Stuck Rod, were completed. | ||
After the reactor was secured, CRDM B was removed for further investigation and a spare CRDM was installed in the B position. Compliance procedure CP-10, Rod Drop Times, for shim control blade B was completed satisfactorily. Performing CP-10 operated the CRDM and its associated offset mechanism with the control blade through its entire range of motion while staff members could observe the CRDM and offset mechanism for binding or any other abnormalities. In accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 6.6.c(4), authorization from the Reactor Facility Director was obtained prior to reactor operation to perform CP-10. During CP-10, two staff members performed a careful visual and audible inspection of the entire assembly as it moved through its full range of travel. | After the reactor was secured, CRDM B was removed for further investigation and a spare CRDM was installed in the B position. Compliance procedure CP-10, Rod Drop Times, for shim control blade B was completed satisfactorily. Performing CP-10 operated the CRDM and its associated offset mechanism with the control blade through its entire range of motion while staff members could observe the CRDM and offset mechanism for binding or any other abnormalities. In accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 6.6.c(4), authorization from the Reactor Facility Director was obtained prior to reactor operation to perform CP-10. During CP-10, two staff members performed a careful visual and audible inspection of the entire assembly as it moved through its full range of travel. | ||
No abnormalities were noted during the inspection, and the Reactor Manager deemed the spare CRDM operable. A normal reactor startup was performed, and the reactor returned to 10 MW operation. With the ball screw detached from the top of CRDM B, CRDM B was considered inoperable, which resulted in a deviation from TS 3.2.a, and Licensee Event Report No. 21-01 was submitted to the NRC on August 9, 2021. | No abnormalities were noted during the inspection, and the Reactor Manager deemed the spare CRDM operable. A normal reactor startup was performed, and the reactor returned to 10 MW operation. With the ball screw detached from the top of CRDM B, CRDM B was considered inoperable, which resulted in a deviation from TS 3.2.a, and Licensee Event Report No. 21-01 was submitted to the NRC on August 9, 2021. | ||
Major maintenance items for the month included: performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B). | Major maintenance items for the month included: performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B). | ||
AUGUST 2021 The reactor operated continuously in August with the following exceptions: five shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, one shutdown for a physics measurement, and one unscheduled/unplanned power reduction. | |||
AUGUST 2021 | |||
The reactor operated continuously in August with the following exceptions: five shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, one shutdown for a physics measurement, and one unscheduled/unplanned power reduction. | |||
On August 20, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor scram was initiated after a Rod Not In Contact rod run-in was received due to shim control blade C anvil disengaging from its electromagnet during a routine sample handling evolution. All immediate and subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedure REP-2, Reactor Scram, were completed. The reactor was refueled and permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the LSRO, and the reactor was subsequently returned to 10 MW operation. | On August 20, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor scram was initiated after a Rod Not In Contact rod run-in was received due to shim control blade C anvil disengaging from its electromagnet during a routine sample handling evolution. All immediate and subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedure REP-2, Reactor Scram, were completed. The reactor was refueled and permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the LSRO, and the reactor was subsequently returned to 10 MW operation. | ||
Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 90-03, Addendum 1: 16-inch Ventilation Exhaust Isolation Valves Solenoid Cabinet Replacement; loading new de-ionizing bed B and placing it on pool coolant system service; replacing the inlet filter cartridges on the pool coolant demineralizer system; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B). | I-4 Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 90-03, Addendum 1: 16-inch Ventilation Exhaust Isolation Valves Solenoid Cabinet Replacement; loading new de-ionizing bed B and placing it on pool coolant system service; replacing the inlet filter cartridges on the pool coolant demineralizer system; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B). | ||
SEPTEMBER 2021 The reactor operated continuously in September with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. | |||
SEPTEMBER 2021 | |||
The reactor operated continuously in September with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. | |||
Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 72-04, Addendum 2: Replace Evacuation and Isolation Relays; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Control Blade, RTP-11(D). | Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 72-04, Addendum 2: Replace Evacuation and Isolation Relays; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Control Blade, RTP-11(D). | ||
OCTOBER 2021 The reactor operated continuously in October with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. | |||
OCTOBER 2021 | |||
The reactor operated continuously in October with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. | |||
On October 11, while the reactor was shut down for scheduled routine maintenance and TS surveillance testing, surveillance testing on reactor core outlet pressure instrument channel 944B (pressure transmitter PT 944B instrument channel) revealed that the PT 944B instrument channel did not initiate a reactor scram at the appropriate TS set point. | On October 11, while the reactor was shut down for scheduled routine maintenance and TS surveillance testing, surveillance testing on reactor core outlet pressure instrument channel 944B (pressure transmitter PT 944B instrument channel) revealed that the PT 944B instrument channel did not initiate a reactor scram at the appropriate TS set point. | ||
Troubleshooting revealed the component in the PT 944B instrument channel that caused the set point deviation to be dual alarm unit 920F. Dual alarm unit 920F was replaced with an exact spare and successfully retested. In accordance with TS 6.6.c(4), authorization from the Reactor Facility Director was obtained prior to returning the reactor to operation. Failure of the dual alarm unit to provide a reactor scram within the TS-required set point resulted in a deviation from TS 3.2.g.6, and Licensee Event Report No. 21-02 was submitted to the NRC on October 25, 2021. | Troubleshooting revealed the component in the PT 944B instrument channel that caused the set point deviation to be dual alarm unit 920F. Dual alarm unit 920F was replaced with an exact spare and successfully retested. In accordance with TS 6.6.c(4), authorization from the Reactor Facility Director was obtained prior to returning the reactor to operation. Failure of the dual alarm unit to provide a reactor scram within the TS-required set point resulted in a deviation from TS 3.2.g.6, and Licensee Event Report No. 21-02 was submitted to the NRC on October 25, 2021. | ||
Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 21-04, Security Upgrades; replacing pressure transmitter PT 944B instrument channel dual alarm unit 920F; performing a zero and span on pressure transmitter PT 943; and performing special maintenance procedure SM-RO-625, Measuring Control Blade Pull Weight and Blade Drop Time with the Test Magnet Assembly, RTP-21. | Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 21-04, Security Upgrades; replacing pressure transmitter PT 944B instrument channel dual alarm unit 920F; performing a zero and span on pressure transmitter PT 943; and performing special maintenance procedure SM-RO-625, Measuring Control Blade Pull Weight and Blade Drop Time with the Test Magnet Assembly, RTP-21. | ||
2,000 kVA transformers. EM restored power and permission to restart | NOVEMBER 2021 | ||
The reactor operated continuously in November with the following exceptions: five shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, one planned shutdown for nuclear instrumentation adjustment, and one unscheduled/unplanned power reduction. The NRC conducted a routine scheduled inspection of Reactor Operations and Emergency Preparedness. | |||
On November 4, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, an automatic reactor scram was initiated due to a sustained loss of normal electrical power. All immediate actions of reactor emergency procedure REP-10, Sustained Loss of Normal Electrical Power, were completed. Investigation by University of Missouri Energy Management (EM) discovered a failed circuit card within the smart switch that feeds the facilitys 1,500 and | |||
I-5 2,000 kVA transformers. EM restored power and permission to restart th e reactor was obtained from the LSRO. The reactor was subsequently returned to 10 MW operation. | |||
On November 8, while the reactor was shut down for routine maintenance and TS surveillance testing, the anti-siphon system high water level rod run-in function did not activate within the required specification during the performance of compliance procedure CP-11, Anti-Siphon High Level Rod Run-in and Low Pressure Alarm. Troubleshooting revealed that the stainless steel cable that connects level controller LC 965 instrument channel to the suspended displacer (float) had developed loops in it, effectively shortening the cable. The loops in the cable were removed, and level controller LC 965 instrument channel was retested and documented to be back in compliance. Engineering analysis subsequently concluded that prior to removing the loops from the level controller cable, the rod run-in was actuating at a level greater than the maximum of 6 inches above anti-siphon system isolation valves V543A and V543B as required by TS 3.2.f.6. In accordance with TS 6.6.c(4), authorization from the Reactor Facility Director was obtained prior to returning the reactor to operation later that day. Failure of level controller LC 965 to actuate before the maximum allowable 6 inches of water above the valves resulted in a deviation from TS 3.2.f.6, and Licensee Event Report No. 21-03 was submitted to the NRC on November 23, 2021. | On November 8, while the reactor was shut down for routine maintenance and TS surveillance testing, the anti-siphon system high water level rod run-in function did not activate within the required specification during the performance of compliance procedure CP-11, Anti-Siphon High Level Rod Run-in and Low Pressure Alarm. Troubleshooting revealed that the stainless steel cable that connects level controller LC 965 instrument channel to the suspended displacer (float) had developed loops in it, effectively shortening the cable. The loops in the cable were removed, and level controller LC 965 instrument channel was retested and documented to be back in compliance. Engineering analysis subsequently concluded that prior to removing the loops from the level controller cable, the rod run-in was actuating at a level greater than the maximum of 6 inches above anti-siphon system isolation valves V543A and V543B as required by TS 3.2.f.6. In accordance with TS 6.6.c(4), authorization from the Reactor Facility Director was obtained prior to returning the reactor to operation later that day. Failure of level controller LC 965 to actuate before the maximum allowable 6 inches of water above the valves resulted in a deviation from TS 3.2.f.6, and Licensee Event Report No. 21-03 was submitted to the NRC on November 23, 2021. | ||
On November 15, while the reactor was shut down for routine maintenance and TS surveillance testing, the control room operators determined that the Reflector Hi-Low Diff Pressure Scram annunciation did not illuminate as pool coolant flow rate decreased to zero after shutting down the pool coolant system. Investigation and further testing revealed that the low reflector differential pressure reactor scram from pressure transmitter PT 917 instrument channel did not activate due to a failed alarm meter unit. The alarm meter unit was replaced with a new spare and subsequently calibrated after installation. In accordance with TS 6.6.c(4), authorization from the Reactor Facility Director was obtained prior to returning the reactor to operation later that day. Failure of pressure transmitter PT 917 instrument channel to initiate a reactor scram resulted in a deviation from TS 3.2.g.10, and Licensee Event Report No. 21-04 was submitted to the NRC on November 23, 2021. | On November 15, while the reactor was shut down for routine maintenance and TS surveillance testing, the control room operators determined that the Reflector Hi-Low Diff Pressure Scram annunciation did not illuminate as pool coolant flow rate decreased to zero after shutting down the pool coolant system. Investigation and further testing revealed that the low reflector differential pressure reactor scram from pressure transmitter PT 917 instrument channel did not activate due to a failed alarm meter unit. The alarm meter unit was replaced with a new spare and subsequently calibrated after installation. In accordance with TS 6.6.c(4), authorization from the Reactor Facility Director was obtained prior to returning the reactor to operation later that day. Failure of pressure transmitter PT 917 instrument channel to initiate a reactor scram resulted in a deviation from TS 3.2.g.10, and Licensee Event Report No. 21-04 was submitted to the NRC on November 23, 2021. | ||
Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 21-05, Supply Fan 2 Variable Frequency Drive; replacing the inlet filter cartridges on the pool coolant demineralizer system; adjusting anti-siphon system LC 965 level controller displacer; replacing pressure transmitter PT 917 alarm meter unit; replacing the fission chamber and associated cabling for nuclear instrumentation signal processor no. 1; and completing compliance procedure CP-25, Control Blade Inspection, for shim control blade C. | Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 21-05, Supply Fan 2 Variable Frequency Drive; replacing the inlet filter cartridges on the pool coolant demineralizer system; adjusting anti-siphon system LC 965 level controller displacer; replacing pressure transmitter PT 917 alarm meter unit; replacing the fission chamber and associated cabling for nuclear instrumentation signal processor no. 1; and completing compliance procedure CP-25, Control Blade Inspection, for shim control blade C. | ||
DECEMBER 2021 The reactor operated continuously in December with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, one shutdown for a physics measurement, and three unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. The NRC administered three senior reactor operator licensing examinations. | |||
DECEMBER 2021 | |||
The reactor operated continuously in December with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, one shutdown for a physics measurement, and three unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. The NRC administered three senior reactor operator licensing examinations. | |||
On December 14, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a control room operator inadvertently placed the reactor in the manual control mode. While attempting to return the reactor to the automatic control mode, an automatic high power rod run-in occurred. After reactor power had reduced to below the trip set point, the LSRO reset the rod run-in, and the reactor was returned to 10 MW operation. | On December 14, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a control room operator inadvertently placed the reactor in the manual control mode. While attempting to return the reactor to the automatic control mode, an automatic high power rod run-in occurred. After reactor power had reduced to below the trip set point, the LSRO reset the rod run-in, and the reactor was returned to 10 MW operation. | ||
rebuilt spare was installed. Permission to restart the reactor was received from the LSRO, and the reactor was returned to 10 MW operation. | On December 24, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor scram was initiated due to incorrect regulating blade height indication on the RPI panel. All immediate and subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedure REP-7, Rod Position Indication System Failure, were completed. Investigation revealed that a setscrew on the coupler attaching the drive motor to the RPI encoder on the regulating rod drive mechanism had backed out, allowing the coupler to slip. The regulating rod drive mechanism was removed and a | ||
I-6 rebuilt spare was installed. Permission to restart the reactor was received from the LSRO, and the reactor was returned to 10 MW operation. | |||
On December 30, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor scram was initiated due to a lowering of pressurizer liquid level. All immediate and subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedure REP-2, Reactor Scram, were completed. Investigation revealed a leak on the diaphragm of primary coolant heat exchanger HX-503B outlet throttle valve. The reactor remained shutdown for the remainder of the year to perform repairs. | On December 30, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor scram was initiated due to a lowering of pressurizer liquid level. All immediate and subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedure REP-2, Reactor Scram, were completed. Investigation revealed a leak on the diaphragm of primary coolant heat exchanger HX-503B outlet throttle valve. The reactor remained shutdown for the remainder of the year to perform repairs. | ||
Major maintenance items for the month included: repairing a leak on the secondary coolant system in mechanical equipment Room 114; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B). | Major maintenance items for the month included: repairing a leak on the secondary coolant system in mechanical equipment Room 114; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B). | ||
SECTION II MURR PROCEDURES January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 As required by administrative MURR Technical Specification (TS) 6.6.e(5), this section of the Reactor Operations Annual Report includes a summary of procedure changes. These procedure changes were reviewed by the Reactor Manager or Reactor Health Physics Manager, as applicable, and others to assure compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. These procedure changes were also reviewed by the Reactor Safety Procedure Review Subcommittee and/or the Isotope Use Procedure Review Subcommittee of the Reactor Advisory Committee to meet the requirements of TS 6.2.a(2). | I-7 SECTION II | ||
A. CHANGES TO REACTOR OPERATIONS PROCEDURES As required by the MURR TS, the Reactor Manager reviewed the Reactor Operations procedures and found them to be adequate for the safe and reliable operation of the facility. | |||
MURR PROCEDURES | |||
January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 | |||
As required by administrative MURR Technical Specification (TS) 6.6.e(5), this section of the Reactor Operations Annual Report includes a summary of procedure changes. These procedure changes were reviewed by the Reactor Manager or Reactor Health Physics Manager, as applicable, and others to assure compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. These procedure changes were also reviewed by the Reactor Safety Procedure Review Subcommittee and/or the Isotope Use Procedure Review Subcommittee of the Reactor Advisory Committee to meet the requirements of TS 6.2.a(2). | |||
A. CHANGES TO REACTOR OPERATIONS PROCEDURES | |||
As required by the MURR TS, the Reactor Manager reviewed the Reactor Operations procedures and found them to be adequate for the safe and reliable operation of the facility. | |||
There were 57 revisions issued to the Reactor Operations policies, procedures, and forms. The majority of these revisions were strictly format or editorial in nature. Additionally, one new procedure and one new policy were issued, while one procedure was obsoleted. The following is a list of the new, revised, and obsoleted policies, procedures, and forms: | There were 57 revisions issued to the Reactor Operations policies, procedures, and forms. The majority of these revisions were strictly format or editorial in nature. Additionally, one new procedure and one new policy were issued, while one procedure was obsoleted. The following is a list of the new, revised, and obsoleted policies, procedures, and forms: | ||
Number | Number Name Rev. Rev. Date Notes AP-RO-105 MURR Operator Requalification Process 2 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial AP-RO-110 Conduct of Operations 30 5/19/2021 Minor Editorial AP-RO-135 Reactor Utilization Requests 5 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial AP-RR-003 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations 15 1/6/2021 Minor Editorial AP-RR-010 Facility Access Criteria 24 3/4/2021 Minor Editorial AP-RR-011 Facility Access Process 24 3/30/2021 Minor Editorial AP-RR-024 Ombudsman Program 9 6/11/2021 Minor Editorial EX-RO-110 Pneumatic Tube System 3 1/29/2021 Minor Editorial EX-RO-120 Beamport 'A' Operation 17 1/29/2021 Minor Editorial EX-RO-120 Beamport 'A' Operation 18 11/24/2021 Minor Editorial EX-RO-125 Beamport 'F' Operation 19 1/29/2021 Minor Editorial EX-RO-125 Beamport 'F' Operation 20 11/24/2021 Minor Editorial FM-03 Sponsor List 31 1/6/2021 Minor Editorial FM-03 Sponsor List 32 7/27/2021 Minor Editorial FM-03 Sponsor List 33 10/27/2021 Minor Editorial FM-04 Visitor/After-Hours Access Request Form 18 2/18/2021 Minor Editorial FM-04 Visitor/After-Hours Access Request Form 19 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial FM-11 Reactor Shutdown Checksheet 9 3/8/2021 Minor Editorial FM-15 10 CFR 50.59 Qualified Reviewers List 26 6/11/2021 Minor Editorial FM-56 Reactor Routine Patrol 28 1/29/2021 Minor Editorial FM-57 Long Form Startup Checksheet 35 5/19/2021 Minor Editorial FM-63 DI Water Makeup Log 13 10/27/2021 Minor Editorial | ||
Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap | |||
Measurement of Primary Coolant/Moderator | II-1 Number Name Rev. Rev. Date Notes FM-66 Customer Sample Pre-Encapsulation Evaluation Worksheet 11 4/5/2021 Minor Editorial FM-97 Routing Form for Facility Drawing Revisions 12 11/24/2021 Minor Editorial FM-140 MURR Access Inactivation Form 8 6/11/2021 Minor Editorial FM-140 MURR Access Inactivation Form 9 9/2/2021 Minor Editorial FM-200 Authorization to Conduct Background Investigation for Unescorted Access to MURR 6 2/3/2021 Minor Editorial GS-RA-100 MURR Equipment Tag Out 18 12/28/2021 Full Review IRR-PSO-Minor Editorial 104 Receipt of Non-Radioactive Material for Irradiation 11 10/28/2021 OP-RO-101 Instrument Air System 14 1/29/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-250 In-Pool Fuel Handling 24 1/12/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-410 Primary Coolant System 19 1/12/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-461 Pool Coolant System - One Pump Operation 20 7/6/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-465 Pool Level Control - Skimmer System 12 2/11/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-466 Pool Level Control - Pool Coolant System 15 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-480 Secondary Coolant System 26 6/22/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-532 Drain Collection System 12 2/11/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-532 Drain Collection System 13 7/6/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-533 Skimmer System 11 11/24/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-555 Fire Protection System 18 6/22/2021 Obsoleted OP-RO-741 Waste Tank System Operation 26 5/19/2021 Minor Editorial POL-20 Special Nuclear Materials Manual 6 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial POL-20 Special Nuclear Materials Manual 7 7/16/2021 Minor Editorial POL-30 MURR Filter Management Program 0 9/22/2021 New Policy RM-RO-400 Waste Tank System Filter Replacement 12 5/19/2021 Minor Editorial RM-RO-405 Reactor Demineralizer System 20 5/19/2021 Minor Editorial RM-RO-405 Reactor Demineralizer System 21 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial RP-RO-100 Fuel Movement 16 10/27/2021 Minor Editorial RP-RO-200 Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Blade, RTP-11 (D) 10 9/2/2021 Minor Editorial | ||
RP-RO-201 Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B) 6 9/2/2021 Minor Editorial | |||
RP-RO-203 Measurement of Primary Coolant/Moderator Temperature Coefficient of Reactivity, RTP-19 2 10/27/2021 Minor Editorial | |||
RP-RO-300 Receipt, Inspection, Accounting, and Shipping of Unirradiated Fuel 8 1/21/2021 Full Review SM-RO-011 Beryllium Reflector Replacement 9 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial SM-RO-025 Removal, Transfer or Installation of an Offset Mechanism 4 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial | |||
SM-RO-025 Removal, Transfer or Installation of an Offset Mechanism 5 11/23/2021 Minor Editorial SM-RO-555 Fire Protection System 0 6/22/2021 New Procedure SM-RO-636 Retracting and Reinserting Beamport 'B' Liner 7 2/17/2021 Minor Editorial SM-RO-637 Retracting and Reinserting Beamport 'C' Liner 7 2/17/2021 Minor Editorial SM-RO-638 Retracting and Reinserting Beamport 'D' Liner 8 2/17/2021 Minor Editorial SM-RO-639 Retracting and Reinserting Beamport 'E' Liner 7 2/17/2021 Minor Editorial | |||
II-2 B. CHANGES TO EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES | |||
As required by the MURR TS, the Reactor Manager reviewed the Emergency Plan implementing procedures and found them to be adequate for the safe and reliable operation of the facility. | |||
There were 11 revisions issued to the Emergency Plan implementing procedures, forms, and operator aids. All of these revisions were strictly format or editorial in nature. Additionally, one form was obsoleted. The following is a list of the revised and obsoleted procedures, forms, and operator aids: | There were 11 revisions issued to the Emergency Plan implementing procedures, forms, and operator aids. All of these revisions were strictly format or editorial in nature. Additionally, one form was obsoleted. The following is a list of the revised and obsoleted procedures, forms, and operator aids: | ||
C. CHANGES TO RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL, BYPRODUCT MATERIAL SHIPPING, AND PREPARATION OF BYPRODUCT MATERIAL FOR SHIPPING PROCEDURES As required by the MURR TS, the Reactor Health Physics Manager reviewed the radiological control procedures and the procedures for the preparation for shipping and shipping of byproduct materials. | Number Name Rev. Rev. Date Notes EP-RO-002 Emergency Responsibilities 10 2/9/2021 Minor Editorial EP-RO-004 Fire 10 6/16/2021 Minor Editorial EP-RO-006 Radiological Emergency 12 6/16/2021 Minor Editorial EP-RO-013 Facility Evacuation 13 6/16/2021 Minor Editorial FM-104 Emergency Call List 43 2/10/2021 Minor Editorial FM-104 Emergency Call List 44 4/1/2021 Obsoleted OA-9 Combined Emergency Flowcharts 8 2/9/2021 Minor Editorial OA-10 Fire Extinguisher Locations and Types 17 2/9/2021 Minor Editorial OA-20 Emergency Equipment 28 2/9/2021 Minor Editorial OA-20 Emergency Equipment 29 6/16/2021 Minor Editorial REP-RO-100 Reactor Emergency Procedures 26 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial REP-RO-100 Reactor Emergency Procedures 27 6/14/2021 Minor Editorial | ||
II-3 C. CHANGES TO RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL, BYPRODUCT MATERIAL SHIPPING, AND PREPARATION OF BYPRODUCT MATERIAL FOR SHIPPING PROCEDURES | |||
As required by the MURR TS, the Reactor Health Physics Manager reviewed the radiological control procedures and the procedures for the preparation for shipping and shipping of byproduct materials. | |||
There were 54 revisions issued to the radiological control, byproduct materials shipping, and preparation for shipping byproduct material policies, procedures, forms, and operator aids. The majority of these revisions were strictly format or editorial in nature. Additionally, three new procedures and one new form were issued, while two procedures were obsoleted. The following is a list of the new, revised, and obsoleted policies, procedures, forms, and operator aids: | There were 54 revisions issued to the radiological control, byproduct materials shipping, and preparation for shipping byproduct material policies, procedures, forms, and operator aids. The majority of these revisions were strictly format or editorial in nature. Additionally, three new procedures and one new form were issued, while two procedures were obsoleted. The following is a list of the new, revised, and obsoleted policies, procedures, forms, and operator aids: | ||
Number | Number Name Rev. Rev. Date Notes AP-HP-115 Iodine 131 Bioassay 6 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial AP-HP-119 High Radiation Area Access 12 2/3/2021 Minor Editorial AP-HP-125 Review of Unplanned Radiation Exposure 8 1/14/2021 Minor Editorial AP-HP-129 Hot Cell HC-01 Control 20 4/5/2021 Minor Editorial AP-HP-130 Reactor License Projects Annual Review 9 10/27/2021 Minor Editorial AP-RR-013 Access Authorization Program for Category 1 and/or Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material 7 1/15/2021 Minor Editorial | ||
AP-RR-017 Physical Security Program for Category 1 and/or Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Materials 0 3/8/2021 New Procedure | |||
AP-RR-017 Physical Security Program for Category 1 and/or Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Materials 1 9/2/2021 Minor Editorial | |||
AP-SH-001 Administrative Procedure - Radioactive Material Shipping 14 1/19/2021 Minor Editorial | |||
OP-HP-400 | AP-SH-004 Notification for Category 2 Material Per Export License PXB143.01 3 3/22/2021 Minor Editorial BPB-SH-020 Receipt Inspection Of Type B Shipping Package 10 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial BPB-SH-031 Bubble Testing Acceptance for Croft SAFKEG-HS Insert Model No. 3987 1 3/8/2021 Minor Editorial | ||
BPB-SH-031 Bubble Testing Acceptance for Croft SAFKEG-HS Insert Model No. 3987 2 8/26/2021 Minor Editorial | |||
BPB-SH-032 Type B USA/0820/B(U)-96 (F-522 Series) Packaging of Type B Radioactive Material 0 8/26/2021 New Procedure | |||
FB-SH-110 Type B Shipment of Spent Fuel Using the BEA Research Reactor Package 9 2/11/2021 Minor Editorial FM-17 Radiation Work Permit 16 4/5/2021 Minor Editorial FM-29 Dosimetry Request Packet 13 1/15/2021 Minor Editorial FM-50 Control Checksheet for Type B USA/0820/B(U)-96 (F-522 Series) Radioactive Material Shipment 0 8/26/2021 New Form | |||
FM-50 Control Checksheet for Type B USA/0820/B(U)-96 (F-522 Series) Radioactive Material Shipment 1 10/28/2021 Minor Editorial FM-137 Type B Qualified Shipper List 33 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial FM-137 Type B Qualified Shipper List 34 10/28/2021 Minor Editorial FM-137 Type B Qualified Shipper List 35 11/19/2021 Minor Editorial FM-147 Control Checksheet for Packaging of Type A Radioactive Material Using Tracerco LS-15 8 1/19/2021 Minor Editorial | |||
FM-159 Control Checksheet for Health Physics Review of Radioactive Material Shipment Documentation 14 9/23/2021 Minor Editorial | |||
FM-165 Radiation Protection Data Sheet 'A' for cMo-99 Process in Hot Cell HC-02A/B 6 3/11/2021 Minor Editorial | |||
II-4 Number Name Rev. Rev. Date Notes Control Checksheet for Health Physics Review of FM-173 Excepted (Limited) Quantity Radioactive Material 4 3/8/2021 Minor Editorial Shipment FM-201 Control Checksheet for Documentation and Labeling of NorthStar Radioactive Material Shipment 2 8/26/2021 Minor Editorial | |||
HC-PSO-002 Hot Cell Preparation of Radioactive Material for Shipment 21 4/5/2021 Minor Editorial HC-PSO-005 Hot Cell-01 Loading of Host Cans 18 11/18/2021 Minor Editorial IC-HP-300 Calibration - Radiation Survey Instruments 11 5/12/2021 Minor Editorial IC-HP-306 Mirion PING209L Stack Monitor - Flow Calibration 1 7/27/2021 Minor Editorial IC-HP-308 Calibration - Mirion PING209L Stack Monitor - Iodine Channel 1 7/27/2021 Minor Editorial | |||
IC-HP-309 Calibration - Mirion PING209L Stack Monitor - Particulate Channel 1 7/27/2021 Minor Editorial | |||
IC-HP-310 Calibration - Eberline Model PING 1A Stack Monitor - Particulate Channel 10 3/8/2021 Minor Editorial | |||
IC-HP-310 Calibration - Eberline Model PING 1A Stack Monitor - Particulate Channel 11 7/14/2021 Minor Editorial | |||
IC-HP-311 Calibration - Eberline Model PING 1A Stack Monitor - Iodine Channel 11 2/3/2021 Minor Editorial | |||
IC-HP-312 Calibration - Eberline Model PING 1A Stack Monitor - Gas Channel 10 2/3/2021 Minor Editorial | |||
IC-HP-312 Calibration - Eberline Model PING 1A Stack Monitor - Gas Channel 11 3/21/2021 Minor Editorial IC-HP-345 Calibration - Canberra S5 XLB Swipe Counter 0 6/15/2021 New Procedure IC-HP-348 Calibration - Canberra S5XLB-G 8 5/12/2021 Obsoleted IC-HP-351 Calibration - Lab Impex Stack Monitor - Gas Channel 7 1/11/2021 Minor Editorial IC-HP-351 Calibration - Lab Impex Stack Monitor - Gas Channel 8 9/22/2021 Minor Editorial IC-HP-354 Calibration - NOA Lab Impex Stack Monitor - Particulate Channel 2 9/27/2021 Minor Editorial | |||
IC-HP-356 Calibration - NOA Lab Impex Stack Monitor - Flow Calibration 5 9/27/2021 Minor Editorial | |||
OA-99 Packaging of Type A Radioactive Material Using USA DOT 7A MURR Model 1500 3 9/23/2021 Minor Editorial OP-HP-222 Air Sampling - Containment Building Ar-41 12 2/3/2021 Minor Editorial OP-HP-228 Performing Iodine 131 Bioassay Measurements 9 9/22/2021 Minor Editorial OP-HP-300 Receipt of Radioactive Material 14 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial OP-HP-353 Waste Tank Sample - Analysis 11 6/15/2021 Minor Editorial OP-HP-365 Iodine 131 Processing Hot Cells Radiation Monitor (ALMO-6) 4 9/22/2021 Minor Editorial OP-HP-400 Gemstone Shipping Barrel Analysis 12 1/14/2021 Obsoleted POL-03 Radiation Protection Program 21 2/9/2021 Minor Editorial POL-03 Radiation Protection Program 22 11/12/2021 Minor Editorial QAB-SH-005 Type B QA Personnel Training 7 2/11/2021 Minor Editorial QAB-SH-006 Type B Shipping Program Quality Audits 4 3/22/2021 Minor Editorial QAB-SH-008 Training for Type B Shipment Leak Test Performers 6 2/11/2021 Minor Editorial RP-HP-105 Transfer of Radioactive Material Within the Facility 15 2/9/2021 Minor Editorial RP-HP-120 Personnel Radioactive Contamination 16 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial RP-HP-135 Room 114 Entry - Self Monitored 12 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial WM-SH-116 Removal of Waste from Hot Cell HC-11A Using Shielded Container 1 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial | |||
II-5 SECTION III | |||
REVISIONS TO THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT | |||
January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 | |||
On August 31, 2006, MURR submitted a request to the NRC to renew Amended Facility Operating License No. R-103 for another twenty years of operation, at which time MURR also provided its proposed Safety Analysis Report (SAR). On January 4, 2017, the NRC issued Renewed Facility Operating License No. R-103. | |||
From 2017 through 2021, a significant amount of effort was spent by MURR staff to update the August 31, 2006, SAR with all of the facility changes and modifications that had occurred between 2006 and 2017, and with applicable information from the hundreds of MURR responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information during the relicensing process. | From 2017 through 2021, a significant amount of effort was spent by MURR staff to update the August 31, 2006, SAR with all of the facility changes and modifications that had occurred between 2006 and 2017, and with applicable information from the hundreds of MURR responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information during the relicensing process. | ||
During calendar year 2021, modifications or changes to the facility occurred that required the following revisions to the SAR, as submitted to the NRC in 2006 for relicensing. The following changes have been reviewed, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, by licensed staff and members of the Reactor Safety Subcommittee; determined not to involve a change to the MURR Technical Specifications; and approved by the Reactor Manager. | During calendar year 2021, modifications or changes to the facility occurred that required the following revisions to the SAR, as submitted to the NRC in 2006 for relicensing. The following changes have been reviewed, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, by licensed staff and members of the Reactor Safety Subcommittee; determined not to involve a change to the MURR Technical Specifications; and approved by the Reactor Manager. | ||
CHAPTER 1 - THE FACILITY Section 1.2.1, Figure 1.1 (page 1-5) | |||
Update with Print No. 1145, Sheet 1 of 5, Placement of Emergency Equipment - Basement Level, Rev. 19, dated 09/21/21 Section 1.2.1, Figure 1.2 (page 1-6) (as revised by the 2019 Reactor Operations Annual Report) | CHAPTER 1 - THE FACILITY | ||
Update with Print No. 1145, Sheet 2 of 5, Placement of Emergency Equipment - Grade Level, Rev. 42, dated 09/30/21 CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL Section 7.6.2.1, second paragraph (page 7-37) (as revised by the 2018 Reactor Operations Annual Report) | |||
Section 1.2.1, Figure 1.1 (page 1-5) | |||
Update with Print No. 1145, Sheet 1 of 5, Placement of Emergency Equipment - Basement Level, Rev. 19, dated 09/21/21 | |||
Section 1.2.1, Figure 1.2 (page 1-6) (as revised by the 2019 Reactor Operations Annual Report) | |||
Update with Print No. 1145, Sheet 2 of 5, Placement of Emergency Equipment - Grade Level, Rev. 42, dated 09/30/21 | |||
CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL | |||
Section 7.6.2.1, second paragraph (page 7-37) (as revised by the 2018 Reactor Operations Annual Report) | |||
Insert new sentences at end of paragraph to read: The chart recorder will display an additional trend line on a loss of electrical power to the primary coolant circulation pumps. A pair of relays are connected to the control circuits for primary coolant circulation pumps P501A and P501B that will provide a real time indication of electrical power to the pumps. This feature assists in data collection for a primary coolant system flow coast down. | Insert new sentences at end of paragraph to read: The chart recorder will display an additional trend line on a loss of electrical power to the primary coolant circulation pumps. A pair of relays are connected to the control circuits for primary coolant circulation pumps P501A and P501B that will provide a real time indication of electrical power to the pumps. This feature assists in data collection for a primary coolant system flow coast down. | ||
Section 7.8.2.1, first paragraph (page 7-58) | Section 7.8.2.1, first paragraph (page 7-58) | ||
Delete: 2. Parallel relays R2A and R2B and relay 2K2 in the CAS will de-energize; Replace with: 2. Parallel R2 series relays (R2A-R2F) and relay 2K2 in the CAS will de-energize; | Delete: 2. Parallel relays R2A and R2B and relay 2K2 in the CAS will de-energize; Replace with: 2. Parallel R2 series relays (R2A-R2F) and relay 2K2 in the CAS will de-energize; | ||
Section 7.8.2.1, second paragraph (page 7-58) | III-1 Section 7.8.2.1, second paragraph (page 7-58) | ||
Delete: De-energizing either relay R2A or R2B (see No. 2 above) of the CAS will cause the following actions to occur: | Delete: De-energizing either relay R2A or R2B (see No. 2 above) of the CAS will cause the following actions to occur: | ||
Replace with: De-energizing the R2 series relays (see No. 2 above) of the CAS will cause the following actions to occur: | Replace with: De-energizing the R2 series relays (see No. 2 above) of the CAS will cause the following actions to occur: | ||
Section 7.8.2.2, first paragraph (page 7-59) | Section 7.8.2.2, first paragraph (page 7-59) | ||
Delete: 2. All actions caused by relays R2A and R2B de-energizing. | Delete: 2. All actions caused by relays R2A and R2B de-energizing. | ||
Replace with: 2. All actions caused by the R2 series relays de-energizing. | Replace with: 2. All actions caused by the R2 series relays de-energizing. | ||
Section 7.8.2.2, second paragraph (page 7-59) | Section 7.8.2.2, second paragraph (page 7-59) | ||
Delete: 1. Parallel relays R3A and R3B will de-energize and open contacts in the CAS thereby de-energizing relays 2K2, R2A, and R2B; and Replace with: 1. Parallel relays R3A and R3B will de-energize and open contacts in the CAS thereby de-energizing relay 2K2 and the R2 series relays; and Section 7.9.2.1, Figure 7.11 (pages 7-63/64) | Delete: 1. Parallel relays R3A and R3B will de-energize and open contacts in the CAS thereby de-energizing relays 2K2, R2A, and R2B; and Replace with: 1. Parallel relays R3A and R3B will de-energize and open contacts in the CAS thereby de-energizing relay 2K2 and the R2 series relays; and | ||
Update with Print No. 203, Sheet 1 of 1, Area Monitoring System, Rev. 16, dated 07/22/21 CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS Section 8.1.3, Figure 8.1 (page 8-4) | |||
Update with Print No. 2294, Sheet 1 of 1, Uninterruptible Power Supply Interconnect Diagram, Rev. 4, dated 01/22/21 Section 8.1.3, Figure 8.2 (pages 8-5/6) | Section 7.9.2.1, Figure 7.11 (pages 7-63/64) | ||
Update with Print No. 522, Sheet 1 of 8, Electrical Distribution Reactor/Laboratory, Rev. 53, dated 09/07/21, and Print No. 522, Sheet 4 of 8, Electrical Distribution Emergency Electrical Power System, Rev. 3, dated 01/22/21 CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIIARY SYSTEMS Section 9.12.2, third and fourth paragraphs (pages 9-20 and 9-21) | Update with Print No. 203, Sheet 1 of 1, Area Monitoring System, Rev. 16, dated 07/22/21 | ||
Delete: In addition to the water treatment system discussed above, an ion exchange demineralizer system (DI-300) serves as a backup. This system consists of a 300- | |||
CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS | |||
Section 8.1.3, Figure 8.1 (page 8-4) | |||
Update with Print No. 2294, Sheet 1 of 1, Uninterruptible Power Supply Interconnect Diagram, Rev. 4, dated 01/22/21 | |||
Section 8.1.3, Figure 8.2 (pages 8-5/6) | |||
Update with Print No. 522, Sheet 1 of 8, Electrical Distribution Reactor/Laboratory, Rev. 53, dated 09/07/21, and Print No. 522, Sheet 4 of 8, Electrical Distribution Emergency Electrical Power System, Rev. 3, dated 01/22/21 | |||
CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIIARY SYSTEMS | |||
Section 9.12.2, third and fourth paragraphs (pages 9-20 and 9-21) | |||
Delete: In addition to the water treatment system discussed above, an ion exchange demineralizer system (DI-300) serves as a backup. This system consists of a 300-ga llon (1,136-l) rubber-lined carbon steel tank sized to hold 24 cubic feet (0.68 m3) of mixed bed resin, filters before and after the demineralizer tank, and associated piping and valves. | |||
Demineralized water from either system may then be directed to the water storage systems for the facility or the reactor plant. | Demineralized water from either system may then be directed to the water storage systems for the facility or the reactor plant. | ||
Replace with: Demineralized water from the RO unit may be directed to the water storage systems for the facility or reactor plant. | Replace with: Demineralized water from the RO unit may be directed to the water storage systems for the facility or reactor plant. | ||
SECTION IV PLANT AND SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 For each facility modification described below, MURR has on file the safety screen or evaluation, as well as the documentation of review, performed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. | III-2 SECTION IV | ||
MODIFICATION RECORD 72-04, ADDENDUM 1 Transfer Evacuation and Isolation Electrical Circuit Supply from Emergency Power to Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) | |||
This addendum to Modification Record 72-04, Evacuation | PLANT AND SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS | ||
MODIFICATION RECORD 72-04, ADDENDUM 2 Replace Evacuation and Isolation Relays This addendum to Modification Record 72-04, Evacuation and Isolation, documents the replacement of relays (R1A, R1B, R2A, R2B, R3A, and R3B) in the facility evacuation and reactor containment isolation systems. The new Schneider relays replace obsolete Square D relays; however, the functionality of the relays remain the same. | |||
MODIFICATION RECORD 88-11, ADDENDUM 2 Uninterruptible Power Supply Alternate Source to Inverter Maintenance Disconnect This addendum to Modification Record 88-11, Reactor Control Power Upgrade (Replacing Line Conditioner with Uninterruptible Power Supply), documents the maintenance required to replace a malfunctioning transformer on the UPS system inverter. To assist in this maintenance, an additional 70-amp fused disconnect was added to the output of the alternate source to allow isolation of the inverter without securing power to all UPS panels. This disconnect was installed to the output of the alternate source and the corresponding contacts on the inverter. This line is a sensing line that supplies the inverter and provides an input to the inverter for detection of the phase for the alternate source. | January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 | ||
IV-1 | |||
For each facility modification described below, MURR has on file the safety screen or evaluation, as well as the documentation of review, performed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. | |||
MODIFICATION RECORD 72-04, ADDENDUM 1 | |||
Transfer Evacuation and Isolation Electrical Circuit Supply from Emergency Power to Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) | |||
This addendum to Modification Record 72-04, Evacuation an d Isolation, documents the tr ansfer of electrical supply power to the facility evacuation and reactor containment isolation systems from the emergency electrical power system to the uninterruptible power supply (UPS) system. Historically, there have been momentary losses of normal electrical power that have been long enough in duration to cause a reactor scram from either the facility evacuation or the reactor containment isolation system; however, not long enough to cause a reactor scram due to decreased primary coolant or pool coolant system flow rate. This change should decrease the probability that the facility evacuation and reactor containment isolation systems will actuate during a momentary loss of normal electrical power, thus increasing operational reliability. | |||
MODIFICATION RECORD 72-04, ADDENDUM 2 | |||
Replace Evacuation and Isolation Relays This addendum to Modification Record 72-04, Evacuation and Isolation, documents the replacement of relays (R1A, R1B, R2A, R2B, R3A, and R3B) in the facility evacuation and reactor containment isolation systems. The new Schneider relays replace obsolete Square D relays; however, the functionality of the relays remain the same. | |||
MODIFICATION RECORD 88-11, ADDENDUM 2 | |||
Uninterruptible Power Supply Alternate Source to Inverter Maintenance Disconnect This addendum to Modification Record 88-11, Reactor Control Power Upgrade (Replacing Line Conditioner with Uninterruptible Power Supply), documents the maintenance required to replace a malfunctioning transformer on the UPS system inverter. To assist in this maintenance, an additional 70-amp fused disconnect was added to the output of the alternate source to allow isolation of the inverter without securing power to all UPS panels. This disconnect was installed to the output of the alternate source and the corresponding contacts on the inverter. This line is a sensing line that supplies the inverter and provides an input to the inverter for detection of the phase for the alternate source. | |||
IV-1 MODIFICATION RECORD 90-03, ADDENDUM 1 | |||
16-inch Ventilation Exhaust Isolation Valves Solenoid Cabinet Replacement This addendum to Modification Record 90-03, 16 Valve Solenoid Cabinet, documents the replacement of the 16-inch ventilation exhaust solenoid-operated isolation valves cabinet. Replacement of the cabinet also included replacement of all of the solenoid-operated valves, which were upgraded to more robust and reliable continuous duty Parker N3554104853 3-way valves, and associated piping inside the cabinet. Additionally, all security features installed under Modification Record 90-03 were removed following a change in license requirements authorized by the MURR Physical Security Plan. | |||
MODIFICATION RECORD 19-02 | |||
Modification to the Laboratory Building Configuration This modification record was generated for the purpose of providing a means for documenting structural changes to the laboratory building. It is intended to capture changes such as the addition or removal of walls, combining or separating laboratory building spaces, etc. It can also be used to capture service changes to laboratory building spaces. | |||
Individual changes under this modification record will be evaluated under 10 CFR 50.59, as needed. | Individual changes under this modification record will be evaluated under 10 CFR 50.59, as needed. | ||
the personnel airlock (Doors 276 and 277) with a newer model (ASCO 8344 Dual Action Piston/Poppet Solenoid Valves) due to obsolescence of the previously-installed solenoid-operated valves. | MODIFICATION RECORD 20-03 | ||
MODIFICATION RECORD 21-04 Security Upgrades This modification record was created as a means of documenting changes to various MURR security features and storing them in one common location. The intent of this modification record is to host various letters to file that describe necessary changes to MURR security that do not warrant a modification record on their own. Individual changes under this modification record will be evaluated under 10 CFR 50.59, as needed. Typical information in each letter to file will include a description of the change, procedural changes, and print changes. This Modification Record is handled as Safeguards Information and is controlled as such. | |||
MODIFICATION RECORD 21-05 Supply Fan 2 Variable Frequency Drive This modification record documents the replacement of the undersized motor contactor on motor control center MCC-4 that supplies electrical power to reactor containment building supply fan SF-2. | Substation B, MCC-5 Micro-Versa-Plus Trip Unit This modification record documents replacement of Substation B motor control center MCC-5 breaker with a refurbished General Electric Type AK 2A-25-1 unit retrof itted with a solid state MicroVersaTrip+ (MVT+) unit. | ||
MODIFICATION RECORD 21-01 | |||
Reactor Control Console LED Status Indicators This modification record documents the replacement of the original-style lamps and pushbuttons utilized for various reactor plant indicators and controls on the reactor control console. The original lamps and pushbuttons, which are General Electric (GE) CR103 incandescent bulbs and GE-style pushbuttons, respectively, were upgraded to confront obsolescence. The packages used in this modification are IDEC AL6 LED Pilot Lights and IDEC AL6 Illuminated Pushbutton switches. These changes were analyzed from an electrical perspective in Tech Note 20-005.00 and found to be suitable replacements for the existing GE lamps and pushbuttons. The listed mechanical life of the proposed pushbuttons is a minimum of 100,000 operations for the selected style of operation. Using a conservative estimation of 6 operations per week, the proposed pushbuttons have a rated operational lifetime of over 300 years. | |||
MODIFICATION RECORD 21-02 | |||
Reactor Containment Building Sealing Gasket Solenoid Valve Replacement This modification record documents the replacement of the sealing gasket solenoid-operated valves for the reactor containment building truck entry door (Door 101), ventilation supply and exhaust plenums (Doors 504 and 505), and | |||
IV-2 the personnel airlock (Doors 276 and 277) with a newer model (ASCO 8344 Dual Action Piston/Poppet Solenoid Valves) due to obsolescence of the previously-installed solenoid-operated valves. | |||
MODIFICATION RECORD 21-04 | |||
Security Upgrades This modification record was created as a means of documenting changes to various MURR security features and storing them in one common location. The intent of this modification record is to host various letters to file that describe necessary changes to MURR security that do not warrant a modification record on their own. Individual changes under this modification record will be evaluated under 10 CFR 50.59, as needed. Typical information in each letter to file will include a description of the change, procedural changes, and print changes. This Modification Record is handled as Safeguards Information and is controlled as such. | |||
MODIFICATION RECORD 21-05 | |||
Supply Fan 2 Variable Frequency Drive This modification record documents the replacement of the undersized motor contactor on motor control center MCC-4 that supplies electrical power to reactor containment building supply fan SF-2. | |||
MODIFICATION REDORD 19 LETTER TO FILE (December 2, 2020) | MODIFICATION REDORD 19 LETTER TO FILE (December 2, 2020) | ||
Addition of Exhaust Ventilation to Room 241 Oven This letter to Modification Record 19-02, Modification to the Laboratory Building Configuration, documents adding additional exhaust ventilation for Room 241 for an oven which will support potentially radioactive work. | Addition of Exhaust Ventilation to Room 241 Oven This letter to Modification Record 19-02, Modification to the Laboratory Building Configuration, documents adding additional exhaust ventilation for Room 241 for an oven which will support potentially radioactive work. | ||
MODIFICATION RECORD 19 LETTER TO FILE (December 22, 2020) | MODIFICATION RECORD 19 LETTER TO FILE (December 22, 2020) | ||
Room 236 Exhaust Ventilation Renovation This letter to Modification Record 19-02, Modification to the Laboratory Building Configuration, documents the addition of a larger exhaust ventilation trunk to support a welding snorkel in Room 236, in addition to the existing room exhaust ventilation. | Room 236 Exhaust Ventilation Renovation This letter to Modification Record 19-02, Modification to the Laboratory Building Configuration, documents the addition of a larger exhaust ventilation trunk to support a welding snorkel in Room 236, in addition to the existing room exhaust ventilation. | ||
MODIFICATION RECORD 15 LETTER TO FILE (February 11, 2021) | MODIFICATION RECORD 15 LETTER TO FILE (February 11, 2021) | ||
Anti-Siphon Actuator Flow Throttling This letter to Modification Record 15-01, Additional Coupling Joint for Anti-Siphon System Isolation Valves V543A and V543B, documents a procedural change to throttle the air supply valve for the pneumatic actuators that this modification record describes. The intent of this change was to reduce wear and tear on the actuators, linkages, and valves. | Anti-Siphon Actuator Flow Throttling This letter to Modification Record 15-01, Additional Coupling Joint for Anti-Siphon System Isolation Valves V543A and V543B, documents a procedural change to throttle the air supply valve for the pneumatic actuators that this modification record describes. The intent of this change was to reduce wear and tear on the actuators, linkages, and valves. | ||
MODIFICATION RECORD 88-07, ADDENDUM 3 - LETTER TO FILE (February 24, 2021) | IV-3 MODIFICATION RECORD 88-07, ADDENDUM 3 - LETTER TO FILE (February 24, 2021) | ||
HC-11 Solenoid Cabinet Pneumatic Exhaust Addition This letter to Modification Record 88-07, Addendum 3, Exhaust Ventilation in MIB Eastward Expansion, documents the relocation of hot cell HC-11 solenoid cabinet pneumatic exhaust from HC-11B to the exhaust line just before the charcoal filters in Room 299V. Previously, the pneumatic exhaust was routed back to HC-11B creating a potential release path into the surrounding room. This change routes all the pneumatic exhaust to the facility exhaust ventilation system and installs a block-off plate on the abandoned HC-11B penetration. | HC-11 Solenoid Cabinet Pneumatic Exhaust Addition This letter to Modification Record 88-07, Addendum 3, Exhaust Ventilation in MIB Eastward Expansion, documents the relocation of hot cell HC-11 solenoid cabinet pneumatic exhaust from HC-11B to the exhaust line just before the charcoal filters in Room 299V. Previously, the pneumatic exhaust was routed back to HC-11B creating a potential release path into the surrounding room. This change routes all the pneumatic exhaust to the facility exhaust ventilation system and installs a block-off plate on the abandoned HC-11B penetration. | ||
MODIFICATION RECORD 86-01, ADDENDUM 5 - LETTER TO FILE (February 25, 2021) | MODIFICATION RECORD 86-01, ADDENDUM 5 - LETTER TO FILE (February 25, 2021) | ||
Thermal Neutron Flux Changes Due to Replacement of | |||
Thermal Neutron Flux Changes Due to Replacement of Gr aphite Reflector Elements 5A and 5B in Year 2020 This letter to Modification Record 86-01, Addendum 5, Replacement of Graphite Reflector Elements in Reflector Tank Positions 5A and 5B, documents the effects of changing graphite reflector elements 5A and 5B in calendar year 2020. After installation of element 5B in February of 2020, MURR Reactor Health Physics noted that Argon-41 levels were approximately 10% higher than previous levels. Replacement of element 5A was postponed until further modifications and procedural changes could be implemented to reduce Argon-41 production. Following the changes that are outlined in their applicable modification records, total annual Argon-41 activity released has been maintained at or slightly below pre-2020 levels. | |||
MODIFICATION RECORD 19 LETTER TO FILE (March 26, 2021) | MODIFICATION RECORD 19 LETTER TO FILE (March 26, 2021) | ||
Lab 215A Ventilation Control This letter to Modification Record 19-02, Modification to the Laboratory Building Configuration, documents the modification to the exhaust ventilation system for Room 215A. The previously-installed ventilation system for Room 215A was non-functional. The original configuration for this laboratory utilized control air to manipulate dampers and an exhaust fan. This change will replace the exhaust fan control with an on-off switch and fully open the dampers for maximum flow. | Lab 215A Ventilation Control This letter to Modification Record 19-02, Modification to the Laboratory Building Configuration, documents the modification to the exhaust ventilation system for Room 215A. The previously-installed ventilation system for Room 215A was non-functional. The original configuration for this laboratory utilized control air to manipulate dampers and an exhaust fan. This change will replace the exhaust fan control with an on-off switch and fully open the dampers for maximum flow. | ||
MODIFICATION RECORD 13-02, ADDENDUM 1 - LETTER TO FILE (July 21, 2021) | MODIFICATION RECORD 13-02, ADDENDUM 1 - LETTER TO FILE (July 21, 2021) | ||
Secondary Chemistry Modifications This letter to Modification Record 13-02, Addendum 1, Secondary Coolant Chemistry Control, documents, at the request of NALCO Water, the relocation the injection point of the liquid biocide agent. This move is intended reduce chemical usage through increased efficiency. | Secondary Chemistry Modifications This letter to Modification Record 13-02, Addendum 1, Secondary Coolant Chemistry Control, documents, at the request of NALCO Water, the relocation the injection point of the liquid biocide agent. This move is intended reduce chemical usage through increased efficiency. | ||
MODIFICATION RECORD 99-01, Addendum 1 - LETTER TO FILE (August 6, 2021) | MODIFICATION RECORD 99-01, Addendum 1 - LETTER TO FILE (August 6, 2021) | ||
coolant pumps are de-energized. This change allows MURR to more accurately evaluate the coast down times for the primary coolant system when the pumps are secured. | Primary Coolant System Coast Down Data Collection This letter to Modification Record 99-01, Addendum 1, Replace Process Instrumentation Recorders - 2018, documents the utilization of the functions of the digital paperless chart recorders to generate a signal when the primary | ||
IV-4 coolant pumps are de-energized. This change allows MURR to more accurately evaluate the coast down times for the primary coolant system when the pumps are secured. | |||
MODIFICATION RECORD 03-03, ADDENDUM 4 - LETTER TO FILE (August 8, 2021) | MODIFICATION RECORD 03-03, ADDENDUM 4 - LETTER TO FILE (August 8, 2021) | ||
SaRB Fire Protection Expansion This letter to Modification Record 03-03, Addendum 4, Fire Protection System in the Shipping and Receiving Building, documents the expansion of the fire protection system in the Shipping and Receiving Building (SaRB) in support of an approximately 1,600 ft2 building expansion. | SaRB Fire Protection Expansion This letter to Modification Record 03-03, Addendum 4, Fire Protection System in the Shipping and Receiving Building, documents the expansion of the fire protection system in the Shipping and Receiving Building (SaRB) in support of an approximately 1,600 ft2 building expansion. | ||
MODIFICATION RECORD 93 LETTER TO FILE (September 22, 2021) | MODIFICATION RECORD 93 LETTER TO FILE (September 22, 2021) | ||
Removal of DI-300 AND Associated Piping This letter to Modification Record 93-01, The Installation of Three New DI Tanks in the North Tower, documents the removal of the ion exchange column (DI-300) that was originally used to supply demineralized water to the facility and reactor plant. | Removal of DI-300 AND Associated Piping This letter to Modification Record 93-01, The Installation of Three New DI Tanks in the North Tower, documents the removal of the ion exchange column (DI-300) that was originally used to supply demineralized water to the facility and reactor plant. | ||
MODIFICATION RECORD 21 LETTER TO FILE (November 5, 2021) | MODIFICATION RECORD 21 LETTER TO FILE (November 5, 2021) | ||
Solenoid Cabinet Isolation Valve This letter to Modification Record 21-01, Reactor Containment Building Sealing Gasket Solenoid Valve Replacement, documents the addition of an additional isolation valve for the containment building airlock. | Solenoid Cabinet Isolation Valve This letter to Modification Record 21-01, Reactor Containment Building Sealing Gasket Solenoid Valve Replacement, documents the addition of an additional isolation valve for the containment building airlock. | ||
MODIFICATION RECORD 91 LETTER TO FILE (November 23, 2021) | MODIFICATION RECORD 91 LETTER TO FILE (November 23, 2021) | ||
Rod Drop Timer This letter to Modification Record 91-01, Replacement of Mechanical Rod Drop Timers and Photoelectric Cells with Digital Rod Drop Timers and Wavelength Sensitive Photoelectric Cells, documents the addition of a fuse on the power supply to the rod drop timer circuitry. This fuse helps reduce the cycling of Breaker No. 9 located in UPS Panel No. 2. | Rod Drop Timer This letter to Modification Record 91-01, Replacement of Mechanical Rod Drop Timers and Photoelectric Cells with Digital Rod Drop Timers and Wavelength Sensitive Photoelectric Cells, documents the addition of a fuse on the power supply to the rod drop timer circuitry. This fuse helps reduce the cycling of Breaker No. 9 located in UPS Panel No. 2. | ||
SECTION V NEW TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 The following amended tests or experiments were approved during calendar year 2021 under a Reactor Utilization Request (RUR): | IV-5 SECTION V | ||
RUR 406, AS AMENDED Irradiation of Enriched Ytterbium Oxide This RUR amendment authorizes the irradiation of up to 3.5 grams of enriched ytterbium oxide in the flux trap position of the reactor. | |||
RUR 440, AS AMENDED Irradiation of Tellurium Oxide This RUR amendment authorizes the irradiation of tellurium oxide at a maximum thermal neutron flux of 1.3 E+14 n/cm2/s. This change was necessitated due to an increase in the achievable thermal flux in certain graphite reflector irradiation positions due to a planned graphite reflector reconfiguration. | NEW TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS | ||
RUR 458, AS AMENDED Molybdenum Metal Irradiation This RUR amendment authorizes the irradiation of molybdenum metal at a maximum thermal neutron flux of 1.3 E+14 n/cm2/s and a maximum fluence of 3.5 E+20 n/ | |||
RUR 459, AS AMENDED Irradiation of Enriched Uranium Oxide This RUR amendment authorizes the long-term irradiation of small quantities (approximately 36 mg) of 3.44% | January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 | ||
The following amended tests or experiments were approved during calendar year 2021 under a Reactor Utilization Request (RUR): | |||
RUR 406, AS AMENDED | |||
Irradiation of Enriched Ytterbium Oxide This RUR amendment authorizes the irradiation of up to 3.5 grams of enriched ytterbium oxide in the flux trap position of the reactor. | |||
RUR 440, AS AMENDED | |||
Irradiation of Tellurium Oxide This RUR amendment authorizes the irradiation of tellurium oxide at a maximum thermal neutron flux of 1.3 E+14 n/cm2/s. This change was necessitated due to an increase in the achievable thermal flux in certain graphite reflector irradiation positions due to a planned graphite reflector reconfiguration. | |||
RUR 458, AS AMENDED | |||
Molybdenum Metal Irradiation This RUR amendment authorizes the irradiation of molybdenum metal at a maximum thermal neutron flux of 1.3 E+14 n/cm2/s and a maximum fluence of 3.5 E+20 n/cm 2. These changes were partly necessitated due to an increase in the achievable thermal flux in certain graphite reflector irradiation positions and partly due to an increase in end-of-irradiation activity needs. | |||
RUR 459, AS AMENDED | |||
Irradiation of Enriched Uranium Oxide This RUR amendment authorizes the long-term irradiation of small quantities (approximately 36 mg) of 3.44% | |||
enriched uranium oxide pellets to support research and development efforts of Texas A&M University researchers. | enriched uranium oxide pellets to support research and development efforts of Texas A&M University researchers. | ||
Each of these tests or experiments has a written safety evaluation on file and a 10 CFR 50.59 Screen, if applicable, to assure that the test or experiment is safe and within the limits of MURR Technical Specifications. The safety evaluations have been reviewed by the Reactor Manager, Reactor Health Physics Manager, Assistant Reactor Manager-Physics, and the Reactor Safety Subcommittee, as applicable. | Each of these tests or experiments has a written safety evaluation on file and a 10 CFR 50.59 Screen, if applicable, to assure that the test or experiment is safe and within the limits of MURR Technical Specifications. The safety evaluations have been reviewed by the Reactor Manager, Reactor Health Physics Manager, Assistant Reactor Manager-Physics, and the Reactor Safety Subcommittee, as applicable. | ||
SECTION VI SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND REACTOR PHYSICS ACTIVITIES January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 INSPECTIONS The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted | V-1 SECTION VI | ||
REACTOR CHARACTERISTICS MEASUREMENTS Fifty-seven refueling evolutions were completed in 2021. Reactor core excess reactivity verifications were performed for each refueling. The largest measured excess reactivity was 3.77%. MURR Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.a requires reactor core excess reactivity above reference core condition to be less than 9.8%. | |||
REACTIVITY MEASUREMENTS Five differential blade-worth measurements of the shim control blades were performed either following a planned replacement of a control blade or to ensure compliance with TS 4.2.g. | SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND REACTOR PHYSICS ACTIVITIES | ||
January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 | |||
INSPECTIONS | |||
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted on e routine inspection reviewing special nuclear material (SNM) activities during calendar year 2021. All records and activities were found to be in compliance with NRC rules and regulations. No violations were noted. | |||
REACTOR CHARACTERISTICS MEASUREMENTS | |||
Fifty-seven refueling evolutions were completed in 2021. Reactor core excess reactivity verifications were performed for each refueling. The largest measured excess reactivity was 3.77%. MURR Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.a requires reactor core excess reactivity above reference core condition to be less than 9.8%. | |||
REACTIVITY MEASUREMENTS | |||
Five differential blade-worth measurements of the shim control blades were performed either following a planned replacement of a control blade or to ensure compliance with TS 4.2.g. | |||
Five reactivity measurements were performed to estimate the total reactivity worth of the center test hole removable experiment sample canister, in addition to all samples loaded in the center test hole region of the reactor. | Five reactivity measurements were performed to estimate the total reactivity worth of the center test hole removable experiment sample canister, in addition to all samples loaded in the center test hole region of the reactor. | ||
Four reactivity measurements were performed to estimate the worth of various samples that are irradiated in the center test hole region of the reactor and another one to estimate the worth of the center test hole removable experiment sample canister. | Four reactivity measurements were performed to estimate the worth of various samples that are irradiated in the center test hole region of the reactor and another one to estimate the worth of the center test hole removable experiment sample canister. | ||
SECTION VII RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 TABLE 1 SANITARY SEWER EFFLUENT Descending Order of Activity Released for Nuclide Totals > 1.000E-02 mCi Nuclide | VI-1 SECTION VII | ||
H-3 | |||
VII-1 | RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT | ||
January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 | |||
TABLE 1 SANITARY SEWER EFFLUENT | |||
Descending Order of Activity Released for Nuclide Totals > 1.000E-02 mCi | |||
Nuclide Activity (mCi) | |||
H-3 1.51E+02 Co-60 6.27E+00 S-35 3.24E+00 Te-125m 1.22E+00 Zn-65 7.81E-01 Lu-177 4.64E-01 P-32 1.88E-01 Ca-45 1.66E-01 Be-7 7.26E-02 Sc-46 5.34E-02 Mo-99 4.88E-02 In-115m 2.62E-02 Cd-115 2.31E-02 Na-24 2.09E-02 Tc-99m 2.03E-02 Fe-59 1.69E-02 Ag-110m 1.65E-02 Total H-3 1.51E+02 Total Other 1.28E+01 | |||
Sanitary sewer effluents are in compliance with 10 CFR 20.2003, Disposal by Release into Sanitary Sewerage. | |||
VII-1 TABLE 2 STACK EFFLUENT | |||
Ordered by % Technical Specification Limit | |||
Isotope Average Concentration Total Release TS Limit Multiplier % TS | |||
(µCi/ml) (µCi) | |||
Ar-41 2.25E-06 1.04E+09 350 64.1836 I-131 1.07E-12 4.98E+02 1 0.5360 H-3 2.45E-08 1.14E+07 350 0.0701 Kr-79 9.38E-09 4.35E+06 350 0.0383 Xe-131m 1.10E-07 5.13E+07 350 0.0158 C-14* 2.04E-11 9.14E-03 1 0.0068 Re-186 1.03E-11 4.76E+03 350 0.0015 Bi-214 4.74E-12 2.20E+03 350 0.0014 Sc-46 2.81E-15 1.31E+00 1 0.0009 Br-82 1.82E-12 8.46E+02 350 0.0001 Hg-203 7.85E-16 3.65E-01 1 0.0001 Os-191 1.16E-15 5.36E-01 1 0.0001 | |||
* C-14 activity is calculated based on the ratio of argon to nitrogen in the air and the (n, p) reaction cross sections for the activation of N-14 to C-14. | |||
Isotopes observed at < 0.0001% Technical Specification (TS) limit are not listed. | Isotopes observed at < 0.0001% Technical Specification (TS) limit are not listed. | ||
SECTION VIII ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND HEALTH PHYSICS SURVEYS January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 Environmental samples are collected two times per year at eight locations and analyzed for radioactivity. Soil and vegetation samples are also taken at each location. Water samples are taken at three locations, while subsurface soil samples are taken at six locations each period. Analytical results are shown in Tables 1 and 2. | Stack Flow Rate = ~30,000 cfm | ||
Stack effluent releases are in compliance with University of Missouri-Columbia Research Reactor, Renewed Facility Operating License No. R-103 TS. | |||
VII-2 SECTION VIII | |||
ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND HEALTH PHYSICS SURVEYS | |||
January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021 | |||
Environmental samples are collected two times per year at eight locations and analyzed for radioactivity. Soil and vegetation samples are also taken at each location. Water samples are taken at three locations, while subsurface soil samples are taken at six locations each period. Analytical results are shown in Tables 1 and 2. | |||
Table 3 lists the radiation doses recorded by the environmental monitors deployed around MURR in 2021. All doses fluctuate around background with the exception of monitor numbers 4, 8, 9, and 45. These monitors are located near a loading dock area where packages containing radioactive material are loaded or traversed prior to being placed on transport vehicles. The doses recorded by these monitors are considered to be the result of exposure to packages in transit. The environmental monitoring program confirms that minimal environmental impact exists from the operation of the MURR facility. Data from the fourth quarter is unavailable at this time due to changes in dosimetry provider and logistical issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This data will be provided in a follow-up report to the NRC once it is available. | Table 3 lists the radiation doses recorded by the environmental monitors deployed around MURR in 2021. All doses fluctuate around background with the exception of monitor numbers 4, 8, 9, and 45. These monitors are located near a loading dock area where packages containing radioactive material are loaded or traversed prior to being placed on transport vehicles. The doses recorded by these monitors are considered to be the result of exposure to packages in transit. The environmental monitoring program confirms that minimal environmental impact exists from the operation of the MURR facility. Data from the fourth quarter is unavailable at this time due to changes in dosimetry provider and logistical issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This data will be provided in a follow-up report to the NRC once it is available. | ||
The number of radiation and contamination surveys performed each month is provided in Table 4. | The number of radiation and contamination surveys performed each month is provided in Table 4. | ||
TABLE 1 | TABLE 1 | ||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
OF ENVIRONMENTAL SET 99 - SPRING 2021 Detection Limits* | OF ENVIRONMENTAL SET 99 - SPRING 2021 | ||
Matrix | |||
Detection Limits* | |||
Matrix Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium Vegetation 0.99 pCi/g 9.47 pCi/g 1.20 pCi/g 7.51 pCi/mL Soil 0.00 pCi/g 4.52 pCi/g 0.58 pCi/g N/A Water 0.40 pCi/g 3.58 pCi/g 186.60 pCi/L 7.04 pCi/mL Subsurface Soil 0.00 pCi/g 4.91 pCi/g 0.44 pCi/g N/A | |||
Activity Levels - Vegetation | |||
Sample Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/mL) 1V99 <MDA 17.44 <MDA <MDA 2V99 <MDA 19.37 <MDA <MDA 3V99 <MDA 13.80 <MDA <MDA 4V99 <MDA 14.23 <MDA <MDA 5V99 <MDA 13.80 <MDA <MDA 6V99 <MDA 14.02 <MDA <MDA 7V99 <MDA 22.79 <MDA <MDA 10V99 <MDA 9.74 <MDA <MDA | |||
TABLE 1 (Contd) | VIII-1 TABLE 1 (Contd) | ||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
OF ENVIRONMENTAL SET 99 - SPRING 2021 | OF ENVIRONMENTAL SET 99 - SPRING 2021 | ||
TABLE 2 | Activity Levels - Soil | ||
Sample Alpha Beta Gamma (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) 1S99 1.05 13.21 2.24 2S99 0.45 8.72 2.62 3S99 0.60 13.11 2.40 4S99 0.90 12.36 3.49 5S99 0.30 13.00 3.00 6S99 1.05 12.14 2.89 7S99 0.75 13.11 2.65 10S99 1.05 15.14 4.58 | |||
Activity Levels - Water | |||
Sample Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/L) (pCi/mL) 4W99 <MDA <MDA <MDA <MDA 6W99 <MDA <MDA <MDA <MDA 10W99 <MDA 4.79 <MDA <MDA | |||
Activity Levels - Subsurface Soil | |||
Sample Alpha Beta Gamma (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) | |||
E99 <MDA 12.57 3.73 S99 1.05 10.97 3.79 SW99 1.05 11.82 3.43 W99 1.35 10.00 3.12 N99 1.50 11.72 3.52 NE99 1.05 10.65 4.05 | |||
* Gamma and tritium analyses are based on wet weights while alpha and beta are based on dry weights. HPGe spectral analyses were performed on any sample with a gamma activity greater than minimum detectable activity (MDA). | |||
VIII-2 TABLE 2 | |||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
OF ENVIRONMENTAL SET 100 - FALL 2021 | OF ENVIRONMENTAL SET 100 - FALL 2021 | ||
TABLE 2 (Contd) | Detection Limits* | ||
Matrix Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium Vegetation 1.40 pCi/g 4.16 pCi/g 1.59 pCi/g 2.85 pCi/mL Soil 0.00 pCi/g 2.02 pCi/g 0.57 pCi/g N/A Water 0.00 pCi/g 2.09 pCi/g 188.47 pCi/L 3.33 pCi/mL Subsurface Soil 0.99 pCi/g 2.08 pCi/g 0.51 pCi/g N/A | |||
Activity Levels - Vegetation | |||
Sample Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/mL) 1V100 2.10 14.88 <MDA <MDA 2V100 <MDA 11.96 <MDA <MDA 3V100 <MDA 11.34 <MDA <MDA 4V100 <MDA 13.21 <MDA <MDA 5V100 <MDA 14.25 <MDA <MDA 6V100 <MDA 15.08 <MDA <MDA 7V100 <MDA 11.55 <MDA <MDA 10V100 <MDA 19.25 <MDA <MDA | |||
Activity Levels - Soil | |||
Sample Alpha Beta Gamma (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) 1S100 0.30 9.52 3.09 2S100 1.05 6.29 3.46 3S100 1.35 7.23 3.27 4S100 0.45 7.54 3.14 5S100 0.60 6.81 2.62 6S100 0.15 4.63 2.36 7S100 0.45 3.69 2.04 10S100 0.45 8.06 4.18 | |||
VIII-3 TABLE 2 (Contd) | |||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
OF ENVIRONMENTAL SET 100 - FALL 2021 Activity Levels - Water Alpha | OF ENVIRONMENTAL SET 100 - FALL 2021 | ||
E100 | |||
Activity Levels - Water | |||
Sample Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/L) (pCi/mL) 4W100 <MDA 4.51 <MDA <MDA 6W100 0.30 5.01 <MDA <MDA 10W100 0.36 12.94 1492 <MDA | |||
Activity Levels - Subsurface Soil | |||
Sample Alpha Beta Gamma (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) | |||
E100 1.05 13.89 3.64 S100 1.20 14.51 4.08 SW100 <MDA 13.47 3.17 W100 <MDA 14.10 4.11 N100 <MDA 14.82 3.59 NE100 1.20 13.99 4.13 | |||
* Gamma and tritium analyses are based on wet weights while alpha and beta are based on dry weights. HPGe spectral analyses were performed on any sample with a gamma activity greater than MDA. | |||
TABLE 3 ENVIRONMENTAL TLD | VIII-4 TABLE 3 ENVIRONMENTAL TLD | ||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
Badge Direction from Meters from 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter Total** | |||
Number MURR MURR Stack (net mrem) (net mrem) (net mrem) (net mrem) (net mrem) 0* Control N/A 24 25 25 N/A 74 1* Control N/A 23 23 26 N/A 72 2* Control N/A 22 24 24 N/A 70 3 W 30 0 <MDA <MDA N/A 0 4 SW 59 19 9 3 N/A 31 5 ENE 110 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 6 NNE 84 4 2 3 N/A 9 7 ENE 55 0 <MDA <MDA N/A 0 8 SW 32 21 20 6 N/A 47 9 SSE 27 11 26 13 N/A 50 10 NE 139 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 11 N 135 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 12 NE 284 2 1 0 N/A 3 13 NNE 305 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 14 S 168 <MDA 0 <MDA N/A 0 15 SSE 74 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 16 SE 113 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 17 E 299 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 18 NE 453 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 19 NE 673 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 20 NE 893 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 21 SSE 239 2 <MDA 0 N/A 2 22 SE 158 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 23 NW 89 2 1 1 N/A 4 24 SSW 308 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 25 SSW 435 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 26 SSW 365 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 27 SW 170 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 28 NW 229 0 0 1 N/A 1 29 NW 260 <MDA 0 <MDA N/A 0 30 N 335 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 31 NNE 677 0 <MDA <MDA N/A 0 32 NW 760 0 <MDA 1 N/A 1 33 ESE 578 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 34 ENE 596 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 35 SSE 477 2 4 2 N/A 8 36 SE 446 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 37 NE 732 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 38 NW 487 2 3 2 N/A 7 39 W 528 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 40 N 503 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 41 NE 161 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 42 In Building N/A 8 9 8 N/A 25 43 In Building N/A 3 3 1 N/A 7 44 SW 102 0 0 <MDA N/A 0 45 SE 94 6 9 0 N/A 15 46 SE 105 4 2 <MDA N/A 6 | |||
* The control monitors are approximately 10 miles NW of MURR, and gross values are shown. | |||
** These totals exclude 4th Quarter data, which will be provided to the NRC in a follow-up report once it is available. | |||
VIII-5 TABLE 4 NUMBER OF FACILITY RADIATION AND CONTAMINATION SURVEYS | |||
Surface Radiation Receipt of Month Radiation Contamination* Air Samples** Work Permits Radioactive Materials January 125 125 42 20 3 February 84 84 36 13 7 March 111 111 45 17 8 April 117 117 43 20 12 May 93 93 44 10 13 June 108 108 48 9 20 July 126 126 50 10 17 August 102 102 47 18 11 September 119 119 47 10 16 October 130 130 48 11 6 November 101 101 43 16 8 December 94 94 46 19 3 | |||
TOTAL 1,310 1,310 539 173 124 | |||
* In addition, general building contamination surveys are conducted each normal working day. | |||
** Air samples include stack Ar-41, containment Ar-41, sump entries, and hot cell entries. | |||
Miscellaneous Note During calendar year 2021, MURR shipped 1,525 cubic feet of low-level radioactive waste containing 20,249 mCi of activity. | Miscellaneous Note During calendar year 2021, MURR shipped 1,525 cubic feet of low-level radioactive waste containing 20,249 mCi of activity. | ||
VIII-6 IX-1}} | |||
Revision as of 14:52, 18 November 2024
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Issue date: | 12/31/2021 |
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Text
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA RESEARCH REACTOR
REACTOR OPERATIONS ANNUAL REPORT
January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA RESEARCH REACTOR
REACTOR OPERATIONS ANNUAL REPORT
January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021
INTRODUCTION
The University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) is a multi-disciplinary research and education facility providing a broad range of analytical, materials science, and irradiation services to the research community and the commercial sector. Scientific programs include research in archaeometry, epidemiology, materials science, plant science, nuclear medicine, radiation effects, radioisotope studies, targeted radiotherapy, and nuclear engineering; as well as research techniques including neutron activation analysis, neutron scattering, and gamma-ray imaging. The heart of this facility is a pressurized, graphite and beryllium reflected, open pool-type, light water moderated and cooled, heterogeneous reactor designed for operation at a maximum steady-state power level of 10 Megawatts thermal
- the highest-powered university-operated research reactor in the United States.
The Reactor Operations Annual Report presents a summary of reactor operating experience for calendar year 2021.
Included within this report are changes to MURR Reactor Operations and Reactor Health Physics procedures, revisions to the Safety Analysis Report (SAR), facility modifications, new tests and experiments, reactor physics activities, and environmental and health physics data.
This report is being submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to meet the administrative requirements of MURR Technical Specification 6.6.e.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The success of MURR and its scientific programs is due to the dedication and hard work of many individuals and organizations. Included within this group are: the University of Missouri (MU) administration; the governing officials of the State of Missouri; the Missouri State Highway Patrol (MSHP); the City of Columbia Police Department (CPD);
the University of Missouri Police Department (MUPD); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); our regulators; those who have provided funding, including the Department of Energy (DOE), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the NRC; Argonne National Laboratory (ANL);
Idaho National Laboratory (INL); Sandia National Laboratories (SNL); the researchers; the students; the Columbia Fire Department (CFD); the MU Campus Facilities organization; the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI); members of the National Organization of Test, Research and Training Reactors (TRTR); and many others who have made, and will continue to make, key contributions to our overall success. To these individuals and organizations, the staff of MURR wishes to extend its fondest appreciation.
Some of the major facility projects that were supported by Reactor Operations during this past calendar year included:
(1) installing an uninterruptible power supply alternate source to inverter maintenance disconnect; (2) installing reactor plant LED status indicators and pushbuttons on the reactor control console; (3) removing, rebuilding, and reinstalling anti-siphon system isolation valves V543A and V543B; (4) transferring electrical power supply for the facility evacuation and containment isolation systems from the emergency electrical power system to the uninterruptible power supply system; (5) replacing the cabinet and solenoid-operated valves for the 16-inch ventilation exhaust system; (6) upgrading the facility evacuation and containment isolation system relays; (7) installing a variable
i frequency drive on reactor containment building ventilation supply fan SF-2; (8) adding an approximately 1,600 ft2 expansion to the Shipping and Receiving Building; and (9) demolishing and renovating Rooms 231/231A to support a new radioisotope processing line.
The facility continues to actively collaborate with the NNSA Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3)
Reactor Conversion Program and five other U.S. high-performance research and test reactor facilities, including one critical facility, that use highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to find a suitable low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel replacement. Although each one of the five high-performance reactors is responsible for its own feasibility and safety studies, regulatory interactions, fuel procurement, and conversion, there are common interests and activities among all five reactors that will benefit from a coordinated, working-group effort. This past year, work focused on:
(1) LEU fuel element fabrication drawings and specifications; (2) the Design Demonstration Elements (DDE), one without uranium and one with uranium, that will be flow tested at the Oregon State University Hydro-Mechanical Fuel Testing Facility and inserted into an experimental position at the INL Advanced Test Reactor to achieve prototypic MURR operating conditions; (3) fuel specification impact assessment analyses; and (4) a technical report on preliminary shipping and backend information, which includes activities for analysis, licensing, and planning of fresh and spent LEU fuel element shipments and backend operations for receipt and storage of the spent nuclear fuel at DOE facilities, which is currently Savannah River Site.
Reactor Operations management also wishes to commend one individual who received their Reactor Operator certification and one individual who received their Senior Reactor Operator certification from the NRC. These individuals participated in a rigorous training program of classroom seminars, self-study, and on-the-job training. The results of this training are confident, well-versed, decisive individuals capable of performing the duties of licensed staff during normal and abnormal situations.
ii TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section Title Pages
I. Reactor Operations Summary............................................................................................... I -1 through 7
II. MURR Procedures............................................................................................................... II-1 through 5 A. Changes to Reactor Operations Procedures B. Changes to Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures C. Changes to Radiological Control, Byproduct Material Shipping, and Preparation of Byproduct Material for Shipping Procedures
III. Revisions to the Safety Analysis Report............................................................................ III-1 through 2
IV. Plant and System Modifications......................................................................................... IV -1 through 5
V. New Tests and Experiments................................................................................................................. V-1
VI. Special Nuclear Material and Reactor Physics Activities.................................................................. VI-1
VII. Radioactive Effluent.......................................................................................................... VII-1 through 2 Table 1 - Sanitary Sewer Effluent Table 2 - Stack Effluent
VIII. Environmental Monitoring and Health Physics Surveys................................................. VIII-1 through 6 Table 1 - Summary of Environmental Set 99 - Spring 2021 Table 2 - Summary of Environmental Set 100 - Fall 2021 Table 3 - Environmental TLD Summary Table 4 - Number of Facility Radiation and Contamination Surveys
IX. Summary of Radiation Exposure to Facility Staff, Experimenters, and Visitors............................... IX-1
iii SECTION I
REACTOR OPERATIONS
SUMMARY
January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021
The following table and discussion summarize reactor operations during calendar year 2021.
Month Full Power Hours Megawatt Days Full Power Full Power
(% of total time) (% of scheduled*)
January 681.34 283.94 91.6 102.5 February 602.71 251.23 89.7 100.5 March 653.48 272.36 87.8 98.3 April 563.24 234.77 78.2 87.7 May 662.00 275.93 89.0 99.6 June 655.80 273.33 91.1 102.1 July 682.55 284.45 91.7 102.7 August 656.29 273.56 88.2 98.8 September 655.59 274.06 91.1 102.1 October 669.15 278.87 89.9 100.7 November 614.26 256.11 85.3 95.7 December 622.35 259.40 83.6 93.7
Total for the Year 7,718.76 3,218.01 88.11 98.71
- MURR is scheduled to average at least 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br /> of full power operation per week. Total time is the number of hours in the month or year listed.
JANUARY 2021
The reactor operated continuously in January with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling and one shutdown for a physics measurement. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions.
Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 88-11, Addendum 2:
Uninterruptible Power Supply Alternate Source to Inverter Maintenance Disconnect; repairing control blade selector switch 1S3; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B).
I-1 FEBRUARY 2021
The reactor operated continuously in February with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling and two unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. The NRC conducted a routine scheduled inspection of facility security.
On February 2, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor shutdown was initiated in accordance with operating procedure OP-RO-220, Reactor Shutdown or Power Reduction, to investigate a decrease in anti-siphon system pressure. Investigation revealed that the cause of the pressure drop was air leaking past anti-siphon system isolation valves V543A and V543B. Valves V543A and V543B were subsequently repositioned in accordance with Standing Order 21-01 to maintain system pressure. Permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the Lead Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO), and the reactor was returned to 10 MW operation.
On February 10, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor shutdown was initiated in accordance with operating procedure OP-RO-220, Reactor Shutdown or Power Reduction, to investigate a decrease in anti-siphon system pressure. Investigation revealed that the cause of the pressure drop was air leaking past anti-siphon system isolation valve V543B. The pneumatic actuator for valve V543B and the anti-siphon system low pressure alarm set point were adjusted, and applicable portions of compliance procedure CP-11, Anti-Siphon High Level Rod Run-In and Low Pressure Alarm, were completed satisfactorily. Valves V543A and V543B were closed in accordance with Standing Order 21-02, and the primary coolant system was restarted. Permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the LSRO, and the reactor was returned to 10 MW operation.
Major maintenance items for the month included: replacing control blade C control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) with a rebuilt spare; and performing two reactivity worth measurements in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Control Blade, RTP-11(D).
MARCH 2021
The reactor operated continuously in March with the following exceptions: five shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling and three shutdowns for physics measurements. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. The NRC conducted a routine scheduled inspection of the Radiation Protection and Shipping Programs.
Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 21-01, Reactor Control Console LED Status Indicators; repairing a leak on the secondary coolant system in mechanical equipment Room 114; performing a chemical cleaning and backflush of the secondary coolant side of pool coolant heat exchanger HX-521; replacing the inlet filter cartridges on the primary coolant demineralizer system; and performing five reactivity worth measurements in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B).
APRIL 2021
The reactor operated continuously in April with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, one shutdown for a physics measurement, and two unscheduled/unplanned power reductions.
On April 18, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, an automatic reactor scram and containment building isolation were initiated by Area Radiation Monitor System (ARMS) Air Plenum 1 Module. All immediate and subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedure REP-2, Reactor Scram, were completed.
I-2 Investigation revealed that the module appeared to be operating erratically and was subsequently replaced with a spare.
Applicable portions of compliance procedure CP-30, ARMs and Associated Horns and Lights, were completed satisfactorily. Permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the LSRO, and the reactor was subsequently returned to 10 MW operation.
On April 21, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor shutdown was initiated in accordance with operating procedure OP-RO-220, Reactor Shutdown or Power Reduction, to investigate a decrease in anti-siphon system pressure. Investigation revealed that the cause of the pressure drop was air leaking past anti-siphon system isolation valves V543A and V453B. Valves V543A and V543B were subsequently removed, rebuilt, and reinstalled. Compliance procedures CP-11, Anti-Siphon High Level Rod Run-In and Low Pressure Alarm, and CP-24, Anti-Siphon System Valves 543A/B, were satisfactorily completed, and the anti-siphon system was channel tested per operating procedure OP-RO-410, Primary Coolant System. Permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the LSRO, and the reactor was subsequently returned to 10 MW operation.
Major maintenance items for the month included: removing, rebuilding, and reinstalling anti-siphon system isolation valves V543A and V543B; performing a chemical cleaning of the secondary coolant side of primary coolant heat exchanger HX-503A; loading new de-ionizing bed K and placing it on pool coolant system service; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B).
MAY 2021
The reactor operated continuously in May with the following exceptions: five shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling and one shutdown for a physics measurement. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. The NRC administered one reactor operator and one senior reactor operator licensing examination.
Major maintenance items for the month included: completing the biennial change-out of control blade A offset mechanism; completing compliance procedure CP-26, Containment Building Compliance Test; performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Blade, RTP-11(D); and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B).
JUNE 2021
The reactor operated continuously in June with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions.
Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 72-04, Addendum 1: Transfer Evacuation and Isolation Electrical Circuit Supply from Emergency Power to the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS); replacing relay 2K26; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Control Blade, RTP-11(D).
I-3 JULY 2021
The reactor operated continuously in July with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, one shutdown for a physics measurement, and two unscheduled/unplanned power reductions.
On July 5, during a normal reactor startup at a transient power level of 2 MW in the manual control mode, a manual reactor scram was initiated due to sporadic height indication for shim control blade D on the rod position indication (RPI) panel. All immediate and subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedures REP-2, Reactor Scram, and REP-7, Rod Position Indication System Failure, were completed. Control blade D CRDM was removed and taken to the Instrumentation Support Shop for troubleshooting. It was determined that control blade D RPI encoder was failing. Control blade C CRDM was subsequently moved to the D position, and a spare CRDM was placed in the C position. Permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the LSRO, and the reactor was subsequently returned to 10 MW operation.
On July 26, during a normal reactor startup with the reactor operating in a subcritical condition in the manual control mode, the Blade Full In light illuminated for shim control blade B. Although RPI for CRDM B indicated a control blade height of approximately 10.30 inches, inspection revealed that the ball screw for CRDM B had detached from the top of the drive mechanism allowing the ball screw, electromagnet, and shim control blade B to fall to the fully inserted position. The LSRO directed another operator to shut down the reactor by initiating a manual scram by placing Master Control Switch 1S1 to the TEST position. All immediate and applicable subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedure REP-8, Control Rod Drive Mechanism Failure or Stuck Rod, were completed.
After the reactor was secured, CRDM B was removed for further investigation and a spare CRDM was installed in the B position. Compliance procedure CP-10, Rod Drop Times, for shim control blade B was completed satisfactorily. Performing CP-10 operated the CRDM and its associated offset mechanism with the control blade through its entire range of motion while staff members could observe the CRDM and offset mechanism for binding or any other abnormalities. In accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 6.6.c(4), authorization from the Reactor Facility Director was obtained prior to reactor operation to perform CP-10. During CP-10, two staff members performed a careful visual and audible inspection of the entire assembly as it moved through its full range of travel.
No abnormalities were noted during the inspection, and the Reactor Manager deemed the spare CRDM operable. A normal reactor startup was performed, and the reactor returned to 10 MW operation. With the ball screw detached from the top of CRDM B, CRDM B was considered inoperable, which resulted in a deviation from TS 3.2.a, and Licensee Event Report No. 21-01 was submitted to the NRC on August 9, 2021.
Major maintenance items for the month included: performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B).
AUGUST 2021
The reactor operated continuously in August with the following exceptions: five shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, one shutdown for a physics measurement, and one unscheduled/unplanned power reduction.
On August 20, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor scram was initiated after a Rod Not In Contact rod run-in was received due to shim control blade C anvil disengaging from its electromagnet during a routine sample handling evolution. All immediate and subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedure REP-2, Reactor Scram, were completed. The reactor was refueled and permission to restart the reactor was obtained from the LSRO, and the reactor was subsequently returned to 10 MW operation.
I-4 Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 90-03, Addendum 1: 16-inch Ventilation Exhaust Isolation Valves Solenoid Cabinet Replacement; loading new de-ionizing bed B and placing it on pool coolant system service; replacing the inlet filter cartridges on the pool coolant demineralizer system; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B).
SEPTEMBER 2021
The reactor operated continuously in September with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions.
Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 72-04, Addendum 2: Replace Evacuation and Isolation Relays; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-200, Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Control Blade, RTP-11(D).
OCTOBER 2021
The reactor operated continuously in October with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling. There were no unscheduled/unplanned power reductions.
On October 11, while the reactor was shut down for scheduled routine maintenance and TS surveillance testing, surveillance testing on reactor core outlet pressure instrument channel 944B (pressure transmitter PT 944B instrument channel) revealed that the PT 944B instrument channel did not initiate a reactor scram at the appropriate TS set point.
Troubleshooting revealed the component in the PT 944B instrument channel that caused the set point deviation to be dual alarm unit 920F. Dual alarm unit 920F was replaced with an exact spare and successfully retested. In accordance with TS 6.6.c(4), authorization from the Reactor Facility Director was obtained prior to returning the reactor to operation. Failure of the dual alarm unit to provide a reactor scram within the TS-required set point resulted in a deviation from TS 3.2.g.6, and Licensee Event Report No. 21-02 was submitted to the NRC on October 25, 2021.
Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 21-04, Security Upgrades; replacing pressure transmitter PT 944B instrument channel dual alarm unit 920F; performing a zero and span on pressure transmitter PT 943; and performing special maintenance procedure SM-RO-625, Measuring Control Blade Pull Weight and Blade Drop Time with the Test Magnet Assembly, RTP-21.
NOVEMBER 2021
The reactor operated continuously in November with the following exceptions: five shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, one planned shutdown for nuclear instrumentation adjustment, and one unscheduled/unplanned power reduction. The NRC conducted a routine scheduled inspection of Reactor Operations and Emergency Preparedness.
On November 4, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, an automatic reactor scram was initiated due to a sustained loss of normal electrical power. All immediate actions of reactor emergency procedure REP-10, Sustained Loss of Normal Electrical Power, were completed. Investigation by University of Missouri Energy Management (EM) discovered a failed circuit card within the smart switch that feeds the facilitys 1,500 and
I-5 2,000 kVA transformers. EM restored power and permission to restart th e reactor was obtained from the LSRO. The reactor was subsequently returned to 10 MW operation.
On November 8, while the reactor was shut down for routine maintenance and TS surveillance testing, the anti-siphon system high water level rod run-in function did not activate within the required specification during the performance of compliance procedure CP-11, Anti-Siphon High Level Rod Run-in and Low Pressure Alarm. Troubleshooting revealed that the stainless steel cable that connects level controller LC 965 instrument channel to the suspended displacer (float) had developed loops in it, effectively shortening the cable. The loops in the cable were removed, and level controller LC 965 instrument channel was retested and documented to be back in compliance. Engineering analysis subsequently concluded that prior to removing the loops from the level controller cable, the rod run-in was actuating at a level greater than the maximum of 6 inches above anti-siphon system isolation valves V543A and V543B as required by TS 3.2.f.6. In accordance with TS 6.6.c(4), authorization from the Reactor Facility Director was obtained prior to returning the reactor to operation later that day. Failure of level controller LC 965 to actuate before the maximum allowable 6 inches of water above the valves resulted in a deviation from TS 3.2.f.6, and Licensee Event Report No. 21-03 was submitted to the NRC on November 23, 2021.
On November 15, while the reactor was shut down for routine maintenance and TS surveillance testing, the control room operators determined that the Reflector Hi-Low Diff Pressure Scram annunciation did not illuminate as pool coolant flow rate decreased to zero after shutting down the pool coolant system. Investigation and further testing revealed that the low reflector differential pressure reactor scram from pressure transmitter PT 917 instrument channel did not activate due to a failed alarm meter unit. The alarm meter unit was replaced with a new spare and subsequently calibrated after installation. In accordance with TS 6.6.c(4), authorization from the Reactor Facility Director was obtained prior to returning the reactor to operation later that day. Failure of pressure transmitter PT 917 instrument channel to initiate a reactor scram resulted in a deviation from TS 3.2.g.10, and Licensee Event Report No. 21-04 was submitted to the NRC on November 23, 2021.
Major maintenance items for the month included: completing Modification Record 21-05, Supply Fan 2 Variable Frequency Drive; replacing the inlet filter cartridges on the pool coolant demineralizer system; adjusting anti-siphon system LC 965 level controller displacer; replacing pressure transmitter PT 917 alarm meter unit; replacing the fission chamber and associated cabling for nuclear instrumentation signal processor no. 1; and completing compliance procedure CP-25, Control Blade Inspection, for shim control blade C.
DECEMBER 2021
The reactor operated continuously in December with the following exceptions: four shutdowns for scheduled maintenance and/or refueling, one shutdown for a physics measurement, and three unscheduled/unplanned power reductions. The NRC administered three senior reactor operator licensing examinations.
On December 14, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a control room operator inadvertently placed the reactor in the manual control mode. While attempting to return the reactor to the automatic control mode, an automatic high power rod run-in occurred. After reactor power had reduced to below the trip set point, the LSRO reset the rod run-in, and the reactor was returned to 10 MW operation.
On December 24, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor scram was initiated due to incorrect regulating blade height indication on the RPI panel. All immediate and subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedure REP-7, Rod Position Indication System Failure, were completed. Investigation revealed that a setscrew on the coupler attaching the drive motor to the RPI encoder on the regulating rod drive mechanism had backed out, allowing the coupler to slip. The regulating rod drive mechanism was removed and a
I-6 rebuilt spare was installed. Permission to restart the reactor was received from the LSRO, and the reactor was returned to 10 MW operation.
On December 30, with the reactor operating at 10 MW in the automatic control mode, a manual reactor scram was initiated due to a lowering of pressurizer liquid level. All immediate and subsequent actions of reactor emergency procedure REP-2, Reactor Scram, were completed. Investigation revealed a leak on the diaphragm of primary coolant heat exchanger HX-503B outlet throttle valve. The reactor remained shutdown for the remainder of the year to perform repairs.
Major maintenance items for the month included: repairing a leak on the secondary coolant system in mechanical equipment Room 114; and performing a reactivity worth measurement in accordance with reactor physics procedure RP-RO-201, Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B).
I-7 SECTION II
MURR PROCEDURES
January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021
As required by administrative MURR Technical Specification (TS) 6.6.e(5), this section of the Reactor Operations Annual Report includes a summary of procedure changes. These procedure changes were reviewed by the Reactor Manager or Reactor Health Physics Manager, as applicable, and others to assure compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. These procedure changes were also reviewed by the Reactor Safety Procedure Review Subcommittee and/or the Isotope Use Procedure Review Subcommittee of the Reactor Advisory Committee to meet the requirements of TS 6.2.a(2).
A. CHANGES TO REACTOR OPERATIONS PROCEDURES
As required by the MURR TS, the Reactor Manager reviewed the Reactor Operations procedures and found them to be adequate for the safe and reliable operation of the facility.
There were 57 revisions issued to the Reactor Operations policies, procedures, and forms. The majority of these revisions were strictly format or editorial in nature. Additionally, one new procedure and one new policy were issued, while one procedure was obsoleted. The following is a list of the new, revised, and obsoleted policies, procedures, and forms:
Number Name Rev. Rev. Date Notes AP-RO-105 MURR Operator Requalification Process 2 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial AP-RO-110 Conduct of Operations 30 5/19/2021 Minor Editorial AP-RO-135 Reactor Utilization Requests 5 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial AP-RR-003 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations 15 1/6/2021 Minor Editorial AP-RR-010 Facility Access Criteria 24 3/4/2021 Minor Editorial AP-RR-011 Facility Access Process 24 3/30/2021 Minor Editorial AP-RR-024 Ombudsman Program 9 6/11/2021 Minor Editorial EX-RO-110 Pneumatic Tube System 3 1/29/2021 Minor Editorial EX-RO-120 Beamport 'A' Operation 17 1/29/2021 Minor Editorial EX-RO-120 Beamport 'A' Operation 18 11/24/2021 Minor Editorial EX-RO-125 Beamport 'F' Operation 19 1/29/2021 Minor Editorial EX-RO-125 Beamport 'F' Operation 20 11/24/2021 Minor Editorial FM-03 Sponsor List 31 1/6/2021 Minor Editorial FM-03 Sponsor List 32 7/27/2021 Minor Editorial FM-03 Sponsor List 33 10/27/2021 Minor Editorial FM-04 Visitor/After-Hours Access Request Form 18 2/18/2021 Minor Editorial FM-04 Visitor/After-Hours Access Request Form 19 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial FM-11 Reactor Shutdown Checksheet 9 3/8/2021 Minor Editorial FM-15 10 CFR 50.59 Qualified Reviewers List 26 6/11/2021 Minor Editorial FM-56 Reactor Routine Patrol 28 1/29/2021 Minor Editorial FM-57 Long Form Startup Checksheet 35 5/19/2021 Minor Editorial FM-63 DI Water Makeup Log 13 10/27/2021 Minor Editorial
II-1 Number Name Rev. Rev. Date Notes FM-66 Customer Sample Pre-Encapsulation Evaluation Worksheet 11 4/5/2021 Minor Editorial FM-97 Routing Form for Facility Drawing Revisions 12 11/24/2021 Minor Editorial FM-140 MURR Access Inactivation Form 8 6/11/2021 Minor Editorial FM-140 MURR Access Inactivation Form 9 9/2/2021 Minor Editorial FM-200 Authorization to Conduct Background Investigation for Unescorted Access to MURR 6 2/3/2021 Minor Editorial GS-RA-100 MURR Equipment Tag Out 18 12/28/2021 Full Review IRR-PSO-Minor Editorial 104 Receipt of Non-Radioactive Material for Irradiation 11 10/28/2021 OP-RO-101 Instrument Air System 14 1/29/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-250 In-Pool Fuel Handling 24 1/12/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-410 Primary Coolant System 19 1/12/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-461 Pool Coolant System - One Pump Operation 20 7/6/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-465 Pool Level Control - Skimmer System 12 2/11/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-466 Pool Level Control - Pool Coolant System 15 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-480 Secondary Coolant System 26 6/22/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-532 Drain Collection System 12 2/11/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-532 Drain Collection System 13 7/6/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-533 Skimmer System 11 11/24/2021 Minor Editorial OP-RO-555 Fire Protection System 18 6/22/2021 Obsoleted OP-RO-741 Waste Tank System Operation 26 5/19/2021 Minor Editorial POL-20 Special Nuclear Materials Manual 6 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial POL-20 Special Nuclear Materials Manual 7 7/16/2021 Minor Editorial POL-30 MURR Filter Management Program 0 9/22/2021 New Policy RM-RO-400 Waste Tank System Filter Replacement 12 5/19/2021 Minor Editorial RM-RO-405 Reactor Demineralizer System 20 5/19/2021 Minor Editorial RM-RO-405 Reactor Demineralizer System 21 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial RP-RO-100 Fuel Movement 16 10/27/2021 Minor Editorial RP-RO-200 Measurement of Differential Worth of a Shim Blade, RTP-11 (D) 10 9/2/2021 Minor Editorial
RP-RO-201 Measurement of Reactivity Worth of Flux Trap Loadings or Individual Samples, RTP-17(B) 6 9/2/2021 Minor Editorial
RP-RO-203 Measurement of Primary Coolant/Moderator Temperature Coefficient of Reactivity, RTP-19 2 10/27/2021 Minor Editorial
RP-RO-300 Receipt, Inspection, Accounting, and Shipping of Unirradiated Fuel 8 1/21/2021 Full Review SM-RO-011 Beryllium Reflector Replacement 9 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial SM-RO-025 Removal, Transfer or Installation of an Offset Mechanism 4 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial
SM-RO-025 Removal, Transfer or Installation of an Offset Mechanism 5 11/23/2021 Minor Editorial SM-RO-555 Fire Protection System 0 6/22/2021 New Procedure SM-RO-636 Retracting and Reinserting Beamport 'B' Liner 7 2/17/2021 Minor Editorial SM-RO-637 Retracting and Reinserting Beamport 'C' Liner 7 2/17/2021 Minor Editorial SM-RO-638 Retracting and Reinserting Beamport 'D' Liner 8 2/17/2021 Minor Editorial SM-RO-639 Retracting and Reinserting Beamport 'E' Liner 7 2/17/2021 Minor Editorial
II-2 B. CHANGES TO EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES
As required by the MURR TS, the Reactor Manager reviewed the Emergency Plan implementing procedures and found them to be adequate for the safe and reliable operation of the facility.
There were 11 revisions issued to the Emergency Plan implementing procedures, forms, and operator aids. All of these revisions were strictly format or editorial in nature. Additionally, one form was obsoleted. The following is a list of the revised and obsoleted procedures, forms, and operator aids:
Number Name Rev. Rev. Date Notes EP-RO-002 Emergency Responsibilities 10 2/9/2021 Minor Editorial EP-RO-004 Fire 10 6/16/2021 Minor Editorial EP-RO-006 Radiological Emergency 12 6/16/2021 Minor Editorial EP-RO-013 Facility Evacuation 13 6/16/2021 Minor Editorial FM-104 Emergency Call List 43 2/10/2021 Minor Editorial FM-104 Emergency Call List 44 4/1/2021 Obsoleted OA-9 Combined Emergency Flowcharts 8 2/9/2021 Minor Editorial OA-10 Fire Extinguisher Locations and Types 17 2/9/2021 Minor Editorial OA-20 Emergency Equipment 28 2/9/2021 Minor Editorial OA-20 Emergency Equipment 29 6/16/2021 Minor Editorial REP-RO-100 Reactor Emergency Procedures 26 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial REP-RO-100 Reactor Emergency Procedures 27 6/14/2021 Minor Editorial
II-3 C. CHANGES TO RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL, BYPRODUCT MATERIAL SHIPPING, AND PREPARATION OF BYPRODUCT MATERIAL FOR SHIPPING PROCEDURES
As required by the MURR TS, the Reactor Health Physics Manager reviewed the radiological control procedures and the procedures for the preparation for shipping and shipping of byproduct materials.
There were 54 revisions issued to the radiological control, byproduct materials shipping, and preparation for shipping byproduct material policies, procedures, forms, and operator aids. The majority of these revisions were strictly format or editorial in nature. Additionally, three new procedures and one new form were issued, while two procedures were obsoleted. The following is a list of the new, revised, and obsoleted policies, procedures, forms, and operator aids:
Number Name Rev. Rev. Date Notes AP-HP-115 Iodine 131 Bioassay 6 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial AP-HP-119 High Radiation Area Access 12 2/3/2021 Minor Editorial AP-HP-125 Review of Unplanned Radiation Exposure 8 1/14/2021 Minor Editorial AP-HP-129 Hot Cell HC-01 Control 20 4/5/2021 Minor Editorial AP-HP-130 Reactor License Projects Annual Review 9 10/27/2021 Minor Editorial AP-RR-013 Access Authorization Program for Category 1 and/or Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material 7 1/15/2021 Minor Editorial
AP-RR-017 Physical Security Program for Category 1 and/or Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Materials 0 3/8/2021 New Procedure
AP-RR-017 Physical Security Program for Category 1 and/or Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Materials 1 9/2/2021 Minor Editorial
AP-SH-001 Administrative Procedure - Radioactive Material Shipping 14 1/19/2021 Minor Editorial
AP-SH-004 Notification for Category 2 Material Per Export License PXB143.01 3 3/22/2021 Minor Editorial BPB-SH-020 Receipt Inspection Of Type B Shipping Package 10 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial BPB-SH-031 Bubble Testing Acceptance for Croft SAFKEG-HS Insert Model No. 3987 1 3/8/2021 Minor Editorial
BPB-SH-031 Bubble Testing Acceptance for Croft SAFKEG-HS Insert Model No. 3987 2 8/26/2021 Minor Editorial
BPB-SH-032 Type B USA/0820/B(U)-96 (F-522 Series) Packaging of Type B Radioactive Material 0 8/26/2021 New Procedure
FB-SH-110 Type B Shipment of Spent Fuel Using the BEA Research Reactor Package 9 2/11/2021 Minor Editorial FM-17 Radiation Work Permit 16 4/5/2021 Minor Editorial FM-29 Dosimetry Request Packet 13 1/15/2021 Minor Editorial FM-50 Control Checksheet for Type B USA/0820/B(U)-96 (F-522 Series) Radioactive Material Shipment 0 8/26/2021 New Form
FM-50 Control Checksheet for Type B USA/0820/B(U)-96 (F-522 Series) Radioactive Material Shipment 1 10/28/2021 Minor Editorial FM-137 Type B Qualified Shipper List 33 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial FM-137 Type B Qualified Shipper List 34 10/28/2021 Minor Editorial FM-137 Type B Qualified Shipper List 35 11/19/2021 Minor Editorial FM-147 Control Checksheet for Packaging of Type A Radioactive Material Using Tracerco LS-15 8 1/19/2021 Minor Editorial
FM-159 Control Checksheet for Health Physics Review of Radioactive Material Shipment Documentation 14 9/23/2021 Minor Editorial
FM-165 Radiation Protection Data Sheet 'A' for cMo-99 Process in Hot Cell HC-02A/B 6 3/11/2021 Minor Editorial
II-4 Number Name Rev. Rev. Date Notes Control Checksheet for Health Physics Review of FM-173 Excepted (Limited) Quantity Radioactive Material 4 3/8/2021 Minor Editorial Shipment FM-201 Control Checksheet for Documentation and Labeling of NorthStar Radioactive Material Shipment 2 8/26/2021 Minor Editorial
HC-PSO-002 Hot Cell Preparation of Radioactive Material for Shipment 21 4/5/2021 Minor Editorial HC-PSO-005 Hot Cell-01 Loading of Host Cans 18 11/18/2021 Minor Editorial IC-HP-300 Calibration - Radiation Survey Instruments 11 5/12/2021 Minor Editorial IC-HP-306 Mirion PING209L Stack Monitor - Flow Calibration 1 7/27/2021 Minor Editorial IC-HP-308 Calibration - Mirion PING209L Stack Monitor - Iodine Channel 1 7/27/2021 Minor Editorial
IC-HP-309 Calibration - Mirion PING209L Stack Monitor - Particulate Channel 1 7/27/2021 Minor Editorial
IC-HP-310 Calibration - Eberline Model PING 1A Stack Monitor - Particulate Channel 10 3/8/2021 Minor Editorial
IC-HP-310 Calibration - Eberline Model PING 1A Stack Monitor - Particulate Channel 11 7/14/2021 Minor Editorial
IC-HP-311 Calibration - Eberline Model PING 1A Stack Monitor - Iodine Channel 11 2/3/2021 Minor Editorial
IC-HP-312 Calibration - Eberline Model PING 1A Stack Monitor - Gas Channel 10 2/3/2021 Minor Editorial
IC-HP-312 Calibration - Eberline Model PING 1A Stack Monitor - Gas Channel 11 3/21/2021 Minor Editorial IC-HP-345 Calibration - Canberra S5 XLB Swipe Counter 0 6/15/2021 New Procedure IC-HP-348 Calibration - Canberra S5XLB-G 8 5/12/2021 Obsoleted IC-HP-351 Calibration - Lab Impex Stack Monitor - Gas Channel 7 1/11/2021 Minor Editorial IC-HP-351 Calibration - Lab Impex Stack Monitor - Gas Channel 8 9/22/2021 Minor Editorial IC-HP-354 Calibration - NOA Lab Impex Stack Monitor - Particulate Channel 2 9/27/2021 Minor Editorial
IC-HP-356 Calibration - NOA Lab Impex Stack Monitor - Flow Calibration 5 9/27/2021 Minor Editorial
OA-99 Packaging of Type A Radioactive Material Using USA DOT 7A MURR Model 1500 3 9/23/2021 Minor Editorial OP-HP-222 Air Sampling - Containment Building Ar-41 12 2/3/2021 Minor Editorial OP-HP-228 Performing Iodine 131 Bioassay Measurements 9 9/22/2021 Minor Editorial OP-HP-300 Receipt of Radioactive Material 14 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial OP-HP-353 Waste Tank Sample - Analysis 11 6/15/2021 Minor Editorial OP-HP-365 Iodine 131 Processing Hot Cells Radiation Monitor (ALMO-6) 4 9/22/2021 Minor Editorial OP-HP-400 Gemstone Shipping Barrel Analysis 12 1/14/2021 Obsoleted POL-03 Radiation Protection Program 21 2/9/2021 Minor Editorial POL-03 Radiation Protection Program 22 11/12/2021 Minor Editorial QAB-SH-005 Type B QA Personnel Training 7 2/11/2021 Minor Editorial QAB-SH-006 Type B Shipping Program Quality Audits 4 3/22/2021 Minor Editorial QAB-SH-008 Training for Type B Shipment Leak Test Performers 6 2/11/2021 Minor Editorial RP-HP-105 Transfer of Radioactive Material Within the Facility 15 2/9/2021 Minor Editorial RP-HP-120 Personnel Radioactive Contamination 16 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial RP-HP-135 Room 114 Entry - Self Monitored 12 12/28/2021 Minor Editorial WM-SH-116 Removal of Waste from Hot Cell HC-11A Using Shielded Container 1 4/6/2021 Minor Editorial
II-5 SECTION III
REVISIONS TO THE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021
On August 31, 2006, MURR submitted a request to the NRC to renew Amended Facility Operating License No. R-103 for another twenty years of operation, at which time MURR also provided its proposed Safety Analysis Report (SAR). On January 4, 2017, the NRC issued Renewed Facility Operating License No. R-103.
From 2017 through 2021, a significant amount of effort was spent by MURR staff to update the August 31, 2006, SAR with all of the facility changes and modifications that had occurred between 2006 and 2017, and with applicable information from the hundreds of MURR responses to NRC Requests for Additional Information during the relicensing process.
During calendar year 2021, modifications or changes to the facility occurred that required the following revisions to the SAR, as submitted to the NRC in 2006 for relicensing. The following changes have been reviewed, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, by licensed staff and members of the Reactor Safety Subcommittee; determined not to involve a change to the MURR Technical Specifications; and approved by the Reactor Manager.
CHAPTER 1 - THE FACILITY
Section 1.2.1, Figure 1.1 (page 1-5)
Update with Print No. 1145, Sheet 1 of 5, Placement of Emergency Equipment - Basement Level, Rev. 19, dated 09/21/21
Section 1.2.1, Figure 1.2 (page 1-6) (as revised by the 2019 Reactor Operations Annual Report)
Update with Print No. 1145, Sheet 2 of 5, Placement of Emergency Equipment - Grade Level, Rev. 42, dated 09/30/21
CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
Section 7.6.2.1, second paragraph (page 7-37) (as revised by the 2018 Reactor Operations Annual Report)
Insert new sentences at end of paragraph to read: The chart recorder will display an additional trend line on a loss of electrical power to the primary coolant circulation pumps. A pair of relays are connected to the control circuits for primary coolant circulation pumps P501A and P501B that will provide a real time indication of electrical power to the pumps. This feature assists in data collection for a primary coolant system flow coast down.
Section 7.8.2.1, first paragraph (page 7-58)
Delete: 2. Parallel relays R2A and R2B and relay 2K2 in the CAS will de-energize; Replace with: 2. Parallel R2 series relays (R2A-R2F) and relay 2K2 in the CAS will de-energize;
III-1 Section 7.8.2.1, second paragraph (page 7-58)
Delete: De-energizing either relay R2A or R2B (see No. 2 above) of the CAS will cause the following actions to occur:
Replace with: De-energizing the R2 series relays (see No. 2 above) of the CAS will cause the following actions to occur:
Section 7.8.2.2, first paragraph (page 7-59)
Delete: 2. All actions caused by relays R2A and R2B de-energizing.
Replace with: 2. All actions caused by the R2 series relays de-energizing.
Section 7.8.2.2, second paragraph (page 7-59)
Delete: 1. Parallel relays R3A and R3B will de-energize and open contacts in the CAS thereby de-energizing relays 2K2, R2A, and R2B; and Replace with: 1. Parallel relays R3A and R3B will de-energize and open contacts in the CAS thereby de-energizing relay 2K2 and the R2 series relays; and
Section 7.9.2.1, Figure 7.11 (pages 7-63/64)
Update with Print No. 203, Sheet 1 of 1, Area Monitoring System, Rev. 16, dated 07/22/21
CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS
Section 8.1.3, Figure 8.1 (page 8-4)
Update with Print No. 2294, Sheet 1 of 1, Uninterruptible Power Supply Interconnect Diagram, Rev. 4, dated 01/22/21
Section 8.1.3, Figure 8.2 (pages 8-5/6)
Update with Print No. 522, Sheet 1 of 8, Electrical Distribution Reactor/Laboratory, Rev. 53, dated 09/07/21, and Print No. 522, Sheet 4 of 8, Electrical Distribution Emergency Electrical Power System, Rev. 3, dated 01/22/21
CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIIARY SYSTEMS
Section 9.12.2, third and fourth paragraphs (pages 9-20 and 9-21)
Delete: In addition to the water treatment system discussed above, an ion exchange demineralizer system (DI-300) serves as a backup. This system consists of a 300-ga llon (1,136-l) rubber-lined carbon steel tank sized to hold 24 cubic feet (0.68 m3) of mixed bed resin, filters before and after the demineralizer tank, and associated piping and valves.
Demineralized water from either system may then be directed to the water storage systems for the facility or the reactor plant.
Replace with: Demineralized water from the RO unit may be directed to the water storage systems for the facility or reactor plant.
III-2 SECTION IV
PLANT AND SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS
January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021
For each facility modification described below, MURR has on file the safety screen or evaluation, as well as the documentation of review, performed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.
MODIFICATION RECORD 72-04, ADDENDUM 1
Transfer Evacuation and Isolation Electrical Circuit Supply from Emergency Power to Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS)
This addendum to Modification Record 72-04, Evacuation an d Isolation, documents the tr ansfer of electrical supply power to the facility evacuation and reactor containment isolation systems from the emergency electrical power system to the uninterruptible power supply (UPS) system. Historically, there have been momentary losses of normal electrical power that have been long enough in duration to cause a reactor scram from either the facility evacuation or the reactor containment isolation system; however, not long enough to cause a reactor scram due to decreased primary coolant or pool coolant system flow rate. This change should decrease the probability that the facility evacuation and reactor containment isolation systems will actuate during a momentary loss of normal electrical power, thus increasing operational reliability.
MODIFICATION RECORD 72-04, ADDENDUM 2
Replace Evacuation and Isolation Relays This addendum to Modification Record 72-04, Evacuation and Isolation, documents the replacement of relays (R1A, R1B, R2A, R2B, R3A, and R3B) in the facility evacuation and reactor containment isolation systems. The new Schneider relays replace obsolete Square D relays; however, the functionality of the relays remain the same.
MODIFICATION RECORD 88-11, ADDENDUM 2
Uninterruptible Power Supply Alternate Source to Inverter Maintenance Disconnect This addendum to Modification Record 88-11, Reactor Control Power Upgrade (Replacing Line Conditioner with Uninterruptible Power Supply), documents the maintenance required to replace a malfunctioning transformer on the UPS system inverter. To assist in this maintenance, an additional 70-amp fused disconnect was added to the output of the alternate source to allow isolation of the inverter without securing power to all UPS panels. This disconnect was installed to the output of the alternate source and the corresponding contacts on the inverter. This line is a sensing line that supplies the inverter and provides an input to the inverter for detection of the phase for the alternate source.
IV-1 MODIFICATION RECORD 90-03, ADDENDUM 1
16-inch Ventilation Exhaust Isolation Valves Solenoid Cabinet Replacement This addendum to Modification Record 90-03, 16 Valve Solenoid Cabinet, documents the replacement of the 16-inch ventilation exhaust solenoid-operated isolation valves cabinet. Replacement of the cabinet also included replacement of all of the solenoid-operated valves, which were upgraded to more robust and reliable continuous duty Parker N3554104853 3-way valves, and associated piping inside the cabinet. Additionally, all security features installed under Modification Record 90-03 were removed following a change in license requirements authorized by the MURR Physical Security Plan.
MODIFICATION RECORD 19-02
Modification to the Laboratory Building Configuration This modification record was generated for the purpose of providing a means for documenting structural changes to the laboratory building. It is intended to capture changes such as the addition or removal of walls, combining or separating laboratory building spaces, etc. It can also be used to capture service changes to laboratory building spaces.
Individual changes under this modification record will be evaluated under 10 CFR 50.59, as needed.
MODIFICATION RECORD 20-03
Substation B, MCC-5 Micro-Versa-Plus Trip Unit This modification record documents replacement of Substation B motor control center MCC-5 breaker with a refurbished General Electric Type AK 2A-25-1 unit retrof itted with a solid state MicroVersaTrip+ (MVT+) unit.
MODIFICATION RECORD 21-01
Reactor Control Console LED Status Indicators This modification record documents the replacement of the original-style lamps and pushbuttons utilized for various reactor plant indicators and controls on the reactor control console. The original lamps and pushbuttons, which are General Electric (GE) CR103 incandescent bulbs and GE-style pushbuttons, respectively, were upgraded to confront obsolescence. The packages used in this modification are IDEC AL6 LED Pilot Lights and IDEC AL6 Illuminated Pushbutton switches. These changes were analyzed from an electrical perspective in Tech Note 20-005.00 and found to be suitable replacements for the existing GE lamps and pushbuttons. The listed mechanical life of the proposed pushbuttons is a minimum of 100,000 operations for the selected style of operation. Using a conservative estimation of 6 operations per week, the proposed pushbuttons have a rated operational lifetime of over 300 years.
MODIFICATION RECORD 21-02
Reactor Containment Building Sealing Gasket Solenoid Valve Replacement This modification record documents the replacement of the sealing gasket solenoid-operated valves for the reactor containment building truck entry door (Door 101), ventilation supply and exhaust plenums (Doors 504 and 505), and
IV-2 the personnel airlock (Doors 276 and 277) with a newer model (ASCO 8344 Dual Action Piston/Poppet Solenoid Valves) due to obsolescence of the previously-installed solenoid-operated valves.
MODIFICATION RECORD 21-04
Security Upgrades This modification record was created as a means of documenting changes to various MURR security features and storing them in one common location. The intent of this modification record is to host various letters to file that describe necessary changes to MURR security that do not warrant a modification record on their own. Individual changes under this modification record will be evaluated under 10 CFR 50.59, as needed. Typical information in each letter to file will include a description of the change, procedural changes, and print changes. This Modification Record is handled as Safeguards Information and is controlled as such.
MODIFICATION RECORD 21-05
Supply Fan 2 Variable Frequency Drive This modification record documents the replacement of the undersized motor contactor on motor control center MCC-4 that supplies electrical power to reactor containment building supply fan SF-2.
MODIFICATION REDORD 19 LETTER TO FILE (December 2, 2020)
Addition of Exhaust Ventilation to Room 241 Oven This letter to Modification Record 19-02, Modification to the Laboratory Building Configuration, documents adding additional exhaust ventilation for Room 241 for an oven which will support potentially radioactive work.
MODIFICATION RECORD 19 LETTER TO FILE (December 22, 2020)
Room 236 Exhaust Ventilation Renovation This letter to Modification Record 19-02, Modification to the Laboratory Building Configuration, documents the addition of a larger exhaust ventilation trunk to support a welding snorkel in Room 236, in addition to the existing room exhaust ventilation.
MODIFICATION RECORD 15 LETTER TO FILE (February 11, 2021)
Anti-Siphon Actuator Flow Throttling This letter to Modification Record 15-01, Additional Coupling Joint for Anti-Siphon System Isolation Valves V543A and V543B, documents a procedural change to throttle the air supply valve for the pneumatic actuators that this modification record describes. The intent of this change was to reduce wear and tear on the actuators, linkages, and valves.
IV-3 MODIFICATION RECORD 88-07, ADDENDUM 3 - LETTER TO FILE (February 24, 2021)
HC-11 Solenoid Cabinet Pneumatic Exhaust Addition This letter to Modification Record 88-07, Addendum 3, Exhaust Ventilation in MIB Eastward Expansion, documents the relocation of hot cell HC-11 solenoid cabinet pneumatic exhaust from HC-11B to the exhaust line just before the charcoal filters in Room 299V. Previously, the pneumatic exhaust was routed back to HC-11B creating a potential release path into the surrounding room. This change routes all the pneumatic exhaust to the facility exhaust ventilation system and installs a block-off plate on the abandoned HC-11B penetration.
MODIFICATION RECORD 86-01, ADDENDUM 5 - LETTER TO FILE (February 25, 2021)
Thermal Neutron Flux Changes Due to Replacement of Gr aphite Reflector Elements 5A and 5B in Year 2020 This letter to Modification Record 86-01, Addendum 5, Replacement of Graphite Reflector Elements in Reflector Tank Positions 5A and 5B, documents the effects of changing graphite reflector elements 5A and 5B in calendar year 2020. After installation of element 5B in February of 2020, MURR Reactor Health Physics noted that Argon-41 levels were approximately 10% higher than previous levels. Replacement of element 5A was postponed until further modifications and procedural changes could be implemented to reduce Argon-41 production. Following the changes that are outlined in their applicable modification records, total annual Argon-41 activity released has been maintained at or slightly below pre-2020 levels.
MODIFICATION RECORD 19 LETTER TO FILE (March 26, 2021)
Lab 215A Ventilation Control This letter to Modification Record 19-02, Modification to the Laboratory Building Configuration, documents the modification to the exhaust ventilation system for Room 215A. The previously-installed ventilation system for Room 215A was non-functional. The original configuration for this laboratory utilized control air to manipulate dampers and an exhaust fan. This change will replace the exhaust fan control with an on-off switch and fully open the dampers for maximum flow.
MODIFICATION RECORD 13-02, ADDENDUM 1 - LETTER TO FILE (July 21, 2021)
Secondary Chemistry Modifications This letter to Modification Record 13-02, Addendum 1, Secondary Coolant Chemistry Control, documents, at the request of NALCO Water, the relocation the injection point of the liquid biocide agent. This move is intended reduce chemical usage through increased efficiency.
MODIFICATION RECORD 99-01, Addendum 1 - LETTER TO FILE (August 6, 2021)
Primary Coolant System Coast Down Data Collection This letter to Modification Record 99-01, Addendum 1, Replace Process Instrumentation Recorders - 2018, documents the utilization of the functions of the digital paperless chart recorders to generate a signal when the primary
IV-4 coolant pumps are de-energized. This change allows MURR to more accurately evaluate the coast down times for the primary coolant system when the pumps are secured.
MODIFICATION RECORD 03-03, ADDENDUM 4 - LETTER TO FILE (August 8, 2021)
SaRB Fire Protection Expansion This letter to Modification Record 03-03, Addendum 4, Fire Protection System in the Shipping and Receiving Building, documents the expansion of the fire protection system in the Shipping and Receiving Building (SaRB) in support of an approximately 1,600 ft2 building expansion.
MODIFICATION RECORD 93 LETTER TO FILE (September 22, 2021)
Removal of DI-300 AND Associated Piping This letter to Modification Record 93-01, The Installation of Three New DI Tanks in the North Tower, documents the removal of the ion exchange column (DI-300) that was originally used to supply demineralized water to the facility and reactor plant.
MODIFICATION RECORD 21 LETTER TO FILE (November 5, 2021)
Solenoid Cabinet Isolation Valve This letter to Modification Record 21-01, Reactor Containment Building Sealing Gasket Solenoid Valve Replacement, documents the addition of an additional isolation valve for the containment building airlock.
MODIFICATION RECORD 91 LETTER TO FILE (November 23, 2021)
Rod Drop Timer This letter to Modification Record 91-01, Replacement of Mechanical Rod Drop Timers and Photoelectric Cells with Digital Rod Drop Timers and Wavelength Sensitive Photoelectric Cells, documents the addition of a fuse on the power supply to the rod drop timer circuitry. This fuse helps reduce the cycling of Breaker No. 9 located in UPS Panel No. 2.
IV-5 SECTION V
NEW TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS
January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021
The following amended tests or experiments were approved during calendar year 2021 under a Reactor Utilization Request (RUR):
RUR 406, AS AMENDED
Irradiation of Enriched Ytterbium Oxide This RUR amendment authorizes the irradiation of up to 3.5 grams of enriched ytterbium oxide in the flux trap position of the reactor.
RUR 440, AS AMENDED
Irradiation of Tellurium Oxide This RUR amendment authorizes the irradiation of tellurium oxide at a maximum thermal neutron flux of 1.3 E+14 n/cm2/s. This change was necessitated due to an increase in the achievable thermal flux in certain graphite reflector irradiation positions due to a planned graphite reflector reconfiguration.
RUR 458, AS AMENDED
Molybdenum Metal Irradiation This RUR amendment authorizes the irradiation of molybdenum metal at a maximum thermal neutron flux of 1.3 E+14 n/cm2/s and a maximum fluence of 3.5 E+20 n/cm 2. These changes were partly necessitated due to an increase in the achievable thermal flux in certain graphite reflector irradiation positions and partly due to an increase in end-of-irradiation activity needs.
RUR 459, AS AMENDED
Irradiation of Enriched Uranium Oxide This RUR amendment authorizes the long-term irradiation of small quantities (approximately 36 mg) of 3.44%
enriched uranium oxide pellets to support research and development efforts of Texas A&M University researchers.
Each of these tests or experiments has a written safety evaluation on file and a 10 CFR 50.59 Screen, if applicable, to assure that the test or experiment is safe and within the limits of MURR Technical Specifications. The safety evaluations have been reviewed by the Reactor Manager, Reactor Health Physics Manager, Assistant Reactor Manager-Physics, and the Reactor Safety Subcommittee, as applicable.
V-1 SECTION VI
SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND REACTOR PHYSICS ACTIVITIES
January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021
INSPECTIONS
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted on e routine inspection reviewing special nuclear material (SNM) activities during calendar year 2021. All records and activities were found to be in compliance with NRC rules and regulations. No violations were noted.
REACTOR CHARACTERISTICS MEASUREMENTS
Fifty-seven refueling evolutions were completed in 2021. Reactor core excess reactivity verifications were performed for each refueling. The largest measured excess reactivity was 3.77%. MURR Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.a requires reactor core excess reactivity above reference core condition to be less than 9.8%.
REACTIVITY MEASUREMENTS
Five differential blade-worth measurements of the shim control blades were performed either following a planned replacement of a control blade or to ensure compliance with TS 4.2.g.
Five reactivity measurements were performed to estimate the total reactivity worth of the center test hole removable experiment sample canister, in addition to all samples loaded in the center test hole region of the reactor.
Four reactivity measurements were performed to estimate the worth of various samples that are irradiated in the center test hole region of the reactor and another one to estimate the worth of the center test hole removable experiment sample canister.
VI-1 SECTION VII
RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT
January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021
TABLE 1 SANITARY SEWER EFFLUENT
Descending Order of Activity Released for Nuclide Totals > 1.000E-02 mCi
Nuclide Activity (mCi)
H-3 1.51E+02 Co-60 6.27E+00 S-35 3.24E+00 Te-125m 1.22E+00 Zn-65 7.81E-01 Lu-177 4.64E-01 P-32 1.88E-01 Ca-45 1.66E-01 Be-7 7.26E-02 Sc-46 5.34E-02 Mo-99 4.88E-02 In-115m 2.62E-02 Cd-115 2.31E-02 Na-24 2.09E-02 Tc-99m 2.03E-02 Fe-59 1.69E-02 Ag-110m 1.65E-02 Total H-3 1.51E+02 Total Other 1.28E+01
Sanitary sewer effluents are in compliance with 10 CFR 20.2003, Disposal by Release into Sanitary Sewerage.
VII-1 TABLE 2 STACK EFFLUENT
Ordered by % Technical Specification Limit
Isotope Average Concentration Total Release TS Limit Multiplier % TS
(µCi/ml) (µCi)
Ar-41 2.25E-06 1.04E+09 350 64.1836 I-131 1.07E-12 4.98E+02 1 0.5360 H-3 2.45E-08 1.14E+07 350 0.0701 Kr-79 9.38E-09 4.35E+06 350 0.0383 Xe-131m 1.10E-07 5.13E+07 350 0.0158 C-14* 2.04E-11 9.14E-03 1 0.0068 Re-186 1.03E-11 4.76E+03 350 0.0015 Bi-214 4.74E-12 2.20E+03 350 0.0014 Sc-46 2.81E-15 1.31E+00 1 0.0009 Br-82 1.82E-12 8.46E+02 350 0.0001 Hg-203 7.85E-16 3.65E-01 1 0.0001 Os-191 1.16E-15 5.36E-01 1 0.0001
- C-14 activity is calculated based on the ratio of argon to nitrogen in the air and the (n, p) reaction cross sections for the activation of N-14 to C-14.
Isotopes observed at < 0.0001% Technical Specification (TS) limit are not listed.
Stack Flow Rate = ~30,000 cfm
Stack effluent releases are in compliance with University of Missouri-Columbia Research Reactor, Renewed Facility Operating License No. R-103 TS.
VII-2 SECTION VIII
ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND HEALTH PHYSICS SURVEYS
January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021
Environmental samples are collected two times per year at eight locations and analyzed for radioactivity. Soil and vegetation samples are also taken at each location. Water samples are taken at three locations, while subsurface soil samples are taken at six locations each period. Analytical results are shown in Tables 1 and 2.
Table 3 lists the radiation doses recorded by the environmental monitors deployed around MURR in 2021. All doses fluctuate around background with the exception of monitor numbers 4, 8, 9, and 45. These monitors are located near a loading dock area where packages containing radioactive material are loaded or traversed prior to being placed on transport vehicles. The doses recorded by these monitors are considered to be the result of exposure to packages in transit. The environmental monitoring program confirms that minimal environmental impact exists from the operation of the MURR facility. Data from the fourth quarter is unavailable at this time due to changes in dosimetry provider and logistical issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This data will be provided in a follow-up report to the NRC once it is available.
The number of radiation and contamination surveys performed each month is provided in Table 4.
TABLE 1
SUMMARY
OF ENVIRONMENTAL SET 99 - SPRING 2021
Detection Limits*
Matrix Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium Vegetation 0.99 pCi/g 9.47 pCi/g 1.20 pCi/g 7.51 pCi/mL Soil 0.00 pCi/g 4.52 pCi/g 0.58 pCi/g N/A Water 0.40 pCi/g 3.58 pCi/g 186.60 pCi/L 7.04 pCi/mL Subsurface Soil 0.00 pCi/g 4.91 pCi/g 0.44 pCi/g N/A
Activity Levels - Vegetation
Sample Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/mL) 1V99 <MDA 17.44 <MDA <MDA 2V99 <MDA 19.37 <MDA <MDA 3V99 <MDA 13.80 <MDA <MDA 4V99 <MDA 14.23 <MDA <MDA 5V99 <MDA 13.80 <MDA <MDA 6V99 <MDA 14.02 <MDA <MDA 7V99 <MDA 22.79 <MDA <MDA 10V99 <MDA 9.74 <MDA <MDA
VIII-1 TABLE 1 (Contd)
SUMMARY
OF ENVIRONMENTAL SET 99 - SPRING 2021
Activity Levels - Soil
Sample Alpha Beta Gamma (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) 1S99 1.05 13.21 2.24 2S99 0.45 8.72 2.62 3S99 0.60 13.11 2.40 4S99 0.90 12.36 3.49 5S99 0.30 13.00 3.00 6S99 1.05 12.14 2.89 7S99 0.75 13.11 2.65 10S99 1.05 15.14 4.58
Activity Levels - Water
Sample Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/L) (pCi/mL) 4W99 <MDA <MDA <MDA <MDA 6W99 <MDA <MDA <MDA <MDA 10W99 <MDA 4.79 <MDA <MDA
Activity Levels - Subsurface Soil
Sample Alpha Beta Gamma (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g)
E99 <MDA 12.57 3.73 S99 1.05 10.97 3.79 SW99 1.05 11.82 3.43 W99 1.35 10.00 3.12 N99 1.50 11.72 3.52 NE99 1.05 10.65 4.05
- Gamma and tritium analyses are based on wet weights while alpha and beta are based on dry weights. HPGe spectral analyses were performed on any sample with a gamma activity greater than minimum detectable activity (MDA).
VIII-2 TABLE 2
SUMMARY
OF ENVIRONMENTAL SET 100 - FALL 2021
Detection Limits*
Matrix Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium Vegetation 1.40 pCi/g 4.16 pCi/g 1.59 pCi/g 2.85 pCi/mL Soil 0.00 pCi/g 2.02 pCi/g 0.57 pCi/g N/A Water 0.00 pCi/g 2.09 pCi/g 188.47 pCi/L 3.33 pCi/mL Subsurface Soil 0.99 pCi/g 2.08 pCi/g 0.51 pCi/g N/A
Activity Levels - Vegetation
Sample Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/mL) 1V100 2.10 14.88 <MDA <MDA 2V100 <MDA 11.96 <MDA <MDA 3V100 <MDA 11.34 <MDA <MDA 4V100 <MDA 13.21 <MDA <MDA 5V100 <MDA 14.25 <MDA <MDA 6V100 <MDA 15.08 <MDA <MDA 7V100 <MDA 11.55 <MDA <MDA 10V100 <MDA 19.25 <MDA <MDA
Activity Levels - Soil
Sample Alpha Beta Gamma (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) 1S100 0.30 9.52 3.09 2S100 1.05 6.29 3.46 3S100 1.35 7.23 3.27 4S100 0.45 7.54 3.14 5S100 0.60 6.81 2.62 6S100 0.15 4.63 2.36 7S100 0.45 3.69 2.04 10S100 0.45 8.06 4.18
VIII-3 TABLE 2 (Contd)
SUMMARY
OF ENVIRONMENTAL SET 100 - FALL 2021
Activity Levels - Water
Sample Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/L) (pCi/mL) 4W100 <MDA 4.51 <MDA <MDA 6W100 0.30 5.01 <MDA <MDA 10W100 0.36 12.94 1492 <MDA
Activity Levels - Subsurface Soil
Sample Alpha Beta Gamma (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g)
E100 1.05 13.89 3.64 S100 1.20 14.51 4.08 SW100 <MDA 13.47 3.17 W100 <MDA 14.10 4.11 N100 <MDA 14.82 3.59 NE100 1.20 13.99 4.13
- Gamma and tritium analyses are based on wet weights while alpha and beta are based on dry weights. HPGe spectral analyses were performed on any sample with a gamma activity greater than MDA.
VIII-4 TABLE 3 ENVIRONMENTAL TLD
SUMMARY
Badge Direction from Meters from 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter Total**
Number MURR MURR Stack (net mrem) (net mrem) (net mrem) (net mrem) (net mrem) 0* Control N/A 24 25 25 N/A 74 1* Control N/A 23 23 26 N/A 72 2* Control N/A 22 24 24 N/A 70 3 W 30 0 <MDA <MDA N/A 0 4 SW 59 19 9 3 N/A 31 5 ENE 110 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 6 NNE 84 4 2 3 N/A 9 7 ENE 55 0 <MDA <MDA N/A 0 8 SW 32 21 20 6 N/A 47 9 SSE 27 11 26 13 N/A 50 10 NE 139 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 11 N 135 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 12 NE 284 2 1 0 N/A 3 13 NNE 305 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 14 S 168 <MDA 0 <MDA N/A 0 15 SSE 74 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 16 SE 113 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 17 E 299 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 18 NE 453 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 19 NE 673 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 20 NE 893 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 21 SSE 239 2 <MDA 0 N/A 2 22 SE 158 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 23 NW 89 2 1 1 N/A 4 24 SSW 308 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 25 SSW 435 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 26 SSW 365 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 27 SW 170 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 28 NW 229 0 0 1 N/A 1 29 NW 260 <MDA 0 <MDA N/A 0 30 N 335 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 31 NNE 677 0 <MDA <MDA N/A 0 32 NW 760 0 <MDA 1 N/A 1 33 ESE 578 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 34 ENE 596 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 35 SSE 477 2 4 2 N/A 8 36 SE 446 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 37 NE 732 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 38 NW 487 2 3 2 N/A 7 39 W 528 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 40 N 503 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 41 NE 161 <MDA <MDA <MDA N/A 0 42 In Building N/A 8 9 8 N/A 25 43 In Building N/A 3 3 1 N/A 7 44 SW 102 0 0 <MDA N/A 0 45 SE 94 6 9 0 N/A 15 46 SE 105 4 2 <MDA N/A 6
- The control monitors are approximately 10 miles NW of MURR, and gross values are shown.
- These totals exclude 4th Quarter data, which will be provided to the NRC in a follow-up report once it is available.
VIII-5 TABLE 4 NUMBER OF FACILITY RADIATION AND CONTAMINATION SURVEYS
Surface Radiation Receipt of Month Radiation Contamination* Air Samples** Work Permits Radioactive Materials January 125 125 42 20 3 February 84 84 36 13 7 March 111 111 45 17 8 April 117 117 43 20 12 May 93 93 44 10 13 June 108 108 48 9 20 July 126 126 50 10 17 August 102 102 47 18 11 September 119 119 47 10 16 October 130 130 48 11 6 November 101 101 43 16 8 December 94 94 46 19 3
TOTAL 1,310 1,310 539 173 124
- In addition, general building contamination surveys are conducted each normal working day.
- Air samples include stack Ar-41, containment Ar-41, sump entries, and hot cell entries.
Miscellaneous Note During calendar year 2021, MURR shipped 1,525 cubic feet of low-level radioactive waste containing 20,249 mCi of activity.
VIII-6 IX-1