05000458/FIN-2014002-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.07 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.07 | ||
| Inspector = R Kopriva, T Skaggs, | | Inspector = R Kopriva, T Skaggs Ryan, A Barrett, D Allen, G Larkin, J O'Donnell, L Ricketson | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failing to verify acceptable performance of the control building chillers. Specifically, station personnel failed to evaluate the increase in instrument uncertainty and increase in design basis accident heat loads in a calculation used to determine the thermal performance for control building chillers. The stations corrective actions included reanalyzing the performance calculation to account for the increased chiller loads and instrument uncertainty; revising the acceptance criteria used in the surveillance test procedures; and revising the surveillance test procedures to use instruments of similar or better accuracy than the instruments used in the performance calculation. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-RBS-2013-07133 and CR-RBS-2013-7105. The failure to evaluate the decrease in temperature accuracy in measuring chilled water and service water temperatures, and evaluate the increase in control building heat loads in the performance calculation to ensure that the chiller capacity acceptance criteria stated in the surveillance test procedures was acceptable, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because if left uncorrected the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, station personnel used incorrect assumptions in the performance calculation that created a reasonable doubt of the operability of the Divisions 1 and 2 control building chillers. In addition, the potential existed that in future testing the asleft instrument uncertainty plus the design basis load could exceed the chillers load capacity. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. Using Exhibit 2, which contains the screening questions for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, the inspectors determined that the finding screened as Green because it was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification deficiency; it did not represent a loss of system or function; it did not represent the loss of function for any technical specification system, train, or component beyond the allowed technical specification outage time; it did not represent an actual loss of function of any non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety- significant; and it did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. These performance deficiencies occurred in 2003 and 2009 and therefore are not indicative of current licensee performance. | | description = The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failing to verify acceptable performance of the control building chillers. Specifically, station personnel failed to evaluate the increase in instrument uncertainty and increase in design basis accident heat loads in a calculation used to determine the thermal performance for control building chillers. The stations corrective actions included reanalyzing the performance calculation to account for the increased chiller loads and instrument uncertainty; revising the acceptance criteria used in the surveillance test procedures; and revising the surveillance test procedures to use instruments of similar or better accuracy than the instruments used in the performance calculation. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-RBS-2013-07133 and CR-RBS-2013-7105. The failure to evaluate the decrease in temperature accuracy in measuring chilled water and service water temperatures, and evaluate the increase in control building heat loads in the performance calculation to ensure that the chiller capacity acceptance criteria stated in the surveillance test procedures was acceptable, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because if left uncorrected the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, station personnel used incorrect assumptions in the performance calculation that created a reasonable doubt of the operability of the Divisions 1 and 2 control building chillers. In addition, the potential existed that in future testing the asleft instrument uncertainty plus the design basis load could exceed the chillers load capacity. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. Using Exhibit 2, which contains the screening questions for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, the inspectors determined that the finding screened as Green because it was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification deficiency; it did not represent a loss of system or function; it did not represent the loss of function for any technical specification system, train, or component beyond the allowed technical specification outage time; it did not represent an actual loss of function of any non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety- significant; and it did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. These performance deficiencies occurred in 2003 and 2009 and therefore are not indicative of current licensee performance. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 00:20, 22 February 2018
| Site: | River Bend  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000458/2014002 Section 1R07 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.07 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Kopriva T Skaggs Ryan A Barrett D Allen G Larkin J O'Donnell L Ricketson |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |