05000461/FIN-2017003-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Self-Revealing | | identified by = Self-Revealing | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15 | ||
| Inspector = W Schaup, E Sanchez | | Inspector = W Schaup, E Sanchez-Santiago, M Doyle, J Wojewoda, J Havertape, L Rodriguez, M Domke, G Edwards, S Mischke, L Kozak | ||
| CCA = H.6 | | CCA = H.6 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.2 | | INPO aspect = WP.2 | ||
| description = The inspectors documented a self-revealed finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of TS limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.6.1.3, for the failure to follow station procedure ERAA200, Preventative Maintenance Program, Revision 3. Specifically, the licensee utilized a condition-based maintenance approach on the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) that failed to monitor and trend equipment performance so that planned maintenance could be performed prior to the MSIVs exceeding the TS leakage limits. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as AR 04009845. As corrective actions, the licensee repaired and tested the valves prior to returning the unit to the modes of applicability.The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it impacted the Barrier Integrity cornerstone attribute of configuration control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the monitoring and trending of local leak rate tests on the MSIVs did not provide performance data that would allow planned maintenance to the valves prior to the valves failing resulting in exceeding TSleakage requirements for the MSIVs. Using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power, Exhibit 2, October 7, 2016, the finding was screened against the Barrier Integrity cornerstone Reactor Containment and did represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment. The inspectors proceeded to Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, and determined that it was a Type B finding that was related to a degraded condition that has potentially important implications for the integrity of the containment, without affecting the likelihood of core damage. The inspectors used Figure 6.1, Road Map for LERF based Risk Significance for Evaluation of Type-B Findings at Full Power and determined this finding is of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance in the aspect of design margins, where the organization operates and maintains equipment within design margins. Special attention is placed on maintaining fission product barriers, defense-in-depth and safety related equipment. Specifically, the procedure for testing the MSIVs utilized an administrative limit that provided no margin to correct performance prior the valves becoming inoperable. [H.6] | | description = The inspectors documented a self-revealed finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of TS limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.6.1.3, for the failure to follow station procedure ERAA200, Preventative Maintenance Program, Revision 3. Specifically, the licensee utilized a condition-based maintenance approach on the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) that failed to monitor and trend equipment performance so that planned maintenance could be performed prior to the MSIVs exceeding the TS leakage limits. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as AR 04009845. As corrective actions, the licensee repaired and tested the valves prior to returning the unit to the modes of applicability.The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it impacted the Barrier Integrity cornerstone attribute of configuration control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the monitoring and trending of local leak rate tests on the MSIVs did not provide performance data that would allow planned maintenance to the valves prior to the valves failing resulting in exceeding TSleakage requirements for the MSIVs. Using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power, Exhibit 2, October 7, 2016, the finding was screened against the Barrier Integrity cornerstone Reactor Containment and did represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment. The inspectors proceeded to Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, and determined that it was a Type B finding that was related to a degraded condition that has potentially important implications for the integrity of the containment, without affecting the likelihood of core damage. The inspectors used Figure 6.1, Road Map for LERF based Risk Significance for Evaluation of Type-B Findings at Full Power and determined this finding is of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance in the aspect of design margins, where the organization operates and maintains equipment within design margins. Special attention is placed on maintaining fission product barriers, defense-in-depth and safety related equipment. Specifically, the procedure for testing the MSIVs utilized an administrative limit that provided no margin to correct performance prior the valves becoming inoperable. [H.6] | ||
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Latest revision as of 19:56, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Clinton  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000461/2017003 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2017 (2017Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | W Schaup E Sanchez-Santiago M Doyle J Wojewoda J Havertape L Rodriguez M Domke G Edwards S Mischke L Kozak |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.6, Design Margins |
| INPO aspect | WP.2 |
| ' | |