05000482/FIN-2013005-02: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.13 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.13 | ||
| Inspector = C Peabody, G Apger, G George, G Guerra, G Ryan, J Laughlin, N O,' | | Inspector = C Peabody, G Apger, G George, G Guerra, G Ryan, J Laughlin, N O, 'Keefen Okonkwo, P Elkmann, R Stroble | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the failure to assess risk associated with an emergent maintenance activity performed on one of the offsite power circuit components inside the Wolf Creek switchyard. Specifically, Wolf Creek arranged for the transmission system maintenance companies to recharge SF6 gas in a 13.8kV breaker actively feeding the train A Class 1E distribution system, without performing risk management actions to verify the readiness of onsite power sources. Loss of SF6 pressure would have caused this breaker to automatically open. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 00077139. The inspectors determined that failure to assess risk associated with an emergent maintenance activity in accordance with station procedure AP 22C-003, Online Nuclear Safety and Generation Risk Assessment, Step 6.1.9 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affects the switchyard activities area of the protection against external factors attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone. Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process, was used to assess the significance of the finding because the finding resulted from the licensees underestimate of plant risk. The regional senior reactor analyst performed a bounding analysis of the incremental core damage probability and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the bounding analysis indicated that the effect of the finding on plant operations was less than the Green/White threshold. The inspectors determined that the finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the performance deficiency was caused by an inadequate procedure change in 1998, which was not representative of current performance. | | description = The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the failure to assess risk associated with an emergent maintenance activity performed on one of the offsite power circuit components inside the Wolf Creek switchyard. Specifically, Wolf Creek arranged for the transmission system maintenance companies to recharge SF6 gas in a 13.8kV breaker actively feeding the train A Class 1E distribution system, without performing risk management actions to verify the readiness of onsite power sources. Loss of SF6 pressure would have caused this breaker to automatically open. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 00077139. The inspectors determined that failure to assess risk associated with an emergent maintenance activity in accordance with station procedure AP 22C-003, Online Nuclear Safety and Generation Risk Assessment, Step 6.1.9 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affects the switchyard activities area of the protection against external factors attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone. Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process, was used to assess the significance of the finding because the finding resulted from the licensees underestimate of plant risk. The regional senior reactor analyst performed a bounding analysis of the incremental core damage probability and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the bounding analysis indicated that the effect of the finding on plant operations was less than the Green/White threshold. The inspectors determined that the finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the performance deficiency was caused by an inadequate procedure change in 1998, which was not representative of current performance. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 20:49, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000482/2013005 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Peabody G Apger G George G Guerra G Ryan J Laughlin N O 'Keefen Okonkwo P Elkmann R Stroble |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) 10 CFR 50.65 |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |