05000482/FIN-2013008-12
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Translate Design Basis Performance Requirements into Pump Surveillance Tests |
| Description | The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, which states, in part, A test program shall be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design document. Specifically, on August 28, 2013, the team identified that the licensee failed to incorporate minimum pump performance requirements into the corresponding pump surveillances for the Containment Spray and Residual Heat Removal pumps. The acceptance criteria did not adequately overlap with the pump design performance requirements. Further, instrument uncertainty was not adequately evaluated, nor incorporated into the tests. The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-73149 and CR-73070. The team determined that the failure to establish and incorporate adequate acceptance criteria into the Containment Spray and Residual Heat Removal pump comprehensive surveillance tests was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Reactor Safety, Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to incorporate adequate acceptance criteria and instrument uncertainties into the safety related surveillances could cause unacceptable pump performance conditions to go undetected. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green), because the finding was not a design deficiency and did not result in the loss of operability or functionality. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the most significant contributor to the performance deficiency did not reflect current licensee performance. |
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000482/2013008 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | S Garchow B Correll A Sengupta H Leake R Kopriva T Farnholtz |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XI |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Wolf Creek - IR 05000482/2013008 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Wolf Creek) @ 2013Q3
Self-Identified List (Wolf Creek)
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